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A REGIONAL POWER: UNITED STATES' POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
AND
THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1970-80.

PAUL TODD.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
the University of Middlesex for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

November, 1994

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VOLUME 1

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 1970-1980:

ABSTRACT.

This study explores the content, context and contradictions in the making of United States' policy for the Indian Ocean region during the decade of the 1970's. In approaching this undertaking, the study will focus on the strategic dimension to policy from both an historical and an analytic perspective.

The work explores three major themes: first, that the need to reverse a perceived decline in U.S. power constituted a common ground for U.S. administrations' during the 1970's; secondly, that the approach to this objective found a critical geopolitical focus in the Middle East and Northern Indian Ocean region; and thirdly, that the modalities of regional engagement redefined, in turn, the nature of regional multipolarity. The principal dilemma to be explored for U.S. policy concerns the reconciliation of the rising importance of the region to the United States with diminishing U.S. leverage, in an era of diffusion of power and emergent strategic bipolarity.

In methodological terms, the research design adapts the controlled comparison case study model developed by Alexander George amongst others. In this context, the class of events under scrutiny is policy - broadly defined - for the Indian Ocean region under differing strategic concepts, with a focus on bureaucratic interaction, organizational process, and military posture. The parallel analysis of macroscopic processes in world economics, inter-state relations and the central balance provides a conjunctural setting for a structured, focused, comparison of source material drawn from Congressional

Hearings, policy documentation, reports, interviews and internal departmental and intelligence memoranda. For the source material itself, the research programme has accessed much material recently declassified under FOI legislation and on record in the National Archives, the National Security Archives and the Nixon Presidential library.

The ordering of the work is as follows: for the six major chapters, chapter one locates the origins of United States' strategic interest in the Indian Ocean within a critical account of U.S. relations with the existing British power. Chapter's two and three commence the main historical part of the work in considering the Indian Ocean policy of the Nixon administration, in terms of the local application of the 'Nixon Doctrine'. Here, the objectives and restraints for U.S. policy are assessed with reference to two major themes of this study, great power strategic parity and regional multipolarity. These themes are referenced to signal historical developments in the region - the withdrawal of British forces, the changes in the world oil market and the 1971 India-Pakistan and 1973 Middle East wars. The emerging strategic focus on the Indian Ocean for the Ford administration is taken up in chapter four within the parallel perspectives of U.S. military posture and the evolving distribution of power in the region itself. This context leads into the Indian Ocean policies of the Carter administration. Chapter five provides an overview of the U.S.-Soviet naval arms limitation talks (NALT) of 1977-8, while chapter six undertakes a three part exposition of the 'Carter Doctrine'. In this, the emergence of the South West Asia/Indian Ocean region as the focus of great power competition is located within analysis of the Iranian revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.

Although aspects of U.S. regional policy have been subject to a substantial literature,

the stance taken here combines an historical analysis with a parallel essay at synthesis - a perspective that locates the region within the overall cast of U.S. national security policy. The study posits a strategic determination for the Indian Ocean policy framework, one whose unifying process accentuated - *pari passu* - the differentiation of means. In these terms, it concludes that a differentiation of ends, and notably, those involving effective disengagement from the Indian Ocean, was displaced as a possible option.

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INTRODUCTION: THE INDIAN OCEAN IN GLOBAL POLITICS.

Erratum

page three, line 21; for Agnell, read Angell.

page 239, line 11; read, "...extend beyond the realm of
bureaucratic longevity'. As was freely admitted by the..."

engaged a novel and problematic divorce of military power from political process. For the national security strategies adopted by both great powers in the Indian Ocean region, the pursuit of local advantage and geopolitical competition was so modulated *faute de mieux* at the start of the 1970's era by elements of co-operation, not least because of the region's own continuing volatility. By the end of the decade, though, this tension had become resolved in favour of confrontation. The 'arc' of the Northern Indian Ocean littoral had become the geographical nexus of a 'New Cold War.'³

INTRODUCTION: THE INDIAN OCEAN IN GLOBAL POLITICS.

In the 1970's, the established European and Pacific terrain of demarcation in world politics between the United States and the Soviet Union had undergone significant revision. A distinctive third front of strategic engagement had emerged between the great powers. This, geographically, was the Gulf, the African Horn and South West Asia, and in a wider geopolitical context, the region of the Indian Ocean.¹ If such development marked the growth of strategic process in an extensive sense hitherto unseen, it also characterized the opening of an era when politics as such had become more truly global.

The latter, conjunctural, aspect of the 1970's was distinguished in other ways delimiting the distribution of power in the international system. The advent of a functioning multipolarity was accompanied by an exponential evolution of weapons of mass destruction. If this 'strategic revolution'² had rendered more comprehensive the distinction between the great powers and otherwise significant international actors, it had also engaged a novel and problematic divorce of military power from political process. For the national security strategies adopted by both great powers in the Indian Ocean region, the pursuit of local advantage and geopolitical competition was so modulated *faute de mieux* at the start of the 1970's era by elements of co-operation, not least because of the region's own continuing volatility. By the end of the decade, though, this tension had become resolved in favour of confrontation. The 'arc' of the Northern Indian Ocean littoral had become the geographical nexus of a 'New Cold War.'³

The focus of the following analysis is upon the role played by the Indian Ocean region in the global strategies of the leading great power - the United States. In asserting a univocal significance to this interrelationship, the study will issue three specific historical arguments. First, that the reversal of a perceived decline in world power constituted the governing strategic imperative for the United States during the 1970's. Secondly, that for the successive U.S. administration's, the maintenance of a singular position in the South West Asia/Gulf/Indian Ocean region was seen as necessarily correlative to addressing the wider issue of secular decline. And, thirdly, that whilst the relation between the global and regional dimensions of U.S. power had become, in the above terms, historically given, it was the reciprocal and differentiated regional leverage on the United States itself that, as sufficient measure, defined the final terms of engagement. Consideration of the historical record in support of these assertions will constitute one level of enquiry for this study. The accompanying analytic framework will question the extent to which the encounter with regional multipolarity had redefined the exercise of U.S. power.

Clearly, the assertion of phases in U.S. history is, *ceteris paribus*, somewhat arbitrary in terms of the span of given administrations. The correspondence asserted here will take a common perception of systemic change and historical challenge as the terrain for a working approach to conjunctural analysis. The study will be taken up from a dual perspective. A detailed account of process will be combined with analysis of historical context. Throughout, the empirical referent under scrutiny is the institutionalized expression of U.S. strategic purpose, the evolution of policy. In relating heuristically between the above, the study will frame what will be taken as the central dilemma facing U.S. policy for the Indian Ocean region during the 1970's: that is, the question of

reconciling the rising importance of the region to the United States with the diminishing of U.S. leverage in an era of diffusion of power and strategic parity with the Soviet Union. It is the responses to this dilemma that comprise the focus of this work.

In approaching such questions, the problem, as Alexander George has observed, is to design a research framework wide enough to 'capture the major elements of historical explanation.'⁴ To this it might be added that the framework be narrow enough to retain the empirical content of historical focus. In addressing this task, the chosen analytic focus will restrict, *pari passu*, the potential range of the subject matter: in that significant developments in great power relations and developments within and between significant regional actors will appear, in the first instance, as objects for policy consideration by the United States. It is thus the emergence of the Indian Ocean region as an integrated strategic arena within U.S. policy which provides the conceptual demarcation for this analysis. During the period under study, the scope of U.S. interests in the region underwent considerable definitional change. In charting the evolution of regional security policy, in particular, from a status that will be argued as that of a 'lesser included case' within overall containment strategy to one approaching an 'excluded case' *de novo*, the analysis will explore the terms of bureaucratic interaction and organizational process in relation to factors of budgetary priority and diplomatic and military posture.

The classic historiographical tradition of analysis of the relationship between territorial expansion, economic configuration and the ends of power has assumed a fresh relevance in recent times. The work of J.A. Hobson, Norman Agnell and H.N. Brailsford brought a distinctive focus to these issues at the start of the twentieth century. At its closure,

whilst individual issues - notably, concerning the arms race, ethnic and civilizational conflict and the central strategic balance - have received due prominence, the conceptual and methodological barrier has expanded, perhaps somewhat extraneously, between the discursive and qualitative focus around specific issue-areas typical within the discipline of modern history and the more quantitative, multiple issue bias of political science.⁶ To be sure, historical analysis is, *ab initio*, interpretative rather than predictive, it is however, within this 'family resemblance' that, as in Wittgenstein's observation, such a 'complicated network of similarities'⁷ can form, for the policy sciences, precisely their point of departure.

The intention behind the work offered here represents such an essay at synthesis, albeit, within some necessarily limited parameters, taking recent historical process as its subject matter and taking advantage of the recent availability of primary sources. The occupation of the United States' Tehran embassy in November, 1979 released a comprehensive - if somewhat involuntary - range of primary material on U.S. foreign and security policy in the Gulf and Indian Ocean regions and, perhaps as important, provided an additional momentum toward the release of further corroborative data.⁸ The aim of this study is, following what have been notably effective historico-analytical syntheses in the work of John Lewis Gaddis⁹ and Alexander George,¹⁰ to take up the fortuity of available sources toward a structured, focused comparison of United States' policy approaches under differing strategic concepts and, in so doing, to confront the questions arising from the policy models and methodology empirically present in the execution of policy itself.

The work will thus critically assess the development of policy from the declared 'low profile' of U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean during the first Nixon administration to the declaration of 'vital national interest' in the Gulf region proclaimed by President Carter. To introduce the major themes and analytic context for the work, the following sections will undertake a brief summation.

After Hegemony: U.S. Singularity in the International System.

The post-World War Two era was characterized by the division of world affairs by competing political/military blocs and, at a deeper level, competing systems of social /economic organization. This period was also defined by the unique strategic status of the United States. The military predominance of the U.S. conveyed by its having, at first, a monopoly of, then an overwhelmingly superiority in, nuclear weaponry was paralleled by its ascendancy in economic development. In terms of both the quantity measures of GNP and the organizational features of production and distribution,¹¹ the U.S. economy had become, effectively, the commanding factor in determining the direction of economic growth in the non-communist world. The strategic aspects of U.S. power, and the institutions created to make it operational were not, therefore, ends in themselves, but were functional to a global process of economic reorganization, complementary to this pattern most evolved in (but not exclusive to) the United States itself.¹² Thus, as Robert O. Keohane observes, 'In the shelter of its military strength, the United States constructed a liberal-capitalist world political economy based on multilateral principles and embodying rules that the United States approved.'¹³ This

ordering of priorities was, as will be shown, explicitly reflected in the policy process from the outset¹⁴ within the post-war planning agendas of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. In analysing the modalities of power and the development of policy, it is thus the economic dimension that presents the point of departure for this study, and notably so within the regional terms of reference. Here, analysis will focus on the policy requirement for restructuring those political and economic arrangements in the Middle East, particularly pertaining to the management of oil resources, which were perceived as incompatible with the circulation of U.S. economic activity on a projected world market. At the outset of this period, these aspects of U.S. definitions of strategic interests came into focus around the question of relations with the British presence in the region.

The principal barrier to releasing such resources was the established hold on the region of the United States' major Western ally, the British Empire. That a critical focus of U.S. economic concern was also within the geopolitical reach of the West's major military, political and ideological adversary - the Soviet Union - had added the corresponding great power dimension to the policy process, as the United States was to employ its singular standing in the international system toward redefining individual allied interests within a concept of generalized interest for the Western political economy as a whole.

There were thus, from the outset, multiple objectives to a U.S. strategy which would aim to displace British economic, and in some respects, political influence in the Middle East, whilst retaining the politico/military aspects of British power in the wider Indian Ocean region as party to the global containment of the Soviet Union.

In establishing the historical context for the main body of the work, this study will offer a critical disaggregation of the several aspects of regional policy which, in turn, will reflect on the constitution of strategic interest for the immediate post-war period. In particular, attention will be drawn to the extent to which the latter dilemmas of inter-alliance management and strategic imperative were to recur. The tensions within the Western alliance were, though, of a different order to those with the Soviet Union and, as will also be shown, were to be resolved on the level of the primacy, for both Western powers, of strategic factors and, *faute de mieux*, simple U.S. ascendancy over its junior ally. Britain's continuing decline, however, was to leave a strategic dilemma for U.S. policy in those areas 'East of Suez' where the historical British presence had presented a low cost strategic option for the West. An increase in direct U.S. military capability - considered, albeit contested internally in the national security bureaucracy of the early 1960's¹⁵ - was to be comprehensively compromised by U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Military reverses in the war in South East Asia were, moreover, to be mirrored in an overall attenuation in the United States' global position, proceeding from economic challenge¹⁶ from other Western/market oriented states and the rise to strategic parity by the Soviet Union. With the Nixon administration, and specifically, through the 'Nixon Doctrine' a new focus was thus adopted by U.S. policy, that of delegation, for the first time in the region, of major security functions to a non-western power, Iran, and the moves toward a regionally based security system.¹⁷

It is the dilemmas of U.S. policy in an era which, as Henry Kissinger observed, was, 'bipolar militarily and multipolar politically'¹⁸ that form the main historical focus of this study, particularly, the effort to relate those remaining areas of global preeminence -

in strategic and economic affairs - to situations of increasing multipolarity and, indeed, respond to leverage extended upon the U.S. by local alignments of states.

The United States in the 1970's had retained, and in several respects, increased its predominance in some areas of the international system. Despite the negative secular trend, the U.S. economy was still substantially the largest in GNP terms and the most established in its global linkages. In the nuclear sphere, the U.S. had drawn ahead conclusively from other states in the West. In the Gulf and Middle East, the U.S. had also retained and consolidated the position of vantage developed in the 1950's.

This latter relationship was, though, to yield paradoxical results for U.S. policy. Just as the United States was uniquely influential with the, otherwise contending, major actors in the Middle East - Israel, the conservative Arab states, Iran - the very elaboration of these linkages, and the evident stake in the region of successive U.S. administrations, had given the several powers an increasing purchase on Washington itself. The resolution of this dilemma, pursued at first with some success, was to rest on the U.S. position as the common regional interlocutor. Despite the dangers raised in the 1973 Middle East war, it was Washington which had emerged apparently strengthened in its singular position. It was this very singularity, however, which was to form the focus of opposition, notably, in Iran. With the revolution in Iran overturning the assumptions of the Nixon Doctrine, and, in a more profound sense, the assumptions of U.S. policy for the third world since Truman,¹⁹ the United States was to turn to those areas of policy still retaining the greatest scope for unilateral action - notably, the military dimension. If the Nixon Doctrine had represented one model for regional security policy, that of delegation, the

Carter Doctrine introduced an alternative, direct course for exercising power in the region.

The heightened focus on military factors and instrumentalities in the determination of policy to be analysed here bear upon contemporary (post -Cold War) reconsiderations of bipolarity/multipolarity in the context of the differentiation of 'positional' or 'relational' and 'absolutist' factors as determinants of interstate relations.²⁰ Within the acknowledged limitations of this analysis, it is hoped to use the particularly rich and multi-layered context offered within the exploration of United States' engagement in the Indian Ocean region to add some empirical qualification to the contemporary debate on interstate confrontation and co-operation and the salience of such 'relative gains.'²¹ These perspectives are developed in the next section.

The Diffusion of Power: Adversity and Opportunity.

As has been outlined above, an emerging characteristic of the international system in the 1970's was the diffusion of power. The increase of military and productive capacity in both the Western and the Soviet alliance was to become a major factor in U.S. policy. The development of the Nixon Doctrine had coincided with the rise of an organized third world coalition in world affairs - politically, in the Non-Aligned Movement and economically, in OPEC - and took into account the growing endogenous capability of emergent third world actors. Notable here were Iran, India, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The geopolitical heart of this new politics of multipolarity was thus loosely bounded by the

Indian Ocean; albeit, the Nixon Doctrine originated above all in response to the signal demonstration of U.S. relativism in South East Asia. Given the loss of comparative advantage across the range of categories of U.S. power, it had come to have global application. The U.S. would thus have to account for the third factor in policy making. Although the Nixon Doctrine assumed that this factor could also be turned to an asset for U.S. policy, the application of such policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia, which became the 'twin pillars' of the U.S. alliance in the Indian Ocean region, was to have contradictory results for the architecture of United States' global strategy.

The South Asian expression of the Nixon Doctrine, however, while expressly designed to serve a function in security affairs, was also to find a wider application in the usage of the region to redress the erosion of U.S. influence in other categories of power - notably, economic power. Whilst much was made of the 'imperatives and opportunities of a pluralistic world' in the administration's public utterances, the specific local opportunities for the devolution of power in the Gulf was also, as shall be argued, to contain a complementary, albeit, somewhat *ad hoc*, economic component. A significant contributor to U.S. global influence - and, critically, influence over the Western alliance - lay, as in the Marshall Plan era, in U.S. predominance in the political economy of oil (Keohane, 1984:150-181). Given that the existing corporate structure of the world oil market had become similarly pluralistic, in the sense of resistant to governmental agency,² the accommodation of the effective nationalization of oil production and distribution by allied states would present net advantages to the United States, in addition to the clear utility of conceding what, as will be shown, the consensus view of both governmental agencies and the administration regarded as the inevitable.

The accession of price and 'participation' functions in the oil industries of the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia was perceived to have clear advantages in terms of the Nixon administration's security objectives - viz., the consolidation of friendly regimes. It would also, given the deepening political and security involvement of the latter with U.S. policy, indirectly serve to reassert a measure of influence in the oil market as a whole. In this way, the decline of U.S. comparative advantage and political leverage in a world market of increasingly economic autonomy was to be addressed in terms of the remaining dependence of the regional powers on the United States in strategic affairs. That, in the event, pluralism was to triumph over U.S. policy in this region was to be one further area of challenge to the Nixon Doctrine that would lead to its supersession under the Doctrine announced 'under last minute pressures'²³ on January 23, 1980 by President Jimmy Carter.

The perspectives on the distribution of power outlined above bear upon both the empirical construction of policy for the Indian Ocean region and the more theoretical terms of debate concerning the enabling conditions for possible policy alternatives. As shall also be argued, the foreign economic policies adopted by the Nixon administration in the Middle East should be taken within the wider context of U.S. efforts to restructure the institutional arrangements governing the international political economy.²⁴

In terms of the contemporary debate, the stance taken here addresses the 'neorealist' stress on the centrality of state actors as the empirical point of departure for analysis and the concern for 'positional' factors by states as a primary policy motivation.²⁵ The

salience of such factors in accounting for policy development in the specific case of the United States will be taken as an index of the decline of U.S. singularity.²⁶ The nexus between the relative decline of the United States' economic position in the early 1970's and the continuing returns in an 'absolute'²⁷ sense derived from the U.S. position at the apex of the capitalist economic system bears upon what will be taken as the central systemic feature of the post war period: that is, the emergence of 'market like forces' which, 'had become autonomous from, and indeed dominated the policies of all states alike, if not equally' (Arrighi, 1982: 61). It is not, however, necessary for this analysis to advance any formal connection between the structural features of late c20th. capitalism and the contemporaneous advent of inter and intra-state plurality of power institutions to assert that their interaction was, empirically, one of reinforcement. As the record will show, the perhaps uncovenanted autonomy of both state and non-governmental actors - in the case here under scrutiny, the U.S. oil corporations - in the international system of the 1970's was to compel a reevaluation of perceived U.S. national interest which, again in contemporary terms, would be conducted according to more closely defined 'relative gains' criteria.

That the early Carter administration was to place the possibilities for mutually beneficial, 'absolute gains' explicitly in the forefront of its foreign policy platform, only to take on a stance perhaps more explicitly 'positional' than its predecessor in some issue-areas - notably, security - suggests, along with realist predictions, a clear 'distributive' qualification.²⁷ However, the trenchant reappearance of distributive considerations in the declared imperatives of the 'Carter Doctrine' herewith can, though, be further explicated in terms of the further systemic dimension to the constitution of

be further explicated in terms of the further systemic dimension to the constitution of world politics in the 1970s that concerns the geopolitical terms of this analysis: namely, the advent of bipolar strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. This will be considered below.

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.

Given the reciprocation, advanced above, between the particulars of local policy contingency and the dynamics of global strategic context, our study will extend to some relevant aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons posture and doctrine in the Indian Ocean region. These will be taken up with respect to the integrating function of nuclear doctrine toward regionally discrete theatres of operations and in terms of the interrelation of these two (allied and nuclear) dimensions of strategic engagement. The respective roles and status of nuclear posture and alliance policy are, in an operative sense, representative of opposite ends of the deterrence spectrum. In a functional sense, however, their relation can be viewed as one of equivalence: in that the one has (historically) constituted a symbolic accumulation of power, the other, a similarly indirect exercise of power, by means of substitution. The dilemmas of relating the direct engagement of U.S. forces in the traditional Clausewitzian sense were a wholly novel feature of the bipolar global order in the post-war, nuclear, age, and one recognized from early on by U.S. national security doctrine. As summarized by Henry Kissinger, the problem, simply stated, was that, 'far from giving freedom of action, the power of modern weapons seems to inhibit it...our weapons technology and the objectives for employing them have become

incommensurable' and, moreover, 'no more urgent task confronts the U.S. than to bring them into harmony.'²⁹ The analysis will be addressing such attempts to so harmonize the nuclear and political aspects of foreign and security policy in the Indian Ocean region. It will thus become apparent that, with the failure of indirect, delegated regional management in the Nixon Doctrine and its essential continuation in the first two years of President Carter's term, renewed attempts were made to reestablish the link between strategic posture and regional policy with the Carter doctrine. Here, the logic of 'counterforce' as a tool of extended deterrence and - *pari passu* - alliance management will be analysed, in the context of a parallel account of the operational doctrine of preemption.

Strategy, Model and 'Image'.

In approaching the terms set for this study, any attempt at comprehensive regional policy analysis for the United States must account for at least three dimensions at interstate level, namely: U.S.-Soviet relations, U.S.-Western relations and U.S. relations with the regional powers themselves. It is the combination and differentiation of these dimensions that gives meaning to the policy process. This meaning is again, though, subject to analytic division. Thus, it must recognize the central role of doctrine which has served to relate and channel the several policy areas, not least toward instruction for the policy instruments - the bureaucracies and planning process - and, at a prior level, provide the organizing logic - the 'image'³⁰ - of international engagement for mobilizing domestic support. For the United States in this period, the central image

so promoted was containment of the Soviet Union. In external affairs, the doctrine of containment, in turn, served to provide a mechanism for establishing a hierarchy of U.S. relations with allied states and for conducting the deeper systemic contest within the lesser powers by providing a legitimating political framework for ruling elites. In analysis of U.S. policy, this process is demonstrable by the existence of overt 'doctrines' proclaimed by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter, two of which specifically and the other two, implicitly, have concerned the status of great power engagement in the Middle East/Indian Ocean.

For the purposes of this study, it is proposed to treat the ideological composition of U.S. domestic politics as an historical constant. The dynamic and reciprocal interaction between U.S. domestic and foreign policies, is, though, an object of analytic focus, notably concerning the appeal to embedded ideological notions of primacy. The continuing salience of this appeal will, as will be shown, have far reaching material consequences for the procurement of strategic systems, the configuration of military posture and the setting of geopolitical priorities in those areas of U.S. international relations that are the subject of scrutiny.

Methodology: Terms, Issues, Definitions, Restrictions.

The methodological approach to be adopted in this study is as follows: whilst recognizing the importance of ideological and social-psychological factors in policy decision making, this level of determination will, as outlined above, be treated as constant with regard to

the historically embedded features of U.S. domestic polity. Accordingly, the analytic focus to be explored will begin by counterposing bureaucratic and organizational perspectives within an identification of overall systemic context and 'rational actor'³¹ considerations at interstate level. The format will develop thematic and historical narratives within the natural chronology of events. In concrete terms, the pattern of policy engagement is charted through such consistent instruments as arms transfers, military posture, alliance diplomacy and the political economy of oil.

For the wider issues raised by the question of U.S. singularity, operative as 'hegemony', in the international system, I am indebted to two accounts, provided in Giovanni Arrighi (1982,1983)³² and Robert O. Keohane (1984).³³ Whilst deriving from differing and, *ceteris paribus*, opposing theoretical traditions - 'neomarxist' and 'neoliberal' respectively - a common ground can be acknowledged in relation to the admission, in both schema, of a primary focus on the institutional features of United States' hegemonic leadership in the international system and a common acceptance of some central premises of 'realism'. As the realist Robert Gilpin has observed, 'some remarkably similar perspectives on the nature and dynamics of international relations,' obtain amongst 'both political realism and Marxism,' notably with regard to the explanatory focus on 'the differential growth of power amongst states.'³⁴ Thus, within this common heuristic terrain, the analytic status of U.S. hegemony is established with reference to its predicates in the operation of the world market, and in particular, the ensuing institutional framework, as expressed in formal and informal 'regimes'.³⁵ Of primary relevance to this study, the parallel development and decline of such regimes in energy and security policy is addressed in terms of their common application in

grounding U.S. Indian Ocean policy as a fulcrum of relations with the Western alliance as a whole.

The key characteristic of United States' policy in the 1970's under scrutiny concerns the development of new instruments for the management of regional affairs. The innovation is identified here in the extent to which endogenous local power capabilities were to figure in the constitution of U.S. policy. To consider the grounding for such an approach, a main analytic focus will thus rest upon the formal expressions of U.S./regional interaction, with regard to bureaucratic directives, institutional arrangements and configuration of military posture. The history of policy making is, in a secular sense, the history of institutions. In setting the terms for analysis, the area of national security policy has been focused as the most economical for relating the overall current of U.S. power in the Indian Ocean region, and, in turn, the importance of the region itself to the current of U.S. global engagement. In adopting this approach, the following justification will be offered. Whilst of varying levels of significance, and, in some instances, antagonism toward other policy areas, the institutions of national security planning serve a unique function as the material expression of the state.³⁶ This latter distinction can, to be sure, be qualified on the grounds that major decisions taken by any state, and, expressedly, by the post-war U.S. planning process in the Indian Ocean region, have employed a marshalling of all relevant assets - of which military capability is only one and not, in some instances, the most significant. Again, however, if the military component was clearly less prominent, in the day-to-day policy process, than economic and politico-diplomatic factors, it is argued that, throughout, the enabling condition for such process was found in the prior establishment of strategic superiority.

And, moreover, as U.S. comparative advantage declined in other categories of power, it was the military component which, as will also be argued, was to come increasingly to the fore.

The Six Chapters: Structure and Narrative Composition.

In concluding this brief exposition of the major themes and questions to which the study is addressed, a short outline of its structure would prove useful. Of the six major chapters, the first is concerned with the commencement of United States' strategic interest in the broad quadrant of the Eastern Mediterranean, South Asia and Indian Ocean littoral hitherto under effective British domination, and, in particular its incorporation within an Anglo-American Security System. In establishing the context for the development of U.S. policy, the chapter sets out a dynamic encompassing global strategy, regional strategy and the mediation served on both levels by relations with Britain. Hereafter, two sets of complementary argument are pursued, concerning Anglo-U.S. strategic alliance and politico-economic competition. The chapter thus assesses how the development of U.S. policy, initially focused on economic interests in the Middle East, would move on to engage security interests in the Soviet 'Northern Tier' and then extend to a wider interest in the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit. In charting this process, the discussion provides an opening perspective on U.S. objectives for the political economy of Middle East oil in post-war reconstruction. The analysis of subsequent U.S. priorities is undertaken within the historical context of the Truman Doctrine, relations with Iran and the development of the CENTO alliance following the

'Eisenhower Declaration' of 1957. Finally, the discussion provides a critical account of the extent to which the British security system in the Indian Ocean was to be incorporated in the later framework of U.S. regional planning.

The second chapter opens the main historical focus of the work with consideration of the Indian Ocean application of the Nixon Doctrine. Here, the specific needs of regional policy are established in relation to the overall strategic concerns of the Nixon administration following the British retrenchment from the Middle East/Indian Ocean. The enhanced role of the U.S. Navy in the reconfiguration of global military posture will emerge as a counterpoint to a structured devolution of regional power. It is argued that the logics of such devolution were to further suggest the basis for a wider devolution of political economy in the region. A critical comparison is thus drawn between the use of U.S. oil corporations as a foreign policy instrument during the Truman/Eisenhower administrations and the focus of the Nixon policy framework on regional states. This process is related to the declared conceptual design of administration strategic 'doctrine' to restore a more utilitarian relationship between the aims and instrumentalities of U.S. power in the international system.

Within this context, the discussion in chapter three then assesses the importance of the 1971 Tehran oil agreement as an economic counterpoint to the administration's strategic focus on Iran and Saudi Arabia as the nexus of an emerging regional security system. These aspects of regional policy are further taken up within chapter three in the context of U.S. naval deployments in the 1971 India/Pakistan war.

The importance of the region as a whole to United States' strategy is reconsidered for chapter four in terms of the consequences of the 1973 Middle East war. For the latter, the regional policies of the Ford administration are analysed as a primary response to the emergence of an operative multipolarity in the international system. If the conclusion of the October war had diminished the Middle East as the main arena for revitalised competition with U.S. adversaries, the success of the producers oil embargo had also revealed the extent of allied leverage on the administration. It is argued that the 'diffusion of power' which had initially provided the grounding for the Nixon Doctrine was now perceived to be working against U.S. policies in the region. The consequences of the 1973 war are thus followed up in terms of: [1] the reassessment of the strategic status of the Indian Ocean region and, [2] the coeval effects of the latter debate on U.S. military posture. A further aspect of the debate is provided by analysis of the conjunction of oil politics with the emergence of a more general coalition of 'nonaligned' interests in the region, and the formal expression of such interests in the 'Zone of Peace' proposals at the United Nations. The context for the debate is provided by analysis of the several Congressional hearings on Diego Garcia. Here, the comparison of U.S. and Soviet policies in the region provides a counterpoint to the discussion of U.S. strategic engagement with the regional powers.

For chapter five, an analysis of the major themes of the foreign policy of the Carter Administration is located in respect of the challenges to U.S. policy outlined above. In this chapter, the redefinition of regional policy pursued by the 1977 Democratic administration is assessed in the context of the latter's expressed approach to global institutional renovation. The influence of the Non-Aligned Movement in informing a

regional policy perspective is discussed with reference to the Carter administration's rapprochement with India. The differentiation and continuity with earlier U.S. policy is presented through a survey of arms sales and arms control perspectives. The discussion then takes up a detailed account of the 1977-1978 Naval Arms Limitation (NALT) negotiations, drawing on interview material with (former ACDA director) Paul Warnke. A strategic context is outlined within analysis of the administration's revisions to military posture. For the latter, the emergence of conflicting priorities is related to the wider internal debate within the U.S. policy community. The policy conflicts between arms control and regional security are further explored as administration policies toward Iran and Saudi Arabia are reviewed. This is followed by consideration of the administration's wider regional agenda in Ethiopia, Yemen and the African Horn.

The final chapter undertakes a three-part exposition of the 'Carter Doctrine'. The last two years of the Carter administration would see the Gulf /Indian Ocean region elevated to a central strategic concern. The concluding sections are thus devoted to the administration's policies for reestablishing a 'regional security framework' in the context of: [1] the Iranian revolution, [2] the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and [3] the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.

The first of these sections opens a detailed review of DOD/DOS assessments of U.S.-Iranian relations. Hereafter, the pattern of crisis management provides an operative context for analysis of continuity and dislocation of U.S. policy in the wider region. The initiation of direct intervention planning for the Indian Ocean is located in the context of Middle East Peace diplomacy and the advent of contemporary crises effecting other

regional allies in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia and North Yemen. For the second, a major focus is provided on efforts to achieve a direct U.S. military presence in the region and the formation of the 'Rapid Deployment Force'. This section presents a detailed account of force structure and mission for the RDF and assesses how the administration's politico/military and politico/diplomatic objectives for the region would be sustained by the renewed primacy of great power factors after Afghanistan.

Within the third and final section, the reinforcement of U.S. regional capability is related to the overall reconfiguration of global strategy and military posture considered under Presidential Directive (PD) 59. The concert of U.S. allies in the Gulf is located in the context of U.S. policy for NATO and the wider Western alliance. Again, the incidence of regional conflict (Iran/Iraq) is assessed in terms of mobilizing a framework for security co-operation in the Indian Ocean. The chapter draws together the several strands of analysis in considering the corresponding mobilization of strategic nuclear policy, regional intervention and cold war ideology in locating the Gulf/Indian Ocean region as the strategic nexus of the administration's 'countervailing strategy'.

INTRODUCTION: FOOTNOTES.

- 1) For the purposes of this analysis, the term 'Gulf' will be used in preference to the connative 'Persian Gulf'; the term 'South West Asia' arose in U.S. policy literature of the early 1980's as an attempt to define a single strategic theatre for the CENTCOM region. South West Asia includes the Horn of Africa, the Gulf states, the Arab states bordering on the Mediterranean from Egypt East and Israel. The term 'Indian Ocean' includes both the EUCOM maritime demarcation within the Red Sea/Gulf areas and the expanded PACOM area to '62 degrees East longitude'.
- 2) See, discussion of the issues in, Henry Kissinger, *For The Record - Selected Statements 1977-80* (London: Weidenfeld, 1981), pp.202-7 (p.203).
- 3) See, for example, Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (London: Verso, 1983, 1986) for analysis of these perspectives. See also, International Institute for Strategic Studies: *Strategic Survey 1982-1983* (London: IISS, 1982); in the view of IISS analysts, 'A review of security developments in 1982 raises the question of whether there are any grounds for optimism about the future of the East-West relationship' (p.12).
- 4) See, Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,' in, Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp.43-68 (p.57).
- 5) This analysis accepts the broad significance of the 'Organizational Process' and 'Bureaucratic Politics' models in qualifying any 'Rational Actor' perspectives on given policy outcomes. See, Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); for a contemporary view, see also the 'Political Process' model developed in, Roger Hillsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1987).
- 6) For discussion of comparative methodologies, see, for example, R.B.J. Walker, 'History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations', *Millenium*, Vol.18, No.2 (1989) pp.163-83; for representative views, see also, Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', *World Politics*, XVII (April, 1966), 361; J. David Singer, 'The Behavioural Science Approach to International Relations: Payoff and Prospects', *SAIS Review*, X (Summer, 1966), pp.12-20
- 7) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford: 1953), p.1,66,67, pp.31-2.
- 8) The Embassy archives, including cables, reports, threat-assessments and intelligence memoranda for the State Department's Near East and South Asia division were published in Tehran as a 63 volume set of *Documents from the U.S. Den of Espionage*; these are available at the National Security Archives, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., Washington D.C. See also, NSA, *Iran: the Making of U.S. Policy 1977-80*, (Alexandria, VA:Chadwyck-Healey, 1989), 2vo./microfiche. For related background on U.S. Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation, see, for example, *The Strange Case of the Nixon Archives* (Alexandria, VA: National Archives and Records Administration, Office of Presidential Libraries; Nixon Presidential Materials Project, 1988).
- 9) See, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: OUP, 1982).
- 10) See, Alexander George/Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia, 1974).

- 11) For a useful discussion of the organizational innovations characterizing the U.S. economy - notably, 'Taylorism', 'Fordism' and the transnational division of labour - see, Giovanni Arrighi 'A Crisis of Hegemony', in Samir Amin (ed.), *The Dynamics of Global Crisis* (London:Macmillan, 1982) pp.56-60. In Arrighi's view, the 'main objective' of U.S. foreign economic policy in this period, '...seems to have been to guarantee an "open door", not primarily to trade but to capitalist enterprise, particularly against threats of nationalization'(p.58). For discussion of U.S. views on investment and nationalization, see, for example, Robert A. Pastor, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976* (Los Angeles/Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1980) pt.3, ch.9.
- 12) For discussion of the historical and institutional characteristics of 'Hegemonic Cooperation in the Postwar Era', see, for example, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: PUP, 1984), pp.135-82.
- 13) *ibid.*, p.137.
- 14) These processes have been comprehensively detailed in, Laurence H. Schoup/WilliamMinter, *Imperial Brains Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review, 1977).
- 15) See chapter one of this study.
- 16) See detailed discussion of the changing U.S. economic role in, Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton: PUP, 1987), part. chs.8/9.
- 17) See, Gary Sick, 'The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions', in A.Z. Rubinstein (ed.), *The Great Game* (New York: Praeger, 1983).
- 18) Henry Kissinger, cited in, *Department of State Bulletin* (DSB), LXXVI, No. 1963 (February 7, 1977), p.102.
- 19) See, Henry Kissinger, 'On Iran' in, Kissinger, 'Record', *op.cit.*, pp.172-187; Kissinger observes, *inter alia*, that,'the...view for decades has been that economic development would more or less automatically produce political stability...has turned out to be clearly wrong'(p.176).
- 20) The central question at issue here concerns the primacy accorded (global) structural factors in accounting for conflict and cooperation between states. The essence of the debate between realists/neorealists and 'neoliberals' has been well expressed by Joseph M. Grieco: thus, 'while neoliberals see states as "rational egoists" interested in their own utility, realists view states as what I have called "defensive positionlists" interested in achieving and maintaining relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of international anarchy'; Joseph M. Grieco, 'Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: the Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory', in, David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia, 1994), p.303.
- 21) The classic realist position has been stated by Kenneth Waltz, thus, 'When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states...are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?", but "Who will gain more?"', Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison -Wesely, 1979), p.105. For a view that emerging multipolarity can convert realist predictions for relative gains into facilitating 'defensive cooperation', see; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', in Baldwin, *op.cit.*, pp.198-201 .

- 22) See, for example, S. Strange, 'States, Firms and Diplomacy', *International Affairs*, Vol.68, No.1 (1992), pp.1-15.
- 23) For further contemporary qualification of the Carter Doctrine, see, (former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) David D. Newsome, 'America Engulfed', *Foreign Policy* 43 (Summer, 1981) pp.17-32; in Newsome's view, 'Despite [this] extension of U.S. discretion and responsibility, the American public has uncritically accepted the commitment to the Carter Doctrine, which itself grew out of last minute pressures for a presidential speech' (p.17).
- 24) For an extended realist perspective on U.S. efforts to restructure the 'Bretton Woods' system of exchange rate parities, see Gilpin, 'Political Economy' , *op.cit.*, pp.131- 54, 308-317.
- 25) For a recent neorealist exploration of relative gains case-study, see, Michael Mastanduno 'Do Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy', *International Security* 16 (Summer, 1991), pp.73-113.
- 26) Thus, for Mastanduno, 'As its relative economic power declines, a hegemonic state will feel that it is less able to afford, and thus will be less likely to tolerate, "free riding" by its allies that works to its relative economic disadvantage'; *ibid.*, pp.80-1.
- 27) This view accords with both realism and institutionalism: as Robert Gilpin observes, 'the scale, diversity and dynamics of the American economy will continue to place the United States at the centre of the world economic system'; Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and Multinational Corporations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975) , p.253.
- 28) The possibilities for such empirical qualification are, however, acknowledged by institutionalists; as Keohane observes, 'the fact that asymmetrical gains have implications for a given set of future power relationships constitutes a necessary but not sufficient condition for states to worry more about relative than absolute gains' (1994, *op.cit.*, p.276).
- 29) Henry Kissinger, 'Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 34, No.3 (April, 1956) pp.349-366 (p.352).
- 30) See, for example, Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Princeton: PUP, 1970), Farrel/Smith (eds.), *Image and Reality in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); see also, Alexander L. George, 'The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Decision-Making', *International Studies Quarterly*, XII (June, 1969) pp.190-222. The approach to 'doctrine' taken in this analysis follows that of John Lewis Gaddis, wherein 'there exist for presidential administrations certain 'strategic' or 'geopolitical' codes, assumptions about American interests in the world, potential threats to them, and feasible responses, that tend to be formed either before or just after an administration takes office and...tend not to change much thereafter'; Gaddis, 'Strategies of Containment', *op.cit.*, p.ix.
- 31) For the rational state as unitary actor approach, see, for example, Stanley Hoffman, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall, 1980); see also discussion of 'rational egoism' in Keohane, 1984, *op.cit.*, pp.27- 30, 79- 4. The approach taken in this study is supportive of Robert Powell's observation that, 'States as rational unitary actors do not exist. They are a theoretical construct. Thus, the question of whether states maximize absolute gains or are concerned about relative gains is empirically meaningless The real question is, which assumptions about state preferences is more useful?'; Robert Powell, 'Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations theory', in, Baldwin, 'Neorealism', *op.cit.*, p.229.
- 32) Giovanni Arrighi, *The Geometry of Imperialism: The Limits of Hobson's Paradigm* (London: Verso, 1983), 'A Crisis of Hegemony', in Amin , 'The Dynamics of Global Crisis' , *op.cit.*

- 33) Keohane, 'Hegemony', *op.cit.*
- 34) Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: PUP, 1981), p.93.
- 35) See discussion in Keohane, 'Hegemony', *op.cit.*, pp.49-65; Keohane observes that, 'Regimes consist of injunctions at various levels of generality, ranging from principles to norms to highly specific decision making procedures...From a theoretical standpoint, regimes can be viewed as intermediate factors or "intervening variables" between fundamental characteristics of world politics such as the international distribution of power on the one hand and the behaviour of states and non-state actors such as multinational corporations on the other' (p.64).
- 36) In terms of the theoretical literature, this bears upon distinctions between the domestic and international realms of political analysis; thus, for Kenneth Waltz, 'The difference between national and international politics lies not in the use of force, but in the different modes of organization for doing something about it...a government has no monopoly on the use of force...An effective government, however, has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force', Waltz, 1979, *op.cit.*, pp.103-4.

CHAPTER ONE: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

The main historical focus of this study concerns United States policy for the Indian Ocean region in an era of challenge and retrenchment for the U.S. globally - the decade of the 1970's. In so identifying the latter period, a concept of historical conjuncture is employed, wherein constellations of different forces affecting the distribution of power in the international system can be analysed in their dominant trends. To establish the terms for undertaking such conjunctural analysis of 1970's United States' policy, it is useful to begin by considering the origins of regional strategy and policy after World War two, a time when U.S. power was at its apogee. In treating these questions with the detail below, it will thus become apparent that, whilst much of the later development of policy - notably concerning military preparedness - was present in embryo, the clear overall policy preference was for a differentiation of non-military means within bilateral relations with individual regional states, underpinned by limited military delegation to Britain. Whilst the U.S. had assumed direct security responsibilities in Europe and South East Asia, the policy instruments taken up for the Indian Ocean region were to stress economic and political factors. However, if an antecedent version of the Nixon Doctrine will perhaps be discerned in the 'Anglo-American security system', there was also, as will further be shown, a basis for the more direct option. The salient characteristic of U.S. regional policy at this time was its almost wholly novel nature. Although Washington had begun to take on limited economic interests in the Middle East since the 1930's, the comprehensive scope demanded of post-war policy objectives - and, as significantly, the chosen form for their realization - were to give an index for the distinctive cast of U.S. power in the international system.

At the close of World War two, the position of the Indian Ocean in United States' strategy was preeminently derived from economic considerations at a global level and relations with Britain at a regional level. The strategic appreciation governing both these ends was reflected in the extent of direct U.S. military commitment - the small advisory and training missions in Iran and Saudi Arabia. By the end of the Johnson administration, U.S. interests had expanded to include security agreements with Iran and Pakistan, military assistance and arms sales programmes to the latter states and Saudi Arabia, and the basis for a direct military presence on the island of Diego Garcia. This chapter will assess how the development of U.S. policy, originally focused on economic interests in the Middle East, would move on to encompass security interests in the Soviet Union's South Asian periphery - the 'Northern Tier' - and then extend to a wider interest in the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit.

Whilst the necessary basis for U.S. national security policy will be identified in the lineages of Cold War, the operative constituents for regional policy will be posed in the interlocking dynamics of economic competition and strategic alliance with Britain. To establish the context for discussion, it is first necessary to consider some background issues concerning the status of the Indian Ocean - and the colonial question in general - in the internal alliance politics of World War two.

1. The Grand Area Strategy and the 'Sterling Area'.

Beginning in the early 1940's, the working 'war aims' agenda devised in the U.S. State Department's 'Advisory Committee on Post War Foreign Policy' envisioned a 'Grand Area', including, 'the United Kingdom itself as well as the Western Hemisphere

and the Far East'² which would support a maximally free market underpinned by 'unquestioned' U.S. and allied military power. The strategic aspects of 'Grand Area' planning assumed a continuation of Britain's global military commitments commensurate with British involvement in constructing the institutional framework of post-war order. However, U.S. support for Britain as a viable national economy, a focus for stability in Europe and a source of historically grounded overseas legitimacy did not entail support for the British imperial system. The Empire's institutional framework - notably the 'Imperial Preference' tariff arrangements and the monetary structures of the 'Sterling Area' - was, in Washington's view, both a political anachronism and a primary obstacle to overall market integration. Of particular contention, and relevance to this discussion, was the British hold on the oil resources of the Middle East. Whilst it should be stressed that there was a clear order of preference in official U.S. 'anti-colonialism', the overall direction did represent a rooted normative bias in U.S. political culture. Such sentiments had found a popular echo in the U.S. media, where the 1942 'Quit India' movement had evoked much sympathy. 'One thing we are sure we are not fighting for', a contemporary *Life Magazine* editorial commented, '...is to hold the British Empire together.'³

Indeed, practical steps in this direction had provided a counterpoint to U.S. military and economic aid to Britain from the beginning. The terms of the 1941 'Lend-Lease' agreement had required that the British should, *inter alia*, eliminate 'discrimination' (i.e., Imperial Preference) in international trading practice; a point further reinforced at the time of the agreement's (August, 1945) unilateral abrogation by the United States and replacement by a conditional \$3.7bn. loan. In a similar vein, Washington's reading of the August, 1941 'Atlantic Charter' was to lend a more literal interpretation to Article

three's 'national self determination' provisions than Whitehall would allow. Aside from the compelling economic case, moreover, a perceptible - if selective - progress toward decolonisation from its wartime allies was required by the Roosevelt administration on strategic grounds, reflecting the conviction that sovereign states, grounded in liberal economic practices, would be less susceptible to revolutionary upheaval.⁴

Given the above considerations, substantial areas of disagreement in Anglo-U.S. relations were evident in the immediate post-war period, particularly concerning Britain's autonomous strategic capabilities. The 'McMahon Act' of 1946 had sought to prevent Britain obtaining nuclear weapons technology. Britain's position in the Middle East was challenged by the opening of U.S. economic and military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia (eligible for 'Lend-Lease' since 1943), while Whitehall's approach to retaining the 'Canal Zone' garrison in Egypt and conducting the UN mandate in Palestine was subject to sustained opposition by the U.S. Congress and - in the latter case, critically - President Truman himself.⁵ Underpinning the particulars of Washington's expanding regional diplomacy lay the unresolved issue of Middle East oil. In contrast to the institutional arrangements agreed on world trade (GATT) and finance (the 'Bretton Woods' system), the principal Western powers - in effect, the U.S. and Britain - had failed to establish the grounds for a formalized energy regime.⁶ The issues at stake, on both sides, were clear. 'We must resist any concessions to the Americans', Foreign Office negotiators had observed at the (inconclusive) Anglo-U.S. 'Oil Talks' of 1944, 'which are likely to result in the introduction into the area of a foreign power to rival our influence.'⁷ If initially questioned by some within the post-war Attlee Government,⁸ the institutional 'climate of opinion' within Whitehall was strongly oriented toward consolidating the

British presence in the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions as an essential grounding for continued world-wide influence, if not imperial power in the sense understood before World War two.⁹

Overall, Britain's position on the South Asian periphery had thus combined three characteristics, which would - successively and collectively - provide the context for two decades of U.S. regional policy. Hereafter, the intermediate post-war period would find British and U.S. interests univocally opposed economically, intermittently opposed politically and increasingly joined strategically. If the alternation of these factors had proceeded from both regional developments and the wider evolution of the Western alliance, there was also common ground, whose further contradiction was not lost on British policy makers. In Whitehall's view, as a 1949 War Office (COS) planning assessment makes clear, 'the privileged position that we...enjoy with the United States and the attention which she now pays to our strategic and other opinions...is directly due to our hold on the Middle East and all that this involves.'¹⁰

II. Strategic Accord: The Truman Doctrine and the Pentagon Talks of 1947.

In Washington, the disposition of political and military strategy for the Middle East and Indian Ocean was evolving at this time. The economic imperatives for the region were, though, clear from the outset. Here, the mould for future policy was being established in Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the Saudi case, U.S. interest stemmed from oil concessions granted in 1933 to Standard Oil of California. Although supported by the British

government,¹¹ the Saudi monarchy sought to widen its political options by agreeing exclusive rights with a consortium of U.S. companies ('ARAMCO'), which had themselves been restricted from operating elsewhere in the Middle East by an agreement of 1928.¹² During the war years, the U.S. airforce had set up a staging post at Dhahran in Eastern Saudi Arabia. Relations were further consolidated by a meeting between King Ibn Saud - notionally, a co-belligerent - and President Roosevelt in 1945. Following the establishment of full diplomatic relations in 1948, U.S. involvement with the Kingdom was to extend to a 'Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement' (1951), providing for continuing USAF usage of air facilities at Dhahran and the arrival of a U.S. military assistance training mission (USMAAG), replacing a previous British mission, in 1952.¹³ The U.S. State Department would also lend active diplomatic support for Saudi border claims against the British protectorates of the lower Gulf and Kuwait and the technically sovereign 'allied' territories of Oman.¹⁴

Of more directly strategic U.S. interest was Iran. Again an area of established British influence, Iran had been occupied by Russian and British forces during World War two and had provided the access for U.S. Persian Gulf Command supply lines to the Soviet Union. State Department aid for the civil administration in Tehran was complemented by a small U.S. military mission (GENMISH) in 1943 to provide for the Iranian Gendarmerie.¹⁵ Iran had been viewed as an 'important' but not 'vital' concern for U.S. security policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the immediate post-war period.¹⁶ However, as elsewhere, a reassessment of the U.S. interests in the Near East region was taking place in the context of what, following George Kennan's widely circulated analysis of February, 1946, was beginning to be termed 'containment'¹⁷ of the Soviet

Union. It is thus a matter of some historical interest that the first significant instance of public U.S. pressure on the Soviet Union had appeared, in March, 1946, in support of Iran's efforts to disengage remaining Soviet forces from its territories.¹⁸ Whilst U.S. and international support at the United Nations - and adroit Iranian diplomacy¹⁹ - had, by May, 1946 induced a Soviet retreat from Iran's Northern provinces,²⁰ the region had also assumed a higher priority in U.S. strategic thinking. By October, 1946, a review conducted by the JCS was to recommend acceding to Iranian requests for 'defensive' military equipment.²¹ This view was endorsed by State Department recommendations to Secretary Byrnes.²² Although avoiding formal guarantees, U.S. 'readiness' to assist Iranian security would be affirmed in the availability of Export-Import bank lines of financial credit and an expanded U.S. military mission ('ARMISH') emplaced in 1947.²³

With the expanding conception of U.S. interests had come a bureaucratic reorganization, establishing a new 'National Security Council' and a reconstituted intelligence service - the CIA - more commensurate with the U.S. global role. Inter-agency planning would, in consequence, encompass a more systematic approach to the Middle East as a strategic unity. The Truman administration's priorities were, though, focused on economic reconstruction in Europe and, collaterally, the defeat of the 'Asia First' wing of the Republican party.²⁴ Given the latter domestic divisions, a renewed enthusiasm for sustaining Britain's established politico-military influence in the Near East becomes apparent. Britain had, in January, 1947 informed the administration that it could no longer afford to provide financial and military support for Greece and Turkey.²⁵ As with the contemporaneous 'European Recovery Program', an unequivocal stress on the Soviet threat would be used to secure Congressional support for both the United

Kingdom and the allied regimes on the USSR's Eurasian periphery. As (then Under Secretary) Dean Acheson was to tell House leaders on February 22, 1947, 'Soviet pressure on the (Bosphorous) Straits, on Iran and on Northern Greece...might open up three continents to Soviet penetration...these are the stakes that a British withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean offered to an eager and ruthless opponent.'²⁶ Such an approach was to enter the public arena with President Truman's announcement that support against 'outside pressures' for these regions would become 'the policy of the United States.'²⁷

However, although the President's March 12, 1947 policy declaration - the 'Truman Doctrine' - was to contain vague but sweeping commitments to 'support free people who are resisting subjugation', the administration was also committed to tightening the defence budget.²⁸ Congress was so assured that, 'there are no plans to send to Greece or Turkey combat troops of any nature.'²⁹ Such allied combat troops as were in Greece, as throughout the Middle East and North Africa, were British. Moreover, the continuing strategic uncertainty in Europe and the progress of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions in the Far East would lend, for the administration, a contemporary urgency to older, more visceral fears of Russian threats to the Middle East and South Asia, relayed from Whitehall in reports from the Chiefs of Staff (COS), the Cabinet 'Joint Intelligence Committee' and the newly established 'Russia Committee' of the Foreign Office.³⁰

Accordingly, in September, 1947, Foreign Secretary Bevin and State Department NEA Director Loy Henderson recorded 'a somewhat extended conversation...on the strategic situation of the whole Near East.'³¹ By December, such 'tentative ideas' had established

the context to concert Anglo -U.S. strategic co-operation on a more formal footing. The outcome of the 'Pentagon Talks', conducted in Washington, would, 'after...a full exchange of views with both American and British military advisors,'³² establish both a threat-assessment and a joint agenda. Here, proceeding from the premise that, 'the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United States,'³³ the policy programme had declared that such security, 'would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union succeeded in its efforts to obtain control of...Italy, Greece, Turkey or Iran,' and that the U.S. 'should assist in maintaining [the] territorial integrity and political independence' of the latter. In pursuing this course, the U.S. 'should be prepared to make full use of its political, economic and...military power in such a manner as may be found effective.'³⁴ And moreover, as the British representatives were gratified to hear, 'it would be unrealistic for the U.S. to undertake...such a policy unless the British maintain their strong strategic, political and economic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and unless they and ourselves follow parallel policies in that area.'³⁵

From a British standpoint, the Pentagon Talks had been a signal success and served to institutionalize Britain's Middle Eastern holdings as integral to global containment. Britain could, the War Office believed, 'find a way of holding the Middle East at the beginning of a war with our own resources and of developing offensive action against Russia from that area.'³⁶ The focus of U.S. planning tended toward more immediate concerns. Thus, agreement was reached on establishing joint facilities in Libya (and the Libyan state itself)³⁷ and berthing rights secured in Bahrain which would establish the U.S. Navy's MIDEASTFOR contingent.³⁸ Britain was particularly reassured by U.S.

agreement that its position in Iraq constituted 'a formidable military barrier between Saudi Arabia and Russia.'³⁹ In concert with the expanding international framework for the U.S. alliance system, the administration had also, by this time, secured a domestic consensus behind the 'Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on...effective self-help and mutual aid and as affects its national security'⁴⁰ - which was given formal expression in the June 11, 1948 'Vandenberg (Senate) Resolution.'⁴¹

The prospects for a wider Anglo-American political understanding in the Middle East had also developed after 1947. Britain had, in May, 1948, withdrawn from Palestine. Despite much public acrimony attending the creation of the Israeli state, Whitehall had also moved to establish a close intelligence relationship both with and within the former mandate⁴² which served, in Washington, to bring strategic as opposed to recent historical factors to the fore. India, long a test case for U.S. 'anti-colonialism' had become independent. And whilst Nerhu's neutrality and 'deeply ethical tone'⁴³ had aroused some misgivings in Washington, British support for the new Pakistani government of Liaquat Ali⁴⁴ provided reassurance of strategic continuity in the Eastern Gulf. In Egypt, the efforts of Ernest Bevin and the successor Churchill/Eden governments to retain the Canal Zone facilities 'on a basis of equality and partnership'⁴⁵ with the host nation received strong support from the new NSC. The 'Middle East Base' at Port Said, Suez and Ismailia was, at this time, the focus for NATO contingency planning in the event of a general conflict with the Soviet Union,⁴⁶ and outline discussion would thus proceed in terms of an extended NATO Middle East command structure.⁴⁷ Although the U.S. and Britain had, by the summer of 1951, secured French and Turkish participation for the

proposed 'Middle East Defence Organization', the plan was rejected on October, 15 by Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha.⁴⁸

III. An Order of Priorities: NSC 68 to the Suez Crisis.

The summary rejection of 'MEDO' by Nahas Pasha and the latter's own displacement in July, 1952 by the 'Free Officers Movement' was also, however, attended by the re-emergence of more general policy differences between Washington and Whitehall. These would concern both Britain's established role in the political economy of the Middle East and the appropriate method of incorporating the region in a globally structured security system. For the Truman administration, a comprehensive expression of the parameters for U.S. global strategy had been set forth in the April, 1950 policy review, 'NSC 68.'⁴⁹ To be sure, the new national security orthodoxy offered an expansive strategic agenda. 'The assault on free institutions is world-wide now', the document records, '...a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.'⁵⁰ Under such conditions, even the United States 'Cannot', as Secretary Acheson was to tell a May, 1950 session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, '...scatter our shots equally all over the world.'⁵¹ Whilst admitting a passing reference to the need for 'A strengthening of the British position...if it is to be a focus of resistance to communist expansion in South and South East Asia,'⁵² the main geopolitical focus of NSC 68 was, though, on Europe and Far East. Here it was felt that the didactic impact of the review's 'Hemingway sentences' might elicit the greatest domestic resonance in contriving what

was, in effect, a Keynesian programme of military expenditure from a conservatively inclined congress.⁵³

The omission of a systematic account of Soviet threat to South West Asia in NSC 68 was indicative of the administration's strategic as well as political priorities. It was not until a further policy review of 1952 - NSC 135/354 - that the administration was to address what State's (then) Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze would significantly term 'problems we'd ignored' (in NSC 68) in 'intervening areas, not only the Middle East, but Africa.'⁵⁵ Here too, the 'problems' were to be couched in terms of the rise of local nationalisms rather than imminent Soviet or communist takeover.⁵⁶ For Whitehall, it was axiomatic that, 'in spite of Atlantic Charters and all that sort of stuff,'⁵⁷ the existing, essentially pre-war, political arrangements in the Middle East should still obtain in order that Middle East oil continue to underwrite the role of sterling as a world currency. From a U.S. perspective, this nexus between British economic and political particularism in the Middle East would increasingly need unpacking from the advantageous strategic aspects of the continuing British presence in the region.

For the Truman administration, such contradictions had been sharpened by unilateral British measures, introduced between April-December, 1949, to restrict all sterling area oil transactions involving U.S. affiliates to purchases from British or Anglo-Dutch suppliers.⁵⁸ From Washington, these actions were perceived as a protectionist threat to U.S. commercial activity in general, and a political threat to the U.S. position in Saudi Arabia (which had excluded the operation of all non-U.S. oil companies) in particular. Under such circumstances, an internal State Department memorandum noted

that a 'Loss of one-quarter annual revenue might stalemate Saudi Arabian progress...jeopardizing the unique co-operation and friendship now existing between the U.S. Saudi Arabia.'⁵⁹ Hence, whilst the immediate 'sterling-dollar-oil-problem' would be resolved by mutual agreement in May, 1950,⁶⁰ the issues raised were to engage a more concerted U.S. response to both the restrictions of Britain's Middle East oil regime and the wider operation of what one State official had described as 'the dead hand of the sterling area.'⁶¹

Given the broader U.S. perspectives on the construction of post-war order, and the key role of the 'Marshall aid' arrangements for Western Europe in particular, U.S. policy was, in any event, to assign a high priority to the political economy of the Middle East. Here, as summarized in a subsequent (1975) Senate FRC report,⁶² the Truman administration's objectives were three. Firstly, 'the U.S. desired to supply a steady supply of oil to Europe and Japan at reasonable prices...for sustained economic growth. Second, the U.S. desired to maintain stable governments in the non-communist, pro-Western oil exporting countries. Third, the U.S. desired that American based firms become a dominant force in the world oil trade.'⁶³ Thus, in the first instance, 'The large amount of Marshall Plan aid that went for petroleum was administered by the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA).'⁶⁴ This enabled the latter government agency to establish price guidelines which, 'foregoing localized high returns,' would effectively undercut what, as we have seen, were British attempts to establish an independent price structure or an Anglo-American monopoly 'favouring Anglo-Saxon consumers.'⁶⁵ Moreover, the ECA's portfolio powers would also help assure the 'dominant' position of U.S. corporations since, as Dean Acheson observed, 'It is ECA policy [that] in every

petroleum transaction an American company must be involved.'⁶⁶ The concentration of such market power would, in turn, promote 'stability' in the Middle East. As the FRC Report further records, 'If the weak economies of the Persian Gulf states were to remain friendly to the West, large amounts of money needed to be pumped into the area...Delegating such a major foreign policy function to the American (oil) majors was the easiest way for Washington's national security bureaucracy to solve its problem.'⁶⁷ The method to achieve the required level of transfer payments was initiated in Saudi Arabia. After December 30, 1950 the Saudi government's income tax requirement was to be creditable against the U.S. income tax liability of the major American oil companies operating in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, ARAMCO would shift its tax payments from the U.S. Treasury to the Saudi exchequer, whose tax income thus rose from \$66m. in 1950 to \$110m. in 1951.⁶⁸ The extension of the system to cover all U.S. overseas oil operations would serve to further differentiate U.S. foreign economic policy from what President Truman's inaugural address had termed, 'the old imperialismexploitation for foreign profits', which, as the President went on to declare, '...has no place in our plans.'⁶⁹

For Washington, the destabilizing effects attending British attachment to 'the old imperialism' in the Middle East were next apparent in refusal of the Anglo-Iranian oil company to negotiate a 50% profit sharing arrangement with the Iranian government of General Ali Razmara. Anglo-Iranian's stance was accompanied by an upsurge of anti-British demonstrations in Iran and the assassination of the Iranian Prime Minister. In the light of the similar profit sharing contract that been concluded between ARAMCO and Saudi Arabia, AIOC's intransigence would be contrasted with

'the...happy situation of all other companies in all other countries.'⁷⁰ It would also provide State Department mediators with an opening to displace the British-owned company from its monopoly position in the production of Iranian oil. U.S. policy toward Iran had been reviewed in NSC 54 of July 21, 1949.⁷¹ Whilst restating the level of U.S. strategic interest in Iran found in the 'Pentagon Talks', such interests were best served, in the administration's view, in the context of increased social and economic progress by the Shah's regime.⁷² Accordingly, a \$25m. Export-Import loan and \$½m. in Point Four grant aid was agreed in October, 1950.⁷³ It was clear, however, that U.S. efforts to promote internal reform in Iran would be compromised by the continuing British refusal, backed by military threats,⁷⁴ to agree terms with the incoming 'National Front' government of Mohammed Mossadeq which had, in March, 1951, consolidated its own position by nationalizing the British oil corporation.

Throughout the last two years of the Truman administration, U.S. negotiators had continued to stress the 'disastrous consequences'⁷⁵ that could proceed from the 'very rigid position'⁷⁶ maintained by the Eden Foreign Office. If Washington could agree that Mossadeq had 'acted unwisely,'⁷⁷ the British approach - involving a break in diplomatic relations and an international boycott of Iranian oil⁷⁸ - was to be met by U.S. threats to 'unilaterally ...give financial aid to Iran', even at the risk of 'great bitterness in Anglo-American relations.'⁷⁹ In Whitehall's view, Mossadeq was a 'dubious character' whom, Foreign Minister Eden remarked, with some prescience, 'would probably not be around for much longer.'⁸⁰ By November, 1952, a further review of U.S. policy - NSC 136/1 - had decided to effect 'an early and equitable resolution of the oil controversy', without, however, 'permitting the UK a veto over U.S. actions.'⁸¹

Thus, although the incoming Eisenhower administration would itself take up British plans to overthrow Mossadeq - activated in the August, 1953 'Operation Ajax'⁸² - an 'equitable resolution' to the marketing of Iran's oil assets had indeed been achieved on U.S. terms. The British stake was reduced to a level of 40% in the new oil 'consortium'.⁸³ Overall, by the end of 1953, U.S. companies had gained a controlling interest in 60% of Middle East oil.⁸⁴

If the U.S. had thus, by the first year of the Eisenhower administration, largely secured its politico-economic objectives to, *inter alia*, underwrite the 'weak economies of the Persian Gulf' within a reconstructed Middle East oil regime, there remained questions concerning the retention of such 'pro-Western' regional states' politico-strategic orientation. 'Many of the Arab League countries', Secretary Dulles had observed, '...are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France, that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism.' However, regional consultations taken in early 1953 had also convinced the Secretary of State that, 'where the Soviet Union is near', the '"northern tier" of nations shows [an] awareness of the danger' and that, 'there is a vague desire to have a collective security system.'⁸⁵

In fact, initial steps toward formulating 'collective security' arrangements were, with 'the fullest support and encouragement'⁸⁶ of the United States, to be independently undertaken by Pakistan and Turkey by late 1953. Whilst the Turkish regime of Ismet İnönü had a not unfounded strategic interest in widening its alliance structure to the East, given the recent history of Soviet pressure,⁸⁷ the concerns of Pakistan were centred on the long-standing border dispute with Afghanistan and the regional balance with India.

For both powers, however, the signing of a five year 'Agreement for Friendly Co-operation' in Karachi on April 2, 1954 was also grounded in the expectation of increased U.S. economic and military aid.⁸⁸ This, for Pakistan, would be forthcoming with Eisenhower's formal offer of MAP support of February, 25 confirmed in an initial \$25m. *aide memoire* of May, 19.⁸⁹ The U.S. interest in 'constructive step[s]...toward ensuring the security of the whole (Middle Eastern) area'⁹⁰ had also been noted in Iraq, as had the extent of U.S. military aid provision to Turkey⁹¹ and Washington's stricture on Britain to establish an 'equitable' oil regime in Iran. Iraq had registered a request for U.S. military aid in March, 1953. This had been approved by the Dulles State Department on April 21, 1954.⁹² In March, King Feisal was to open security negotiations with Pakistan. In August, further talks were commenced with Turkey by Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri es-Said.⁹³ The latter two governments would thus, on January 24, 1955, conclude a five year 'Treaty of Mutual Co-operation', open for accession to any member of the Arab League, 'or any other state actively concerned with security and peace in the Middle East.'⁹⁴ This 'Baghdad Pact' was the basis for the eponymous South West Asian alliance organization.

The prospect of Iraq developing an expanded range of political and military options - embracing both the regional powers and the United States - had engaged a more active interest in the evolving collective security system from Britain. London had initially, as a State Department briefing paper records, 'shown little enthusiasm for the "Northern Tier" concept.'⁹⁵ However, the perceived setback of 'Abadan' and certainty of withdrawal from Egypt after 1956⁹⁶ had prompted an extensive review of British strategic policies 'East of Suez'.⁹⁷ Of particular concern to Whitehall was the need to

retain the two British air bases in Iraq (Habbaniya and Shaibah)⁹⁸ and Britain's established position as Iraq's principal ally. As the basis for both the operative and less tangible British assets was under threat with the (1957) expiry of the 1930 'Anglo-Iraq Treaty', Britain was, on April 4, 1955, to itself accede to the Baghdad Pact, and concurrently agree a new bilateral treaty with Iraq in which RAF access to the bases was to be continued in return for British aid in equipping the Iraqi airforce.⁹⁹

The ambit of the Baghdad Pact was to be further extended during 1955, with the accession of Pakistan (September, 23) and, on October, 23, Iran. The delay on the behalf of both powers owed much to efforts to encourage a formal adherence from Washington.¹⁰⁰ The military priorities of the Eisenhower administration were, however, focused elsewhere. 'In view [of] the retarded status [of] regional defense planning', Foster Dulles was to instruct the Tehran Embassy, '...the U.S. cannot commit itself, even indirectly, to any specific concept of ME (Middle East) defense.'¹⁰¹ In Dulles' view, 'laying the political foundation for Northern Tier' was, self-evidently, in the 'best interests' of the parties directly concerned.¹⁰² Iran, in particular, should thus not 'regard accession to [the] Baghdad Pact as a favor to [the] U.S. for which [the] latter should pay a high price.'¹⁰³ Washington was, to be sure, to issue a declaration of formal support for the Pact and to appoint, on November 19, 1955 the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to function as U.S. 'Military and Political Liaison' to the opening sessions of signatories on November 21-22.¹⁰⁴ Such gestures would not, though, involve any revision of U.S. military posture in the Middle East.

The Eisenhower administration's policy of avoiding outright commitment to the Baghdad Pact in favour of more indirect 'liaison' was to give rise to some misunderstanding in the region¹⁰⁵ - despite Dulles' pedagogic efforts - and be subject to a particular level of misinterpretation within the Eden government in Britain. From Washington's perspective, however, such a *de facto* approach was entirely in keeping with the administration's assessment of the nature of the present (politico-military) threat and of the region's position in the overall context of U.S. global strategy. Eisenhower was not opposed in principle to the use of selective or covert military means in the third world. Significant instances took place in Guatemala (1954) and, as we have seen, Iran. But the more open-end and formal commitment entailed by the Baghdad Pact would, in the President's view, rather serve to restrict U.S. options in the region and provide fresh stimulation to both Arab radicals and remaining isolationist sentiment in the U.S. itself. As a general principle, moreover, the administration was determined that the 'vague desire' for regional collective security should be clearly identified with the regional powers themselves, rather than with Dulles' Seventh Floor offices at Foggy Bottom.

The administration had, by October, 1953 undertaken a wide-ranging reassessment of global defence posture. Within NSC/162/2 - 'The New Look' - a premium was placed on the 'massive retaliatory powers'¹⁰⁶ of nuclear weapons, as opposed to what Eisenhower had termed 'old fashioned (conventional) forces' which the United States, 'could not...maintain all around the world.'¹⁰⁷ Whilst the 'New Look' was clearly engaged in counterpoising the more Keynesian propensities of NSC 68 - and would administer a decline in U.S. defence expenditure from a baseline (1953) 13.8% of GNP to a level of 9.6% by 1956¹⁰⁸ - the Eisenhower approach was to also assume much of the latter's

conceptual underpinning. For if NSC 68 made much of the 'militancy' of the 'Kremlin Design', the empirical threat was identified as much in perceptions of the central balance and was thus to be addressed 'by all means short of war.'¹⁰⁹ A 'Soviet acknowledgement of realities'¹¹⁰ - principally, nuclear ones - was expected, and indeed, transpired at the 1955 Geneva Summit¹¹¹ and conclusion of the Austrian neutrality treaty. For the Middle East, the main secular thrust of Soviet strategy was also viewed as political rather than overtly military. To be sure, the Soviet Union had strongly attacked the Baghdad Pact at the United Nations¹¹² and continued to stress its opposition to 'aggressive military blocs.'¹¹³ However, in terms of the possibility of Moscow itself initiating a military riposte, 'the U.S. doubts', Foster Dulles had informed the Shah of Iran, '...that USSR would go so far as to take actions which would prejudice its assiduously developed current peace campaign.'¹¹⁴ The Secretary was to further note the Soviet willingness to sign commercial and frontier agreements with the 1954 government of the Shah, 'rather than with [the] previous vacillating, Commie-infiltrated Mossadeq regime.'¹¹⁵

If the United States' Middle Eastern allies had suffered from some mis-apprehension that participation in the Baghdad Pact could lead to more 'substantial' outflows in 'dollar aid' than the 'extreme financial stringency'¹¹⁶ perceived in Washington would allow, the approach to the alliance from Britain was to involve a more fundamental misconception. For Eden, the Pact was viewed as, potentially, 'a NATO for the Middle East'¹¹⁷ and certainly as a diplomatic coup that 'strengthened our influence and our voice' throughout the region.¹¹⁸ Such sentiments were supported by the Labour opposition. Shadow Commonwealth Affairs Spokesman Patrick Gordon Walker had endorsed Eden's diplomacy as a necessary response to 'a vacuum...in the Middle East...that we should

not leave' and declared that, '...the only way it will be filled up is by this sort of pact.'¹¹⁹ However, whilst British strategy had still ascribed the premise, retained in successive post-war planning estimates since 1946,¹²⁰ that 'Our Middle East air bases are a valuable deterrent to Russian aggression'¹²¹ and viewed the possibility of 'developing offensive action against Russia from that (Middle East) area'¹²² as a real, if remote, basis for Britain's own essay in 'counter-value' nuclear deterrence, the more immediate threat was perceived in militant Arab nationalism concerted from Cairo. Britain would, accordingly, make strenuous efforts to employ the alliance as a forum to counter Egypt's President Nasser's anti-British activism and to extend the Baghdad Pact's membership to Jordan.¹²³

Dulles, though, could look to other instruments to 'assure...the friendship and understanding of the newly independent countries who have escaped from colonialism.'¹²⁴ The Secretary had, particularly following the successful 1954 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, come to view Nasser as potentially the 'wheel-horse of Western policy' in the region.¹²⁵ Washington had, 'financial stringency' notwithstanding, extended a \$40m. loan to the Nasser regime and was considering a \$56m. arrangement from the World bank to finance Egypt's Aswan dam project.¹²⁶ Moreover, such acute divergence of Anglo-American priorities - if not ultimate ends - in the Middle East and South Asian littoral was to admit a further dimension to the dangers of a regional 'vacuum' to those posed by expressions of British policy conventionally on view. A survey of U.S. activities in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 'Persia' and Pakistan, would suggest, for Britain's Washington ambassador, Sir Roger Makins, a confirmation of Whitehall's 'very understandable suspicion that the Americans are out to take our place in the Middle East.'¹²⁷

Perhaps the nadir of U.S. relations with Britain in the Middle East was reached with the October 31, 1956 Anglo-French attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal, following on the Israeli invasion some days before. Here, the comprehensive nature of the Eisenhower administration's response was to release two strategic consequences of some significance for later U.S. policy. The first of these was an intensification of the Franco-Israeli collaboration in the development of nuclear weapons¹²⁸ which would, by 1969, establish Israel as both a nuclear power and, *ceteris paribus*, the major U.S. strategic partner in the region. The second was the closure of Britain's geopolitical options that would compel the Macmillan and Wilson governments to restructure British defence posture for the Middle East around an Indian Ocean-based security system.

Eisenhower was not, even before Egypt had nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, in any ignorance of the general British desire to both re-occupy the Canal Zone and 'knock Nasser off his perch.' Nor, indeed, was Nasser. Britain's contingency plans for what became 'Operation Musketeer' had been passed to the Egyptian General Staff by U.S. ambassador Henry Byroade.¹²⁹ Britain had calculated that a combination of factors, concerning Nasser's relations with the Soviet Union - an \$80m. arms transfer had been agreed in September, 1955 - and the proximity of the November U.S. Presidential elections would, in the last analysis, compel Washington to, in Dulles' phrase, 'pull their (British) chestnuts out of the fire.'¹³⁰ However, as the minutes of the administration's November, 1 NSC meeting make clear, Eisenhower and Dulles had, on the contrary, 'almost reached the point of deciding...whether we think the future lies with a policy of reasserting by force colonial control of less developed nations or whether we shall oppose such a course of action by every appropriate means.'¹³¹ If

allowances can be made for some hyperbole, an 'appropriate means' to compel a British withdrawal from Suez was certainly to hand. By November, 6, Britain had lost 15% of her foreign currency reserves and faced a world-wide oil embargo.¹³² The price of U.S. support, Dulles was to tell Harold Macmillan (at the Exchequer), was a cessation of hostilities in place by November, 7.¹³³ While U.S. logistics experts were, soon after, to supervise the clearing of the Suez Canal, Nasser was to receive a \$54m. U.S. aid subvention and access to surplus wheat stocks under PL 480. Eden was to resign on January 9, 1957.

IV. Strategy Renewed: the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Central Treaty Organization.

In considering the broader context to the Suez crisis, it should be stressed that some in Washington were not unsympathetic to the idea of a more selective operation, as originally envisaged by France and Israel, to engage a localized military strike on Egypt's forward-deployed air and armoured capability.¹³⁴ Nasser's trenchant opposition to the Baghdad Pact, and military relations with Moscow, were construed as, at the least, admitting an indirect avenue for increased Soviet influence in the region. The force of United States' opposition to 'Suez' had, rather, stemmed from Eden's encompassing war aims - viewed as completely unrealistic - and the method of their execution. 'It was a bad thing', Paul Nitze relates, '...for a junior member of the (Western) alliance to get out of hand...Foster (Dulles) felt that the thing had been done behind his back.'¹³⁵ However, if U.S. influence in the Middle East had clearly benefited from curtailment of Britain's essay in 'the old imperialism', the dangers to stability inherent in Nasser's 'Pan

Arab' programme - widely disseminated in the daily transmissions of the 'Voice of the Arabs' - would also require a more positive response. Nasser had, in April, 1955, met with other third world leaders at Bandung. And whilst much has been made of Dulles' censure of 'neutralism' in the nascent movement for 'Afro-Asian Solidarity' as, 'an immoral and short-sighted conception',¹³⁶ Eisenhower was, as ever, weighing the financial costs of the alternatives. In this respect, as the President was to tell conservative Senators, neutrality had, indeed, a positive merit in terms of the fiscal priorities informing the 'New Look'.¹³⁷ In thus proposing to, 'wage the cold war in a militant, but reasonable style',¹³⁸ Eisenhower had determined to gain Congressional approval for a \$200m. military and economic aid supplemental for the Middle East for the budget appropriations of FY 1957.¹³⁹

However, whilst Eisenhower might, in conclave, consider a 'reasonable style' most appropriate to promoting U.S. security interests in the Middle East, the conventions of a Congress suspicious of 'do-gooder giveaways'¹⁴⁰ in the field of foreign aid would demand a more 'militant' presentation. Accordingly, on January 5, 1957 the President was to request and on March, 9, receive a Congressional endorsement of his proposals, couched in terms of the 'vital...national interest' involved in 'preservation of the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East'.¹⁴¹ The United States would, moreover, be 'prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism'.¹⁴² As with earlier U.S. pronouncements, many observers - not least in the Middle East itself - were to neglect the domestic context of what became known as the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'. In the wake of Suez, the declaration had produced

an, at best, ambivalent international reception, underscored by its wholehearted approbation by only the embattled Falangist President of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun. In London, though, the Joint Resolution would be taken up as a new mandate for Britain's presence in the Middle East. Eisenhower had moved swiftly to diffuse some of the bitterness of Suez. The administration had mobilized a consortium of 15 U.S. oil companies, the 'Middle East Emergency Committee', to provide an emergency oil lift programme to Britain amounting to 380,000 barrels-per-day over pre-crisis levels.¹⁴³ For its part, the new Macmillan government, while determined to retain at least the residuary of 'world power', had no illusions of engaging in a quasi-imperial role in open opposition to Washington.

The Eisenhower administration's increased focus on alliance politics in the Middle East was marked by the dispatch of a special Presidential envoy to the region¹⁴⁴ and, in January, 1958 by the presence of Secretary Dulles at the fourth 'Ministerial Council' sessions of the Baghdad Pact.¹⁴⁵ On July, 14, however, a military coup in the Iraqi capital had both deposed the Hashemite monarchy and put in question the wider basis of the collective security regime for South Asia.¹⁴⁶ Although U.S. regional commitment was to be reasserted with the deployment, on July 15, of a Marine Task Force to Lebanon and a British Parachute Brigade to Jordan - both under somewhat ambiguous military justification - Foster Dulles had publicly raised the possibility that the formal arrangements of the Pact be allowed to 'wither on the vine.'¹⁴⁷ Support for some form of security association from the regional states and Britain was, though, to receive U.S. endorsement in the July, 28 'London Declaration'. Here, meeting under the (notional) auspices of the Fifth Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, all the remaining members

were to, 'declare their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression,' and affirm that, 'the need which called the Pact into being is greater than ever.'¹⁴⁸ If the United States had still stopped short of formal membership of the alliance, Washington was prepared to 'promptly enter into agreements designed to give effect to this co-operation.'¹⁴⁹ Accordingly, the administration would take the occasion of inaugurating the Baghdad Pact's successor - the 'Central Treaty Organization' (CENTO) - to enter a series of new bilateral arrangements with the three regional powers. These, with Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, were signed at CENTO Headquarters, Ankara, on March 5, 1959.¹⁵⁰

Whilst the three bilateral agreements would become the preferred avenue for U.S. military and economic aid to the CENTO powers, it is useful at this stage to examine the scope of CENTO itself as an indicator of the general cast of U.S. priorities for the region. In the first instance, as repeated U.S. policy statements were to emphasize, 'CENTO is an entirely different animal from NATO.'¹⁵¹ Its purpose, as summed up in one (1964) State Department position paper, subsists rather as a 'limited political instrument' which, 'helps to bind the regional powers politically and psychologically to the West.'¹⁵² As such, the alliance's direct military and security dimensions were, despite regional promptings, 'somewhat incidental.'¹⁵³ Thus, while Washington had concurred in a resolution, proposed at the ninth 'Ministerial Council' sessions in April, 1961,¹⁵⁴ for upgrading command structures to include 'a CENTO military directing agency' - on the lines of NATO's permanent military committee - and, similarly, a (four star rank) CENTO 'Supreme Commander', U.S. refusal to appoint a senior officer to the post was to leave the prospects for 'an appropriate and effective' military planning machinery

much as before.¹⁵⁵ Although a range of contingency schedules were, on a yearly basis, prepared by the 'Combined Military Planning Staff',¹⁵⁶ these were limited to developing 'basic assumptions...for a situation of global war.'¹⁵⁷ The restriction of CMPS terms of reference to 'aggressive threat[s]...instigated or supported by international Communism,'¹⁵⁸ would be questioned by the regional powers - and in particular, by Pakistan.¹⁵⁹ Such language though, as DOS policy guidance makes clear, was specifically framed 'to exclude planning against India.'¹⁶⁰

However, if CENTO was not to be in a position to fulfil some of the more encompassing regional ambitions and, after Suez, lose British enthusiasm for 'a NATO for the Middle East,'¹⁶¹ a range of projects and activities were undertaken that would approximate the original aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Dulles' aspirations for the 'Northern Tier'. These included a Turkey-Iran-Pakistan communications (microwave) link, Turkey-Iran road and rail infrastructure, the upgrading of regional port facilities and the establishment of a modern air traffic control system between Ankara, Tehran and Karachi.¹⁶² In concert with smaller technical and capital assistance programmes, U.S. economic aid to the CENTO area amounted to some \$55m. by 1964.¹⁶³ Whilst the latter projects could claim a generalized strategic return for U.S. regional policy, some direct - if limited - military benefits were also forthcoming from the periodic joint exercises, notably involving air defence (the semi-annual 'Shabhaz' series),¹⁶⁴ and the annual 'MIDLINK' series of alliance naval deployments in the Indian Ocean,¹⁶⁵ In addition, the CENTO framework would provide a useful political 'cover' for U.S. forces on occasional bilateral assignment in the region.¹⁶⁶

V. The Global Arena: McNamara, Mobility and Flexible Response.

The CENTO alliance, in providing for limited military co-ordination, an annual 'informal' meeting of ministers at the commencement of the UN General Assembly¹⁶⁷ and a focus for routine policy co-ordination at the State Department's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs¹⁶⁸ had thus far represented the extent of U.S. collective security diplomacy in South Asia. With the advent of the Kennedy administration, an expanded conception of U.S. regional interests would emerge that was to extend beyond the CENTO powers and encompass the wider boundaries of the Indian Ocean. The Democratic Presidency had brought with it a general belief in active government, conceived as a political counterpoint to its commitment to Keynesian economics. For security policy, a similar expression of expansible material means would be found in the revisions in strategic doctrine and military posture. The Kennedy administration's approach was, to be sure, attuned to developments independently occurring in both the region and in the wider context of great power relations. Also possessing its own dynamic, however, was the direction thus represented in U.S. national security thinking. Many now in the administration had been arguing for such an expansion of means since NSC 68.¹⁶⁹

To consider the regional implications of the Kennedy/Johnson programme, it is thus first necessary to turn to the administration's wider approach to security policy. Here, whilst the Kennedy campaign platform had made much of an alleged 'missile gap' between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the revisions inaugurated in government were to also reflect a more over-arching critique of defence policy, posture and strategic

doctrine, extending back throughout the Eisenhower/Dulles era. For Kennedy and his advisors, this was focused on both the 'imbalance' perceived in the paramount nuclear weapons emphasis of the 'New Look', and what were further seen as insufficient levels of capability for the strategic systems themselves. The perceived failings of both U.S. nuclear and conventional force levels under Eisenhower had been earlier featured in the November, 1957 'Gaither Report'¹⁷⁰ on 'Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age'. The report of the bi-partisan Presidential panel had voiced the widespread dissatisfaction in the Washington policy community with the inflexible doctrinal basis of Dulles' 'massive (nuclear) retaliation' strategy, as also with the Republican administration's equally inflexible commitment to fiscal conservatism. Both were to be addressed as the Kennedy administration's own defence outlay was to rise from an inherited \$47.4bn. (FY 1961) to \$53.3bn. for FY 1964,¹⁷¹ and embrace the full range of U.S. strategic, conventional and 'unconventional' warfare capability. The administration's conceptual aims, moreover, reflected a further differentiation from the objectives of U.S. national security policy adhered to under Dulles and Eisenhower. Paul Nitze, Chairman of the President's national security transition 'task force' and back in government as Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) had given public notice on what was to become a familiar theme. In concert with allied forces, Nitze observed, the administration's strategic programme, 'gives the West a definite nuclear superiority'. And furthermore, 'We...believe that this superiority can be maintained into the future.'¹⁷²

The attainment of strategic 'superiority' did not, as is clear from the above, mean a neglect of conventional forces by the administration. 'The paradox of atomic weapons', in the view of State's influential Director of Policy Planning, Walt W. Rostow, '...has

permitted the lesser powers degrees of bargaining freedom they would not have if military force had not taken so violent and discontinuous a technical leap.'¹⁷³ The imminent prospect that, as Rostow again observes, 'the arena of power will...become truly global'¹⁷⁴ was to figure strongly in the administration's revision of defence doctrine and procurement policy. In particular, these considerations would accelerate the development, long urged by Kennedy's chief military advisor and future CJCS, General Maxwell Taylor,¹⁷⁵ of strategically mobile forces. The new U.S. strategic doctrine - termed 'flexible response' - was articulated by Kennedy himself in the administration's first 'State of the Union'. Of central importance was a programme of increased air and sea transport capability,¹⁷⁶ which, the President announced, 'will better assure the ability of our conventional forces to respond, with discrimination and speed, to any problem at any spot...it will enable us to meet any deliberate effort to...divert our forces by starting limited wars on widely scattered parts of the globe.'¹⁷⁷

The civil component of the new administration's approach - and clearly complementary to policies pursued in both defence and the domestic economy - was a commitment to the global circulation of the 'Keynesian revolution'.¹⁷⁸ To demonstrate that the 'underdeveloped nations' can move successfully to economic growth 'within the orbit of the democratic world', was, in Walt Rostow's view, 'the most important single item on the Western agenda.'¹⁷⁹ Of particular moment was the fear that states unresponsive to the need for 'progressive' social-economic transformation would become 'the main focus of communist hopes.'¹⁸⁰ Precisely these concerns had been underscored by Nikita Khrushchev's January 6, 1961 foreign policy address proclaiming an era of 'wars of national liberation'. The Soviet leader's widely publicised speech had been delivered a

week before the Kennedy Inaugural. For Rostow, as for others in the Kennedy administration,¹⁸¹ the implications for U.S. policy were clear: 'our interests', as conceived in the March, 1962 draft 'Basic National Security Policy', '...are likely to be better served by accepting the risks of leaning forward toward more modern groups than the risks of clinging to familiar friends rooted in the past.'¹⁸²

For the littoral of the Indian Ocean region - home to one-third of the world's most 'underdeveloped' populations - the inclusion of an overtly 'modernist' component within the Kennedy administration's foreign policy architecture provided a conceptual unity previously lacking in U.S. policy. Taken in tandem with the revisions advanced in strategic doctrine and military posture, such a perspective would work to actively - if selectively - reassess U.S. relations with the regional states. Here, the issues surrounding the failings of 'massive retaliation' in deterring external threats to (and from) the 'lesser powers', the utility of mobile forces in confronting such threats and the administration's attraction to supporting 'progressive' local movements within, were to present an early challenge to U.S. policy in the context of Iran.

In considering Iran, a January, 1961 inter-agency report had concluded that 'vigorous action' on a range of domestic reforms was required by the Shah's regime to avert either a military coup or a revolutionary upheaval.¹⁸³ The latter prospect, with the potential for bringing together the suppressed 'Tudeh' (communist) party in alliance with the 'dissident urban middle classes'¹⁸⁴ had, indeed, been likened by Khrushchev himself to a 'ripe plumb'¹⁸⁵ waiting to drop for the Soviet Union. United States' pressure on Iran to allocate its budgetary priorities to civilian rather than military expenditure and

'strengthen its social and economic structure'¹⁸⁶ had, as we have seen, been pursued in successive policy directives of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.¹⁸⁷ The Dean Rusk State Department had, though, determined on a more active backing for reform, identified with Prime Minister Ali Amini, and was prepared to, 'make abundantly clear to [the] Shah that the achievement of Amini's initial objectives remain Iran's best hope for surmounting critical current economic and political problems.'¹⁸⁸ However, if the Shah's resistance to such efforts was, in the view of U.S. analysts, tempered by the conviction that, 'alignment with the West offers his best hope ...of assuring his dominance within Iran,'¹⁸⁹ a real, if essentially political threat from Soviet military pressure could not be discounted.¹⁹⁰ Moscow had, from August, 1961 begun to release confidential Baghdad Pact contingency documents secured after the (1958) Karim Qassem coup in Iraq.¹⁹¹ As these had suggested, in accordance with 'New Look' strategic orthodoxy, an early use of nuclear weapons,¹⁹² the McGeorge Bundy NSC was to thus examine the possibilities of developing a U.S. 'rapid reinforcement' capability to permit a greater range of conventional military options for contingencies in South West Asia.¹⁹³ In this way, the administration could also hope to deflect Iranian pressure for increased military aid and to 'shift the Shah's focus...to economic development.'¹⁹⁴

By 1963, the administration had, however, come to accept the Shah's own programme of domestic reform, the 'White Revolution', as offering the best hope for stability in Iran¹⁹⁵ and, accordingly, agreed a five year plan for the modernization of Iran's armed forces.¹⁹⁶ Washington was, though, resistant to Iranian requests for 'prestocking' U.S. military equipment to provide for possible joint contingencies.¹⁹⁷ However, if the prospects for a specific mobile forces capability for the Northern Indian Ocean were, at

this stage, in abeyance, a reaffirmation for the concept of strategic mobility itself would be found in the establishment of a U.S. (CONUS)-based mobile reserve - 'Strike Command' (STRICOM) - set up within Defense Secretary McNamara's 1963 reorganization of the 'Unified Command Plan'.¹⁹⁸ While the arguments for mobile strike forces had been much discussed in the services and the academic community, the configuration actually chosen was to stem from McNamara's internal DOD reforms and, in particular, the methodological innovations introduced by the newly formed JCS 'Special Studies Group'. McNamara had disestablished the system of individual service assessments of defence need in favour of a requirement to present joint position papers in the form of a 'Draft Presidential Memorandum' (DPM). The DPM was intended to establish a common ground for systems analysis with the JCS-SSG. One of the first assignments of McNamara's overall 'Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System' (DPPBS) was to put the case for strategic mobility on a scientific footing.¹⁹⁹

The resulting study, entitled 'The Rapid Deployment of Forces For Limited War' appeared in several phases from 1963-7. Within it, the SSG, according to Project Director Lawrence E. Lynn, 'posed threats in (given) contingency areas, for example, Korea, South East Asia and the Middle East...two basic strategies evolved: rapid deployment of troops immediately to blunt aggression, and the slow deployment of troops, to build a solid force in the country.'²⁰⁰ Thus equipped, McNamara had approached Congress from 1963 with a programme for a new class of heavy transport aircraft, the C-5A, complemented by 30 'Fast-Deployed Logistical Ships' (FDL's) to be prepositioned with supplies near likely theatres of conflict.²⁰¹ Questions of command structure, troop levels and inter-service responsibility accompanying the FDL programme

were, at this stage, deliberately left open. Although largely successful in securing the C-5A - 81 out of the requested 120 were authorized for FY 1965²⁰² - an initial \$131m. funding requirement to develop four FDL's was halved for Fiscal 1966 and finally rejected in the Defense Procurement Act for FY 1968.²⁰³ If the hopes of some in the DOD to produce a comprehensive 'rapid deployment' capability (as it became known) for STRICOM itself had been thus far restricted, an avenue for possible future development had also been indicated. Thus, whilst the overall methodological model for strategic mobility had been agreed between all the services, the task of determining modalities of logistical support had fallen to the Systems Analysis office of the U.S. Navy. Here, under the direction of (then) Cmdr. Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy's report had indicated that the principal 'contingency area' in most need of theatre logistics prepositioning lay in the Middle East.²⁰⁴ The natural points of access to the Middle East were to be found in the Indian Ocean.

However, whilst STRICOM in its present form had assumed a notional geographical responsibility for the Middle East, and the U.S. Navy, from 1963, would commit an occasional Carrier Task Group to participate in the 'MIDLINK' series of CENTO exercises in the Indian Ocean,²⁰⁵ the declared policy of the Johnson administration, approved in early 1964, to institute a more regular pattern of CTG transits was never fully implemented. The Navy was, by this stage, heavily committed to Vietnam,²⁰⁶ Secretary McNamara was, moreover, resistant to the large scale expansion of U.S. power in the region from the outset. The U.S. did not, as repeated 'National Intelligence Estimates' made clear, regard the Soviet threat to the Middle East/South Asian littoral as being primarily a military one.²⁰⁷ The political dangers posed by local nationalisms,

socio-economic 'instability' and 'subversion' throughout the Gulf region, South Asia and East Africa were, though, of more active interest to a Democratic administration concerned to establish a firm direction to the 'stages of economic growth' than to its more laissez-faire Republican predecessor. Under these circumstances, a fresh U.S. interest in supporting the British presence 'East of Suez' had emerged. Hereafter, if the increased U.S. perception of a broadly-figured strategic significance to the Indian Ocean region was proceeding necessarily, as it were, from the renascent globalism of the 'new frontier', its empirical development would owe much to the renewed perception of the Indian Ocean as a strategic unit found independently in Whitehall's regional defence planning.

VI. The Anglo-American Security System.

For Britain, a major strategic dilemma had been presented by the creation, in the aftermath of Suez and the Iraqi coup, of what was termed the 'Middle East Air Barrier' between bases in Europe and the range of commitments in the Far East and Indian Ocean. Accordingly, work had commenced between 1958-61 on a network of Indian Ocean facilities which served, together with the reorganized regional command arrangements,²⁰⁸ to restore to the area something of the strategic unity once derived from defence of India. For the Royal Navy, a carrier task group was to be permanently stationed in Singapore, complemented by a two-frigate force in Simonstown (South Africa)²⁰⁹ and an amphibious warfare squadron based at Aden.²¹⁰ The British Army's 'East African Command' was to spend £7.5m. from 1957-9, on extensive support facilities in Kenya.²¹¹ With Kenyan independence in 1964, the 6,000-strong garrison was

transferred to Aden, which would thus become the focus of forward planning for the Indian Ocean region. In March, 1962, Defence Minister Harold Watkinson had announced a 'fundamental change' in British Defence policy. Henceforth, British forces were to no longer be dispersed around the world 'in small pockets,' rather, there would be a 'concentration' of military posture, 'on three main bases from which to fan out by sea and air. These bases are Britain, Aden and Singapore.'²¹²

The new confidence with which the Macmillan government was pursuing its strategic aims in the Indian Ocean owed much to support from Washington. In December, 1961, Assistant Secretary Nitze was to stress the importance placed on Britain's continuing role in official exchanges and before the more public arena of Institute of Strategic Studies.²¹³ Events in the region itself had also seemingly born out Britain's theatre-mobile strategy. In July, 1961, 45 Royal Navy ships with attendant air and ground support were swiftly deployed to Kuwait in response to a possible Iraqi invasion.²¹⁴ Although the military threat from Iraq was perhaps overdrawn, the efficiency of Britain's response was commended by Secretary McNamara and JCS Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer.²¹⁵ Deepening U.S. involvement in Vietnam, McNamara was to tell a February, 1962 session of the Senate Military Appropriations Sub-committee, made it imperative that Washington not be 'isolated' as the only Western power on the Asian periphery.²¹⁶

If Britain's individual efforts in the Kuwait mobilization had received a favourable view from the Kennedy administration, the advent of further regional crises in October, 1962 would provide the stimulus for joint Anglo-U.S. security policy in the wider Indian

Ocean region. The outbreak of border hostilities between India and China had brought a prompt response from London and Washington. Following Prime Minister Nehru's October, 29 request for military aid, a British delegation, headed by former Defence Minister Duncan Sandys, had arrived in New Delhi to co-ordinate incoming supplies and assess longer term military needs for the Indian forces. Kennedy had released \$60m. U.S. military supplies from NATO stockpiles, invoking a section of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act on executive order.²¹⁷ The regional agenda for Anglo-U.S. defence co-operation was to be further developed at the December, 1962 Nassau Summit Conference between Kennedy and Macmillan²¹⁸ here, the agreement of a \$120m. joint military aid package to India had raised hopes, long nourished in Whitehall, of a more active Indian defence relationship with the Western powers. These hopes were not entirely misplaced. Between 1963 and 1965, the United States would provide some \$95m. in military aid, including equipment for six army divisions and an air-defence system.²¹⁹ Britain would, in November, 1963, deploy an RAF fighter squadron for air-defence exercises over New Delhi and Calcutta.²²⁰

On the civil side, the apparent breakdown of the 'Bandung' consensus also seemed to offer, for Washington, the opportunity to demonstrate the merits of a capitalist approach to the development process, as opposed to the statist programme being pursued in China's 'Great Leap Forward'. From the Policy Planning desk at the State Department, Walt W. Rostow considered societies poised for economic 'take off' as being particularly vulnerable to, 'the seizure of power by communist conspiracy.'²²¹ India, in Rostow's view, virtually a textbook case,²²² would thus be helped negotiate the 'transition' to economic growth by a sufficient use of Western financial inputs and

planning methodology. The Kennedy administration was to be generous with both. Overall, New Delhi would become the largest single recipient of U.S. aid programmes (export credits, Point 4, and PL 480) which would amount to some \$9,801bn. between 1951-71.²²³

However, despite the scale of U.S. aid efforts on the sub-continent, and their energetic promotion by U.S. ambassador J. K. Galbraith, there was to be no long-term increase in regional security co-operation. The prospects for an enhanced Indian strategic relationship with the West had, in any case, been more entertained in Whitehall than on Capitol Hill. A \$500m. Indian request for military aid, registered in 1963, made little progress despite endorsement by a Presidential commission.²²⁴ The requests of a May, 1964 Indian Military mission to Washington for procurement of a wide range of modern weapons systems were again deferred, under the influence of Pentagon concerns to retain the established military relationship with Pakistan.²²⁵ The increased focus on regional affairs by the State Department following the 1962 war, combined with the post-Nassau political amity with Britain had, though, set a point of departure for future U.S. security policy in the Indian Ocean. The possibilities of establishing a direct mobile forces capability for the region had already been raised within both the Defense Department's extensive 'strategic mobility' discussions and the localized circumstances of the U.S. security dialogue with Iran. It was within the more encompassing defence relationship with Britain however, that a process of, in one analysts's expression, 'continuous cross-fertilization' of strategic discourse²²⁶ would effect an operational programme for the Pentagon and Department of Defense out of Britain's own approach to the strategic mobility issue in the Indian Ocean.

For Whitehall, if most attention had been focused on the construction of land based facilities in Kenya and Aden, a parallel development of island -based air facilities was also envisaged; originally as a complement to the multi-purpose garrisons in East Africa and South Arabia, but increasingly, for both political and financial reasons, as an alternative. Despite the public pronouncements and the considerable (£20m.)²²⁷ financial investment in the Aden facilities, the possible end to Britain's tenure had been foreseen as early as 1962.²²⁸ The use of off-shore staging posts had first been proposed by RAF Transport Command in 1960.²²⁹ Against a background of intense funding rivalry with the Admiralty, air strategists were to adapt the scheme to include the projection of airpower and airborne forces in the Indian Ocean, utilizing a chain of Island facilities from the South Atlantic to Australia. Strongly prompted by the RAF, the Defence Ministry announced, in March, 1962, that it was conducting a feasibility study, involving surveys of Tristan da Cunha, Prince Edward Island and Aldabra.²³⁰ Other islands with existing or wartime air facilities were also considered, including Sal (Cape Verde Islands), Gan (Maldiv Islands), Socotra, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia and Mauritius. Masira Island, site of an operational RAF base, and the RAAF base on the Cocos Islands were looked to for possible expansion. In November, 1963, *The Times* was to report the setting of more detailed planning options for Aldabra.²³¹

The island-base strategy for the Indian Ocean was, at this stage, still strongly opposed by the British Admiralty.²³² It had also, however, acquired an international dimension. Discussions on the feasibility of joint Anglo-U.S. regional facilities were formally broached by DOD officials in early 1964.²³³ In July and August of that year, joint surveys were undertaken of likely locations, with Aldabra and Diego Garcia - site of

a small naval air station in World War Two - being selected as most suitable for future development.²³⁴ Whilst the immediate State/Defense initiative in concerting such plans owed much to political uncertainty surrounding the imminent British elections, a general U.S. strategic interest in Britain's Indian Ocean possessions was longstanding. Paul Nitze, when Director of Policy Planning in the Acheson State Department, had considered the possibility of leasing British island sites in the Indian Ocean for the theatre stockpiling of war-surplus U.S. matériel.²³⁵ In 1953, the merits of a joint island base structure for Gulf/Middle East contingencies had again arisen in inter-agency discussion of the Dulles 'Northern Tier' strategy.²³⁶ Within the Pentagon, Stuart B. Barber, Assistant Director of the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) 'Long Range Objectives Group', had begun a series of contingency studies for the region in 1960, in response to, 'a vacuum of realistic planning to meet possible future national and Navy needs in the Indian Ocean.'²³⁷ Also initiated through the CNO's office at this time, were the 'political efforts which kept Diego Garcia under British control...and led to the remarkably generous base rights agreement.'²³⁸

If the origins for what would become the 'remarkably generous' Anglo-U.S. agreements on the future of Diego Garcia are thus attributable to the Office of the Pentagon's Chief of Naval Operations, their final fruition owed much to inter-departmental support for the scheme from the State Department. By 1962, the CNO's planning had received formal endorsement from the Joint Chiefs.²³⁹ The more detailed assessment established by 1963 had contained schedules for construction funding (for FY 1964). These were not proceeded with at this stage due to doubts about the island's formal status in international law.²⁴⁰ The momentum for pursuing the scheme was,

however, a political rather than immediately military priority. Throughout 1964-5, U.S. pressure had been mounting on the Home and Wilson governments to remain militarily 'East of Suez', even at the expense of NATO commitments in Europe.²⁴¹ From both State and the NSC, the argument had thus gained ground that a symbolic U.S. involvement would add a further inducement to Britain retaining its regional defence role.²⁴² Aside from the wider politico-diplomatic considerations, Secretary McNamara - originally opposed to the 1960 CNO planning²⁴³ - was determined to avoid the further pressure for an expanded U.S. Navy presence in the Indian Ocean that would inevitably arise from a British withdrawal.²⁴⁴ Accordingly, in July, 1965, McNamara was to use the occasion of a Washington visit by (then Chancellor of the Exchequer) James Callaghan to develop a more detailed agenda for Britain's possessions in the Indian Ocean.²⁴⁵

Thus, on November 8, 1965, Whitehall was to issue an Order in Council creating a new administrative unit, termed the 'British Indian Ocean Territory' (BIOT). Reflecting the outcome of the several planning requirements since 1960, the 'territory' would consist of the Islands of Aldabra, Farquar and Desroches detached from the Crown Colony of the Seychelles, and those of the Chagos archipelago (including Diego Garcia) detached from the Dependency of Mauritius. 'These islands', Colonial Secretary Michael Stewart informed the House of Commons on November, 10, '...will be available for the construction of defence facilities by the British and United States governments.'²⁴⁶

For Secretary McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the case for Britain remaining militarily engaged in the Southern Hemisphere had gained increasing urgency with the expansion of Washington's own commitments in Vietnam. For the Wilson

Government, such considerations were to now become central to the political as well as strategic rationale for retaining, despite mounting Commons and Treasury opposition, a significant military posture in the Indian Ocean. The British Chiefs of Staff had earlier noted that Britain's claims to 'world power' were directly related to the 'privileged position we enjoy with the Americans' conveyed, in turn, by 'Britain's hold on the Middle East.' The first (December, 1964) Ministerial visit of Harold Wilson to the Johnson administration had found the Prime Minister informed on current U.S. thinking on the position. As placed before Parliament, this would reinvest the old 'special relationship' argument with a new twist. 'Our American allies,' Wilson had told the December, 16 sitting of the House, are not so impressed by our 'claims to be a world power' by a simple 'arithmetic of megatons,' rather, 'what does impress them is our ability to mount peace-keeping operations that no one else can mount.'²⁴⁷ However, if Wilson's Atlanticist arguments were becoming increasingly compromised by their identity with the U.S. role in Vietnam, Britain's own 'peace-keeping' capabilities were to be placed similarly in question by the intractable nationalist insurgency in Aden. Following repeated political and military efforts²⁴⁸ to negotiate a continuing presence in the South Yemen colony after the (January, 1968) deadline set for independence, Defence Minister Denis Healey had announced, in February, 1966, that Britain's withdrawal would be total.²⁴⁹ It was, though, a more mundane 'arithmetic' of successive British budget deficits that was to finally compel the Prime Minister to announce, on January 16, 1968, that British forces would be withdrawn from throughout the Persian Gulf and Far East by December, 1971.²⁵⁰

The U.S. pressure - sustained to the last²⁵¹ - to retain the British presence in the Indian Ocean was, as we have seen, matched by a parallel mobilization of Washington's own planning for the region. A close interest from the Departments of State and Defense was thus maintained in the fierce Whitehall competition over procurement policy for the Navy and Royal Air Force.²⁵² Here, Britain's April, 1965 decision to cancel the RAF's TSR-2 long range strike aircraft in favour of the American (General Dynamics) F-111A has raised strategic implications for future U.S. regional policy. If the primary U.S. interest was focused on Diego Garcia,²⁵³ the creation of the wider 'British Indian Ocean Territory' was also seen as facilitating the RAF's island base scheme. For Britain, the BIOT provisions were to be shortly followed by the 'Britain-Maldives Islands Agreement' of July 26, 1965 (for Gan),²⁵⁴ while British access would also be maintained to other existing bases in Bahrain, Mauritius and Masira Island.²⁵⁵ Entirely new facilities were to be developed on Aldabra. For the latter, reporting in the November, 1967 *Economist* suggested that, 'troop carriers could fly from Britain via the American base on the British island of Ascension...From Aldabra the planes could then fly to...Arabia and the Persian Gulf...for operations in East or Central Africa the island could also be used as a base for strike aircraft to support the infantry.'²⁵⁶ Such late advocacy is perhaps indicative of the depth of the Whitehall funding battle. On November 18, however, Denis Healey announced the abandonment of the Aldabra project in tandem with an overall £100m. reduction in defence spending for 1968-9.²⁵⁷

For Washington, doubts concerning the eventual realization of Britain's multi-island strategy had become stronger after the earlier defence cutbacks set out, along with the withdrawal from Aden, in the February, 1966 Defence 'White Paper'.²⁵⁸ The critical

item was the decision to cancel the Royal Navy's projected carrier programme,²⁵⁹ to be replaced by a theatre-deployed force of 12 F-111A's (out of the total order of 50). Future British operations in the region, it was announced, would only take place in co-operation with 'allies'.²⁶⁰ In acknowledgement of the likely direction that a future balance of (respective) capabilities was taking, a more specific Anglo-U.S. arrangement for BIOT was signed on December 30, 1966. In this, all the territories 'comprising British Indian Ocean Territory' would be made available to the U.S. government for, 'the defence purposes of both governments as they arise';²⁶¹ whilst the island(s) eventually selected for development were subject to a lease of 50 years, with the option of a 20 year extension.²⁶² In a classified note to the agreement, the United States, 'agreed to provide up to half the British "detachment" costs' - incurred in establishing the island territories - to an amount 'not exceeding \$14m.'²⁶³ The latter costs were to be met from the DOD's budgetary allocations, originally in the form of an incremental waiver for the standard 5% R&D surcharge on the April, 1963 'Polaris Sales Agreement', but finally, in view of Britain's financial distress, provided as a lump sum.²⁶⁴

Thus, following the final settlement of the legal status of Diego Garcia, the CNO's office submitted a detailed study of possible contingencies in the Middle East and Northern Indian Ocean to the Joint Chiefs for consideration in mid-1967. The base proposals, again drawn up by Stuart B. Barber, were centred on creating an oiling facility for carrier task forces in transit from Norfolk, Virginia, to 'Yankee station' off the coast of Vietnam. The 1967 'Indian Ocean Base Study' was, however, rejected by the systems analysis division at the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the grounds of cost (\$26m.) and marginal utility.²⁶⁵ In March, 1968, the JCS had prepared a modified

development plan for Diego Garcia, costed at \$19m., focusing on the need to span a VLF communications 'gap' between U.S. facilities at North West Cape (Australia) and Asmara (Ethiopia).²⁶⁶ Other possible functions, including ASW (P-3) patrols and reserve oil (POL) capability were also provided in a three-phase option schedule; extending from the *status quo* 'option "A"', to an ambitious \$55m. 'option "C"', involving forward submarine deployment, staging of ground forces, theatre logistics and air projection capabilities. Whilst the conscientiously medial communications' option ('option "B"') was to be again questioned by OSD's Systems office - on the grounds of imminent improvements in satellite technology²⁶⁶ - and further challenged in a joint State/Defense analysis of *U.S. Base Requirements in the 1970's* of December, 1968,²⁶⁷ the development was provisionally approved by DOD and the Pentagon, with final funding arrangements deferred for consideration under the incoming Nixon administration.

Conclusions.

Given the importance of Middle East oil resources in the post-war order, and the proximity of the Soviet Union, it is clear that some level of United States' strategic interest in the Indian Ocean was inevitable. There are, though, two aspects to the expression of such interest in the period we have been considering that deserve comment. Thus, what is striking in the first instance is the use of the private sector as the principal vehicle of U.S. foreign policy. Britain's attempts, at the height of the Cold War, to present the Middle East as an arena for forward containment were actively discouraged.

The second aspect concerns the foundation of a direct U.S. intervention capability in the Indian Ocean region during an era wherein the Soviet military threat had, if anything, actually diminished. The direction of Soviet policy in the early 1960's was, to be sure, somewhat unpredictable. The key variable at issue here, however, was surely the U.S. conviction that the attainment of strategic 'superiority' could - and should - become a permanent feature of the international system.

If this is taken as the point of departure for U.S. policy, a subsidiary logic then becomes apparent; relating to the optimum balance of integrated U.S. and allied capability within a given theatre of operations. The focus of policy thus shifts toward identifying the minimum conditions for a controlled U.S. strategic involvement in the Indian Ocean region, in order to deny the conditions for more uncontrolled military escalation. It is thus with some consistency that the McGeorge Bundy theatre-mobile force proposals appear in relation to the ambitions of the Shah, in tandem with the McNamara DOD's support for the British regional presence in relation to the ambitions of the U.S. Navy. At the end of the Johnson administration, the final expression of such strategic economy can be seen in the Navy's own programme for Diego Garcia in relation to what Stuart B. Barber candidly describes as more 'covert arrangements (by the Pentagon) for the...use of base facilities in populous, weak or unstable nations around the periphery,' which, the former CNO official concludes, would 'obligate us to support a new crop of ineffective dictatorial regimes in the Saigon style.'²⁶⁸

If the war in Vietnam had presented insurmountable practical difficulties for implementing a more comprehensive programme of U.S. military capability for the

Indian Ocean region, the signal absorption of U.S. strategic efforts in the Indo-China conflict had also placed the wider assumptions of United States' foreign and security policy in question. Overall, it was thus the uncertain returns from the Kennedy/Johnson administration's essay in differentiating locally the 'stages of economic growth' alongside a global military posture of 'flexible response' which had provided the growing momentum towards inter-agency acceptance of DOD and U.S. Navy planning perspectives for another potentially volatile area of the third world, notably by the State Department. As the next chapter will show, the new administration was to avoid the dilemmas of W. W. Rostow's 'takeoff' theorizing by downgrading concerns for the internal factor in foreign and security policy, if not ignoring it altogether. In the Indian Ocean, as elsewhere, the Nixon administration was to make a conspicuous virtue of its focus on external affairs. The differentiation of means was, rather, to be emphasized in military posture. The conventional provisions of flexible response were to be taken up by a restructured regional alliance system for the United States, notably, in Iran. The extent to which this new approach was to itself be subject to a range of wholly unforeseen political and strategic dilemmas will be considered in the following chapter.

CHAPTER ONE: FOOTNOTES

- 1) The Committee was set up in late December, 1941, after Pearl Harbour. It was to be heavily influenced, in both agenda and personnel, by the 'War and Peace Studies Project' established by the (non-governmental) Council on Foreign Relations on December 6, 1939. For an overview of CFR/DOS concepts for post-war planning, see Laurence Shoup/William Minter, *Imperial Brains Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review, 1977), pp.118-148.
- 2) See, Memorandum E-A10, October 19, 1940, CFR, War-Peace Studies, Baldwin Papers, Box 117, YUL; cited in Shoup/Minter *op.cit.*, p.128.
- 3) See, Henry R. Luce, 'Open Letter to the People of England', *Life Magazine*, October 1942.
- 4) For a summary of U.S. perspectives on the colonial issue, see, W.R. Louis, 'American Anti-Colonialism and the British Empire', *International Affairs*, Vol.61, No.3 (Summer, 1985) pp.395-420; see also the contemporary discussion on 'the new nations' in, *The United States in World Affairs* (New York: Harper/CFR, 1950), pp.350-80.
- 5) 'I'm sorry gentlemen', Truman had told Arab ambassadors after the November, 1945 Congressional elections, 'but...I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents'; quoted in Richard P. Stevens, *American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947* (Beruit: 1970), p.138. For an overview, see also Richie Owendale, 'The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1946', *International Affairs*, Vol.55, No.3 (July, 1979), pp.409-431.
- 6) See, for example, the account of the development of international economic regimes in, Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: PUP, 1984), pp.135-181. Keohane argues that the failure to establish a formal energy regime in this period planted 'the seeds of decay' for American power' (p.141).
- 7) Appreciation by the Foreign Office, India Office and Chiefs of Staff in preparation for the 1944 (Washington) Anglo-American oil talks, included in the FO *Monthly Middle East Summary* for March, 1944; cited in, Anthony Verrier, *Through the Looking Glass: British Foreign Policy in the Age of Illusions* (London: Cape, 1983), p.104. The provisional agreement, reached in the summer of 1944, was rejected after pressure from the domestic U.S. oil industry. See also, Keohane, *op.cit.*, pp.152-5.
- 8) The principal sceptic of Britain's military role in the Middle East was Attlee himself. 'The British Empire can only be defended by its membership of the United Nations', the Prime Minister had minuted colleagues on September 1, 1945, '...If the new organization is a reality, it does not matter who holds Cyrenaica or Somalia or who controls the Suez Canal'; see, Cab 129/1, CP (45) 144, 1 September, 1945 cited in, Raymond Smith/John Zametica, 'The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee reconsidered, 1945-7', *International Affairs*, Vol.61, No.2 (Spring, 1985) p.243.
- 9) The Chiefs of Staff, backed by Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, had threatened to resign if Attlee pressed ahead with plans to declare the Eurasian periphery of the USSR (Greece, Turkey, Iraq and Iran) a 'neutral zone' from which British and Soviet forces would both disengage. See, for example, Raymond Smith, 'A Climate of Opinion: British Officials and the Development of British Policy, 1945-7', *International Affairs*, Vol.64, No.4 (Autumn, 1988), pp.631-647.

- 10) See, Chiefs of Staff, 'Strategic Implications of an Independent and United Libya', COS (49) 381, 10 November, 1949, DEFE 5/18.
- 11) The fact that Ibn Saud's British support had originated from the India Office, in opposition to the support for the rival Hashemite rulers of Mecca from the War Office and Arab Bureau, had entered a certain ambivalence into British-Saudi relations from the outset. See, for example, H.V.F. Winstone, *The Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military Intelligence in the Middle East 1898-1926* (London: Cape, 1982).
- 12) The 'Red Line Agreement' of 1928 stipulated a 23.75% share of liftings for American firms in areas formally controlled by the Ottoman Empire. It was formally dissolved in 1947. See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Report*, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Senate MNC/Rep.*), section 1 - pp.33-45.
- 13) See, Saudi Arabia and the United States: The New Context in an Evolving 'Special Relationship' - Report for the House Sub-committee on Europe and the Middle East (CRS/For. Affairs National Defense Division) August, 1981, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981) (hereafter, *CRS 'Saudi Arabia'*), p.47.
- 14) Saudi Arabia had broken diplomatic relations with Britain from 1956-63 over claims to the Buraimi oasis (Oman/UAE) and the disputed Kuwait 'neutral zone'. See, J.B. Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers* (London: Faber & Faber, 1964).
- 15) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Foreign Assistance, *U.S. Military Sales to Iran: A Staff Report by Geoffrey Kemp/Robert Mantel*, 95th. Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *Iran Arms Sales Rep./1976*), p.4.
- 16) See, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS), 1946, vol. VII, pp.209-13; Report of Joint Strategic Survey Committee, February 10, 1946, CCS 092 United States 12-21- 45.
- 17) See, George F. Kennan, ("X") 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July, 1947); see also, John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York: 1972).
- 18) *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII, pp.289-494 passim.
- 19) See, for example, Amir Tahiri, *The Nest of Spies* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), pp.18-20.
- 20) The Tehran government was to reassert control over Azerbaijan in December, 1946 and annul Soviet oil concessions in the North in October, 1947.
- 21) Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to Maj. Gen John H. Hildring, October 12, 1946, in *FRUS*, 1946, Vol. VII, pp.529-532; also Memorandum of October 22, 1946, P&O Division, 218 JCS Files, 463.7 JLPC 33/38.
- 22) Memorandum prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, October 18, 1946, in *FRUS*, 1946 Vol. VII, pp.535-536.
- 23) See, *Iran Arms Sales Rep./1976*, *op.cit.*, p.10; see also Memorandum from Henderson to Acheson, October 18, 1947, in *FRUS*, 1947 Vol. V, pp.533-538.
- 24) The Congressional elections of November, 1946 had returned a Republican majority. See, for example, H. Bayard Price, *The Marshall Plan and its Meaning* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955).

- 25) See, Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton: 1980), pp.381-2; see also the account of divisions in the Attlee cabinet in, Smith/Zametica, *op.cit.*, pp.248-251.
- 26) See Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 219.
- 27) The President's Message to Congress, March 12, 1947, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman*, 1947, pp.176-180.
- 28) The Truman defence budgets went down from \$44.7bn. in FY 1946 to \$13.1bn. for FY 1947; for an account of budgetary priorities, see, Gaddis, 'Cold War', *op.cit.*, pp. 341-346.
- 29) See, *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. IV, pp.577-9, and U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Historical Series, Hearings in Executive Session: *Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine* (Washington: GPO, 1973).
- 30) See, for example, CAB 66/65 WP(45)256, 'Defence of the Middle East', 13 April, 1945; CAB 21/1964, COS(46)277(0), 'Turkey and Greece-Anglo American assistance', 13 November, 1946. The 'Russia Committee' of the Foreign Office had begun coordinating policy at Under-Secretary level from mid-1946. For a critical account of these findings, see, Ray Merrick, 'The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the Cold War 1946-47', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1985, Vol.20.
- 31) Memorandum of conversation between Loy Henderson and Ernest Bevin, September 9, 1947, in *FRUS*, 1947 vol. V., pp.496-502.
- 32) See, *FRUS*, 1947 vol. V., pp.485-626 (p.575).
- 33) *ibid.*
- 34) *ibid.*, p.576.
- 35) *ibid.*
- 36) Chiefs of Staff, 'Strategic implications of an independent and united Libya', COS(49) 381, 10 November, 1949, DEFE 5/18.
- 37) After Libyan independence in 1951, the U.S. retained use of the Wheelus Field air base and other facilities; Libya remained in the Sterling Area. See, *FRUS*, 1951 Vol. V., pp. 1332-1358.
- 38) COMIDEASTFOR was established in 1949 on facilities leased the Royal Navy base 'HMS Jufair' at Bahrain; it consisted of two destroyers and a sea-plane tender (USS Valcour) deployed on rotation. See, Lt. Comdr. P.W. DeForth (USNR), 'U.S. Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf: The Mideast Force Since World War II', *Naval War College Review*, October-November, 1975 pp.28-38.
- 39) *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. V., p.571.
- 40) *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. III, pp.135-6.
- 41) The Senate resolution (SR-239) was passed 64-4; whilst immediately aimed at securing public endorsement for decisions reached to form the Atlantic alliance, it also marked the final defeat of domestic 'unilateralism'. See, for example, Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy 1938-1980* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p.148.

- 42) The SIS station in Tel Aviv was set up in 1948, reportedly on Bevin's direct instruction; see, Verrier, *op.cit.*, p.97.
- 43) Nehru had refused an August, 1949 U.S. offer of arbitration on the Kashmir issue; see, USWA, *op.cit.*, p.417
- 44) For discussion of Anglo-U.S. policies toward the new state of Pakistan, see, Selig S. Harrison, 'India, Pakistan and the United States', *The New Republic*, August, 1959.
- 45) The formal approach to Egypt was made on October 13, 1951. See, *History of CENTO*; State Confidential Report, DOS, (31/3/64 - decl.21/9/81), draft: James Bullingham (hereafter, *DOS/CENTO*), p.2.
- 46) As Paul Nitze recalls, the Near East component of NATO 'Basic Assumptions for Global War' - based on earlier W.W.II planning - required that allied forces 'retreat to Suez, right away' from the outset of hostilities. Interview recorded with Paul H. Nitze, Washington, June 6, 1990.
- 47) Apart from the strategic arguments for retaining the Suez base, a further motive to extend NATO's ambit to the Middle East was found in British COS dissatisfaction at the 'distribution of four-star commands in the NATO area', which were heavily biased in favour of the Pentagon. Paul H. Nitze, interview; *op.cit.*
- 48) See, *DOS/CENTO*, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 49) NSC 68 was declassified in 1975; see, U.S. National Security Council, 'NSC 68: A Report to the National Security Council, April 14, 1950', *Naval War College Review*, May-June, 1975, pp.51-108, also reprinted in *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 1, pp.236-93.
- 50) *ibid.*, p.240.
- 51) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations [Hearings in Executive Session] *Reviews of the World Situation 1949-1950* (Washington: GPO, 1974) p.292, executive testimony of Dean Acheson.
- 52) *FRUS* 1950, Vol. 1, p.261.
- 53) Drawing an analogy with W.W.II, NSC 68 argues that, 'the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a higher standard of living'; *ibid.*, pp.256-58, 286. For discussion of the linkage of military and civil sector Keynesian policies in NSC 68; see, Paul Nitze, 'The Development of NSC 68', *International Security*, IV (Spring, 1980), pp.169-70.
- 54) NSC 135/3, 'Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security', September 25, 1952, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives (Washington).
- 55) Paul H. Nitze, interview; *op.cit.* Nitze had coordinated (and substantially, written) NSC 135/3.

- 56) NSC 135/3 had, though, stressed the dangers of 'Soviet political warfare', and the need to 'develop greater stability in peripheral or other unstable areas'.
- 57) Memorandum from (Colonial Secretary) Leo Amery to (Viceroy of India) Lord Linlithgow, 30 Jan., 1942, cited in Mansergh et-al (eds.), *The Transfer of Power 1942-47* (London: HMSO, 1970-83), Vol. 1 pp. 94-5; the memo continues, 'it looks as if the world were moving steadily towards more intensive forms of national organization, and if so our Empire may have to follow suit or fall into the hands of others.'
- 58) For a concise account of the 'Sterling-Dollar-Oil-Problem' see, Keohane, (1984) *op.cit.* pp.159-167; see also, Senate MNC/Rep., *op.cit.*, pp.45-57.
- 59) See, National Archives, Petroleum Division; 'Working Paper', *ibid.*, Near East Conference', December 20, 1949, p.4 (box 2, Record Group 59), cited in Keohane, pp.160-1
- 60) The key factor was the upturn in demand for oil after the outbreak of the war in Korea.
- 61) Remarks attributed to Andrew Lynch, U.S. Consul General for Libya in memorandum by Roger Allen, Head of the African Department, British Foreign Office, 9 May, 1951; FO 371/90386, cited in Louis, *op.cit.*, p.408. The U.S. had originally opposed Libya's joining the 'Sterling Area'.
- 62) Senate MNC/Rep., *op.cit.*
- 63) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 64) *ibid.*, p.83.
- 65) Exxon planning assessment of 1950, cited in *ibid.* The document also notes that the U.S. arrangements would 'avoid anything which looks like monopolistic abuse' and be 'an investment in future sound and satisfactory relationships' with the producer countries.
- 66) Acheson memorandum, August, 1950; cited in Senate MNC/Rep., *op.cit.*, pp.83-4.
- 67) *ibid.*, p.28.
- 68) *ibid.*, p.85.
- 69) Truman inaugural address, January 20, 1949, cited in USWA, (1949), *op.cit.*, p.96; Truman was introducing the 'bold new programme' of 'Point Four' aid, technical assistance and investment guarantees for the 'new nations'. For Point Four legislation; see, Harry S. Truman, *Message to Congress: Hs. Doc. No. 240*, June 24, 1949, 81st.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1950).
- 70) State Cable # 2862; Memorandum of conversation on Iran oil dispute of Secretary Acheson, Ambassador Harriman, Sir Anthony Eden and Sir Pearson Dixon (Secret), DOS, (14/11/51) to: Acting Secretary Webb, from: Ambassador Bruce (Paris). The cable regrets that 'British (government) judgements were formed by the the advice of the very men who had led British policy into the present trouble', and stresses that 'we (USG) were absolutely convinced that AIOC could not (rpt. not) return (to Iran).'
- 71) NSC 54: *The Position of the United States with Respect to Iran*, July 21, 1949 (Declassified).
- 72) See, Memorandum of conversation among Truman, Acheson, the Shah, and Hussein Ala, November 18, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, Vol. VI, pp.572-574; Memoranda of conversations among the Shah, Acheson, Ala and others, November 18, 1949, in *ibid.*, pp.574-579.

- 73) See, Telegram from Acting Secretary Webb to Embassy Tehran, October 6, 1950, in *FRUS* 1950, vol. V, pp.604-605; see also, *Department of State Bulletin* (DSB), October 30, 1950, p.703; Telegram from Grady to Acheson, October 12, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, Vol. V, pp.605-607.
- 74) Britain was preparing to mount an amphibious landing at the Abadan oil terminal, backed by an airborne force in Eastern Iran landed from bases in Iraq and Pakistan. Cabinet papers for 1951, summarized in the *Guardian* and *Daily Telegraph* (2/1/81), detail the extent of U.S. opposition to the plan.
- 75) State Cable # 380 (Top Secret/NODIS), DOS, (25/7/51-decl. 3/83), to: Harry Truman/Dean Acheson, from: Avril Harriman.
- 76) Memorandum of conversation among Sir Oliver Franks (British Ambassador) and Dean Acheson/John Jernegan (NEA), (Confidential), DOS, (11/8/52-decl.3/83), from: John D. Jernegan, subject: *Message from Mr Eden to Mr. Acheson regarding Iran*; the memorandum records that, 'the only resemblance I (Jernegan) could see between the aide memoire we had given to the British government and Mr. Eden's reply was that they were both written on paper with a typewriter.'
- 77) State # 380, *op.cit.*
- 78) See, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman*, 1951, pp.298-299, 324, 347, 365-367; *DSB*, May 28, 1951, p.851; *ibid.*, June 4, 1951, pp.891-892; *ibid.*, July 9, 1951, p.73.
- 79) State # 2862, *op.cit.*, pp.2-3.
- 80) Memcon, 'Message from Mr. Eden', *op.cit.*
- 81) NSC 136/1, United States Policy Regarding the Present Situation in Iran, November 20, 1952 (Top Secret); cited in, *The Evolution of the U.S.-Iranian Relationship(B): A Survey of U.S.-Iranian Relations; 1941-79*, State Report (Top Secret/NODIS), IRN, (1980-decl.11/4/83) (hereafter, *IRN/Iran Survey*), pp.13-14.
- 82) Whilst the CIA's somewhat overdrawn account of 'Operation Ajax' - for example, Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup* (NY: McGraw/Hill, 1979) - was to later rebound on U.S. policy, the action was planned and largely executed by SIS ('Operation "Boot"'); see, Verrier. *op.cit.*, pp.107-8. The clear preference of the Truman administration was for a bilateral arrangement with the National Front, which had been provisionally concluded by Paul Nitze (at State) with Mossadeq during the latter's (October, 1951) visit to Washington. As Nitze recalls, 'we did get a deal worked out with Mossadeq', which the Iranian Prime Minister then 'wrecked - much to my horror.' Paul H. Nitze; interview, *op.cit.*
- 83) See, Senate MNC/Rep., *op.cit.*, pp.57-77.,
- 84) As compared with 45% in 1951; see, Verrier,*op.cit.*, p.109.
- 85) See, *DSB*, v.28, June 15, 1953, pp.831-835.
- 86) The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, had formerly been ambassador to Washington. See, DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 87) The Soviet press had given prominence to historic Russian claims on the Kars region of Northern Turkey; Moscow had also, in 1946, demanded a revision of the 1936 Montreux Convention to obtain privileged rights of transit (for certain classes of warship) through the Straits of the Bosphorous. See, USWA (1949), *op.cit.*, pp.387-388.

- 88) See, DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, pp.3-5; see also Harrison, *op.cit.*, pt. 1. Harrison notes that Pakistan Embassy officials had attended staff talks at the Pentagon in March, 1952; this was followed up by a visit from the Pakistan Army's Master General of Ordinance, Shahid Hamid.
- 89) For text, see, *Documents on American Foreign Relations* (DAFR) 1954, pp.373-374, 379-383.
- 90) Eisenhower statement, February 25, 1954, cited in *The United States in World Affairs*, 1954 (New York: Harpers/CFR), p.324.
- 91) This had amounted to \$152,545,000 from 1947-9; see, *USWA* (1949), pp.388-9.
- 92) For text, see, *DSB*, v.30, May 17, pp.772-773.
- 93) *USWA* (1954), *op.cit.*, p.344.
- 94) For text, see, *DOS/CENTO*, section 111, p.105.
- 95) *ibid.*, p.10.
- 96) Under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of July 27 1954, the deadline for total British withdrawal was 20 months.
- 97) With the withdrawal from Suez had come an increased need for staging posts between Cyprus and Aden; see, Philip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez* (London: RUSI/OUP, 1973) pp.65-6. A further factor was the Churchill cabinet's decision, on June 16, 1954 to produce a British hydrogen bomb; this was made public in the February, 1955 Defence White Paper (Cmnd 9391).
- 98) The H-bomb decision had placed a premium on the need for forward air bases, particularly in view of the COS' abandonment of the 'broken backed' concept of intermediate nuclear exchange. See, Michael Carver, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945* (London: Hutchinson, 1992), pp.36-40.
- 99) FO, *Special Agreement between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Iraq*, Cmnd 9544 (1955).
- 100) See, DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.9.
- 101) State Cable # 000460 (Secret), DOS, (17/9/55-decl.21/9/81) to:USEmb/Tehran, from:Dulles, p.4; the cable also records that, 'U.S. cannot commit itself to conditions...relating to military problems which cannot be settled outside regional context (requiring formal U.S. border guarantees) and others which are not germane, e.g. (Iran's own claim on) Bahrain' (p.1), and, 'U.S. desires to separate question (of) adherence to (the) Baghdad Pact from level of military aid'(pp.4-5).
- 102) *ibid.*, p.1.
- 103) *ibid.*
- 104) *New York Times*, November 20, 1955, 66:1

- 105) The constraints on U.S. policy and overall thinking behind 'Northern Tier' were given to the Shah by Dulles at a meeting in Pakistan. See; Memorandum of Conversation among Secretary Dulles and the Shah of Iran (Secret), DOS, (9/3/56 -decl.21/9/81). Responding to 'an almost emotional plea for United States' financial assistance', Dulles observes that, 'there (were) a good many countries in the world which regarded themselves as the most critical spot...if all these things were added up the total would be of astronomical proportions'; moreover, 'the American people generally did not appreciate the significance of the Middle East and South Asia...It was particularly difficult during a political year to get Congress...(to)...perhaps unbalance our budget in order to help some foreign people'(pp.1-2).
- 106) For Dulles, the essence of the 'New Look' involved 'a selection of military means, rather than a multiplication of means' and, critically, 'more basic security at less cost'; John Foster Dulles, speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954, *DSB*, XXX (January 25, 1954), 108; see also John Foster Dulles, 'Policy for Security and Peace', *Foreign Affairs*, XXXII (April, 1954), pp.357-359.
- 107) The President's Press conference, January 12, 1955, *Public Papers of the Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower*, p.57.
- 108) From table prepared from U.S. statistical abstracts cited in, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War National Security Policy*, (New York: OUP, 1982), p.359.
- 109) NSC 68 (FRUS v.1/50), *op.cit.*, pp.252-253.
- 110) *ibid.*, pp.241-242.
- 111) See, Gaddis 'Strategies', *op.cit.*, pp.174-5. 'They're not ready for war and they know it', Eisenhower had observed in 1955, '...That...tends to make people conservative'; Hagerty Diary, February 8, 1955, Hagerty Papers, Box 1, cited in *ibid.*, p.389 n.30
- 112) See, *USWA*, (1955), p.156
- 113) The Soviet Union also charged that Iran's accession was, 'incompatible...with certain treaty obligations of Iran' - a reference to the Soviet Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 1921, and the Soviet Iranian Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality of 1927. This was denied by Iran in an exchange of notes of November, 26 and December 7, 1955; see, *New York Times*, October 13, 1955, see also DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, pp.11-12.
- 114) State # 000460, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 115) *ibid.*
- 116) *ibid.*, p.4.
- 117) Sir Anthony Eden, *Full Circle* (London: Cassell, 1960) p.220.
- 118) 539 HC Deb., 4 April 1955, col.897.
- 119) 539 HC Deb., 4 April 1955, col.854-5.
- 120) The concept of attacking Russia from the Middle East had been developed by FO and COS partly in response to Attlee's 'neutral zones' proposals; see, for example, Smith/Zametica, *op.cit.*, pp.246-251.

- 121) COS strategic assessment in, Cab 131/2, DO (46) 47, 2 April, 1946; the document notes, 'Of those areas in which we can reasonably expect to maintain our influence in peace the Middle East is the nearest to the important Russian industrial and oil producing areas of Southern Russia and the Caucasus.'
- 122) Chiefs of Staff, 'Strategic implications of an independent and united Libya', COS(49)381, 10 November, 1949, DEFE 5/18.
- 123) Britain offered Jordan a revision of the 1946 security treaty and an increased subsidy; see, DOS/CENTO *op.cit.*, pp.15-16.
- 124) Dulles' view of U.S. policy as a 'tightrope...between our old and valued relations with our British and French allies' and such 'newly independent countries' is recorded in, National Security Council, 302 Meeting, Nov. 1, 1956, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman file, cited in Louis *op.cit.*, p.415.
- 125) Paul H. Nitze, 'interview', *op.cit.*; Nitze recalls Dulles' efforts to establish a personal contact with Nasser, including the gift of a brace of antique pistols.
- 126) See, Robert Engler, *The Politics of Oil* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp.259-63.
- 127) Memorandum by Makins, 25 January, 1954, Cab 129/66.
- 128) See, for example, Peter Piy, *Israel's Nuclear Arsenal*, (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp.11-27. The extent of this collaboration, which was broken off by de Gaulle after the 1967 war, was known to USG and contributed to the strong opposition to France's own nuclear weapons found under the Kennedy administration.
- 129) See, Verrier, *op.cit.*, p.125. The plan had been shown to the U.S. Embassy in order to emphasize the seriousness of Britain's position. Its release to (General) Hakim Amer can be explained, as Verrier suggests, 'by Dulles' insistence on thwarting Britain by any means to hand' (*ibid.*).
- 130) NSC minutes, October 4, 1956 (NSC Series), cited in, Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, the President* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1984), p.357.
- 131) NSC 302 meeting, November 1, 1956, cited in *ibid.*, p.363.
- 132) At a Treasury meeting of November, 7 (chaired by Macmillan), it was estimated that to maintain oil supplies from Western Hemisphere sources would cost an additional £800m. over a six month period. See, (PRO) T 236/4189, cited, in Richard Lamb, *The Failure of the Eden Government* (London: Sigewick, 1987), p.280.
- 133) Lamb, *ibid.*, pp.281-99.
- 134) Paul H. Nitze, 'interview', *op.cit.*
- 135) *ibid.*
- 136) Commencement address by John Foster Dulles, Iowa State College, June 9, 1956 in; *New York Times*, June 10, 1956.

- 137) Memorandum, Eisenhower conversation with Sen. Styles Bridges, May 21, 1957, Eisenhower papers, Whitman File: DDE Diary, Box 13, 'May 57 Misc (2)'; cited in Ambrose, *op.cit.*, p.380. In putting the case, Eisenhower observed that, otherwise, 'how much have we got to put into India to make it reasonably safe for them even to exist?'.
- 138) *ibid.*
- 139) See, DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.24.
- 140) The phrase of Sen. Bridges, used in the above context, was responsible for the Senator being called to the Oval Office.
- 141) See, Public Law 86-7, 85th.Cong., H.J. Res 117, March 9, 1957: *Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East*; Sec. 2, text in, DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, pp.108-9.
- 142) *ibid.*
- 143) *Oil and Gas Journal*, February 25, 1957, p.78; for discussion, see, Keohane, *op.cit.*, pp.172-174.
- 144) The mission of Presidential Special Ambassador James P. Richards had resulted in an immediate \$12.57m. in aid for CENTO capital projects; for documents see, *American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1957*, DOS Publication 7101 (Washington: GPO, 1961) pp.831-871.
- 145) DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.26.
- 146) Iraq was not to formally withdraw from the Pact until March 24, 1959; see, *The Middle East*, 1962, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1962, p.131.
- 147) Dulles also expressed the opinion that Iraq's participation in the Pact had been a mistake from the beginning, because it was a 'liability' for the Nuri Said government; see, Memorandum of conversation, leaders of delegations to Fifth Ministerial Council Session, July 17, 1958, in; Briefing Book for the Session (USDEL/MC/14), cited in DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.28.
- 148) Declaration of the Fifth Session of the Council, Lancaster House, London (28/7/58), article 1, text cited in *ibid.*, p.106.
- 149) Article 4, in *ibid.*, p.107; according to State Department press briefings, acceptance of articles 1 and 4 were 'as close' as U.S. formal adherence could become without presenting the Pact before the Senate to be ratified as a treaty. See, *New York Times*, July 30, 1958, 1:6.
- 150) The three 'executive agreements' committed the U.S. to 'take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East' (article 1), text in DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.105. A major factor behind the agreements was pressure from the Shah of Iran for increased military aid provisions and a formal U.S. treaty guarantee; see, IRN/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, pp.31-32
- 151) DOS/CENTO *op.cit.*, p.48
- 152) *ibid.*
- 153) *ibid.*

- 154) Document CD/64/D1, cited in *ibid.*, pp.38-40.
- 155) A British offer to fill the post was rejected by Pakistan; *ibid.*, p.39.
- 156) The CMPS reported to the 'Permanent Military Deputies Group', renamed the 'Military Committee in Permanent Session' in April, 1961; see, doc C/7/D7, cited in *ibid.*, pp.73-4.
- 157) Doc CD/61/D28, cited in *ibid.*, p.61.
- 158) Discussion in *ibid.*, p.62.
- 159) *ibid.*
- 160) *ibid.*
- 161) The UK had, though, committed two squadrons of Canberra bombers, based on Cyprus, for CENTO contingencies; *ibid.*, p.61.
- 162) *ibid.*, pp.53-58.
- 163) *ibid.*, p.58; the paper notes however, that opposition from the GAO 'make(s) it doubtful that the U.S. will finance any more major CENTO capital projects'(p.57).
- 164) *ibid.*, p.76; these were inaugurated in 1959.
- 165) *ibid.*, p.61; 'Midlink IV' of October, 1963 involved a U.S. carrier (USS 'Essex') for the first time.
- 166) *ibid.*, p.77; the paper notes that, 'exercises which are essentially bilateral in nature, such as the U.S.-Iranian exercise "Delever" of April, 1964, may be placed under the "CENTO umbrella" for political purposes.'
- 167) *ibid.*, p.40.
- 168) *ibid.*, p.98.
- 169) Notable amongst those connected with NSC 68 were, Dean Acheson (special advisor to the President), Dean Rusk (Secretary of State) and Paul Nitze (Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA); see, for example, Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, (Boston:1965), pp.153,155-7.
- 170) NSC 5724, *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*: A Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee, November 7, 1957, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives. Whilst originally commissioned to examine possible civil defence measures for nuclear war, the Panel's recommendation of a \$44.bn. overall defence budget increase (over 5 years) would be central to attacks on the 'New Look' mounted by Senate Majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson. See also, Morton H. Halperin. 'The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process, *World Politics*, Vol. XIII, No.2 (April, 1961), pp.360-84.
- 171) See, Gaddis, 'Strategies', *op.cit.*, p.226.

- 172) Paul Nitze, address to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (London), December 11, 1961, Kennedy Papers, NSC File, Box 273 'Department of Defense'; cited in, William W. Kaufman, *The McNamara Strategy* (Washington: 1964), pp.108-110. Nitze was also Director of the DOD 'Limited War Study Committee' whose report of February, 1961, had favoured increased conventional forces on both military and macro-economic grounds; see, 'Limited War Study sees use for Billions', *Washington Evening Star*, February 14, 1961.
- 173) Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (London/NY: CUP, 1960), p.125.
- 174) *ibid.*, p.128.
- 175) See, Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1959).
- 176) A supplemental request for \$172m. in airlift modernization funding was placed in February, 1961; see, U.S. Cong., Hs., *Message from the President on Recommendations related to our Defense Budget*, Doc 123, 87th.Cong. 1st.Sess., (Washington: GPO 1962), p.13.
- 177) *Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy*, January 20-December 31, 1961, (Washington: GPO, 1961), p.24.
- 178) See, Rostow 'Stages' *op.cit.*, pp.89,155.
- 179) *ibid.*, p.134.
- 180) *ibid.*
- 181) See, for example, Dean Rusk, speech at University of California (Berkeley) March 20, 1961, *DSB XLIV*, (April 10, 1961), Schlesinger, 'Thousand Days', *op.cit.*, p.558.
- 182) S/P draft, 'Basic National Security Policy', March 26, 1962, Lyndon B. Johnson papers, V/P-Security File, Box 7, L.B.J. Library; cited in Gaddis, *op.cit.*, p.204.
- 183) Memorandum from Morgan to Bundy, 'Iran', March 27, 1961 (Secret); 'A Review of Problems in Iran and Recommendations for the NSC', May 15, 1961 (Secret).
- 184) *ibid.*
- 185) State Cable # 00211 (Secret/LIMDIS), DOS, (22/10/61-decl. 21/9/81), to: SecState, from: USEmb/Syria (Ridgeway B. Knight).
- 186) NSC 54 (1949), *op.cit.*
- 187) NSC 5703/1 'U.S. Policy Toward Iran', February 8, 1957 (Top Secret); Memorandum of Discussion at NSC meeting, September 18, 1958 (Top Secret); NSC 5821/1, 'U.S. Policy Toward Iran', November 13, 1958 (Top Secret); NSC 6010, 'U.S Policy Toward Iran', June 8, 1960 (Top Secret); cited in, IRN/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, pp., 28, 30, 32-3.
- 188) State # 00211, *op.cit.*
- 189) See, *The Soviet Threat to Iran and the CENTO Area*; Special National Intelligence Estimate # 11-12-61, (Secret), CIA, (5/10/61-decl.23/1/86), sec.12, p.3.

- 190) The CIA notes that, 'Iran is the most vulnerable target for a Soviet attempt to undermine CENTO', albeit, 'We believe that the Soviet threats against CENTO should be considered primarily as part of a general Soviet policy of intimidation...the primary pressure point of which is Berlin'; SNIE/1961, *ibid.* sec.10, sec.4.
- 191) *ibid.*, sec.1-4; the CIA notes that, 'certain of the documents which the Soviets are exploiting are authentic and have almost certainly been in their possession for a number of years'; see also, DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.40.
- 192) As the CIA further observes, 'these papers purported to prove...that Baghdad Pact plans for nuclear attacks on the USSR would involve an "atomic death" raining on Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan...The Soviets have also charged that CENTO plans call for the partitioning of Afghanistan between Iran and Pakistan'; SNIE, *ibid.*
- 193) State Cable # 1293 to Tehran, May 29, 1961 (Secret); cited in IRN/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.35. A pre-generic usage of the term 'rapid deployment' occurs in Kennedy's more public Congressional request for strategic mobility funding. The President notes that, 'The Army is developing plans to make possible a much more rapid deployment of a major portion of its highly trained Reserve forces. When these plans are completed and the Reserve is strengthened, two combat -equipped divisions, plus their supporting forces, a total of 89,000 men, could be ready in an emergency for operation with but three weeks notice.' See, John F. Kennedy, 'Special Message to Congress', May 25, 1961; 'Public Papers', *op.cit.*, (Washington: GPO, 1962-4), Vol.1, p.401.
- 194) State Cable '# 1293', *op.cit.*
- 195) Message; the President to the Shah, February 13, 1963; Memorandum, Bundy to Rusk *et al*, 'NSAM 228', March 14, 1963 (Unclassified); SNIE 34-63 'The Iranian Situation', April 10, 1963 (Secret).
- 196) See, Iran Arms Sales Rep/1976, *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 197) Letter; the Shah to the President, June 1, 1963 (Confidential), in IRN/Iran, *op.cit.* p.38.
- 198) U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 2440*, 88th.Cong. 1st.Sess. 1963 (Washington: GPO, 1963), pp.454-458.
- 199) See, 'Secretary McNamara Reports Progress, Future Plans for National Military Airlift', *Armed Forces Journal and Register*, 100 (August 10, 1963), pp.16-19. Details of the extensive Pentagon debate on strategic mobility appear in, Richard M. Rainey, *Mobility--Airlift, Sealift and Prepositioning*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1966).
- 200) See, 'Airlift/Sealift Capacity Grows, but Problems Remain in Some Areas', *Armed Forces Management*, April, 1967, pp.93-99.
- 201) HASC, 'H.R. 2440' *ibid.* The respective utility of air and sea mobility systems was closely argued in the Pentagon. For the Navy's contribution, a 1964 study of 'Logistic Support of Land Forces'(LOGLAND) was to press the case for FDL prepositioning in 'forward objective areas' of potential conflict; see, Tom Klein, 'The Capacity to Intervene', in Rodberg/Shearer (eds.), *The Pentagon Watchers* (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p.193.
- 202) See, Alain C. Enthoven/K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969* (New York: Harper, 1971), pp.236-8.

- 203 Secretary McNamara had argued that the FDL had, 'opened up the possibility of an entirely new rapid deployment strategy in which sealift would play a much more prominent role' (Statement of Robert S. McNamara before HASC, January 28, 1968, p.140), for Congressional critics however, this was precisely the point at issue. 'If Americans find it easy to go anywhere and do anything', Senate ASC Chair Richard Russell observed, 'they will always be going somewhere and doing something,' see, *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1967, pp.7511-12; see also, 'Report of MCPL', *Congressional Record* (Senate), June 27, 1980, pp.2-3.
- 204) Zumwalt was director of the 'Studies and Analysis Group' reporting to the CNO's Office of Program Appraisal (1965) and Special Assistant for Strategic Mobility to the JCS (1966); see, Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis*, (New York: 1973), p.51, see also, R.L. Madhouse, 'The FDL Surfaces Again', *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (June, 1968), pp.54-66.
- 205) See, Gary Sick, 'The Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean Regions', in Alvin .Z. Rubinstein (ed.), *The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p.54. The changes in command structure, wherein CINCSRIKE also assumed CINCMEDAFSA after December, 1963, were strongly contested by the Navy, which lost operational control over the MIDEASTFOR. See, Congressional comments in; U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1965*, 88th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1964) pt.4, p.315.
- 206) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Near East and South Asia, *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean: Hearings*, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*), p.3, statement of J. Owen Zurehellen (DD/ACDA).
- 207) As 195n.; SNIE/1965 notes that, 'The USSR's longstanding campaign against CENTO arises essentially from Soviet political ambitions in the Middle East, rather than concern over the alleged military threat of CENTO', *ibid.*, sec.5.
- 208) The restructured Middle East Command, established at Aden, was responsible for all the British land and air forces in British Somaliland and the Arabian peninsula, and naval forces in the Persian Gulf; 573 HC Deb., 10 July, 1957, coll. 49-50. By 1957, restrictions on former RAF staging posts in Ceylon (Katunayake), India (Dum Dum) and Pakistan (Karachi) had led to the reestablishment of air facilities on Gan (Maldives Is.); see, *Times*, January 4, 1957, *Guardian*, April 4, 1957.
- 209) MOD, *Exchange of Letters on Defence Matters between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa*, June, 1955, Cmnd 9520.
- 210) See, 'Britain's Defence Emphasis Shifts East', *Times*, March 15, 1960.
- 211) See, Darby, *op.cit.*, pp.279-80.
- 212) 655 HC Deb., coll. 46-7.
- 213) In Nitze's view, it was more important that Britain maintain its present force levels in the Middle East than in Germany. Nitze address cited in Kaufman, 'McNamara', *op.cit.*, pp.108-10; see also 'Defence in 1962', *Times*, December 28, 1961.
- 214) The Iraqi threat was in response to the signing of a new Anglo-Kuwait treaty of 'close friendship' - in effect, formal independence - on June, 20. See, Anthony Verrier, *An Army for the Sixties*, (London: Cape, 1966), pp.225-7

- 215) See, *Times*, February 16, 1962.
- 216) See, *Sunday Times*, February 25, 1962.
- 217) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on National Security and Scientific Developments, *The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future: Hearings*, September 20, 1971, 91st.Cong. 1st.Sess., (Washington: GPO, 1971) (hereafter, *Hs.Indian Ocean Hgs./71*), p.51, testimony of Ambassador Chester Bowles.
- 218) HC, Fourth Report...Session 1962-1963: *Spring Supplementary Estimates* (1963), p.56, para.232; Britain's willingness to consider sending ground troops in the event of further 'aggression' by China was reported in the *New York Times*, November 2, 1962.
- 219) See, Stephen P. Cohen, 'South Asia and U.S. Military Policy' in, Rudolph & Rudolph (eds.), *The Regional Imperative* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Humanities Press, 1980), p.104.
- 220) Darby, *op.cit.*, p.232; India announced its acceptance of a U.S.-British air-defence plan, including provisions for Western reinforcements, on July 22, 1963; see, *New York Times*, July 23, 1963.
- 221) W.W. Rostow, 'Stages', *op.cit.*, p.163.
- 222) *ibid.*, pp.45-50.
- 223) B.N Banerji, *Foreign Aid to India* (Delhi: Agara Prakashan, 1977), p.131.
- 224) U.S. Department of State, *The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programmes: A Report to the President from the Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World* (Washington: GPO, 1963), p.81.
- 225) The Indian Mission was headed by Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan; see, Bowles/Indian Ocean Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.51.
- 226) Darby, *op.cit.*, p.294.
- 227) *Daily Telegraph*, March 20, 1963.
- 228) See, Verrier, 'Army' *op.cit.*, pp.261-2; some thought was also given at this time to developing a base in Western Australia.
- 229) The Author of the Scheme was ACM. Sir Edmund Huddleston (Vice-Chief of Air Staff); see, *Times*, November 4, 1963, *Guardian*, November 4, 1963.
- 230) 655 HC Deb, 5 Mar. 1962, col.48.
- 231) *Times*, November 4, 1963.
- 232) Darby, *op.cit.*, p.264.
- 233) The British Cabinet had agreed to establish 'British Indian Ocean Territory' in May, 1964. See, Sick, 'Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.54; *Guardian*, August 3, 1964, *Observer*, August 30, 1964, *Washington Post*, August 30, 1964.
- 234) *Observer*, August 30, 1964.
- 235) Paul H. Nitze, 'Interview'; *op.cit.*

- 236) These discussions took place at the Faculty of International Studies at Princeton. Summing up the proceedings, Paul Nitze observes that, 'from the political standpoint, we hadn't done badly (in the Middle East)', although in military terms it was felt that 'we hadn't dealt sufficiently with the base structure,' *ibid.*
- 237) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Near East and South Asia, *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean: Hearings*, February-March 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*), p.174, correspondence from Stuart B. Barber, March 16, 1974.
- 238) *ibid.*
- 239) See, U.S. General Accounting Office, *Financial and Legal Aspects of the Agreement on the Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes: Report of the Comptroller General of the United States*, January 7, 1976, (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *GAO/Rep.*), p.4.
- 240) *ibid.*
- 241) *Daily Telegraph*, April 9, 1965; *Times*, June 18, 1965.
- 242) *Washington Post*, August 30, 1964, November 7, 1964.
- 243) See extended account of the debate in, *Times*, December, 10, 19, 1965, January 25, 26, 28, 1966.
- 244) McNamara was aware that impending 'block obsolescence' amongst classes of U.S. Navy warships would be used to argue for an increased building programme to cover the Indian Ocean. A 1962 U.S. Naval War College analysis of the issues concluded that the Indian Ocean should remain a charge upon Britain; see, Verrier, 'Army' *op.cit.*, p.262n.
- 245) *Guardian*, July 1, 1965, *Sunday Times*, July 18, 1965.
- 246) Great Britain, Privy Council, Orders in Council no.1920, *British Indian Ocean Territory*, Orders in Council (8 November, 1965); 720 HC Deb., 10 Nov. 1965, col.2.
- 247) 704 HC Deb., 16 Dec. 1964, col.425-6; see also, *Times*, December 8, 9, 10, 1964.
- 248) For discussion of British negotiations with the several South Yemen liberation movements, see, for example, Anthony Nutting, *Nasser* (London: Constable, 1972), pp.369-72.
- 249) MOD, *Statement on Defence Estimates 1966*, Pt. 1: Defence Review, Cmnd 2901, p.8.
- 250) 756 HC Deb., 16 Jan. 1968, col.1580-5.
- 251) A personal message protesting the move from President Johnson (to Harold Wilson) was reported in the *Sunday Times* and the *Observer*, January 14, 1968.

- 252) British hopes of obtaining a generous 'offset' arrangement from the U.S. (to purchase British equipment) as part of the F-111 sale would be, in some measure, dependent on retaining the Indian Ocean presence; see, *Financial Times*, December 1, 1965. A further trans-Atlantic 'cross-fertilization' can perhaps be detected in the proceeding development by the U.S. airforce of a 'bare base' deployment concept at the same time as the RAF's island base planning for the Indian Ocean. The concept called for a capability to convert quickly an unimproved or abandoned airstrip to combat status and had resulted, by 1966, in the award of procurement contracts from the Boeing corporation. By 1967, USAF directives had been issued for the operational functions of Tactical Air Command (TAC) units under STRICOM command and control. See, 'U.S. Developing Instant Air-Bases', *New York Times*, November 1, 1970, p.1.
- 253) Sick, 'Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.54.
- 254) The agreement restricted Britain's use of facilities to Commonwealth defence and was to run until December, 1986; see, T.B. Millar, 'The Indian Ocean and the Pacific: Some Strategic Considerations', *Adelphi Paper* 67 (May, 1969) pp.15-16.
- 255) *ibid.*, the 'Britain-Oman/Muscat Exchange of Letters' of July 25, 1958, was, in any case, of indefinite duration.
- 256) *Economist*, November 11, 1967, p.595
- 257) 754 HC Deb., 20 Nov. 1967, col.938. Aldabra was favoured by the U.S. Airforce (see, n.252). A \$60m. provisional funding request was, however, rejected by McNamara in 1966 after opposition by the Royal Audubon Society and the Smithsonian; see, Warren Unna, 'Kissinger Down South', *New Republic*, March 9, 1974.
- 258) MOD, *Statement on Defence Estimates 1966*, Pt. 1: Defence Review, Cmnd 2901.
- 259) *ibid.* p.7, par.19.
- 260) *ibid.*, the Review notes that, whilst Britain would continue to maintain a military presence in Southern Asia, 'Its effectiveness will turn largely on the arrangements we can make with our Commonwealth partners and other allies in the coming years.'
- 261) *TIAS*, 6196.
- 262) *ibid.*, art.11.
- 263) See, *GAO/Rep.*, p.2.
- 264) DOD memorandum to Deputy Legal Adviser (DOS), November 12, 1965 notes, 'the waiver for such a charge in exchange for a valuable consideration does not constitute the waiver of a charge which the Executive Branch is under a statutory mandate to collect'; cited in *ibid.*, p.4.
- 265) See, Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, pp.83-4, testimony of Earl C.Ravenal (Asian Div., Systems Analysis, OSD).
- 266) *ibid.*, p.83.
- 267) *U.S. Base Requirements in the 1970's: A Report for the Special State-Defense Study Group* by Gen. Robert J. Wood, December, 1968 (Secret), cited in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on S. Res. 160 to Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia, 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975), p.68.
- 268) Stuart B. Barber, 'correspondence', cited in Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.175.

CHAPTER TWO. THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN: (I) DÉTENTE AND DEVOLUTION.

The first term of the Nixon Presidency would mark a sustained reassessment of U.S. foreign and security policy. Moreover, despite the conventional tendency for incoming U.S. administrations to define policy in terms (if not in practice) first of all distinguishable from the old, it should be stressed that, whilst the Nixonian lexicon was to not lack in terminological innovation, the departure in policy so signified would be as real as it was involuntary.

For the new administration, the necessary adjustment to 'an increasingly heterogeneous and complex world' was to embody both continuity and contradiction. 'The American people', as the administration freely acknowledged, 'have grown somewhat weary of twenty-five years of international burdens.'¹ The latter, as was also abundantly clear, were most acutely felt in the military sphere. Hereafter, the priority for United States' policy would turn on recasting the structures of U.S. global engagement in areas of abiding strength - economic and political. Confronting such an approach, however, the rise to strategic parity and global reach by the Soviet Union was to otherwise re-establish the terms of bipolar strategic competition in a fresh context. Here, if the United States was determined to withdraw militarily from Vietnam, the nexus of economic and strategic interests represented within the Middle East/South Asian crescent would assume a perhaps heightened importance to composing the new U.S. global position. For the region itself, the undertaking for policy was faced by both transformed local milieux and a strategic environment potentially extending throughout the wider Indian Ocean.

In terms for concrete policy consideration, the prospective withdrawal of British forces from the Indian Ocean - and continuing U.S. involvement in Vietnam - was to present the more developed U.S. regional allies as classic cases for local devolution of security functions under what would come to be designated as the 'Nixon Doctrine'. Albeit, the rise of new centres of politico/military and economic influence in the Middle East were also, within the overall reconfiguration of U.S. military posture, perceived as an opportunity to review long-standing ambitions to assume a more forward role in the wider trans-oceanic region by the Pentagon and the U.S. Navy.

If the national security bureaucracy was considering the options for U.S. strategic engagement in the Indian Ocean, the region had also begun to focus attention elsewhere. The advent of a new U.S. administration, the reorientation of Britain's military and foreign policy concerns to Europe and NATO, signalled in 1968, and the growing assertiveness of the regional powers themselves had brought forth increased interest in the Indian Ocean, in both more public Washington forums and internationally. Thus an 'Indian Ocean' conference held at CSIS in Georgetown in March, 1970² had attracted U.S. officials and academics, as well as representatives from the littoral states and Japan. The subject of 'great power' naval and military competition in the Indian Ocean would also be given much prominence at the September, 1970 Conference of Heads of Non-Aligned Nations at Lusaka (Zambia). In this, the NAM had called for 'all states' at the United Nations to, 'consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which great power rivalries...are excluded.'³ Further provision concerning 'bases conceived in the...context of such rivalries' was to make the resolution increasingly controversial when adopted, in December, 1971, at the UN itself.

The increasing focus on the Indian Ocean as the geographical and perhaps, geopolitical centre of an emergent third world coalition was paralleled in developments in Soviet policy. The Soviet Union had, in June, 1971, registered a carefully worded initiative suggesting 'an equal bargain' for mutual limitations on 'the navies of the Great Powers'⁴ to be taken up in concert with the 'Zone of Peace' programme at the UN. This was, with some qualification, linked in turn to a major theme of Soviet regional diplomacy of 1969-71 for 'collective security' arrangements amongst Russia's Asian neighbours bordering the Indian Ocean.⁵ To be sure, the unavoidable anti-Chinese implication of these proposals was to leave more in the way of circumspection than endorsement for Moscow. The Soviet Union's efforts amongst some traditional U.S. allies in South Asia - notably, Pakistan and Iran - would, however, suggest a new pragmatism to Soviet diplomacy in the region which, for some U.S. policy makers, was uncomfortably close to the *realpolitik* approach to ideology in the international system so promoted under the Nixon Doctrine.

Conceptually and chronologically, the administration's agenda for the Indian Ocean divides into three aspects, encompassing restructured U.S. policy instruments, East/West relations and the material application of policy within the regional arena. In charting the Indian Ocean policies of the Nixon administration, the following two chapters will thus establish the grounding for policy development in an introductory overview, the discussion will then assess the changing strategic balance and regional military posture, and some operational considerations pertaining to both attending the 1971 India-Pakistan war. The concluding section will present a critical summary of administration aims and instrumentality's concerted with the principal U.S. regional ally, Iran.

1. The End of the Post War Era.

In contrast to the exuberance initiating the Kennedy era and the expansive 'Great Society' rhetoric of Lyndon Johnson, the advent of the Nixon administration on January 20, 1969 promised only the possibility of retreat from Vietnam - 'Peace with Honour' - and a somewhat unspecified reassessment of America's role within the international system. Vietnam aside, such foreign policy themes as were produced from the Nixon campaign platform had appeared in close correspondence with the concerns of Nixon's conservative Mid-Western and Californian constituency and indeed, the President's own previous record in public office. For many observers, the internationalist Republican tradition, in more direct lineage from Eisenhower, had been diminished by the defeat of Nelson Rockefeller. In this sense, Richard Nixon was, as National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger records, 'the first Republican President in thirty-six years.'⁶ In practice, however, Nixon's well-rehearsed alienation from the mainstream of Washington political culture and - again in contrast to his immediate predecessor - personal interest in foreign affairs would provide a dynamic reinforcement to the more conceptual 'conservative' agenda of the former Rockefeller and Council on Foreign Relations consultant who had become Nixon's personal choice to direct the National Security Council.

For the Nixon administration, foreign policy, defence policy and, perhaps more extemporaneously, foreign economic policy were to receive an integrated treatment unseen since the wartime cabinets of Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. In Kissinger's view, this close correspondence between issue-areas was required to redress the

separation of 'power' and 'diplomacy' seen as vitiating previous U.S. policy. Here, for Kissinger, 'we never succeeded in translating our military superiority into political advantage.'⁷ If the latter assertion can, at the least, be questioned in terms of the record of U.S. ascendancy after 1945, the promotion of a more Clausewitzian dialogue between (politico-military) means and given ends would become axiomatic for the Kissinger NSC's approach to 'the end of the post-war era.' The instrumental grounding for this process was premised on the ends of U.S. policy themselves being subject to a more rigorously utilitarian assessment consistent with a studied 'concept of our national interest.'⁸ Hereafter, in contrast to the 'exuberant over-extension' of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, the U.S. national interest was to be redefined as anterior to more open-ended concepts of global engagement concerning the Western alliance and the 'free world' as a whole. For the latter, indeed, the 'stronger' position of U.S. allies would bring a competitive edge to Washington's relations with both the emergent 'new nations'⁹ and the hostile but 'now divided' Communist world. In thus seeking a position *point d'appui* in the unfolding 'geopolitical' balance, the 'new American role' conjoined systemic analysis at the service of a fresh secular expediency. 'Some vestiges of the past consist of essentially sound relationships', the NSC's staff writers had observed in the second administration *Foreign Policy Report*, 'They should be preserved. Others must be liquidated...We must avoid practising either consistency or novelty for its own sake.'¹⁰

However, if the administration's avowed pragmatism in foreign affairs was to be premised on the enabling contingency of 'multi-polar Communism' as much as necessary accommodation to diminished U.S. global leverage, such prescriptives to 'set aside

doctrine'¹¹ were functional to an undisguised conservatism of ends in U.S. policy. The displacement of ideology by great-power considerations was, in operative terms, equally premised on an inherent 'conservatism' of major actors toward the process of systemic engagement itself. In stressing that the U.S. would 'regard our Communist adversaries first and foremost as nations,'¹² the Nixon administration was also signalling a limit to concern over the internal structures of states in general.¹³ Although, in Kissinger's dictum, 'the analysis and strategy of the conservatives' could, where appropriate, include contracting with the 'tactics of the liberals,'¹⁴ this entailed a clear subsidiarity. Such modular methodological constructs as W. W. Rostow's 'Stages of Economic Growth' were to be disestablished, concurrently with the universalist claims of the Kennedy/Johnson political programme, in favour of *laissez fair* as a policy toward the domestic arrangements of U.S. allies. In application this would achieve, as will be found, a particular moment within the 'moderate authoritarian' states of the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The ideological conservatism governing the Nixon administration's view of the ends of U.S. policy would thus not preclude a radicalism of means. This, in the first instance was to apply to the structure of the foreign policy bureaucracy. The motif of the 'freedom' of the statesman in conflict with the 'necessity' of bureaucratic routine forms a consistent backdrop to Kissinger's philosophy of history.¹⁵ If the essential precondition for a successful foreign policy - 'the acid test' - was, for Kissinger, 'its ability to obtain domestic support'¹⁶ then this, in immediate terms, will involve 'the problem of legitimizing a policy within the governmental apparatus.'¹⁷ For the latter, however, 'Success consists in moving the administrative machine to the point of decision. The

quest for "objectivity" ...involves the danger that means and ends are confused.'¹⁸ Such reductionist tendencies within the bureaucratic process, which in Kissinger's view, had hobbled the foreign policy structures of the Eisenhower administration, were to persist in those of Kennedy and Johnson. If the Eisenhower system had suffered from excessive formalism, with a stress on consensus from the full National Security Council, decision making under Johnson had tended toward a polar *ad hoc* extreme - the 'Tuesday lunches'.¹⁹ Throughout, for Kissinger, the scope for executive action had been undermined by 'a form of administrative democracy.'²⁰ Accordingly, at the December 2, 1968 press conference confirming Kissinger's appointment, Nixon was to announce 'a very exiting new procedure' for policy making in the NSC which, 'Doctor Kissinger is setting up at the present time.'²¹

In formal terms, the revised NSC structure, drafted in December, 1968, was to retain the six inter-departmental 'Regional Groups', now termed Interdepartmental Groups (IG's), from the Johnson system which would be chaired, as before, by State Department Assistant Secretaries. The Department's 'Senior Interdepartmental Group' - effectively, a policy constitutive body at Under Secretary level - was, however, to be abolished. The latter was replaced by an 'inter-Agency Review Group' (IRG), chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), whose function was to assess the respective 'National Security Study Memoranda' (NSSM's), developed to (Kissinger's) order at IG level. A further bureaucratic instrument at Kissinger's disposal was the 'cover memo' containing his own views which would accompany the completed NSSM to the Oval Office prior to formal NSC endorsement. As each IG was to also include an NSC aide with *de facto* Assistant Secretary status, the result, as one

former staffer recalls, was that 'the lines of control ran from every level of the system...by means of his authority to originate and sign the NSSM, Kissinger determined the context of the policy review, the questions to be asked and the calendar of discussion...this endowed him with something like the power of his own executive order.'²²

The operative significance of the administration's consolidation of bureaucratic power in the NSC would emerge in what became the most thoroughgoing review of U.S. global strategy since NSC 68.²³ The parameters of Nixon's 'New Strategy for Peace' can be identified in four aspects. Firstly, the 'stability' seen by Kissinger as fundamental to the reconstruction of U.S. power in the international system was to be pursued within a primary focus on relations with the Soviet Union. Kissinger had frequently criticized earlier U.S. administrations for having 'lost our opportunity' to secure a comprehensive settlement with Moscow during the period of maximum American ascendancy after World War two.²⁴ Given the evident willingness of the Kremlin - signalled during the Johnson administration - to open negotiations on strategic weapons and trade issues, the basis would be developed for a wider 'linkage' with Soviet systemic engagement in the management of regional affairs. This formed the second tier of administration strategy. In Kissinger's view, 'events in different parts of the world...were related to each other, even more so Soviet conduct in different parts of the world.'²⁵ By the same token, 'Our posture in arms control could not be separated from the resulting military balance, nor from our responsibilities [to] a global system of alliances.'²⁶ Hence, 'The administration resorted to linkage' as an organizing logic to promote exchanges on discrete issue-areas. For collateral, as was made clear by the

administration, ground was to be laid for a 'de-linkage' of generic revolutionary upheaval in the third world from the interests of the Soviet Union.²⁷

The perceived viability of approaching such arrangements with Moscow is apparent in the third aspect of the administration's strategy: a re-configuration of U.S. global military posture away from the need to counter major strategic threats in both European and Asian theatres ('2½ wars'). A concerted Soviet and Chinese attack on the U.S. and allied powers was, in any event, unlikely as Nixon and Kissinger had both independently concluded.²⁸ The restructured '1½ Wars' posture provided a signal reinforcement to U.S. diplomatic efforts to open relations with Beijing.²⁹ Here, as analyst John Lewis Gaddis observes, 'It is difficult to think of anything that the Nixon administration could have done that would have produced a more dramatic shift in world power relationships of greater benefit to the United States at less cost.'³⁰ The architecture of Nixon and Kissinger's approach would, however, owe more to Clausewitz than Le Corbusier. Given the inhibitions on direct military involvement in third countries by any great power, the administration was to turn the 'global diffusion of power' to its advantage. For in the fourth component of the strategy - the 'Nixon Doctrine' itself - Washington would 'furnish military and economic assistance' to its allies, whom would then themselves assume the 'primary responsibility' of providing the manpower for their defence.³¹

Complementary to the Nixon Doctrine's conceptual stress on a 'more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress'³² were the more concrete measures aimed at a basic reconfiguration of U.S. military posture. True to the

pursuit of the 'full range of options' sought in the administration's bureaucratic reorganization, a study of alternative approaches - 'NSSM 3' - had been launched on January 21, 1969. Conducted by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard through the Defense Program Review Committee, the study had presented 10 'general purpose' force options before the IAG,³³ which were then narrowed to the conventional three for Nixon's consideration in October. These assessed a shifting scale of threat and policy guidance in respect to: [1] conventional forces for the established (90 day) criteria for countering a Warsaw Pact offensive in Western Europe and for 'simultaneous assistance' (logistics and limited combat support) to resist attacks on an Asian ally 'short of a full scale Chinese invasion,' [2] had focused on either a NATO initial defence or major conflict in Asia, whilst [3] would retain the existing the McNamara strategy of addressing simultaneous major contingencies in Europe and Asia and a 'limited contingency' elsewhere.³⁴

Kissinger's recommendation of 'option two' on October 2, 1969 reflected both the international strategic considerations of 'multi-polar' communism and a domestic awareness that anything more ambitious would not pass Congressional scrutiny.³⁵ To be sure, the overall reductions in defence outlay envisaged under 1½ wars were substantial. The immediate economies returned in 'breaking the cycle of submitting a five year defense plan to Congress'³⁶ had, in addition, realizable political benefits for the administration. In total, the FY 1970 budget was revised to \$77bn. (from a projected \$85.6bn. in the Johnson estimates) whilst the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) for 1971 was set at \$72.9m. - a fall from 9.5% to 7% gnp.³⁷ In concrete terms, this would enable the reduction of airforce squadrons from 169 in FY 1968 to 110 by FY 1974,

army and marine divisions from 23 to 16 in the same period and navy ships from 976 to 495.³⁸ The programme was to also result in the closure of 392 overseas bases and installations.³⁹ Such retrenchment was, in some areas, not dissimilar to the estimated (post-Vietnam) 'peace dividend' envisaged by a range of media and former Johnson administration critics of the DOD,⁴⁰ if not the annual defence 'alternative budgets' proposed by the House/Senate caucus of 'Members of Congress for Peace through Law'.⁴¹ However, in keeping with the administration's studied relativism toward the 'tactics of the liberals,' such losses would be compensated elsewhere.

In the event, the somewhat involuntary rigour of NSSM 3 was to yield considerable benefits for the administration. The new flexibility in military posture was matched by an economy of force structure. The force levels notionally attributed to '2½ wars' had, in practice, never been generated even under the early McNamara DOD.⁴² Hereafter, U.S. forces were to be restructured toward perceived strengths in naval, air and strategic systems. The political dividend from 'reordering national priorities' in line with governing Congressional opinion was to be realized in the latter's acceptance of longer-term funding programmes for a new generation of weapons systems, notably 'Trident' (SSBN), Cruise (SSM/SLCM) and the 'B-1' bomber.⁴³

In historical perspective, it is clear that much of the Nixon Doctrine's conceptual grounding was - 'new era' rhetoric notwithstanding - to fall well within the purview of standard U.S. politico-diplomatic practice. The focus on the 'primary' defence responsibilities of allies had also been pursued by Truman in the European Recovery Programme and by Eisenhower and Dulles within the elaborated regional pacts - notably,

in the 'Northern Tier' arrangements of SEATO and CENTO. 'Linkage', as an operative tool was not, as Kissinger acknowledges, 'an idiosyncrasy of the administration.'⁴⁴ What did, however, mark an area of departure was the rigour with which these policies were related, stemming from a tightness of bureaucratic control from their inception. For the Gulf and Indian Ocean regions, the priorities for U.S. policy were two. Firstly, to ensure continuity in the territories hitherto under (somewhat ambiguous) British control and secondly; to employ the conceptual guidelines being developed under the Nixon Doctrine to diminish the influence of the Soviet Union. The approach here was, again, clear in concept, if complex in execution. 'Détente' with the Soviet Union would be used to address the (favourable) *status quo* at regional level. The devolution of local security functions to U.S. allies would ensure U.S. interests; whilst great power agreement on bilateral issues (trade, strategic weapons) would secure the framework for détente itself. The regional implications of this approach will be considered below.

II. The Regional Balance: the Middle East, the Shah and NSSM 66.

For the Nixon administration, the development of U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean was, particularly given Kissinger's 'geopolitical perspective', to be taken in tandem with overall policy for the Middle East. Here, given the factors of indigenous volatility, allied political and economic rivalries, increasing Soviet involvement and, indeed, enduring domestic salience in U.S. politics, pressure for diplomatic initiatives was apparent from the outset of the administration.⁴⁵ For the lower Gulf and wider Indian Ocean region itself, more strategic considerations were paramount, proceeding from

a need to ensure local security linkages in the context of Britain's forthcoming withdrawal. In this, however, a substantive measure of inter-agency preparedness was extant from the end of the Johnson administration. The discrepancy between the agency's perceptions of the respective Indian Ocean and Middle East policy areas was apparent in the priority accorded the latter in the NSC. Thus, 'NSSM 2', commissioned on January 21, 1969 was conceived to elicit the positions being prepared by the several bureaucratic actors - notably, the State Department⁴⁶ - as much as to concert U.S. policy for the Middle East itself. The NSC's second 'National Security Study Memorandum' was to be followed by the similar regional studies of NSSM 17 (February, 6), NSSM 30 (March, 19) and NSSM 33 on March, 21.⁴⁷

The calendar for discussion on the NSC's agenda was reflected in the extent of State Department diplomatic activism in the region.⁴⁸ However, the latter process was also, in some measure, a reflection of the administration's internal brokerage and Nixon's own domestic sensitivities to Middle East affairs. The allocation of the Middle East by Nixon as virtually the only foreign policy area for independent initiative by Secretary of State Rogers had only underlined the extent of White House ambivalence on the issues. Thus, as former NSC aide Morton Halperin recalls, Nixon had, to some extent, 'wanted to get into the Middle East...from early on in the administration,'⁴⁹ a view seemingly born out by remarks at the first Presidential press conference of January, 27.⁵⁰ Albeit, here, Nixon's qualified call for, 'strategic arms talks in a way...that will promote...progress on outstanding political problems at the same time - for example, on the problems of the Middle East' was perhaps a more accurate indication of the direction policy would develop in practice. Without the wholehearted support of the White House, Rogers'

efforts would remain, as Kissinger observes, 'in the overcrowded limbo of aborted Middle East peace plans.'⁵¹

Kissinger's own preference - which would, by default, become administration policy - was essentially *laissez faire* and, in this sense, more consistent with the 'conservative' ideological grounding of the Nixon Doctrine. As expressed in the administration's first *Foreign Policy Report*, this approach places clear qualifications on prospective areas of commitment for the United States. 'We will help', the Report declares, 'where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.'⁵² From these perspectives, as Kissinger records, the 'Arab-Israeli conflict' was viewed as essentially a conjunctural manifestation of an underlying 'Arab radicalism', whose internal dynamic of 'social and economic dissatisfaction' and 'opposition to the Arab moderates'⁵³ would remain unaffected by any diplomatic settlement at inter-state level. For Kissinger, the key variable was the effect of any such settlement on the promotion of 'Soviet influence' in the region. In the broader context of the Nixon Doctrine's lexicography, the mounting of a purely diplomatic effort such as the December 9, 1969 'Rogers Plan' would be tantamount to allowing 'commitment' to shape U.S. 'interests' by granting away rights of definition. Thus, given that 'The causes of social and economic unrest would persist' in the Middle East, and that 'Western capitalism would remain anathema to the radicals,' the more restricted U.S. aim of securing the 'Arab moderates' against the time of possible *de facto* arrangements with Israel would be best served by exploiting areas of long-term U.S. strength - economic and geopolitical - at the expense of perceived long-term Soviet and 'radical' weakness in both spheres. In this way, 'the Arabs will come to realize it is the U.S. and not the USSR that holds the key to what

they want...At some point it will become apparent that time is not working for the Soviets...patience could be our weapon.' ⁵⁴

Thus, in the above context, Indian ocean policy was to assume a clear tertiary role. Such a *laissez faire* approach was premised on the assumption of continuing stability in the Gulf/Indian Ocean region providing an essential ballast to administration endeavours to let 'patience be our weapon' in the wider Middle East. The strategic category of 'stability', whilst somewhat open ended in conception, was of key importance to the execution of the Nixon Doctrine in the Gulf and South Asia. Although of an established conventional usage in U.S. official discourse, it also had a particular theoretical formulation in the Kissinger schema. 'Stability', the then Harvard History Professor had observed, '...has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace, but from a generally accepted legitimacy...[which]...means no more than an international agreement about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.'⁵⁵ Such agreed methodology would, *a priori*, take the domestic arrangements of individual states as its point of departure. For the Gulf and the Middle East, the practical consequences were made plain by the administration. 'I am not in any way trying to make a case', as Assistant Secretary Joe Sisco was to inform one (1972) House Sub-committee '...that what we are doing is going to bring the democratic trappings to this area.'⁵⁶

In contrast to the increasingly public inter-agency conflicts over Middle East policy, the administration's approach to the Gulf and Indian Ocean regions reflected a more established cross-governmental consensus. As Assistant Secretary Sisco again observes, 'We tried to look at this very systematically as early as 1968...because we knew the

British were going to get out.'⁵⁷ As well as the operational side of policy, the institutional framework was to be similarly restructured. Inter-departmentally, the Indian Ocean region fell under the responsibility of the State Department's Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, whose primary concern was with the Middle East. In terms of bureaucratic profile, the region had thus lacked a 'central organizational focus on its affairs' until the appointment, in early 1971, of Ronald Spiers, Director of Politico-Military Affairs at State, as overall policy co-ordinator.⁵⁸ On the policy side itself, the principal vehicle for analysis - 'NSSM 66' - was to address the immediate security position in the Gulf. Other NSC studies were to examine wider aspects of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean region, including the regional naval balance (NSSM's 104, 110, 119) and relations with South Africa (NSSM 39). Commissioned on July 12, 1969, NSSM 66 sought a comprehensive review of policy options from the Near East and South Asia Inter-Departmental Group, to be delivered to the NSC 'Senior Review Group' by September, 30.⁵⁹ The study was focused on three areas. Firstly, 'Discussion of the problems created by withdrawal from the Gulf of the British presence in its present form, including the possibility of an Arab-Iranian confrontation in the region'; secondly, discussion of 'our choices in setting a general U.S. posture toward the various political entities in the Gulf area', to include political relationships and arms aid policy, and thirdly, a 'description of the specific decision to be made regarding continued U.S. naval activity in the region after the British withdrawal.'⁶⁰

Whilst sub-categorized here for analytic convenience, the three issue -areas for U.S. Gulf policy were, in fact, closely linked. In concrete terms, the flash points of possible 'Arab/Iranian confrontation' would, *inter alia*, concern the Shah of Iran's territorial

claims on strategic islands (Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tumbs) in the lower Gulf and on the British administered island of Bahrain. The prospective status of 'various political entities' comprising the Trucial Sheikhdoms was of similar importance to the regional balance as, in the broader context, were the more established polities of Kuwait and Oman. Whilst the 'specific naval decision' would involve the future arrangements for the U.S. Navy's MIDEASTFOR, subject to negotiation with a future authority in Bahrain.

Thus, during the period of NSSM 66's conception, immediate attention was focused on the nature of the political arrangements for the lower Gulf Sheikhdoms. The territories - Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras al-Kaimah and Fujairah - had been negotiating the formation of a 'Federation of Arab Emirates' (FAE), under British auspices, with the original aim of including Qatar and Bahrain. Here, however, the considerable divergence's in oil, population, natural resources and political cohesion between the Trucial States were objects of concern to U.S. policy, particularly given the unhappy precedent of earlier British 'state building' in the 1964 'South Arabian Federation'. An uncertain outcome could, as CIA analysts observed, potentially disrupt both the regional balance and bilateral U.S. relations with the respective regional states. 'This tenuous venture at combining the seven Trucial sheikhdoms with Bahrain and Qatar', a January, 1969 'National Intelligence Estimate' (NIE) records, '...seems unlikely to achieve any significant unity.'⁶¹ Moreover, the 'continuing opposition' of the Shah to the inclusion of Bahrain - reflecting Iran's 'recently revived' historical claims on the island - may, 'further encourage the Federation's tendency to look to Saudi Arabia as its main source of support.'⁶² The prospect of such a clash of interests between

its principal allies had become the central issue for the administration's regional policy. Aside from the disputed status of Bahrain, Iranian demands on the three Gulf islands had also raised areas of economic contention - involving possible undersea oil deposits⁶³ - as had the unresolved question of the (international) 'median line' of territorial demarcation in the Gulf waterway between Iran and its neighbours.⁶⁴

Accordingly, Iran's insistence that relations with Saudi Arabia would be conducted in a framework of 'positive co-operation', set forth in a personal communication from the Shah of December, 1969⁶⁵ was to receive strong endorsement from Nixon in a Presidential response of February, 1970.⁶⁶ In March, this 'positive' trend in Iran/Saudi relations was to be incorporated in administration policy, as the completed NSSM 66 came before the NSC. Thus would be established what was to become known as the 'Twin Pillar' approach to security in the Gulf, formally ratified in National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 92 in November, 1970.⁶⁷ As later (1979) DOS summation observes, 'Since the U.S. had strategic interests in both Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for either in isolation would alienate the other. Stability would depend on their co-operation in the face of Arab radicalism encouraged by the Soviet Union.'⁶⁸ Clearly, Iran was earmarked to become the senior 'pillar' for U.S. interests in the region. However, Saudi Arabia, as U.S. regional specialists were well aware, 'has a political entrée to the Gulf that Iran, for all its superior strength...cannot match'⁶⁹ and, as Assistant Secretary Noyes was to further inform (1972) Congressional Hearings, '(Saudi) King Faisal early realized that, with the departure of the British, it would be necessary to cooperate with Iran to assure stability throughout the Gulf.'⁷⁰

The principal forms of Saudi contribution would be political and - as befitted the 'worlds largest oil exporter'⁷¹ - financial. With estimated foreign currency reserves of '\$2.5bn',⁷² Saudi Arabia was not only in a position of 'major aid donor to a number of Arab countries in the peninsula'⁷³ but able to provide a further 'entrée' to U.S. diplomacy in the wider Arab world. The Kingdom had, after the August, 1967 'Khartoum Agreement', committed an annual \$378m. subsidy for Egypt and Jordan.⁷⁴ For Egypt, the '76 percent' of the annual (\$250m.) Arab League subsidy supplied from Saudi and Kuwaiti revenues would admit some reciprocity. 'Nasser', as 1970 CIA analysis observes, '...is not likely to risk offending these donors by adventuring in the Gulf.'⁷⁵ Relations were to further improve following the (September 28, 1970) death of Nasser and Egypt's increasing abandonment of 'Arab Socialism'. If U.S. policy could thus expect a substantive politico/economic and a - less tangible - ideological return from the 'center of Islam'⁷⁶ in the Middle East, the military component in U.S./Saudi relations was not to be neglected. By February, 1972, Riyadh had signed arms agreements to the value of \$312,405m. for F-5B/E aircraft, mobile artillery systems and a naval modernization programme involving '19 small ships, construction of shore installations and training.'⁷⁷

The prospect of British retrenchment in the region sharpening the ambitions of Iran had also featured prominently in State/NSC assessments at the close of the Johnson administration. Here, a clear U.S. irritation at 'Britain's self-imposed three year deadline'⁷⁸ - notwithstanding, as we have seen, the best efforts of Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and the President himself - is joined with concerns that the Shah, hereafter, 'expects concessions to him.'⁷⁹ The locus of these was also clear to the administration.

'The Gulf', as one State/NEA 'background paper' (prepared for the Iranian monarch's state visit of June, 1968) observes, 'has become the Shah's great preoccupation.' And thus, 'Although the Shah is not displeased to see the British go', the anticipated period of readjustment in the region has, 'created an intense situation for the Shah against any real or imagined adversary.' The Shah accordingly, 'began almost at once to jockey within political and economic uncertainties to make the post-1971 Gulf come out in a shape advantageous to Iran.'⁸⁰ However, despite the level of 'pique' at Britain displayed in Tehran's extensive regional agenda, NEA analysts were also reasonably confident that, 'these claims [are] things to be bartered' and, moreover that 'the British have...outlined the possibility of some kind of "package" that might take care of the Shah's territorial preoccupations.' ⁸¹

The precise extent of the Anglo-Iranian 'package' was to become clear in 1971. Here, concurrently with the deadline for British withdrawal on December, 1, Iranian troops were to forcibly occupy the disputed Tumb islands and, by 'arrangement', the island of Abu Musa.⁸² Although strongly contested by the Arab league,⁸³ U.S. reactions were to stress that Washington had 'never taken a position' on the issue.⁸⁴ Also addressed under a wider 'barter' was the Shah's opposition to the continuing presence of the U.S. Navy's MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain - and indeed, to the Bahraini state itself. Washington was to applaud the 'statesmanlike' approach of Iran in entering formal recognition of Bahrain after August, 1971⁸⁵ and on, December 23, sign an executive agreement with the new Bahraini government to 'demonstrate the continuing interest of the United States...in that strategically important area.'⁸⁶ The MIDEASTFOR, an independent command from the Sixth (Mediterranean) Fleet, would consist as before of two destroyers rotated from

CINCLANT and an updated flagship (the USS 'LaSalle') developed from a marine assault vessel, albeit here, 'not configured in a combatant role.'⁸⁷

Despite administration efforts to avoid any public compromise of Bahrain, the 'premature' disclosure of the MIDEASTFOR arrangements in January, 1972⁸⁸ had also brought forth Congressional and media concern that the U.S. was adopting a more overt military role in the region - particularly as a similar executive agreement was signed with Portugal during the same month to provide for continuing U.S. naval/air staging rights on the islands of the Azores.⁸⁹ Officials were thus to stress that, 'The (Bahrain) stationing agreement...contains no military or political commitment, either explicit or implicit, to the Government of Bahrain'⁹⁰ and that, 'The United States has assumed none of the former British military role or functions' and, '...has no intention of seeking or appearing to replace the British presence in the Gulf.'⁹¹ London's security presence itself had, in fact, been more restructured than withdrawn in its entirety. 'When one speaks of the "departure" of the United Kingdom', Deputy Assistant Secretary Noyes was to tell the February sitting of the House Near East Sub-committee, 'one must keep in mind exactly what this means.'⁹² Whilst Britain was to abrogate the formal responsibility for defence and foreign relations for Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE and the defence provisions in the 1961 treaty of 'close friendship' with Kuwait,⁹³ British military personnel were to continue serving on 'secondment' in the former protected territories⁹⁴ and the United Kingdom would provide arms, training missions and conduct regular joint exercises in the region. A more substantive presence was to be retained in Oman, where British special forces were engaged, along with those of Iran, in counter-insurgency operations in Dhofar.⁹⁵ Britain would also retain the use of an 'air

facility' on Masira island.⁹⁶

The British Conservative government, elected in June, 1970, had, indeed, actively considered reversing some of the 1968 defence cutbacks 'East of Suez', which had been strongly resisted in opposition.⁹⁷ If these moves found little favour with the larger Gulf powers - notably, Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia⁹⁸ - the Heath government would have more success elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. In March, 1971, Britain announced the restoration of naval links to South Africa (principally the resumption of regular visits to the former 'South Atlantic Command' headquarters in Simonstown) and sales of 'defensive' naval and other arms to the Pretoria regime.⁹⁹ The case for expanded UK., U.S., or NATO naval co-operation with South Africa had been widely canvassed within the British defence community and, as noted in (1971) Congressional Hearings, had been 'repeatedly brought up in the editorials of the *Economist* magazine.'¹⁰⁰ However, if the supposed requirement to secure the transit of tankers and other sea-borne traffic around the South African Cape had been also featured in some U.S. analyses of possible naval missions in the Indian Ocean,¹⁰¹ the undoubted need to assuage the trenchant South African lobby in Conservative party politics was of perhaps more immediate concern to Whitehall. For the Nixon administration, though, an awareness of the probable domestic reaction against such a change in South Africa policy had precluded even a public endorsement of the (inter-agency) consensus option of 'limited association' chosen in the 1969 policy review 'NSSM 39'.¹⁰² For the Portuguese African colonies, policy was, in the NSC's view, 'influenced by countervailing factors,'¹⁰³ notably concerning the Azores transit agreements. The administration would thus continue to permit exports of certain categories of 'dual use' (Military/civil) items and technologies and funnel discreet EXIM

aid to the Lisbon government.¹⁰⁴ In return, Angolan and Mozambican ports would continue to be made available for refuelling units of the MIDEASTFOR.¹⁰⁵ Given the 'uncertainty' of overflying rights in Northern and central Africa, 'there is', as NSSM 39 records, 'U.S. military interest in alternative routes through Southern Africa to support contingency operations in the Indian Ocean and Middle East areas.'¹⁰⁶ Albeit, whilst the possibility of 'the establishment of a NATO ASW task-force, permanently based in Simonstown'¹⁰⁷ proposed by some in the Pentagon would not be feasible, more covert contacts with South Africa were also to be maintained in the spheres of Intelligence and maritime surveillance co-operation.¹⁰⁸

Of more immediate utility to the U.S. naval planning programme for the Indian Ocean, Britain had, in December, 1970 given formal endorsement to the DOD's construction programme for naval communications facilities on the island of Diego Garcia,¹⁰⁹ and agreed joint regional strategy guidelines during meetings between Prime Minister Heath and President Nixon in London and Washington.¹¹⁰ Overall, the Nixon administration remained confident of 'continuing...British support' for U.S. policies in the Indian Ocean region, 'where major British strategic and commercial interests parallel our own.'¹¹¹

III. The Strategic Arena: the ABM Treaty, the Naval Balance and Regional Détente and the Nixon Doctrine.

By 1972, initial administration concerns over Arab-Iranian antagonism in the Gulf and the 'tenuous' future of the UAE had been substantially allayed. The 'withdrawal' of

British forces had, in the DOD's view, 'left no vacuum in the usual sense of the word.'¹¹²

'The Persian Gulf', as James Noyes was to further inform the February HCFA, '...is not looked upon as a house of cards that is going to collapse at a moment's notice.'¹¹³ In parallel with the 'encouraging' trend toward intra-regional security co-operation concerted after NSSM 66, the region's status in the central balance was to also be addressed, under the wider precepts of the Nixon Doctrine. Given the anachronism of earlier 'basic assumptions' for conducting airborne tactical nuclear exchange from bases in the CENTO area (see Chap.1), the focus of both U.S. and Soviet strategic planning had found a primary emphasis on naval contingencies in the Indian Ocean. These, in turn, involved two principal aspects: the deployment of submarine nuclear weapons (SSBN) and the collateral deployment of surface units and other counter-measures for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Here, the characteristics of what U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (Adml.) Elmo Zumwalt was to term the region's 'geopolitical asymmetry' were instrumentalized, in respect to deployed force-structures, by an asymmetry of mission. The advantages of the region as a theatre for sea-based nuclear weapons would almost entirely accrue to the Western powers and the United States. In practical terms, however, this potentially significant strategic factor was to figure more as a negotiating asset to offset any possible large scale movement of the Soviet navy to the Indian Ocean. The latter prospect was, for a variety of reasons, beginning to assume some prominence in U.S. media and Congressional debate¹¹⁵ following the well-publicised transit of a Soviet naval flotilla.

Although the region had seen previous use by Soviet commercial and research vessels and replacement units to the Pacific from the Northern fleet,¹¹⁶ a specific Indian Ocean

naval task group had appeared for the first time from March 22-July 15, 1968. The Soviet flotilla, consisting of three combatants and attendant support vessels detached from the Pacific fleet, had completed a circuit of the Northern Indian Ocean and Red Sea littoral, visiting ports in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Somalia and Aden in the newly-established Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).¹¹⁷ The regularity of subsequent deployments (November 1968-April, 1969, May-October, 1969, August, 1969-March 1970), and patterns of size, composition and itinerary¹¹⁸ had indicated, for one leading U.S. analyst, 'an initial wide-ranging inspection of facilities throughout the area during the first twelve months of the operation,'¹¹⁹ after which a 'steady state' of force rotation was to be sustained through port visits to sympathetic regimes, notably in the PDRY and Somalia.¹²⁰ For others though, the coincidence with the withdrawal of Britain's permanent naval presence from 'the last great vacuum area of the world'¹²¹ had, rather, suggested that the January, 1968 British decision had actively 'enticed' the Soviet fleet to undertake a more forward role in the region.¹²² The application of such a 'power vacuum' thesis to the Indian Ocean as, by the same token, to the Gulf and environs was, however, strongly resisted by the administration. Aside from having unwelcome budgetary and procurement implications for U.S. naval planning, it would undercut the whole conceptual basis of the Nixon Doctrine in South Asia.

Thus, whilst agreeing that the Soviet Union, 'like the Czars' have, 'long had an interest in the Indian Ocean', and that 'the growing Soviet naval capability in reference to the so-called choke points (of entry)' could, 'not but exert some influence on the political orientation of those nations who would be most affected' by a hostile use of

such a capability,¹²³ State's Ronald Spiers was to offer an essentially conservative interpretation of Soviet Indian Ocean policy to date. Observing that, since the 1950's, 'almost two-thirds of their (Soviet) financial and economic aid has been devoted to third world countries in the Indian Ocean area' and that, 'some twelve percent' of the regional merchant marine traffic was Soviet registered and, 'the growing Indian Ocean fishing fleet' now accounts for 'almost one-third of their annual catch,'¹²⁴ the PMA Director was to accordingly place the 'classic peacetime employment' of Soviet naval assets in the context of, 'using sea power to complement ongoing economic and political objectives'¹²⁵ in the Indian Ocean region. The perception of a 'relatively low order'¹²⁶ of Soviet military threat, presented in the first (public) comprehensive review of U.S. Indian Ocean policy of June, 1971, was to be reinforced in similar administration assessments as the House Near East Sub-committee reconvened the following year. Here, for Deputy Assistant Secretary Noyes, 'the Soviet naval presence and military assistance programs have supported Soviet policy and helped expand its influence; they have not themselves been the initiator of this influence.'¹²⁷ And, as Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco further records, 'We do not believe that this (region) ought to become an area of confrontation between the major powers' rather, 'an area of peaceful competition between the Soviet Union and the United States' and 'an important testing area for the principles that were expressed in the (July, 1972) "Moscow Communiqué".'¹²⁸

The identification of the Indian Ocean as an arena for practical demonstration of the 'Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet relations' was, to be sure, presented as a classic instance of the operation of linked inducements and restraints on Soviet policy premeditated under the Nixon Doctrine. It was also closely related to administration efforts to put the

military aspects of U.S.- Soviet competition in the wider Middle East 'on ice' in the approach of the November, 1972 U.S. elections.¹²⁹ However, the U.S. confidence that great power competition in the Indian Ocean 'should emphasize the political'¹³⁰ would also reflect the arrival of more specific lines of accord with Moscow on the region's strategic status as developed in parallel with the most significant arms control agreements to date - ABM and SALT I.

Here, if the conclusion of the May, 20 1972 limitations on offensive strategic weapons - 'SALT' - drew much impetus from Soviet concerns to contain the perceived U.S. advantage in submarine nuclear systems (SSBN),¹³² the collateral agreement on restricting the development of Anti-Ballistic Missile defence (ABM) was further predicated on the subsidiary but not unimportant status of the Indian Ocean as a theatre for SSBN deployment. On entering office in January, 1969, the Nixon administration had inherited both a set of provisional Soviet proposals on opening strategic arms talks¹³³ and the proceeding U.S. programmes for the weapons themselves. The latter included Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) on existing systems ('Minuteman III'), a new MIRV submarine system ('Poseidon') and a - more contentious - programme for ABM defence ('Sentinel/Safeguard').¹³⁴ Whilst the Soviet Union had itself deployed a limited ABM system in several phases from 1961,¹³⁵ the Soviet offer, relayed by Foreign Minister Gromyko in June, 1968 for 'mutual reduction and subsequent limitation' of nuclear weapons was specifically extended to both 'offensive and defensive' strategic systems, 'including anti-ballistic missiles.'¹³⁶ The Soviet willingness to discuss ABM reflected several factors, some of which concerned a realization of the substantive technical difficulties in the systems

themselves.¹³⁷ These had also been brought out in the extensive U.S. research programme.¹³⁸ Perhaps more significant from the U.S. perspective, however, was the public signalling of changes in Soviet strategic doctrine inherent in the USSR's new negotiating position,¹³⁹ and the scope thus offered to operationalize the 'linkage' between the strategic and geopolitical levels of U.S.- Soviet engagement so envisaged under the Nixon Doctrine.

At the strategic level, the Soviet approach stemmed from a policy preference to stabilize the central balance following the approach of 'parity' with the U.S. in offensive systems¹⁴⁰ - and the parallel concern for possible third country nuclear expansion, notably from China.¹⁴¹ However, if the Soviet interest in retaining a minimal ABM capability to deter 'nth country' threat was proceeding independently of fears of possible U.S. ABM advances - particularly given the public controversy over actual ABM deployment in Washington¹⁴² - the deterrent effectiveness of the Russian 'Galosh' ABM network could, regardless, be compromised by advances in U.S. offensive systems and patterns of forward deployment.¹⁴³ For the latter contingency, a clearly advantageous area for U.S. planning was apparent in the region of Arabian sea. With the deployment of the (2,500nm.) Polaris A-3 system after 1963, the South Russian industrial complex would come under threat, as would Moscow itself.¹⁴⁴

The significance of the Indian Ocean as a theatre for possible U.S. SSBN operations had become further heightened with the McNamara DOD's focus on the containment of China, following the successful Chinese thermo-nuclear test of June, 1967.¹⁴⁵ In July the same year, the Pentagon announced contingency studies for a sea-based ABM

system.¹⁴⁶ By developing existing Polaris technology, the proposed 'SABMIS' system would potentially offer, for the first time, a true 'mid-course intercept' capability against incoming ICBM's. Plans for the 'forward deployment of submarines' were, it can be recalled, envisioned in the 1968 'option "C"' funding schedule for Diego Garcia. The implications of the DOD ratified 'option "B"' were equally clear to Soviet analysts, if subject to some public reticence by the administration. The 'austere' communications facility would enhance traffic along VHF frequencies which were most suited to providing command and control with submerged submarines.¹⁴⁷ Overcoming the acknowledged 'gap'¹⁴⁸ in such capability would thus complete an Indian Ocean VFH net planned from 1961 and commenced in May, 1963 with the agreement to develop facilities at N.W. Cape in Western Australia.¹⁴⁹ The final link in the chain would be provided by upgrading the existing military communications base at Asmara (Ethiopia), which was to be transferred entirely to the U.S. Navy by 1971.¹⁵⁰

The Soviet concern at the apparent trend in U.S. nuclear strategy was earlier indicated in draft 'Measures for Further Easing International Tension and Restricting the Arms Race' registered at the United Nations on December 7, 1964.¹⁵¹ The Soviet memorandum had proposed that nuclear free zones be established in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean regions. From Moscow's perspective, the dangers of opening a third geopolitical zone to U.S. targeting options were compounded by an awareness of the technical advances imminent in U.S. delivery systems. The first funding request for the Poseidon programme was placed before Congress on January 18, 1965.¹⁵² Of further consideration to Soviet strategy had been the British acquisition of the Polaris A-3 system after the Nassau summit of December, 1962. Of the five submarines originally

scheduled, a possible three could be on station at any one time.¹⁵³ Here, given that a deployment of two SSBN was considered more than adequate to fulfil the 'Moscow criterion'¹⁵⁴ from North Sea and Atlantic stations, the third could logically be emplaced in the Arabian Sea. This would be consistent with earlier British (counter value) deterrence posture in the Middle East and the additional disposition within the Wilson government to consider - under U.S. prompting - the 'containment of China' as a major rationale for Britain's 'independent' strategic capabilities.¹⁵⁶

However, by the beginning of the Nixon administration, the grounds for U.S.-Soviet agreement on strategic systems - offensive and defensive - had been clearly established. Early Soviet confidence in ABM development had been succeeded, by 1968, by the Soviet initiative to restrict or ban ABM's altogether. Further, if subsidiary, momentum toward addressing Soviet 'nth country' concerns in the Indian Ocean was provided by the imminent British retrenchment from the region.¹⁵⁶ The far greater consideration of potential U.S. deployments of SSBN had also gone into abeyance. The Pentagon's 'option "C"' for Diego Garcia was not proceeded with. Furthermore, in the 'anti-military orgy spawned by Vietnam', any move by Washington to open a new theatre of operations would, particularly in the nuclear sphere, meet intense Congressional opposition and compromise the administration's programme of 'damage limitation' on prospective Pentagon budget items like Trident and B-1.¹⁵⁷ U.S. nuclear targeting priorities, had, moreover, sought to move away from the position wherein 'any analysis of possible use of nuclear weapons tended to presuppose that the Soviet Union and China were a single target area'¹⁵⁸ and thus the requirement to develop a joint targeting capability from the Arabian sea.

Thus, while most attention on the SALT 1 agreement would focus on the limitations on offensive (ICBM) systems, the separate treaty limiting ABM's, signed concurrently at the Moscow Summit of May, 1972, was to also ratify a mutually advantageous strategic *status quo* for the Indian Ocean.¹⁵⁹

IV. Limited Contingency in a Global Context: Project 60 and 'Total Force Planning'.

After 1972, the level of possible theatre strategic significance for the Indian Ocean had clearly diminished with the SALT and ABM treaties and the administration's rapprochement with China. The Pentagon could thus, with some sincerity, claim to have addressed Soviet and nonaligned concerns toward SSBN deployment in the Indian Ocean, in that 'We won't have them there.'¹⁶⁰ If the DOD could equally claim that the 'low profile but nevertheless positive indication of U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean region'¹⁶¹ provided by the MIDEASTFOR was an adequate level of direct U.S. military presence, such confidence reflected not only the downgrading of the region from great power strategic considerations but also the compensatory approach to the regional balance adopted under the precepts of 'Total Force Planning.'¹⁶²

Introduced in the DOD's *Annual Report* for FY 1972, the new terminology would also launch the first five-year defence programme to be individually conceived by the Nixon administration.¹⁶³ The 'conceptual thrust' of the administration's agenda was to become further refined by the time of 'designing the Nixon Doctrine forces to implement the program'¹⁶⁴ in FY 1973. In 'considering the spectrum of potential conflict'¹⁶⁵ for the

FY 72 programme, Secretary Laird's typology of 'strategic nuclear war' and 'theatre nuclear war' offered much continuity with previous DOD planning. For the latter categories, U.S. forces would bear the 'primary responsibility'.¹⁶⁶ For 'theatre conventional war' - the 'major contingency' of successive Pentagon war planning - allied forces would 'share the responsibility'. It is in the fourth category of 'sub-theatre or localized warfare' that the Nixon Doctrine comes into its own. Here, 'the country or ally which is threatened bears the primary responsibility'.¹⁶⁷ U.S. involvement was thus to be confined to 'military and economic assistance', albeit, 'where appropriate' bolstered by 'sea and air combat support' and only in, 'some special cases' would limited ground combat support be extended.¹⁶⁸ Given that, in a contemporaneous DOD view, 'no littoral state is of direct strategic importance to the United States',¹⁶⁹ it is here that the new security doctrine would most apply to the Indian Ocean. Within the specific local characteristics of the region, however, a particular scope - in terms of economic strength and indigenous military capability - would also be found 'to use all appropriate resources for deterrence -- U.S. and Free World -- to capitalise on the potential of available assets.'¹⁷⁰

In concrete terms, the practical application of the administration's 'Total Force' provisions to the Indian Ocean region can be considered in three aspects. These are: [1] structural reorganization, [2] force structures and [3] military aid programmes (MAP). To further establish the relation of these structural components within the parameters of the revised '1½ Wars' military posture, it is useful to review the changing conceptual development of the 'lesser contingency' itself in U.S. military doctrine. As the previous chapter has shown, earlier attempts to prepare U.S. forces for missions involving

'limited wars on widely scattered parts of the globe' had assumed an institutional expression in the establishment of STRICOM. With the increasing commitment of Vietnam, however, the growth of what was originally envisaged as a 'lesser contingency' into the proportions of a major one had led to atrophy of the original functions of STRIKE.¹⁷¹ The mobility systems originally envisaged - FDL and C-5A - were also subject to both the changing procurement priorities of the war and increasing Congressional opposition to developing a 'brushfire war' capability as such.¹⁷² Thus, although some analysts had emphasized the political rather than purely military limitations preventing the full implementation of '2½ wars'¹⁷³ it was, by 1969, also clear that aside from a total mobilization of the reserves, 'limited war in the present climate is not an option for the U.S. today.'¹⁷⁴

The accuracy of the above contention was brought home, for many in the defence community, by the authority of the source - former CJCS General Maxwell Taylor. However, if the 'half war' capability of U.S. forces was acknowledged as unsatisfactory, planning would continue to account for a principal theatre of operations for the lesser contingency being found, as before, in the Middle East.¹⁷⁵ For this undertaking, the ground was to be laid within a wide ranging reorganization of the military planning apparatus. The early move of Secretary Laird to abolish the unitary McNamara 'PPBS' arrangements - thus restoring a measure of inter-service autonomy to the planning process - was widely supported in the Pentagon.¹⁷⁶ Further welcomed was the reorganization, effective from January, 1 1972, of the 'Unified Command Plan'.¹⁷⁷ In this, 'The area of responsibility of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was expanded to include the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East to the Eastern

border of Iran...the area of responsibility of the Pacific Command (PACOM) was expanded to include the Indian Ocean to 62 degrees east longitude [and] those South Asian countries formerly assigned to USCINCMEDIAFSA.'¹⁷⁸ The expansion of hemispheric areas of responsibility had also involved the dissolution of STRICOM. Its replacement, the 'U.S. Readiness Command' (REDCOM) was set up to reflect both the Laird DOD's sensitivity to Pentagon dislike of joint command structures and Congressional sensitivity - reflected in change of the name - to an overt intervention capability. Thus, REDCOM, established at McDill Airforce Base, Florida, would have no specified geographical designation and be 'manned austere'. Whilst retaining a notional combat capability,¹⁷⁹ its main task was to 'provide a general reserve of combat ready forces...perform deployment planning' and, 'assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing doctrines and techniques for the joint employment of forces.'¹⁸⁰

Overall the dissolution of STRICOM as 'a fire brigade organization to speed military forces to the world's trouble spots,'¹⁸¹ as a valedictory DOD press release was to put it, reflected the main conviction of the Nixon Doctrine that, 'our allies can and must bear the primary task for planning to cope with sub-theatre and localized conflicts.'¹⁸² Thus, although Melvin Laird was to maintain that, in any event, 'the rapid deployment capabilities of U.S. forces are substantial,' the Defense Secretary would also insist that for FY 1972 and hereafter, 'our goal is to minimize the need for such deployments in the future,' and that the 'modifications to our own forces' underway will thus, 'enhance their complementary role, rather than a supplanting role.'¹⁸³

The reassignment of the geographical areas in the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions formerly under STRICOM to the hemispheric commands had also resolved some outstanding organizational rivalries in the Pentagon. The U.S. Navy had regained operational control of the MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain.¹⁸⁴ The provision of military assistance groups (MAAGS) for the Middle East was reassigned to EUCOM. Concurrently, the stress on 'strengthening the planning capability for the defense of the Southern flank of NATO' thus adopted was also reinforcement for the administration's policy of integrating European NATO more closely within its strategy for the Middle East.¹⁸⁵ Here, the functional significance of the administration's organizational review was reflected in changes in force structure. In particular, the function of integrating the several hemispheric theatres of operations would find an enhanced role for the U.S. Navy.

Thus, following some internal studies on naval force structures (NSSM 50) and procurement policy (NSSM 54) - and a wider intra-service debate reported at the time as the Navy's 'greatest period of reappraisal since World War two'¹⁸⁶ - Nixon had appointed, on July 1, 1970, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt as the new Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), with a brief to conduct a 'bottom up' review of U.S. naval posture.¹⁸⁷ The result, termed 'Project 60', was delivered in September, 1970 and had recommended a change in the Navy's principal mission area from 'force projection' (involving a necessarily limited number of carrier task groups) to 'sea control' requiring, in Zumwalt's view, an expanded number of more modest 'flat tops'. In keeping with the DOD's stress on 'long range planning', the new 'hi-lo mix' required the U.S. Navy 'to give up a very large amount of current capability in order to make investments in future

capability.'¹⁸⁸ The Navy's inventory would, accordingly, be reduced from 976 vessels in 1970 to a projected 508 by 1975.¹⁸⁹ In compensation, the Navy could expect to equip some eight 'sea control' ships for the cost formerly borne by one nuclear carrier.¹⁹⁰ For Zumwalt, the need for 'a large number of escort vessels' would have a particular relevance to the Indian Ocean, in terms of 'the possibility that (the Navy) would be called upon to protect tankers on the...long voyage from the Persian Gulf to the United States, Western Europe or Japan.'¹⁹¹

To be sure, the new CNO's views on naval posture were not, even at this stage, uncontested within the NSC and wider inter-agency milieu. As recalled by Adml. Zumwalt, the policy discussions on the deployment implications of 'Project 60' of November, 1970-June 1971 prefigured much of the later, more public, debate on Indian Ocean policy. For the present stage of policy discussion, however, the CNO was, in accordance with the practice of the Nixon NSC, to provide a private briefing for Kissinger on November 6, 1970 where decision could be agreed 'in principle'. The full NSC would then meet on November, 9 to consider NSSM 104. The latter study, conceived as 'an assessment of possible Soviet Naval threats to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area', had also produced options for, 'the development of friendly naval force and basing alternatives...over the 1971-5 period.'¹⁹² Here, despite argument from ACDA and State that, 'no vital U.S. interests' were at stake in the Indian Ocean,¹⁹³ Zumwalt was to succeed in augmenting the MIDEASTFOR with a periodic carrier task group deployment from the Seventh Fleet, to take effect from April, 1971.¹⁹⁴

Whilst a separate Indian Ocean command for the U.S. Navy - beyond those functions currently undertaken by MIDEASTFOR - was not contemplated under the 'Project 60' planning schedule,¹⁹⁵ the extension of the Navy's regional capability was affirmed by funding and construction approval for the facilities on Diego Garcia. This was voted \$5.4m. (out of a projected \$19m. total) in the military construction appropriations for FY 1971.¹⁹⁶ When completed in 1973, the development envisaged an 8,000 foot hardened runway, VHF communications, 'a very small logistic POL storage' and accommodation for 274 British and American personnel.¹⁹⁷ Although the 'austere' facilities planned for BIOT were not, at this stage, a particularly controversial DOD budget item,¹⁹⁸ questioning at (1971) Congressional Hearings had revealed the existence of 'earlier plans' (the 1968 'Option "C"') and, as State's Ronald Spiers was to acknowledge, that, 'Potentially Diego Garcia would be capable of serving much more extensive purposes.'¹⁹⁹ Some outline of the latter was to also emerge in the Congressional testimony. Thus, in stressing that 'it is not intended to be a base', PMA Director Spiers had further affirmed that 'there is no intention to use it for servicing nuclear submarines.' And while the proposed airfield 'theoretically could take fighter-bombers' there was, 'no intention to use it for that purpose.'²⁰⁰ However, if force projection, in keeping with revised 'Project 60' guidelines, was indeed not an immediate requirement for Diego Garcia, the island facilities would present a clear augmentation for the Navy's priority 'sea control' programme. The runway, with parking facilities for two aircraft was designed to accommodate C-130 and C-144 air transport.²⁰¹ It was equally adaptable to the P-3 maritime patrol which was also the Navy's principal airborne anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform. And if - after SALT 1 - SSBN offensive systems were, *de facto*, excluded from Indian Ocean operations, the VFH establishment would remain capable

of providing communications with nuclear or conventional 'hunter-killer' submarines in tandem. In this context, a U.S. ASW carrier task group had begun extensive exercises in the Indian Ocean in April 1971 - 'to practice their skills in...relatively unfamiliar waters'²⁰² - upgrading a mission which had previously been conducted by the more modest MIDEASTFOR.²⁰³

In parallel with structural reorganization of the 'Unified Command Plan' and the revised force structures of REDCOM and 'Project 60', the third aspect of 'Total Force' planning most immediate to the Indian Ocean region was to be found in arms transfers, military aid and military assistance. And in parallel with the DOD's elaborated scale of possible threat scenarios, the planning requirements of 'Total Force' were similarly subdivided into: [i] 'Unilateral force planning' (confined to U.S. forces), [ii] 'Combined force planning' (allowing integration with allied forces), [iii] 'Complementary force planning', which aimed towards specialist air and logistics support for allies, '[but]...does not include prepositioned, integrated U.S. forces during peacetime',²⁰⁴ and [iv] 'Supplementary force planning', concerned with, 'supplementing local capabilities, primarily through the provision of appropriate security assistance.'²⁰⁵ It was the latter level of 'supplementary' force planning - conceived as the functional expression of the DOD's category of 'sub-theatre or localized warfare' - which would assume the primary burden of the Nixon Doctrine security provisions for the Indian Ocean.

Again, the security assistance programme falls into two categories: MAP (grant military assistance) and FMS (export credits and direct sales). For both, the planning requirement for 'all security related aid programs' was to be integrated for the FY 1973

budget, planning for which was to be brought entirely within the Pentagon's revised PPB System.²⁰⁶ This would be administered by two new bureaucratic instruments, the 'Defense Security Assistance Council' and the 'Defense Security Assistance Agency'.²⁰⁷ However, in seeking overall 'to reduce the need for American ground combat support by shifting the emphasis to Military Assistance Programs,'²⁰⁸ the Defense Secretary was to also acknowledge a significant corollary; that, 'It is the policy of the administration...that we should move our military assistance from a grant to a sales basis as the economies of the recipient countries improve.'²⁰⁹

The extent of FMS provision to 'countries more able to bear their share of the burden'²¹⁰ would become fundamental to the exercise of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East and wider Indian Ocean region. The administration's aims, however, were more far reaching than relayed by the staple prefixions of 'partnership' and 'burden sharing' conventionally attached to programmes of military exports. As Melvin Laird and the Pentagon were well aware, the U.S. capabilities to conduct the posited 'half war' in the revised military posture were, in fact, far from 'substantial'. This was brought home in the preparations for intervention in the 1970 'Black September' crisis in Jordan. Here, as Kissinger recalls, mustering a significant capability would have 'enlist[ed] our entire strategic reserve.'²¹¹ Awareness of these factors was, though, to underlie the 'conceptual thrust' of the Nixon Doctrine's military component from the outset. The material U.S. constraints on conducting 'brushfire wars' were to acquire a compensatory flexibility within a more unified approach to global strategy. 'The Total Force approach', as so set forth in Secretary Laird's official summation, '...involves much more than a mere division of responsibilities or the analytical separation of potential threats into categories

of required forces', rather, 'Total Force calls for a new order of co-ordination and co-operation.'²¹² 'The potential and significance of the concept', Laird concludes, '...are profound.'

Despite conjecture amongst some critics on the parallel significance of the Defense Secretary's own order of political ambition,²¹³ the hyperbole attending Melvin Laird's account of his departmental programme for FY 1973 was not unfounded. Following the Tehran oil agreement of February, 1971 and the Tehran summit of May, 1972, the extent to which both the immediate defence 'burden' and altogether less manageable categories of power was to 'shift' to U.S. allies in the Middle East would be profound indeed, albeit with consequences perhaps not wholly anticipated by the administration.

CHAPTER TWO: FOOTNOTES.

- 1) See, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building For Peace*. A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, February, 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971) (hereafter, *U.S. Foreign Policy/71*), pp.4-5.
- 2) For a selection of research papers presented at Georgetown, see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on National Security and Scientific Developments, *The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future: Hearings*, August-September, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971) (hereafter, *U.S. Indian Ocean Hgs./71*), 'Appendix'; see also edited results of findings in, Alvin Cottrell/R. M. Burrell (eds.), *The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military Importance* (New York: Praeger, 1972).
- 3) See, *Statement on the Indian Ocean, United Nations and Other Topics from the Conference of Non Aligned Nations, Lusaka, Zambia September 8-10, 1970* (NAC/Conf.3/Res. 13).
- 4) See, Dusko Doder, 'Brezhnev asks Talk on Navies: Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Limits Urged', *Washington Post*, June 12, 1971. The Brezhnev statement was issued in the course of a wide-ranging address on foreign affairs and other disarmament issues before the Palace of Congresses (Moscow) June 11, 1971.
- 5) See, for example, V. Pavlovski, 'Collective Security, the Way to Peace in Asia', *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 7 July, 1972; Ian Clark, 'Collective Security in Asia', *The Round Table*, October, 1973; Alexander O. Gebhardt, 'The Soviet Collective Security System', *Asian Survey*, December 1973.
- 6) Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (London: Weidenfeld, 1979), p.24.
- 7) Henry A. Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy', *Daedalus* 95 (Spring, 1966), p.512.
- 8) Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, p.65.
- 9) See, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy For Peace*. A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970) (hereafter, *U.S. Foreign Policy/70*), pp.2-3; 'A New Era'.
- 10) *ibid.*
- 11) See, *U.S. Foreign Policy/71*, p.6; 'The New American Role'.
- 12) See, *U.S. Foreign Policy/70*, pp.133-5; 'An Era of Negotiation'.
- 13) See, *U.S. Foreign Policy/71*, pp.11-14; 'Toward New Forms of Partnership'.
- 14) See, Henry A. Kissinger, *The Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld, 1982), p.240.
- 15) See, for example, Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure', *op.cit.*, 'Reflections on Bismark: The White Revolutionary', *Daedalus* 68 (Fall, 1959). For exploration of Kissinger's analytic dept to Max Weber, see, Dickson, *Kissinger and the Meaning of History* (Cambridge, Mass: OUP, 1978.).
- 16) Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace 1812-1822* (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 1964), p.326.

- 17) *ibid.*
- 18) Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure', *op.cit.*, p.507.
- 19) For an account of the weekly foreign policy deliberations of the Johnson cabinet, see, Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (NY: Harper and Rowe, 1977), pp.7-45.
- 20) Kissinger, 'Domestic Structure', *op.cit.*, p.508. In this context, Kissinger maintains that, 'While these tendencies exist to some extent in all bureaucracies, they are particularly pronounced in the American system of government', wherein, 'the attitudes of the business elite reinforce those of the legal profession'; (*ibid.*, pp.516-8).
- 21) *New York Times*, December 3, 1968.
- 22) Morris, 'Greatness', *op.cit.*, p.80. The structure was designed by Pentagon (ISA) aide Morton Halperin. It is perhaps worth pointing out, however, that Kissinger's preeminence was by no means established at the start of 1969. As Halperin recalls, 'Kissinger (at this stage) was nowhere near that influential. He was nowhere near as sure of himself as he later became. Over time, he became aware that Nixon really preferred to make decisions in private.' Interview with Morton H. Halperin, Center for National Security Studies, Washington DC, June 3, 1990. For the administration's own account; see, *U.S. Foreign Policy/70*, pp.226-32; 'The National Security Council System'.
- 23) In considering the parallels with NSC 68, it is clear that the NSC process was, in its initial stages, indeed intended to provide a genuinely thorough basis for policy review. As Halperin observes, 'the decision making structures (of the early NSC) were different to what came afterwards...they were operational, they led to decisions that were actually made and we actually carried them through...we could see the decisions that actually came out of them'; Morton H. Halperin, Interview, *op.cit.*
- 24) Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, p.62.
- 25) *ibid.*, p.129.
- 26) *ibid.*
- 27) *ibid.*
- 28) *ibid.*, pp.195-225.
- 29) This was made explicit in the first (1970) 'Foreign Policy Report'. The document notes 'the spirit in which we have resumed formal talks in Warsaw with Communist China. No nation need be our permanent enemy'; 'New Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.13.
- 30) See, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy* (NY: OUP, 1982), p.297.
- 31) *U.S. Foreign Policy/71*, pp.14-15; 'The Nixon Doctrine'.
- 32) See, 'New Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.7.
- 33) The 10 options extended from a minimum \$14bn. per year defence budget (7 Army div's.) to a maximum \$85bn. outlay (40 Army div's.). See, 'U.S. Study offers 10 options on conventional Forces', *New York Times*, May 2, 1969.
- 34) Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, p.221

- 35) See, Melvin R. Laird, *Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1971* (Washington: GPO, 1970) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY- 71*), p.15.
- 36) See, Melvin R. Laird, *Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1972* (Washington: GPO, 1971) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-72*), p.16.
- 37) See, *DOD Rep./FY-71*, p.24. As Secretary Laird observes, these measures would comprise a 'rock bottom budget' whilst the DOD sought to 'preseve the basic capabilities the Nixon administration inherited as the final decisions were being made on the major elements of our new national security strategy,' (*ibid.*, p.16).
- 38) See, Lawrence J. Korb, *The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon: American Defense Policies in the 1970's* (Westport, Conn.:1979), p.42, Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.214-5.
- 39) Further economies included 272,900 military and 154,000 civilian redundancies. See, Melvin R. Laird, *Department of Defense Final Report for FY 1974* (Washington: GPO, 1973), p.94.
- 40) See, for example, Charles L. Shultze 'Budget Alternatives after Vietnam', Karl R. Kaysen, 'Military Strategy, Military Forces and Arms Control', in Kermit Gordon (ed.) *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington: Brookings, 1968).
- 41) See, John W. Finney, '45 in Congress seek rein on Military' *New York Times*, June 3, 1969; see also Congressional Quarterly May 30, 1969, p.847; for an extended debate, see ,U.S. Congress: Joint Economic Committee, *The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities*, Hearings before the Sub-committee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, 91st.Cong. 1st.Sess. pt.1 (Washington: GPO, 1970).
- 42) The JCS had regularly argued for 30 Army/USMC divisions (from the existing 21), 36 air wings (from 26) and the full C-5A/FDL programme; see, U.S. Senate, *DOD Appropriations for FY 1971*, 91st.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1970), p.150.
- 43) See, Melvin R. Laird, *Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1973* (Washington: GPO, 1972) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY- 73*), pp.60-1, Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp.214-5
- 44) Kissinger, W.H.Y., 126.
- 45) See, for example, Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'Nasser, Israel and the Middle East', *Newsweek*, February 10, 1969, 'Interview with Levi Eshkol', *Newsweek*, February 17, 1969.
- 46) Morton H. Halperin, 'Interview', *op.cit.*
- 47) For a critical account of the NSSM process, see, John Leacacos, 'The Nixon NSC: Kissinger's Apparat', *Foreign Policy* 5 (Winter, 1971-2), pp. 3-27.
- 48) Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp.341-79.
- 49) Morton H. Halperin, 'Interview', *op.cit.*
- 50) *New York Times*, January 28, 1969.
- 51) Kissinger, W.H.Y., p.376.
- 52) See, 'New Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.6.
- 53) Kissinger, W.H.Y., p.558.

- 54) *ibid.*, p.559.
- 55) Kissinger, 'World Restored', *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 56) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf*: Hearings, February 2/August 15, 1972, 92nd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1972) (hereafter, *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72*), p.88, testimony of Joseph J. Sisco (ASS/NESAA).
- 57) *ibid.*, p.105.
- 58) See, *Hs.Indian Ocean Hgs./71*, p.1; introduction by Rep. Clement Zablocki. The previous division between three State Department Bureaux was matched by a parallel dispersal of military command functions between CINCLANT/CINCPAC; the restructuring in State's regional organization would thus, in turn, be complemented by the forthcoming changes in the Unified Command Plan.
- 59) NSSM 66: *Policy Toward the Persian Gulf*, (Secret), NSC, (12/7/69) to: Sec/State, Sec/Def., Sec/Tres., DCI, from: (U/Sec.) Elliot Richardson.
- 60) *ibid.*, p.1 (decl.2/8/88).
- 61) See, *Iran: National Intelligence Estimate # 34-69* (Secret/NOFORNDIS), CIA, (10/1/69-decl.1/86), p.7.
- 62) *ibid.*
- 63) See, Visit of the Shah of Iran, June 11-12, 1968; Background Paper# B -4: *Iran in the Middle East Setting* (Secret), DOS (8/6/68-decl.3/83). The paper notes Iran's refusal to ratify a provisional (maritime) border protocol agreed in 1965 with Saudi Arabia, and that, 'In January (1968) there was a drilling rig crisis involving the forceful removal of an ARAMCO crew by the Iranian Navy' (p.2).
- 64) The potentially more serious dispute was with Iraq on the terms of the 1937 'Treaty of Jeddah' demarking the Shatt al-Arab channel; this was to be formally abrogated by the Shah in February, 1969 (see, Ch.3/n.191).
- 65) Letter, Shah to President Nixon, 17/12/69 (no classification).
- 66) Letter, from: Executive Office of the President, to: The Shah of Iran (23/2/70-decl.4/83). Nixon affirms that, 'there is no question that cooperation among the states around the Persian Gulf is in our mutual interest', that, 'you may be assured of my firm intention to maintain our cooperation with you to insure Iran's continuing capacity for defense' and, moreover, that, 'Iran's desire to increase its oil revenues is clearly understood.'
- 67) NSDM 92, November 7, 1970 (Secret).
- 68) See, *The Evolution of the U.S./Iran Relationship(B)*: A Survey of U.S.-Iran Relations: 1944-79, State Report (Top Secret/NODIS), INR, (1980-decl.11/4/83) (hereafter, *INR/Iran survey*), p.47.
- 69) See, *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72*, *op.cit.*, p.15, statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs.
- 70) *ibid.*
- 71) *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72*, *op.cit.*, statement of Joseph J. Sisco, p.77.

- 72) *ibid.*
- 73) *ibid.*
- 74) The Khartoum Summit, called to concert Arab League policy after the 1967 Middle East war, provided for, *inter alia*, Egyptian disengagement from the YAR. See, 'The Arabian /Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: statements by John Duke Anthony' (CSIS/Georgetown), cited in, app.iv, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf: Hearings, June 6-November 28, 1973* (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *Hs.Gulf Gulf Hgs./73*), pp.204-5.
- 75) See, *Iran's International Position: Special National Intelligence Estimate # 34-70* (Secret), CIA (3/9/70-decl. 29/1/86), p.6.
- 76) *Hs.Gulf Hgs./73, op.cit.*, p.15, statement of Joseph J. Sisco.
- 77) *ibid.*, p.47, statement of James H. Noyes. The F-5E 'has been developed specifically to meet the needs of allied and friendly air forces', see, *DOD Rep./FY-73*, p.125.
- 78) See, Visit of the Shah of Iran, June 11-12, 1968; Background Paper, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 79) *ibid.*, p.1.
- 80) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 81) *ibid.*, p.3.
- 82) In the State Department's view, a 'decisive issue was resolved...when Iran and...Sharjah reached an amicable working arrangement regarding their contending claims to Abu Musa'; DOS statement of February, 1972 cited in, *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, op.cit.*, p.155.
- 83) Iraq and Kuwait had issued formal diplomatic protests; Libya had retaliated against perceived British collusion by nationalization of British Petroleum assets and withdrawal of foreign currency reserves from Britain. See, 'Persian Gulf Politics', *Wall St. Journal* (ed.), December 17, 1971.
- 84) Department of State, 'Reply to the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton', December 17, 1971, cited in, *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, op.cit.*, p.153.
- 85) *ibid.*, p.84, statement of Joseph J. Sisco.
- 86) *ibid.*, p.12, statement of James H. Noyes.
- 87) *ibid.*, notes that 'the USS "La Salle" is 500 feet long, 84 feet in beam, draws 21 feet, and is capable of 20 knots. It will be manned on a reduced basis with 387 personnel' (p.5), and that 'COMIDEASTFOR ships made 108 port calls in 17 countries in 1971' (p.12).
- 88) See, *New York Times*, January 6, 1972.
- 89) This was expressed in February, 1 Senate FRC Hearings on both sets of 'executive agreement'. See, 'Statement of U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs', February 1, 1972, cited in *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, op.cit.*, p.22; see also, Bruce Oudes, 'The U.S. Deal with Portugal', *Newsday*, January 1, 1972.
- 90) *Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, op.cit.*, p.4, testimony of James H. Noyes.

- 91) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 92) *ibid.*, p.13.
- 93) *ibid.*
- 94) *ibid.*, p.14 notes that, 'The British...have military personnel assigned to the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces, the Union Defence Force (formerly the Trucial Oman Scouts), the Bahrain Defence Force, the Qatar Security Forces and the Abu Dahabi Defence Force'.
- 95) For a critical account of the Dhofar insurgency, see, Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans* (London: Penguin, 1974), pp.304-52.
- 96) Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, p.13, statement of James Noyes.
- 97) See, for example, David Holden, 'The Persian Gulf: After the British Raj', *Foreign Affairs* 49, No.4 (July, 1971), iv.
- 98) See, 'Iran in the Middle East Setting', *op.cit.*, p.1, p.3.
- 99) For data on British military and related transactions with South Africa, see, *Strategic Survey 1972* (London: IISS, 1972), pp.60-1.
- 100) See, Hs.Indian Ocean Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.128, testimony of Dr. Garry Gabbert (Wisconsin Univ.) ; see also, 'Red Flag off the Cape of Good Hope', *Daily Telegraph*, May 16, 1969, Geoffrey Rippon, 'South Africa and Naval Strategy', *The Round Table*, (July, 1970), J.E. Spence, 'South Africa and the Defence of the West', *Survival* (March, 1971), D.C. Watt, 'Britain and the Indian Ocean: Diplomacy Before Defence', *The Political Quarterly* (July-September, 1971), *The Economist* (London), December 16, 1972.
- 101) See, for example, D.C. Watt, 'The Continuing Strategic Importance of Simonstown', U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (October, 1969), Stewart Menaul, 'The Security of the Southern Oceans: South Africa the Key', *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, (April-May, 1972).
- 102) NSSM 39 was leaked for publication in 1974. See, *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa* (NSSM 39), (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), pp.70-2; for Congressional attitudes to security links with South and Portuguese Africa, see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Africa, *U.S. Business Investment in South Africa: Hearings* (pt.2), 92nd.Cong. 1st.Sess., September 27, November 12, December 6-7, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1972), pp.92-114, testimony of James H. Noyes; see also, Jim Hoagland, 'U.S. Shifts Policy on Africa', *Washington Post*, November 8, 1970, Jack Anderson, 'Henry Kissinger's First Big Tilt', *Washington Post*, October 11, 1974, Murray Marder 'Nixon 'Tilt' in Africa Bared', *Washington Post*, October 13, 1974.
- 103) NSSM 39, *op.cit.*, p.59; the study notes, 'Portugal is a NATO ally which we equip with arms and whose islands, the Azores, we find important for use as an air base'. Albeit, for Southern Africa as such, 'the U.S. does not have vital security interests in the region'(pp.50-4).
- 104) See, Oudes, 'Deal' *op.cit.*; the December, 1971 executive agreement was accompanied by a 5 year \$436m. credit from the Export-Import Bank, retroactive to 1969. For data on dual- use items and U.S. military assistance, see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Africa, *Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa and Related Issues): Hearings*, March 20, 22,; April 6, 1973, 93rd.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1973), pp.47, 50, 52,96, 98, 117.

- 105) MIDEASTFOR units made some 60 refuelling visits to Mozambique and Angola between 1968-74; see, *ibid.*, p.106
- 106) NSSM 39, *op.cit.*, p.82.
- 107) See, *Armed Forces Journal*, May 17, 1971, p.39; NSSM 39 notes, however, the 'strategic significance of South African refuelling and repair facilities' to accomodate U.S. aircraft carriers, and that, 'their availability to the Navy would be useful in peacetime and essential in time of war' (p.82).
- 108) The South African ADVOKAAT communications/SIGINT net extended from the Cape to the Indian Ocean; see, Bloch/Fitzgerald, *British Intelligence and Covert Action* (Dublin: Junction, 1986), see also NSSM 39; 'South Africa is eager to be included in Western Defense arrangements...South Africa hopes to use the small but persistant Soviet Naval presence in the Indian Ocean as a basis for some sort of collaboration with the U.S. in monitoring or surveillance, with resultant increased U.S. naval presence in the area and use of South African ports' (p.83).
- 109) See, *Los Angeles Times*, Decermber 15, 1970.
- 110) These took place in September/December, 1970; see, Kissinger, W.H.Y. *op.cit.*, p.93.
- 111) Statement of Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson in Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, p.23.
- 112) *ibid.*, p.14, statement of James H. Noyes.
- 114) *ibid.*, p.7.
- 115) See, for example, Michael MccGwire, 'The Russians at Sea' *Guardian*, August 28, 1970, Henry Stanhope, *Times*, December 16, 1970; on supposed Soviet plans for Socotra island, see, *Time Magazine*, January 4, 1971.
- 116) The major Soviet shipbuilding facilities were based in Murmansk/Archangelsk; it is also worth noting the annual turnover of one-third of (conscripted) Soviet naval personnel. See, Geoffrey Jukes, 'The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy', *Adelphi Paper No.87* (London: IISS, 1972).
- 117) See, Michael MccGwire, The Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment in the Indian Ocean, 1968-71, in MccGwire/McDonnel (eds.), *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp.425-7.
- 118) Soviet units in the Indian Ocean did not participate in the August, 1970 'Okean' series of (global) naval exercises; see, James McConnell, 'The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean', in *ibid.*, p.391, Jukes, *op.cit.*, p.28.
- 119) MccGwire, 'Pattern', *op.cit.*, p.429.
- 120) McConnell, (*op.cit.*) notes the presence of two 'Krupnyi' class suface combatants in Mogadishu (Somalia) from April 17-May, 1970 during an (April, 27) power struggle within the Said Barre regime (p.394).
- 121) See, Hs.Indian Ocean Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.69, testimony of Alvin J. Cottrell (Georgetown Univ.).
- 122) *ibid.*, p.73. See also, Alvin Cottrell, 'The Political Balance in the Persian Gulf', *Strategic Review*, (Washington: United States Strategic Institute), Winter, 1974, pp.32-8, Cottrell/Burrell, 'The Indian Ocean', *op.cit.*

- 123) See, Hs.Indian Ocean Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.166, testimony of Ronald I. Spiers.
- 124) *ibid.*, p.167
- 125) *ibid.*, p.166
- 126) 'Therefore' Spiers observes, 'there appears to be no requirement at this time for us to feel impelled to control or even decisively influence, any part of the Indian Ocean or its littoral, given the nature of our interests there and the current level of Soviet or Chinese involvement'; *ibid.*, p.168.
- 127) See, Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, p.9, testimony of James H. Noyes.
- 128) *ibid.*, p.80, testimony of Joseph J. Sisco; for text of the 'Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations', see, *DSB*, LXVI (June 26, 1972), pp.898-9.
- 129) Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.1285-7.
- 130) See, Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, p.9, statement of James H. Noyes.
- 132) Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp.1229-41.
- 133) The first official indication of these had come in March, 1967 when President Johnson 'confirmed the willingness of the Soviet government to discuss means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles'; see, 'The President's News Conference of March 2, 1967', *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol.3 (Washington: GPO, 1967), p.353. Earlier talks had begun in 1966, see also, Raymond L. Garthof, 'East-West Relations', in Carter/Schwartz (eds.), *Ballistic Missile Defense*, (Washington: Brookings/MIT, 1984), pp.294-8 .
- 134) The Sentinel programme - developed from the earlier 'NIKE- X' - had divided support in Congress and was opposed by Defense Secretary McNamara; see, James Reston, 'Washington: McNamara and the Anti-Ballistic Missile', *New York Times*, July 20, 1966, John W. Finney, 'President Warns of "Futile" Step up in Nuclear Race', *New York Times*, February 18, 1967.
- 135) The initial (1961) system, covering Leningrad, was dismantled in 1963; in 1962 work was begun on a Moscow system which extended to 64 launchers by 1970. See, Laurence Freedman, *U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat* (Princeton NJ: PUP, 1986), pp.88-91, William J. Durch, *The ABM and Western Security* (Cambridge MA: Ballinger, 1988), pp.5-6; for U.S. NIE's projecting up to 8000 Soviet ABM vehicles, see, John Prados, *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength* (NY: Dial, 1982), pp.155-64, Jeffrey T. Richelson, 'U.S. Intelligence and Soviet Star Wars', *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 42, No.5 (May, 1986), p.13.
- 136) A.A. Gromyko, 'On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union' (address to the Supreme Soviet, June 27, 1968), *Isvestia* , June 28, 1968.
- 137) See, for example, Bruce Parrott, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense*, (Westview FPI: SAIS/Johns Hopkins, 1987), pp.24-31.
- 138) Not the least of these was the possibility of nuclear-armed ABM's disabling their own C³ capability; see, Steven Weinberg, 'What Does Safeguard Safeguard?', and Hans Berth, 'Countermeasures to ABM Systems' in Chayes/Weisner (eds.) *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti- Ballistic Missile System* (New York: Signit, 1969).
- 139) For discussion, see, Gerard Smith, *Doubletalk: the Story of SALT 1*, (New York: UPA, 1979) pp.93-6.

- 140) Garthof (op.cit.) notes the 'almost open debate' on strategic doctrine engaged by Soviet political and military leaders at the time of the Gromyko speech. For sample of (Russian language) sources, see, *ibid.*, pp.299-300.
- 141) See, Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.545, 547-8, 554-5; Kissinger's interpretation of a Soviet 'oral note' of July 1970 - implying possible joint action against China - is disputed (Garthof, *op.cit.*, pp. 315-6); Soviet-PRC hostility was, though, clearly at a high level. See, for example, Neville Maxwell, 'The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao', *The China Quarterly*, No.56 (October-December, 1973). A factor in easing Soviet 'nth country' nuclear concerns was found in West Germany's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of July 1, 1968 (Garthof, *op.cit.*, pp.301-2).
- 142) See Congressional debate in, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs, *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems*: Hearings, 91st.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1969) 3 pts.
- 143) These considerations could apply to a perhaps greater extent in the event of ABM advances by the USSR. Given the pessimistic NIE projections (n.135), the Indian Ocean would thus become highly attractive for forward SSBN deployment due to technical factors concerning the angle of vehicle re-entry; see, for example, Stephen Weiner, 'Systems and Technology', in Carter/Schwartz, 'Ballistic Missile Defense', *op.cit.*, p.51, pp.49-97, see also, McConnell, 'The Soviet Navy' in MccGwire, 'Soviet Naval Developments', *op.cit.*, p.390.
- 144) See, MccGwire, 'Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployment', in *ibid.*, p.440. The U.S. decision to produce and deploy MIRV - and, in particular, to deploy MIRV with Poseidon - was justified with reference to Soviet ABM capability; see, U.S. Department of Defense, *Statement of Secretary Robert S. McNamara Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Sub-committee on DOD Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget* (mimeographed, January 23, 1967), p.44, see also, William Beecher, 'Missile to Carry Warhead Cluster', *New York Times*, January 20, 1967, Hanson Baldwin, 'Soviet Anti-missile System Spurs New U.S. Weapons', *New York Times*, February 5, 1967.
- 145) See, U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: *Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons on United States National Security*, 90th.Cong. 1st.Sess. 1967 (Washington: GPO, 1967).
- 146) See, William Beecher, 'Anti-missile Net at Sea Proposal', *New York Times*, July 4, 1967.
- 147) MccGwire, 'Soviet Naval Deployment', *op.cit.*, p.440; for extended discussion, see also, Jukes, 'Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy', *op.cit.* (passim).
- 148) See, Hs.IO Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.187, testimony of Robert J. Pranger (Dep.Asst.Sec.Def.ISA for Policy Plans/NSC Affs.).
- 149) *ibid.*, p.184.
- 150) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1970*: Hearings, 91st.Cong. 1st.Sess. (pt.3) (Washington: GPO, 1970), p.750, testimony of Adml. Fitzpatrick. For details of current (1971) DOD 'Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) capability, see, Hs.IO Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.189, statement of Robert J. Pranger.
- 151) The Soviet memorandum is discussed in Jukes, 'Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy', *op.cit.*, pp.7-8.

- 152) See, MccGwire, 'Soviet Naval Deployment', *op.cit.*, p.441; for McNamara's recommendation to deploy Poseidon, see, William Beecher, 'The Anti-missile Issue', *New York Times*, November 1, 1966.
- 153) This possibility was lessened after the Cabinet decision to reduce the Polaris order to 4 SSBN reached in November, 1965; see, (Fld. Mar.) Michael Carver, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945* (London: Hutchenson, 1992), pp.86-7.
- 154) An extended account of UK decision making on the Polaris issue appears in; Ministry of Defence: *Chevaline Improvements to the Polaris Missile System*, Ninth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, House of Commons, sess. 1981-2 (London: HMSO, 1982).
- 155) See, *MoD, Statement on Defence Estimates 1965*, Cmnd 2592, par.11,12; see also editorial in, *The Times*, December 23, 1964.
- 156) The modified British Polaris system (Antelope/Chevaline) was, in addition, restricted in its possible areas of deployment due to increased weight factors; see Carver, *op.cit.*, p.98.
- 157) Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.212-5.
- 158) *ibid.*, p.220.
- 159) Interview with Paul C. Warnke, Washington, DC, June 5, 1990.
- 160) See, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean: Hearings*, February/March 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*), p.137, testimony of (Adml.) Elmo R. Zumwalt; Zumwalt adds that, 'I see no impact of Diego Garcia with regard to...strategic nuclear capability. We have no plans to use Diego Garcia in such a way' (*ibid.*, p.136).
- 161) See, Hs.IO Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, statement of Robert J. Pranger.
- 162) See, DOD Rep./FY-72, *op.cit.*, p.21; 'The Total Force Approach'.
- 163) *ibid.*, p.16.
- 164) See, DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, p.59.
- 165) DOD Rep./FY-72, *op.cit.*, p.22; 'Concepts for Defense Planning'.
- 166) *ibid.*
- 167) *ibid.*
- 168) *ibid.*
- 169) See, Hs.IO Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.171, testimony of Robert J. Pranger.
- 170) DOD Rep./FY-72, *op.cit.*, p.22; the Report also notes that, 'our future defense planning must also ensure a U.S. capability to prevent an effective challenge to free use of international air space and the oceans of the world' (*ibid.*).
- 171) See, 'Pentagon Plans to Trim U.S. Strategic Reserve', *New York Times*, August 7, 1967.

- 172) Secretary Laird admits to 'major problems in this area'; the C-5A programme was reduced (by 10 units) for FY 1970 to a projected 81 (4/sq.) level. There was also a continuing 'lack of a rapid-deployment sea-lift capability'. Here, however, 'In view of the past reluctance of the Congress to authorize the Fast Deployment Logistic (FDL) ship program, we are looking for alternative solutions,' see DOD Rep./FY-71, *op.cit.*, pp.64-5.
- 173) *ibid.*, p.53; Laird observes that, 'the forces and budgets proposed by the previous administration were never sufficient to support that policy.'
- 174) Maxwell Taylor, address to the National War College, September, 1970; cited in Juan Cameron, 'The Armed Forces' Reluctant Retrenchment', *Fortune*, (November, 1970).
- 175) See, DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, pp.50-1, 'Sub-theatre/ Localized Threats'.
- 176) This would help circumvent military opposition to the Secretary's retrenchment programme; see, DOD Rep./FY-71, *op.cit.*, p.14. As Laird observes, 'We encourage full discussion among senior military officers and civilian officials...I particularly insist that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...be given full consideration' (*ibid.*, p.77).
- 177) See, DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, p.138 #5 'The Unified Command Plan'.
- 178) The (1963) assignment of the Middle East and Africa South of the Sahara (MEAFSA) to STRICOM had consistently been opposed by the USMC and the Navy - as had STRIKE itself. These disputes were underscored when the mission of evacuating U.S. nationals during the June, 1967 Middle East war was claimed by the USMC and Sixth Fleet, despite notional STRICOM geographical responsibility; see, 'U.S. to Drop STRIKE Command in Revamping World Forces', *Washington Post*, July 9, 1971.
- 179) See, Drew Middleton, 'Readiness Command Keeping Low Profile', *New York Times*, March 27, 1977.
- 180) See, DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, p.138.
- 181) *Washington Post*, 'U.S. to Drop STRIKE Command', *op.cit.*
- 182) DOD Rep./FY-72, *op.cit.*, p.107
- 183) *ibid.*
- 184) This had earlier been urged by the Navy's congressional supporters, see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1965: Hearings*, 88th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1964), pt. 4, p.315.
- 185) DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, p.138; the reorganization will thus provide for, 'countering the increased Soviet presence in the Middle East...It also ensures that all U.S. military planning and operations in Europe will be coordinated and controlled by one commander.'
- 186) *Navy Magazine*, June, 1971, p.7.
- 187) For a critical review of changes in U.S. Naval posture, see, for example, Johan Jorgen Holst, 'The Navies of the Superpowers: Motives, Forces, Prospects', in Alford (ed.), *Seapower and Influence* (London: IISS, 1980), pp.44-7
- 188) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Briefing on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate*, April 14, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *DG Briefing/74*), p.42, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt; Zumwalt observes that, 'The Southeast Asia war...cost us a generation of ships' (p.41).

- 189) *ibid.*
- 190) Thus, for Adml. Zumwalt, 'we concluded that to deal with the increasing global reach of the Soviet Union, we were going to have more platforms as soon as possible', *ibid.*
- 191) Zumwalt testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 'Annual Posture Statement', February, 1972, cited in Elmo R. Zumwalt, *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p.452.
- 192) *ibid.*, p.362
- 193) *ibid.*
- 194) See, James H. Noyes, *The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and U.S. Policy*, Hoover Publication 206 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp.55-6. Recommendation 102 of the 1972 NATO Assembly instructed the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) to develop contingency plans for the defence of the Cape Route in conjunction with NSSM 104 projections; see, for example, Christopher Coker, 'The Western Alliance and Africa', *African Affairs*, vol.81, No.324 (July, 1982), pp.132-2.
- 195) DG Briefing/74, *op.cit.*, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt, p.27.
- 196) See, Hs.IO Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, p.165, statement of Ronald Spiers; this was described as 'the culmination of our efforts to meet a naval communications requirement dating back to the 1960's.'
- 197) *ibid.*, pp.183-4.
- 198) *ibid.*, as (Sub-comm. Chair) Rep. Clement Zablocki observes, 'If indeed this is the only scope of that facility, there should be no problems.'
- 199) *ibid.*, testimony of Ronald Spiers.
- 200) *ibid.*
- 201) *ibid.*, p.184.
- 202) The task group consisted of 1 ASW carrier (USS 'Ticonderoga'), 4 destroyer escorts, and 1 submarine. These departed from the Seventh Fleet (PACOM) on April 18, 1971 for conducting a 'routine ASW training exercise' in the S. Eastern Indian Ocean; see, U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of Information, correspondence with Rep. Donald M. Frazer, in *ibid.*, pp.179-80. Correspondence also notes the annual (November) 'Midlink' CENTO exercises, involving the UK and Iran, and that U.S. Navy ships made a total 358 port visits in the region between 1969-70.
- 203) *ibid.*, p.179
- 204) See, DOD Rep./FY-73 *op.cit.*, pp.61-4; 'Military Strategy and Force Planning'.
- 205) *ibid.*
- 206) *ibid.*, p.124.
- 207) *ibid.*, pp.139-40.
- 208) DOD Rep./FY-71 *op.cit.*, p.18; 'National Security Strategy'.
- 209) *ibid.*p.59; 'General Purpose Forces'.

- 210) *ibid.*
- 211) The reserve consisted of four brigades, one capable of 48hr. deployment from Germany (EUCOM) and others 72hr. from CONUS (82nd.a/b.); see, Kissinger, *W.H.Y.* , p.605,620.
- 212) DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, p.24; 'The Strategy in Brief'.
- 213) See, for example, Morris, *op.cit.*, on the features of NSC/DOD bureaucratic politics, pp.134-8, *passim*.

CHAPTER THREE. THE NIXON DOCTRINE (II): THE DIFFUSION OF POWER.

The previous section identified the conceptual grounding for the Indian Ocean application of the Nixon Doctrine, in terms of the international environment, the Washington policy environment and the perspectives brought to bear by the incoming administration. The analysis will now move on to consider significant operational manifestations of Nixon's 'New Strategy for Peace', as it sought to harness some local components of the 'diffusion of power' in the Gulf, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

1. The Tehran Agreement, the 'Twin Pillars' and the New Economic Policy.

If the successful conclusion of SALT 1 had permitted a practical down-grading of the Indian Ocean from strategic nuclear competition amongst the great powers, the pursuit of regional stability engaged within the 'total force' strategy would also require more positive measures. 'It is important to re-emphasize', Secretary Laird's FY 1973 *Annual Report* observes, '...that any realistic assessments and resulting plans for military forces...must include political, economic and social considerations.' And, moreover, 'we must give careful consideration not only to the strengths of potential adversaries but also to the deficiencies in their capabilities and the various constraints with which they must cope.'¹ For the Soviet Union, such 'deficiencies and constraints' had glaringly existed in the sphere of economic attraction, and particularly so in the Middle East. The ability to 'shore up ...the weak economies of Persian Gulf states' ensured by the commanding market power of U.S. oil corporations had, for two decades,

underwritten Washington's strategic objectives in the region. However, as both State and Defense officials were to stress in early 1971, 'almost two thirds of (Soviet) financial and economic aid has been devoted to third world countries in the Indian Ocean region' since the 1950's and, furthermore, 'The Soviets in this and other regions are showing an increasing propensity to support incumbent conservative and non-communist governments where there is political capital to be gained.' This policy, 'often at the expense of radical leftist groups with poor prospects' was demonstrative, for DOD's Robert Pranger, that, 'Political realities are prevailing over ideological motivations.'² To be sure, this perception of Soviet pragmatism had formed precisely the grounding for détente for the Nixon administration. The reduction in cold war tensions in the Middle East would also, though, bring more localized economic and political factors to the fore and hence admit a new level of regional leverage on both the administration and the erstwhile executors of 'U.S. foreign policy objectives' in the major oil corporations.

Thus, just as the advent of Soviet strategic parity had removed one pole of United States' singularity in the international system - and provided the conditions wherein 'smaller allies' as Kissinger observes, were 'all the more tempted to conduct independent foreign policies'³ - the erosion of another had taken place with the loss of U.S. predominance in the field of oil production. And whilst much attention had been paid to the effects of Soviet parity on the strategic balance, the effects on the U.S. global position would be equally subversive in this other dimension to the 'diffusion of power'.

It is useful to briefly reconsider some background conditions concerning the interaction between the (U.S.) internal and the international oil markets and the historical relation

of both to U.S. power in the international system. As we have seen, a central concern for the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had been the securing of a dominant position in the production of Middle East oil. When combined with the capacity of U.S. domestic production, this had endowed Washington with a decisive margin of market power. The flexibility to influence both European allies - as at Suez in 1956 - and the producing countries of the Middle East had provided an essential complement to the operation of more formalized international economic 'regimes' in trade and liquidity.⁴ However, just as the latter had begun to work to U.S. disadvantage by the end of the 1960's,⁵ a decline in domestic oil capacity would produce a similar reduction in the abilities of government to exercise market regulatory functions. The necessary conditions for U.S. predominance in the political economy of oil lay in the security of its own domestic supply. This had, most recently, enabled Washington to overcome the oil embargo organized in July, 1967 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)⁶ in response to Israeli military conquests in the six-day war. Although founded in September 1960, the capabilities of OPEC had hitherto been disregarded by U.S. analysts due, *inter alia*, to conditions of global surplus in oil production capacity.⁷ Although the latter were to still obtain, on a global basis in 1970,⁸ the position had changed for the specific capacity levels in the U.S. A February, 1970 Cabinet Task Force Report on 'The Oil Import Question' had confirmed a growing U.S. dependence on imported oil, which was predicted to reach a level of 27% of total consumption by 1980. By early 1972, the U.S. oil fields were, for the first time, producing at full capacity.⁹

If the possible 'long range national security issue[s]' raised by U.S. oil imports had been acknowledged in general terms by the Energy Task Force and other administration studies,¹⁰ the circumstantial cause for the wider market transformation lay in an exploitation of internal oil industry rivalry by the emergent 'Revolutionary Command Council' in Libya.¹¹ This had resulted in the lesser oil 'independents' yielding a 40c. p/b (20%) price increase and Libyan government control over levels of production.¹² The success of Libya's claims would establish a new precedent for the OPEC cartel. Accordingly, a fresh package of demands on price and (equity) 'participation' was launched at the December 1970, OPEC conference in Caracas.¹³ The industry was given a thirty-one day deadline to comply with these conditions, after which OPEC would reconvene to consider 'other measures' on January 19, 1971 in Tehran.

Here, faced with the ostensibly 'radical' and 'moderate' wings of OPEC united behind a 'separate but necessarily connected'¹⁴ negotiating platform, the immediate choice before the Nixon administration was perceived in political and strategic rather than strictly economic terms. A clear account for the latter was, in any event, proving difficult to quantify.¹⁵ The administration's priorities lay in securing the regional 'stability and co-operation' sought in NSSM 66 and reaffirmed in November, 1970 by NSDM 92.¹⁶ The blossoming of Saudi-Iranian co-operation apparent within OPEC¹⁷ was, on a strategic level, not inconsistent with these overall aims for the 'Twin Pillars' of U.S. regional security policy. Albeit, some appearance of a unilateral U.S. option toward the old energy regime had also to be recorded, in order to maintain the initiative for the administration. The Department of Justice had thus provided the corporate 'London Policy Group' with anti-trust immunity dispensation, and on January 16, 1971, Under

Secretary of State John Irwin was dispatched to Tehran as a Presidential special envoy, to 'place the power and prestige of the U.S. government'¹⁸ behind the terms for a settlement.

In the event, the opportunity to consolidate U.S. links with Iran was not otherwise unwelcome for the Nixon administration, particularly given the sometimes uneasy relationship obtaining under Kennedy, Johnson and the State Department of Dean Rusk. Here, if the United States had ceased to promote 'more modern groups' amongst the Shah's political opponents, Iran had in turn accepted the restrictions on Consortium oil production established under the oil 'majors' global allocation agreements from 1954 and, *faute de mieux*, U.S. assessments on the correct 'balance'¹⁹ between civil development and military expenditure. Such provisions had, indeed, been formally incorporated in the Kennedy administration's 'memorandum on military assistance' of 1962.²⁰ Whilst the Shah's more expansive threat assessments continued to be discounted in Washington, lobbying from successive U.S. ambassadors and Iran's evident economic growth had led to a revised memorandum of understanding of July 4, 1964. This had provided the first instance of FMS credits to Iran (\$200m. for FY 1965-69) and a further \$50m. of military cash sales.²¹ The terms of U.S.-Iran military relations were again revised, in an additional \$200m. FMS agreement of August, 1966, to include F-4 aircraft and a radar air-defence system.²² The latter agreement was strongly influenced by the Shah's negative appraisal of U.S. 'neutralism' during the 1965 India-Pakistan war.²³ Iran would, non-the-less, reinforce the diplomatic representations and still outstanding differences over arms procurement with the U.S. by concluding a \$110m. agreement for Soviet arms in February, 1967.²⁴

Iran's growing leeway in international affairs was symbolized, in November, 1967, by the termination of U.S. economic assistance and, in 1969, the similar end to U.S. grant aid to the Iranian military. Tehran's move from MAP, through FMS credits to FMS cash sales was matched by a corresponding loss of U.S. influence on the Shah's procurement programme. Whilst U.S. analysts would continue to emphasize the 'restraint' on 'excessive purchases' still extant within the 'careful technical advice and persuasion of the ARMISH-MAAG,'²⁵ the agencies were also aware that, 'The Soviet Union has kept constant pressure on the Shah to buy almost anything he wants' at 'attractive prices', and that, 'The Western European countries and the UK appear ready to sell without restraint their military products.'²⁶ Overall, reflecting on the several dimensions to 'the military problem', a September, 1969 State (Tehran embassy) report was to voice the widespread view of the concerned agencies that, 'The Shah's appetite for equipment keeps us constantly uneasy.'²⁷

An economic counterpoint to the Shah's 'decreasing tolerance of foreign restraints'²⁸ in the Iranian military programme was provided by the operation of global quota allocations within the Iranian National Oil Company. Here, opposition to the level of corporate stricture on the NIOC itself was compounded by Iranian perceptions of an institutionalized oil company preference for Arab producers.²⁹ Iran had not participated in the inconclusive 1967 OPEC embargo and had secured a temporary 22% liftings increase above quota.³⁰ This, however had been contested in the following year by the Consortium, who wished to restore quotas to the previous levels of (global) distribution. Given the oil industry's projection of 'a growing world-wide surplus in oil production

over the next five years,'³¹ any increase in Iran's liftings would have to come at the expense of other producers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.³² Although pressure from the Shah had secured a further \$865m. revenue 'stopgap'³³ toward fulfilling the 'Fourth (five-year) Development Plan', the 'almost constant negotiations' between Iran and the Consortium³⁴ were, by 1969, imposing increasing strain across the spectrum of U.S.-Iran relations in general.

For the Nixon administration, the existing structure of the world oil market was, in immediate terms, of less direct concern than the creation of a stable security structure in the Gulf and South Asia. In this, the consistent area of disagreement between Iran and previous U.S. policy - the Shah's conception of military predominance in the region - would, rather, form the basis for a new U.S.-Iranian accord. The foundations for Iran's renascent role in the 'natural alliance'³⁵ were laid during the Shah's two state visits to Washington of March and October, 1969. Here, discussions with Nixon had focused on the Gulf security position after Britain's withdrawal and provided for the wider considerations of NSSM 66. Despite Nixon's support, the Shah's efforts to negotiate either an ambitious 'arms for oil' barter arrangement³⁶ or a more modest (\$155m.) increase in Iran's U.S. oil import quota to provide procurement funding had foundered on the opposition of the oil Consortium. 'This event' as Kissinger records, '...merely served to teach Nixon how negligible the influence of the President of the United States over oil import allocations.'³⁷ And thus, on July 30, 1970, 'Nixon was obliged to write to the Shah in effect that he could not deliver.'³⁸ What the President would be able to deliver, however, was to become clear in the course of the oil companies' January, 1971 confrontation with the Shah and OPEC in Tehran.

Notwithstanding the uncertain bureaucratic relationship obtaining between the Nixon administration and the institutional agencies of government, there was broad agreement on the statistical breakdown of Iran's political economy found in successive 'National Intelligence Estimates' (NIE's) provided by the CIA and the parallel studies conducted by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department. Here, a January 1969 NIE suggests that 'Iran will probably be able to sustain an average annual increase in GNP of about eight percent over the remainder of the (1968-73) Plan period' and that, 'for some years to come Iran can continue without significant strain to finance both its military and economic programs at currently planned levels.'³⁹ By September, 1970 however, a reappraisal of the same economic indicators by the Agency had concluded that Iran's 'rapid economic expansion...has been achieved at the cost of serious balance of payments difficulties.'⁴⁰ These, in concrete terms, were costed at the 'about \$150m.' figure (for 1969-70) of the Shah's unsuccessful quota submission of October, 1969, and due to reach \$350m. by 1973 on present forecasting.⁴¹ Thus, assuming the continuation of 10% (\$2.1bn.) levels of annual foreign exchange outlay for military purposes, Iran, 'cannot pay for both military procurement and civilian imports at levels specified in existing programs without significantly increasing its already heavy debt burden.'⁴² For the State Department, INR research, conducted in June, 1970 was equally clear that, 'Iran can not finance the additional weapons purchases the Shah seems to have in mind...unless Iran obtains concessionary financing.'⁴³ Moreover, in the CIA's view, although 'A windfall of several hundred million dollars from new oil agreements' could reduce Iran's debt differential, 'it would not close the gap.'⁴⁴

As will be shown, precisely such a 'windfall' - amounting to an immediate \$1.4bn. extra revenue for the Gulf members of OPEC⁴⁵ - would attend the Nixon administration's *laissez faire* approach to the oil negotiations at Tehran. Despite a degree of confusion attending the Tehran negotiations themselves,⁴⁶ the stance taken by the administration was to soon become apparent to the several contending parties. Thus, in the course of regional consultations, Under Secretary Irwin was assured that potential OPEC sanctions were directed 'solely against the (oil) companies,' and that oil would remain available to consumers 'even if negotiations with the companies broke down.'⁴⁷ For the latter, 'It was perfectly clear', an internal LPG memorandum records, '...that (Iranian Finance Minister) Amouzegar believes that he and H.I.M. (the Shah) have convinced [the] American government in recent discussions of the correctness of their position.'⁴⁸ In a rare display of intra-governmental accord, the White House' preference for accommodating the regional powers was backed by State Department concerns to demonstrably 'recognize the realities' of 'nationalization and participation' in the Gulf oil industry⁴⁹ and move toward 'new forms of relationship'⁵⁰ with the producer nations. In Kissinger's more pragmatic view, the terms on offer at Tehran would, in aggregate, 'affect primarily Europe and Japan and probably improve our competitive position.'⁵¹ Precisely this analysis was also in circulation amongst the European (EEC) governments,⁵² prompting efforts to exploit the 'millstone' of U.S. support for Israel to effect advantageous bilateral terms with the Arab members of OPEC.⁵³ The perceived need to frustrate such 'linkage' between U.S. political particularism in the Middle East and wider foreign economic policy⁵⁴ had also weighed strongly in the NSC's strategy for finessing the demands of the oil companies.⁵⁵ Finally, as Kissinger recalls, 'our hands-off policy ordained the result: the companies yielded.'⁵⁶ The Tehran agreement of February

14, 1971, thus conceded an average 30c. per barrel immediate increase for the Gulf producers, rising to 50c. by 1975 and would amount to a projected \$11.7bn. extra revenue during that period.⁵⁷

For the Shah, the prospect of further oil company concessions, and the clear support of the administration would encourage a further expansion of military procurement, extending to a range of weapons systems (F-14/15 aircraft, 'Phoenix' and 'Maverick' missiles), some of which were not yet in service with U.S. forces. If, for some in the agencies, 'There is no immediate threat to Iran that would justify new inputs of military equipment,'⁵⁸ it was the increasing capability for deterrence from Iran itself that provided the focus for the Kissinger NSC. Such considerations had become sharpened, moreover, by the deteriorating security position elsewhere in the Middle East. By mid-1970, the Soviet Union had installed some 10-15,000 military personnel in Egypt, supported by air and naval units and a comprehensive air defence system.⁵⁹ The Soviet presence was actively employed in providing logistics and reserve air combat support for the Cairo regime's 'war of attrition' with Israel along the Suez Canal.⁶⁰ In September, the administration had become involved in an extended effort to secure the pro-Western government of King Hussein in Jordan from assault by Syria and an alliance of Palestinian guerrillas under the umbrella of the PLO.⁶¹ The review of options for possible U.S. military intervention had, as we have seen, also brought out serious shortcomings in 'rapid deployment' capability for regional contingencies in general.⁶² These, as the administration was well aware, were unlikely to be addressed in the short term by a Congress concerned rather to cut U.S. military spending. Under such conditions, the

Shah's 'appetite for equipment' had begun to look less than 'excessive' to the main shapers of U.S. policy in the Oval Office and the West Basement offices of the NSC.⁶³

A further expression of the 'linkage' between oil, regional security and the pivotal role of Iran in administration decision-making was to be found in Tehran's established oil supply relationship with Israel. Although formal diplomatic relations had never been established, Iran had also developed a close level of technical and security co-operation with Tel Aviv from the early 1950's.⁶⁴ The most tangible manifestation of relations between Washington's principal allies in the Middle East was, however, economic. By 1967, the movements of four tankers 'all flying the Liberian flag' were the subject of regular comment in classified CIA/INR cable traffic⁶⁵ monitoring shipping movements between Eilat (Israel) and the Kharg Island oil terminal. Trade had, by April, 1968, justified the construction of a Mediterranean oil pipeline (with a capacity of 500,000 bpd.)⁶⁶ to enable Israeli resale of its surplus on the world market. Thus, by 1976, a confidential State Department memorandum records, 'at least 75% of Israeli domestic (oil) consumption...is supplied by Iran.'⁶⁷

Viewed in the overall context of an administration determined to reestablish 'a rational conception of America's interest' and against a domestic climate coloured by perceptions of protectionism from Japan and the enlarging (from 1971) EEC,⁶⁸ the rise of new centres of national economic power in the Gulf was not disadvantageous to the objectives of Nixon's 'new framework for international relations'. On August, 15, 1971, the U.S. Treasury had announced a range of 'strong unilateral measures' - including a 10% import surcharge and suspending the convertibility of the dollar - in order to address the

severe U.S. balance of payments position⁶⁹ and what were further perceived as the 'fundamental structural problems of the system.'⁷⁰ Given that the existing international trade and monetary regime was, from the U.S. perspective, viewed as admitting undue scope for foreign comparative advantage, the Tehran and subsequent oil agreements did indeed contribute to redressing the 'disequilibrium on the surplus side'⁷¹ of Washington's economic competitors. The 'affirmative contribution' to balance of payments gain in the United States itself stood at \$2bn. in some estimates by 1972.⁷²

The administration's 'New Economic Policy' and effective ending of the 'Bretton Woods' system of exchange rate parities provided further expression of Nixon's determination to utilize 'the end of the post-war era' of American strategic and economic singularity to forge new advantage. In the Gulf, these ends would be served by increased scope for manoeuvre with the individual states following the disestablishment of the 'Seven Sisters' corporate hegemony. The breakdown of the corporate oil structure had not lessened the strategic dependence of the regional powers on Washington. Similarly, a critical component of U.S. global influence - and in particular, influence on the Western alliance - remained dependent on Washington's position in the Middle East. Given the increasing constriction on U.S. political and economic options internationally, underscored by the NEP, it was in the strategic and military sphere in the Middle East and Indian Ocean that U.S. policy would seek the initiative. Here, if the U.S. response to the oil price conflicts had a certain incremental and *ad hoc* quality, the administration's strategic aims were more firmly established. As developed operationally, however, the scope accorded U.S. strategic engagement with the Gulf powers, Saudi Arabia and, perhaps most fundamentally, Iran was such as to mark an historical

departure equal to the dissolution of the oil companies' erstwhile role as 'third government' in the region.

II. Global Contingency in a Regional Context: The 'Tilt', The 'Zone of Peace' and the India-Pakistan War.

During 1971, both the conceptual and operational framework for the Nixon Doctrine had become established. If the administration's New Economic Policy had demonstrated the ability to conduct 'drastic unilateral steps' toward the principals of the Western alliance, the position of lesser allies had been, rather, enhanced and particularly so in the Middle East. In this context, as NSSM 66 had begun providing a fresh focus to traditional U.S. interests in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, the outbreak of the third India-Pakistan war elsewhere in South Asia would also underscore the changing status of the wider Indian Ocean region in the administration's 'geopolitical design'.

Above the clear affective preferences of Nixon himself between the respective leaderships of India and Pakistan,⁷³ U.S. policy during the March -December Bangladesh secession crisis was entirely consistent with the 'Twin Pillars' approach to security in the Gulf. In a fashion parallel to the case of Iran, U.S.-Pakistan relations had remained correct, if restricted, during the Kennedy/Johnson era. Similarly, obtaining Pakistan's 'active participation' in the regional mobilization of the Nixon Doctrine would require fresh initiative from Washington. Since the Johnson administration's curtailment of arms shipments to both belligerents in the 1965 war with India, U.S. interests in Pakistan had been conventionally defined, in successive departmental position papers, as 'humanitarian' rather than 'strategic'.⁷⁴ In July, 1969, the parameters of existing U.S.

policy throughout the sub-continent had been comprehensively reviewed in a report prepared for the U.S. Air Force.⁷⁵ Considering 'U.S. strategic alternatives' in South Asia, the review observes that, since the 1965 armistice - mediated by the Soviet Union - 'the Pakistanis have...followed what has in fact amounted to a nonaligned policy' and 'Pakistan's *de facto* nonalignment has allowed it to receive military aid from the U.S., the USSR and China.' With reference to the CENTO protocols and 1959 'memorandum of understanding', the report further records that, given the above considerations, it is thus 'extremely unlikely that Pakistan will be subject to "communist aggression"', and moreover, 'there is no real U.S. interest in maintaining West Pakistan's control over East Pakistan.'⁷⁶

For India, the USAF study notes the, 'informal' commitment of the Johnson administration to defend India against nuclear attack from China, albeit, 'we anticipate a decline in the credibility of any U.S. nuclear commitment to India.'⁷⁷ In summation, it is thus clear to the study's authors that, 'American opinion...will not be receptive to new commitments or deployments overseas. This is especially likely to effect the Indian Ocean area, with which Americans have traditionally had few contacts.'⁷⁸

However, if Pakistan's '*de facto* nonalignment' had, here-to-fore, largely corresponded to Washington's own preference for disengagement from the ramified treaty commitments of the Dulles era, the Indian approach to even such readjusted U.S. regional involvement had sought a more rigorous definition of 'nonalignment' in both an organizational and political sense. This framework was joined with more traditional strategic and nationalist perspectives as New Delhi had moved to active opposition

to U.S. Indian Ocean policy. India had been a strong supporter of the 'Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace' adopted at the third Conference of Non-Aligned nations meeting at Lusaka in September, 1970. Here, the resolution for the exclusion of 'bases conceived in the context of (great power) rivalries and competition'⁷⁹ from the region had been identified, in practice, with the United States. India's particular condemnation of the Anglo-U.S. 'base' development on Diego Garcia⁸⁰ stood in contrast to the 'normal international arrangement' obtaining for port 'facilities' depicted in New Delhi's appraisal of Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean.⁸¹ On August 9, 1971 the increasing level of Soviet-Indian rapprochement, begun in the mid-1960's, had become further institutionalized with the signature of a twenty year joint treaty of 'Peace, Friendship and Co-operation'.⁸²

If, therefore, there were compelling policy objectives to be served by support for Pakistan in terms of the regional framework of the Nixon Doctrine, it was the Soviet involvement with India that set the 'protocol level' for the administration. In Moscow's own regional diplomacy, the targeting of 'incumbent conservative and non-communist governments' had also extended to Iran and Pakistan itself as part of the co-ordinated initiative for 'Collective Security in Asia'.⁸³ The USSR could thus prospectively attempt a repetition of the earlier mediation on the sub-continent achieved at Tashkent in 1965/6.⁸⁴ This possibility would, in itself, suggest sufficient reason for engaging a close politico-military bidding from the Nixon White House. There was, though, yet a third aspect to the high profile of U.S. commitment to Pakistan, proceeding from the Yahya Khan government's role in the administration's opening to China.⁸⁵ Pakistan's '*de facto* nonalignment' had, over the 1960's, engendered an active diplomatic and security

relationship with Beijing - concomitant with the latter's enmity to India. If the PRC was perhaps less committed to the survival of the specific regime in Islamabad,⁸⁶ U.S. actions in support of a Chinese ally were, regardless, considered essential to avoid a 'demonstration of American irrelevance', which, in Kissinger's view, 'would severely strain our precarious new relationship with China.'⁸⁷

The administration's vigorous engagement on behalf of Pakistan was made clear as successive diplomatic communications to India⁸⁸ were buttressed by the suspension of \$72m. PL-480 assistance (December, 3) and \$87.6m. in development loans (December, 6).⁸⁹ In parallel, the White House had itself made plain the personal commitment of President Nixon in a series of public and confidential démarches to the Soviet Union (October 18, November 15, 18, December, 6, 10, 12).⁹⁰ Were Moscow's 'undoubted influence' on India not brought into play, Kissinger had informed news reporters, a 'new look' might have to be taken at plans for the forthcoming U.S.-Soviet summit.⁹¹ At the UN Security Council, U.S. ambassador George Bush had charged India with 'armed attack on the very existence of a member-State of the United Nations'⁹² and had concerted a series of motions for cease-fire and Indian withdrawal (December, 4, 7, 12).⁹³ These were to command widespread support (104-11) in the General Assembly. India's censure at both UN forums was only avoided by the exercise of three (Security Council) Soviet vetoes.⁹⁴ More controversially, the U.S. had mobilized a naval task force - 'TF-74' - to assemble from PACOM on December, 10 and, on December 15, deploy in the Bay of Bengal.

The U.S. task force, consisting of an attack carrier (USS 'Enterprise'), a marine assault carrier and eight other combatants⁹⁵ would comprise the greatest concentration of naval power yet seen in the Indian Ocean. Its mission, in Kissinger's view, was to provide the 'margin of uncertainty' to ensure that India would not follow its victory in the East by further actions in West Pakistan, and in particular, the disputed territory of Kashmir.⁹⁶ To this end, TF-74 was to also fulfil two ancillary objectives: firstly, given the level of domestic and inter-agency dissent in the U.S.⁹⁷ the task group would demonstrate to all actors, and particularly the Chinese,⁹⁸ that the White House was in 'control of the government process.'⁹⁹ Secondly, by raising the prospect of (unqualified) U.S. military co-operation with China, the administration sought to 'raise the stakes for the Soviets...to a level where Moscow would see larger interests jeopardized.'¹⁰⁰ Whilst admittedly 'unlikely',¹⁰¹ a possible 'worst-case' contingency could be developed around threat co-ordination in the Assam/Bengal region - the site of earlier Chinese advances in the war of 1962.

The strength of international support for U.S. diplomacy at the United Nations was presented as a vindication of administration policies by Nixon and Kissinger.¹⁰² India had, furthermore, declared an unconditional cease-fire (on all battle fronts) on December, 16. The precise correspondence between these sets of events, however, required, for many critics, considerable disaggregation. The widely publicised Pakistani repression in East Bengal before the final outbreak of hostilities with India had given the issues a wide domestic salience in the United States.¹⁰³ From the outset, the administration's clear partisan 'tilt' in favour of Pakistan had also run up against the 'traditional Indian bias'¹⁰⁴ of the State Department. If the level of the Executive's political and diplomatic support

for a regime acknowledged to be 'caught up...beyond their comprehension'¹⁰⁵ had seemed excessive to the civilian agencies, the utility of the administration's military 'margin of uncertainty' was equally unclear to many in the Pentagon. Whilst aimed ostensibly at preventing the 'dismemberment' of Pakistan in the West, the disposition of TF-74 in the Bay of Bengal would limit its theatre of operations to the former East Pakistan where hostilities had, by this stage, effectively ceased. In the view of the Chief of Naval Operations, Elmo R. Zumwalt, the 'futile' and 'untimely' deployment of U.S. forces would only serve to institutionalize the presence of Soviet naval deployments in the region;¹⁰⁶ given that the regular (two combatant) Soviet contingent had been fortuitously reinforced by similar replacement units and further augmented by two (four combatant) 'task groups' from the Russian Pacific fleet.¹⁰⁷

To be sure, CNO Zumwalt and CJCS Thomas Moorer were, under other circumstances, forceful advocates of an enhanced U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The strategic status of the region had been consistently advanced in support of such claims, and in opposition on both counts to those of State and ACDA, in successive inter-agency policy debates on the issues (NSSM's 104, 109, 110, 118, 133 of November 1970 - June, 1971).¹⁰⁸ However, the emphasis in Zumwalt's planning - in line with the wider 'Project 60' strategy - was on the Navy's 'sea control' mission rather than on the role of 'force projection' represented, *par excellence*, by the carrier task group.¹⁰⁹ As sea control was, regardless, given priority in the Seventh Fleet's 'Outline Plan for Show of Force Operations in the India-Pakistan Area', the deployment of major surface combatants clearly configured for force projection represented, for the CNO, a critical 'mismatch' between force structure and mission.¹¹⁰

For Kissinger, though, if such ambiguity was - rather - contributory to combining the anti-Soviet sea control posture with suggesting 'even the minor risk that we might act irrationally'¹¹¹ against India, the main purpose of TF-74 was to emphasize the position of the United States as a regional military actor. The latter considerations had been otherwise brought into sharp relief by the - albeit, diplomatically couched - U.S. refusal to accede Pakistan's invocation of Article one of the 1959 'Bilateral Agreement'.¹¹² Here, the White House' sympathy for Pakistan would be weighed against the dangers of allowing prior 'commitments' to shape current U.S. 'interests' in a manner that could lose the initiative for the administration. The precept that existing U.S. treaty undertakings be viewed as a 'dynamic process'¹¹³ was central to the expressed objectives of the Nixon Doctrine. Moreover, like the wider body of legislation stemming from the 1957 'Joint Declaration', the 1959 bilaterals were never formally registered in the U.S. Senate as (legally bounded) treaties. Congressional opposition to any U.S. action under these auspices would, therefore, have been formidable. However, if the construction of the 1959 agreement with Pakistan or the CENTO protocol was, in any event, 'explicitly excluded from planning against India', it was the impact of such disavowal on the other identically-worded agreements with Turkey, and in particular, Iran that was of uppermost concern for the administration.¹¹⁴

Approached in these terms, the deployment of TF-74 can be placed in the context of the five previous U.S. naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in 1971. These, as we have seen, had commenced in April with the ASW task group of the USS 'Ticonderoga'. They had then extended to CENTO air defence linkups with Turkey and Iran (June 20-30), U.S. Special Forces exercises with Iran (July 1-15) and earlier manoeuvres of the

USS 'Enterprise' and escorts in the vicinity of Indonesia (September 20-2).¹¹⁵ Thus, if later (1972) DOD summation was not inaccurate in asserting that, 'the deployment of the U.S. naval task force to the Indian Ocean in December, 1971 did not represent a change in our Indian Ocean naval policy,'¹¹⁶ the timing was clearly advantageous in the context of Britain's final withdrawal from the upper Gulf on December, 1. The entry of TF-74 would thus coincide with the departure of a British carrier task group from Singapore from October-December¹¹⁷ and add substance to the extension of PACOM responsibilities to the Indian Ocean, effective from the last week of December. The timing of TF-74 had also a further, albeit subsidiary application in terms of the recent independence of Bahrain and the prevailing climate of tension between Iraq and Iran.¹¹⁸ A demonstration of 'visible U.S. power'¹¹⁹ could have similar significance for U.S. relations with both Saudi Arabia and the 'tenuous' Union of Arab Emirates, whose propensity, noted in one Congressional report, to, 'not stay cohesive'¹²⁰ had been exacerbated by the Shah's November, 29 seizure of the three strategic islands in the Gulf. Overall, as subsequent Congressional hearings were to be told, U.S. policy thus sought recognition as a 'regional power...with a continuing political and security dialogue with many of the parties involved.'¹²¹

However, the White House' assertion of a 'geopolitical' primacy to its own regional design - as opposed to the more parochial 'regional perspective' perceived in the State department¹²² - was not without cost for later U.S. policy. If Kissinger was correct in observing that, following the successive U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the Security Council and UN General Assembly, 'we enjoyed more support in the world community than on any other (issue) in a decade,'¹²³ the U.S. military activities had met a more

mixed reception. The Lusaka 'Zone of Peace' Declaration of 1970 had been introduced in an expanded form to the United Nations on October, 1. Sponsored by Sri Lanka, the resolution (2832) proscribed that the Indian Ocean 'together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto' be, 'hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace'¹²⁴ and was passed substantially (61-0) on December, 16 by the General Assembly. Although many delegates had expressed doubts about the resolution's operational feasibility, recorded in the number (55) of abstentions,¹²⁵ the absence of opposing votes had also, for the expanding nonaligned caucus at the UN, established a point of principle. Moreover, whilst the original Sri Lankan draft had extended to the armed forces of littoral states,¹²⁶ these terms were modified after, 'it became apparent that the members of the (UN First) committee were not ready for such a comprehensive scheme for demilitarization of the Indian Ocean.'¹²⁷ The resolution's sphere of competence was thus restricted to the 'escalation and expansion' of the military presence of the 'Great Powers' and called for the 'eliminating from the Indian Ocean [of] all bases...weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence conceived in the context of great power rivalry.'¹²⁸ India's particularist interpretation of the conditions defining 'great power' bases has been noted: the 'Peace Zone' resolution's explicit requirement that 'warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any littoral or hinterland state of the Indian Ocean'¹²⁹ would further reflect the recovery of India's diplomatic momentum in the aftermath of TF-74.

There was to be a more material legacy for U.S. relations with the sub-continent, again proceeding from what one Indian view had characterized as 'atomic gun-boat

diplomacy.'¹³⁰ The 'margin of uncertainty' attending possible U.S. military action that had so persuaded the Pakistan General Staff to postpone surrender in the East¹³¹ was precisely the margin needed to impress India with this same possibility. The unwitting role played by Pakistan's Eastern command in the administration's threat-bargaining would take similar issue to Indian concerns that American forces could again be in a position to 'act irrationally' in the Indian Ocean. The existing provisions for nuclear weapons research were to undergo significant expansion in the military programmes of both powers. Pakistan's post-war Prime Minister, Ali Bhutto, was to declare in January, 1972 that his country would 'eat grass' rather than forego nuclear weapons.¹³² India would, on May 18, 1974, explode a purportedly 'peaceful' nuclear device derived from Canadian nuclear power technology.¹³³ In Kissinger's view, however, the 'costs' of U.S. policy '...would prove as temporary as they were unavoidable.'¹³⁴ Withal, 'the basic structure of our foreign policy was intact', the then National Security Advisor records, 'we could resume our course.'¹³⁵

III. The Unconditional Ally: the Tehran Summit and 'Blank Cheque'.

If the Nixon administration was thus convinced that its great power focus had been vindicated in the 1971 war and that it was pressure from the Soviet Union that, in the final analysis, had compelled India to modify its presumed 'hegemonic' ambitions on the subcontinent,¹³⁶ the conflict had also brought back security considerations of a more regional nature to the fore. For Pakistan itself, the diplomatic thrust of the administration's 'tilt toward peace'¹³⁷ was to be complemented by the release of 300

armoured personnel carriers (APC's) on order since 1970,¹³⁸ \$87m. in economic aid and a willingness to supply 'on a case by case basis the cash sale of spare parts for previously supplied lethal equipment.'¹³⁹ Here, despite official insistence that the 1965 guidelines on 'lethal military equipment' transfers to both India and Pakistan were to be retained, the criteria for 'lethality' were, as was also acknowledged, a 'grey area'¹⁴⁰ and would not preclude such items as ammunition and bomb racks for previously supplied F-86 and F-104 aircraft.¹⁴¹ The U.S. had supplied some \$692m. of 'materiel hardware' to Pakistan between 1954-65, supplemented by \$700m. of security supporting assistance (as opposed to \$92m. of military and related aid to India between 1962-5).¹⁴² Thus, under this reading, the 'tilt', as administration spokesmen conceded,¹⁴³ was to remain as the basis of U.S. South Asian policy.

In addition to restoring Pakistan's endogenous military capability, the new civilian regime of Ali Bhutto was encouraged to consolidate its security links with the other U.S. allies in the region. Pakistan was thus, in November 1972, to take part in the annual CENTO exercises for the first time since 1965.¹⁴⁴ If the Central Treaty Organization had long ceased to aspire to be a 'NATO for the Middle East', the administration would still recognize the utility of a 'loosely defined co-operative arrangement which gives Pakistan, Iran and Turkey...some sense of potential co-operation', and that, 'as long as they believe there is a validity to CENTO in a political sense, in a quasi-military sense and in an economic sense...we should welcome this.'¹⁴⁵ The main focus of regional support for Pakistan, as for other regional powers was, however, devolved to Iran. The pre-eminence of Iran in the administration's 'geopolitical design' was to be ostensibly affirmed by Nixon's round of international summitry in early 1972. Following the

successful visits to Beijing (February, 21) and Moscow (May, 20) the Presidential entourage was to cap the 'emerging structure of peace' on May, 30 by arriving in Tehran.

'The Shah', Nixon's May, 12 'Briefing Book' for the Tehran summit records, '...is highly gratified by your prospective visit...and the recognition that it brings him as an important world figure...Your visit will put both friends and adversaries in the region on notice that we have important interests in the Gulf area we intend to maintain.'¹⁴⁶ High on the Tehran agenda was, inevitably, the Shah's expanding military procurement programme. Here, administration policy was aiming to redress both the immediate issues of 'credibility' posed in public divisions over the India-Pakistan war and the longer legacy of U.S. questioning of Iranian security priorities. Summing up these perspectives, the briefing memoranda for the President's visit observes that, 'we have in the past...sometimes conveyed the impression that we were unwilling to provide the Shah with military information or equipment because we did not agree with his assessment of his security requirements.'¹⁴⁷ To allay such 'suspicions about our reliability', the Shah should thus, 'be told that in view of Iran's major role in strengthening the free world's security...you have ordered that Iran is to receive our full and continued co-operation as has been reflected in our recent responses to his requests.'¹⁴⁸ The resulting White House memorandum, circulated on June, 15, was later to assume some bureaucratic notoriety as the 'blank cheque'. In addition to being 'forthcoming in response to the Shah's general request for continued U.S. support,' the administration would make 'specific commitments' in regard to: [1] F-14 and F-15

aircraft, [2] laser-guided bombs and [3] 'an increased number of uniformed military technicians from the U.S. services.'¹⁴⁹

The climate of U.S.-Iranian amity on security issues apparent during the Nixon visit was complemented by an outline economic agreement on Iranian oil production arrangements, negotiated by Exxon (for the oil consortium) and the National Iranian Oil Company in late May, 1972.¹⁵⁰ Provisionally fixed for the next 20 years, the agreement involved, *inter alia*, the transfer of refineries in Abadan to the NIOC, the construction, at the consortium's expense, of a further refinery on Kharg Island and a progressive 51% of equity transfer from the consortium to NIOC.¹⁵¹ Previous U.S. policy had, as we have seen, been driven by concerns that Iran's military budget would divert scarce resources from civilian development. After the above and earlier agreements in Tripoli and Tehran, this was perceived as a decreasing problem by the Nixon administration. As the May negotiations had progressed, the administration was confident that, 'the several oil price increases since 1970 which Iran was instrumental in negotiating have substantially eased Iran's financial difficulties' and moreover, that 'Iranian hard currency oil earnings will continue to rise dramatically over the coming years.'¹⁵² The full drama of Iran's market power in the economy of oil was, to be sure, yet to play before the administration. For the moment, though, Nixon's brief to 'express your satisfaction with the responsible attitude Iran has shown in negotiating new relationships with the foreign oil companies'¹⁵³ reflected an outcome perceived as entirely satisfactory.

Of equal satisfaction to both the White House and the several agencies, some DOD dissent notwithstanding,¹⁵⁴ was the Shah's 'farsighted recognition' that, 'Iran must carry

a large share of the responsibility for the security of the Persian Gulf and the approaches to it.¹⁵⁵ The Iranian arms procurement programme was surely commensurate with this task. After the termination of grant military assistance (MAP) in 1969, Iran had acquired some \$750m. worth of arms from then until 1971 - approximate to the total MAP/FMS programme for 1955-68.¹⁵⁶ Following the Tehran summit, the further expansion of Iranian arms procurement was, in the words of a later (1979) State/Defense Department analysis, 'immediate and dramatic'. Outstanding contracts with U.S. companies grew from \$500m. in 1972 to \$2.5bn. in 1973. Amongst the inventory were, 'I-Hawk' s/a missiles (\$687), 332 Bell 214-A helicopters (\$1.2bn.), 'Phoenix' a/a missiles (\$150m.), 80 F-14 aircraft (\$2.497bn.), four DD-693 destroyers (\$1.466bn.) and ancillary equipment, and precision guided munitions.¹⁵⁷

The ostensible locus of external threat identified in Iran's procurement schedules was, as in the past, the Soviet Union. Here, the Shah - widely accounted, in Admiral Zumwalt's observation - as 'one of the worlds most knowledgeable students of weapons systems.'¹⁵⁸ was thus interested in the F-14 in order to offset the latest Soviet air-superiority inventory. The Shah's preference for the British 'Chieftain' tank (as opposed to U.S. models) was similarly derived from its capability against the Soviet T-62. Albeit, despite the massive influx of arms, repeated U.S. intelligence estimates were emphatic that 'the USSR could, of course, overwhelm Iran with ease',¹⁵⁹ and that 'it would not be productive for Iran to plan for such a contingency except in the context of a general East-West war.'¹⁶⁰ Such contingencies remained, to be sure, the subject of regular planning review in the still-extant CENTO 'Basic Assumptions'. In 1965 however, Iran had begun to withdraw significant sections of CENTO-allocated forces from its Soviet border after

expressing public disillusion with alliance inactivity in the (second) India-Pakistan war.¹⁶¹ Iran's overwhelming reliance on U.S. training MAAG's and matériel would, though, necessarily provide for continuing interoperability options and a common strategic doctrine. Thus, whilst the DOD was to admit an unelaborated reference to 'certain countries in the Middle East' within the ambit of 'supplementary force planning'¹⁶² in the 'Total Force' sliding scale, the precise level of possible integration of (respective) forces was to be left contingent within the framework of the 1959 executive agreement and the CENTO treaty itself.¹⁶³ The spread of options informing the Shah's security perspectives was reflected in Iran's changing military posture. In this, the reconfiguration of force structures begun in 1965 had extended, by 1967, to the creation of a new Third army corps (air mobile) based in the Southern city of Shiraz and the redeployment of the Iranian Second corps from the Soviet border to Tehran.¹⁶⁴

The main secular thrust of Iran's military posture was thus not aimed primarily at passive defence against the Soviet Union but attaining the active capability to assume a 'leading role in promoting and protecting area interest'¹⁶⁵ at regional level. The Shah had, indeed, consistently voiced concern to his U.S. interlocutors over 'Soviet advances in Iraq' and, in a recurrent theme, 'what he regards as a grand USSR design to acquire warm water ports in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian sea.'¹⁶⁶ In this context, though, a May, 1972, CIA intelligence Memorandum',¹⁶⁷ compiled to establish inter-agency implementation guidelines for Nixon's discussions in Tehran, again suggests an essentially political focus to Soviet aims in Iraq and the Middle East in general. Russia had, since 1967 given vigorous political and military support to Egypt - for State's INR, the 'first Soviet priority in the Middle East'¹⁶⁸ - and on May 27, 1971 concluded

a twenty year 'Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation' with the regime of Anwar al-Sadat in Cairo.

On April 9, 1972 the Soviet Union was to sign a similar treaty with Iraq. Soviet political and military involvement in Iraq - pursued with varying intensity with the several military governments since 1958 - had, by 1972 extended to a \$250m. defence package and a \$170m. investment in the Iraqi oil industry.¹⁶⁹ The Soviet Union had further assisted in the expansion of Iraq's naval facilities at Um Qasr and the construction of six military airfields.¹⁷⁰ However, although the latter could, in the Agency's view, 'be used to support a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean,'¹⁷¹ such an option had yet to materialize, and overall, 'While the Soviets could use naval facilities in the Indian Ocean for their ships, they have not assigned a high priority to securing such facilities in the Gulf itself.'¹⁷²

The degree of potential Soviet military support for Baghdad was thus not unqualified in the view of CIA analysts.¹⁷³ If the provisions to 'continue ...co-operation in the strengthening of [their] defence capabilities' of Article Nine in the 1972 Treaty were more explicit than those in similar treaties with Egypt and India, the text remained, as the CIA observes 'a careful formulation.'¹⁷⁴ Moscow had remained notably unresponsive to Iraqi requests for a joint protest over the Iranian seizure of the Tumbs islands.¹⁷⁵ The Soviet Union was to similarly distance itself from an Iraqi border incursion in Kuwait of March 20, 1973.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, 'According to a clandestine source' of the CIA, it was further noted that, 'the Soviets rejected an Iraqi request that the friendship treaty include a guarantee [that] the USSR would intervene if Iraq were attacked by Iran.'¹⁷⁷

Overall, far from seeking to sponsor Iraqi particularism at the expense of other regional states, the 'grand design' as presented by the CIA rather locates Soviet Iraq policy within an integrated strategy embracing the wider Gulf area and - notably - Iran itself. Observing that, 'Soviet policies in the Persian Gulf have followed a consistent course over the past five years', in this respect, the Agency notes that, 'Iran is now the fourth largest recipient of Soviet economic aid and the second largest recipient of East European aid' and that, following recent transactions of \$350m., 'the USSR has emerged as Iran's third largest arms supplier.'¹⁷⁸ Furthermore, given that, 'the Soviet assistance programs in Iran...are being implemented more rapidly than Soviet programs in other less developed countries', the analysis concludes that, 'The political and economic benefits that have accrued to the USSR from its trade and aid ties to Iran have become important policy considerations in Moscow.'¹⁷⁹

For the rest of the Gulf, the Soviet Union had announced formal recognition of Bahrain, the UAE and Qatar in 1971, and declared a 'willingness to establish diplomatic relations.' The exchange of ambassadors had, however, been blocked on the Gulf side by Saudi pressure.¹⁸⁰ The U.S. view of a growing Soviet 'rapprochement...with conservative regimes' expressed in the more public Congressional arena is further born out in the CIA's assessment of the region's revolutionary potential. Whilst the Soviet Union had 'established contact' with the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf' (PFLOAG) - currently waging a low-intensity conflict in the Dhofar province of Oman - and the 'Bahraini Liberation Front' and 'provided some small arms and limited funds' to the former via South Yemen, overall, 'the Soviets are being cautious about encouraging subversive activity' in the Gulf and Arabian peninsula.¹⁸¹ In

its public pronouncements the Agency observes, 'Soviet propaganda has become less enthusiastic over the prospects for success of liberation movements in the area.'¹⁸²

If Moscow was thus to display some circumspection regarding 'subversive activity' in the Gulf littoral, a more activist approach was envisaged for the U.S. and its allies, following on decisions taken by Nixon and Kissinger at the summit in Tehran. These involved, as Kissinger records, moves to 'encourage the Shah in supporting the autonomy of the Kurds in Iraq.'¹⁸³ Iran's intermittent involvement in the Kurdish insurgency of Mullah Mustapha Barzani had been expanded in 1965 in co-operation with Israel.¹⁸⁴ In accordance with established CENTO protocol, a watching brief was also maintained by Turkish intelligence¹⁸⁵ Britain¹⁸⁶ and the CIA. However, whilst U.S. intelligence had long noted that 'Iran could, as it has in the past, interfere actively in Iraqi domestic politics', and that 'Iraq is politically and militarily very vulnerable'¹⁸⁷ to such efforts, the commitment of active U.S. intelligence and training support and some \$16m. of 'covert' funding¹⁸⁸ was to mark a conscious departure from previous U.S. policy - notably in terms of the executive level of the decision making.¹⁸⁹ The administration's aims in Kurdistan, however, and those of the much greater Iranian programme, were clear. '[Iran], like ourselves', a March, 1974 CIA memorandum records, '...has seen the benefit in a stalemate situation...in which [Iraq] is intrinsically weakened by [the Kurds] refusal to relinquish semi-autonomy. Neither [Iran] nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolved one way or the other.'¹⁹⁰ The return for the administration from support of such a 'uniquely useful tool for weakening [Iraq's] potential for international adventurism'¹⁹¹ was to soon be forthcoming. 'Nixon's Kurdish decision', as Kissinger again observes,

had left 'Only one Iraqi division...available to participate in the October, 1973 Middle East war.'¹⁹²

Conclusions.

At the outset of the Nixon administration, the principal threats to the U.S. position in the Gulf, South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean region were perceived in three interconnected dimensions. These were: firstly, local nationalisms directed against the West, secondly, rival nationalisms amongst local U.S. allies and finally, possible combinations of the above proceeding in conjunction with the emergent global capability of the Soviet Union. The objectives of U.S. policy were equally clear; to retain, under changing conditions, the singular status of U.S. influence in a region which had, to signal extent, underpinned the global position of the United States since 1945.

Thus, from the perspectives of the end of the first Nixon term, the aims for U.S. policy identified in the NSC's opening review of global strategy had, to significant extent, come to fruition for the administration. The restructuring of the British military presence had been successfully accomplished. The potentially unpredictable Saudi-Iranian rivalry had been contained within a framework of common security interests with Washington. In tandem, U.S. accession to restructured economic arrangements throughout the Gulf region had served to rather entrench the central position of the United States in the political economy of oil. And if the Tehran agreements had seemingly removed economic nationalism as a potential obstacle to U.S. political

influence in the Gulf and Middle East, the *de facto* removal of the Indian Ocean from strategic competition with the Soviet Union had displaced the broader terms of great power political and military competition to a terrain where U.S. allies were the better suited to assume the initiative in the region. The fostering of sympathetic regional nationalism had, again, enhanced the position of the U.S. in relation the wider Western alliance. If the U.S. oil companies were no longer able to act as intermediary executors of 'U.S. foreign policy objectives', their displacement by allied regional states was, *pari passu*, advantageous to U.S. objectives within the 'increasingly heterogeneous' intra-governmental dialogue - a development which would provide a useful foil to U.S. efforts at restructuring global economic regimes in a way which, as the administration was to acknowledge, 'our relations with our allies appeared...to be somewhat out of phase with the innovations taken in our relations with our adversaries.'¹⁹³

For the Middle East, the establishment of 'stability' in the Gulf and 'restraint' in U.S.-Soviet military engagement in the Indian Ocean would prepare the grounding to disperse the 'intractable' conflict between the conservative Arab states and Israel. Throughout, the role of Iran was central to administration strategy. By concerting economic and security links with Israel, increasing political dialogue with Washington's Arab allies and established military links with Pakistan and Turkey, the Shah's regime was, uniquely, the 'pillar' of U.S. interests across the hinterland of the Northern Indian Ocean. In considering the emerging pattern of regional alignments, Nixon could, with some plausibility, take up within the prepared 'talking points' for Tehran the observation that, 'this was precisely what you had in mind when you enunciated the Nixon Doctrine.'¹⁹⁴

In the event, however, the momentum of 'creative forms of nationalism' so commended by the Nixon administration and materially advanced throughout Washington's regional security planning would emerge in ways not wholly accounted for in the NSC's strategy. Time was not entirely on the administration's side in the Middle East, as would be shown by the outbreak of war in October, 1973. Hereafter, faced with overt economic pressure from Arab allies and more elaborated forms of leverage from Israel, the faltering Nixon administration and its successor would seek more direct avenues to project U.S. influence in the region by consulting its strategic position in the Indian Ocean. This will be discussed in the next section.

CHAPTER THREE : FOOTNOTES.

- 1) DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, p.29.
- 2) See, Hs.IO Hgs./71, *op.cit.*, statement of Robert J. Pranger, pp.167-9; see also, DOD Rep./FY-73, p.52, 'Communist Military Assistance', the Report notes that 'over 90% of Soviet military aid...has been to countries situated in an arc running from the Eastern Mediterranean, through the Red Sea, to the Arabian Sea' and, 'Furthermore, these programs are often geared specifically to weaken relations between the U.S. and the country concerned.'
- 3) Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, p.67.
- 4) See, for example, Keohane, 'Hegemony', *op.cit.*, pp.182-217.
- 5)# *ibid.*, p.199.
- 6) *ibid.*
- 7) President Eisenhower observed that, 'anyone could break up the organization (OPEC) by offering five cents more per barrel for the oil of one of the countries,' see, 'Memorandum of Discussion', NSC, September 21, 1960 (Top Secret), cited in INR/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.33.
- 8) For an authoritative contemporary account of global oil production capacity, see, for example, M.A. Adelman, *The World Petroleum Market* (Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); summary in, Adelman, 'Is the Oil Crisis Real?', *Foreign Policy* 9 (Winter, 1972-3) notes, 'By mid-1972, excess producing capacity...was almost universal' (pp.70-1).
- 9) See, U.S. Cabinet Task Force on Import Control, *The Oil Import Question: A Report on the Relationship of Oil Imports to the National Security*, February, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), pp.124-5.
- 10) See, for example, *Nixon Presidential Materials Project* (National Archives and Records Administration), files on 'Oil Import Controls 1969-70', ([CF] FG 221-2); amongst much comment on the declining domestic oil capacity, a February, 3 memo from (OST official) Lee A. DuBridge notes the 'long range national security issue at stake here which could be of overwhelming importance.'
- 11) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub- committee on Multinational Corporations, *Mulinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Report* (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *MNC Rep./75*), pp.119-26.
- 12) *ibid.*, p.125.
- 13) OPEC Resolution XX 1120 (December 21, 1970), cited in *ibid.*, p.126.
- 14) *ibid.*, p.132.
- 15) Kissinger notes that, 'The price increases, while substantial in percentage terms, started from a very low base'; see, Henry A. Kissinger, *The Years of Upheava l*(London: Weidenfeld, 1982), p.862.

- 16) NSDM 92, November 7, 1970 (Secret), cited in, INR/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.47; the report notes, 'The "Twin Pillar" concept was confirmed in National Security Decision Memorandum 92...In it, the President recognized the preponderance of Iranian power in the area, decided to develop a direct relationship with the Gulf sheikhdoms, and decided not to reduce U.S. naval presence in the Gulf.'
- 17) See, for example, Remarks by the Head of the Saudi Arabian Delegation, XXII Conference (Extraordinary) of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties, Tehran, February 3-4, 1971, cited in, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings*, pt.6; Appendix, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *MNC Hgs./74*); addressing the host nation (Iran), the delegation notes, 'Ten years ago, OPEC was founded to raise prices to a justified level...when history will be written I think with your guidance and with the inspiration you are giving us we are now walking in the right avenue to achieve this goal.'
- 18) MNC Rep./75, *op.cit.*, p.130; the Report notes that 'The Irwin mission was personally authorized by President Nixon' (p.129).
- 19) See, Letter, the Shah to the President, January 7, 1964 (unclassified), Letter, the President to the Shah, March 3, 1964 (Confidential). In President Johnson's view, Iran's current military outlay was 'practical and adequate' and a substantive Arab threat was unlikely; correspondence cited in, INR/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.39.
- 20) See, *The Military Problem: State Report* (Secret), DOS, (8/9/69), to: SecState, from: USEmb/Tehran (Esp. v.8: 24-28) the Report notes, 'We wrote this concept into the military program beginning with the memorandum on military assistance of 1962 and it has become enshrined in a joint annual economic review to assess the economic impact of anticipated military purchases'. (p.1).
- 21) INR/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, pp.40-1; see also. *ibid.*, (pt.2) 'Military and Security Issues: The U.S.-Iranian Military Relationship, 1941-79' (Secret), DOS, (29/1/80-decl. 4/83), p.8.
- 22) The agreement specified 2sq. of F-4D interceptors (32 aircraft) to be delivered at four units/ two months beginning September, 1968; see, Iran Background paper, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 23) The Shah had visited the Soviet Union in the Summer of 1965 and reportedly speculated 'aloud' on the prospects of a non-aggression treaty with the USSR at a September, 2 meeting with the U.S. Ambassador; see INR/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.41.
- 24) *ibid.*, p.43.
- 25) See, 'The Military Problem', *op.cit.*, p.1.
- 26) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 27) *ibid.*, p.1.
- 28) *ibid.*
- 29) See, MNC Rep./75, *op.cit.*, p.109.
- 30) *ibid.*, this was in addition to the 11 % increase 'so painfully negotiated the previous year.'
- 31) SOCAL memorandum; 'Free World Oil Consumption and Supply and Growth Prospects for Crude Oil Production in the Middle East' to DOS, February 27, 1968 cited in *ibid.*, p117.

- 32) *ibid.*, p.107.
- 33) After threats of nationalization by the Shah, the Consortium had raised this revenue by readjusting its returns in accord with the 'Persian (Archaemenid) Calendar'; *ibid.*, p.116.
- 34) *ibid.*, p.117.
- 35) Tel. # 51210 SecState (Washington) - USEmb (Tehran), April 3, 1969, (Secret), 'Conversations with the Shah'.
- 36) See, INR/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.46; Kissinger, 'Years of Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.857.
- 37) Kissinger, 'Years of Upheaval', *ibid.*
- 38) Nixon letter to the Shah, July 30, 1970, cited in *ibid.*, p.858.
- 39) NIE/Iran/69, *op.cit.*, p.7.
- 40) SNIE/Iran/70, *op.cit.*, p.3.
- 41) *ibid.*
- 42) *ibid.*
- 43) See, *The External Threat to Iran: State Report RNAS-6* (Secret/NODIS), DOS/INR, (9/6/70-decl.21/9/81), vi.7[b], 'Conclusions', p.9; the study observes, 'The most likely threat to Iranian security lies in subversive activities...economic measures continue to be, in the Iranian context, the most appropriate means of dampening political discontent' (p.8).
- 44) SNIE/Iran/70, *op.cit.*, p.3.
- 45) See, MNC/Rep/75, *op.cit.*, p.133.
- 46) For example, the Irwin Mission had left Tehran on February, 18 - one day before the arrival of the LPG representatives; see, *ibid.*, pp.130-3.
- 47) See, John J. McCloy, (memcon) 'Meeting with Mr. Akins of the State Department in My Office' February 9, 1971, in MNC/Hgs./74, *op.cit.*, 'John J. McCloy, attorney for the London Policy Group, memorandums and notes of conversations with State Department-January, 1971-October, 1972, p. 301; see also James E. Akins, 'The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is here' , *Foreign Affairs* 51, No.3 (April, 1973) pp.462-90.
- 48) See, London Policy Group, 'Message No.2 from Tehran' January 19, 1971, in MNC/Hgs./74, (exhibit 7), p.69.
- 49) See, John J. McCloy, 'Meeting with James Akins', January 20, 1972, in 'McCloy memoranda', *ibid.*, p.304.
- 50) *ibid.*
- 51) Kissinger, 'Years of Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.863 262.
- 52) In discussing U.S. negotiating tactics, John McCloy notes that, '(French C.F.P. representative) Mr. DeMetz had even made charges that the...whole maneuver was a clever move by the Antitrust Division in cooperation with the American companies to improve the U.S. balance of payments,' memorandum for files, 'Re: Oil Companies' negotiations with OPEC', February 3, 1971, in MNC/McCloy memoranda *ibid.*, p.300.

- 53) See, Akins, 'Oil Crisis', *op.cit.*, pp.474-5; for an account of French trading patterns in the Middle East, see, for example, Edward A. Kolodziej, 'France and the Arms Trade', *International Affairs*, Vol.56, No.1 (January, 1980), pp.54-72.
- 54) In Kissinger's view, 'To improve their bargaining position...the oil companies might bring pressure on the government to intervene in the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was contrary to our strategy of demonstrating the limits of Soviet influence', 'Years of Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.863.
- 55) In this context, John McCloy had affirmed that, 'United States policy in the Arab-Israeli controversy' was, indeed '...the chief act of the drama'; see, 'Exchange of correspondence between Senator Frank Church and John J. McCloy', in MNC Hgs./74, *op.cit.*, p.291.
- 56) Kissinger, 'Years of Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.863.
- 57) See, MNC Rep/75, *op.cit.*, p.133.
- 58) See, INR 'External Threat'/70, *op.cit.*, p.1; 'Abstract'.
- 59) See, Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.569-93.
- 60) *ibid.*, pp.587-8; for an overview, see, Yaacov Bar-Simon- Tov, *The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition: 1969-70* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980, see also, David Kimche, *The Final Option* (London: Weidenfeld, 1991), pp.7-29.
- 61) Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp.594-632.
- 62) *ibid.*, p.605; a subsequent Pentagon investigation of the Jordan (U.S.) alert revealed that the 82nd. Airborne was the only unit capable of rapid deployment to Jordan, but the division was so understrength that only two of three brigades could have been deployed in 'combat-ready' status. See, George Ashworth, 'U.S. Army's Worldwide Profile Shrinks under Budget Axe', *Christian Science Monitor*, December 7, 1970.
- 63) Despite some adverse publicity, the 82nd. Airborne remained the only combat ready unit in the strategic reserves two years after 'Black September'; see, testimony of Army COS William Westmoreland for the Senate Defense Appropriations Sub-committee, cited in, 'Rapid Manpower cuts leave Army with 1 Combat Division in U.S.', *Baltimore Sun*, March 20, 1972, p.8. See also GAO report on combat readiness, May 1972, cited in, 'U.S. Report Calls Many Units of Strategic Forces Unready', *Baltimore Sun*, May 18, 1972, p.1.
- 64) See, for example, M.G. Weinbaum, 'Iran and Israel: The Discrete Entente', *Orbis*, Vol. XVIII, No.4 (Winter, 1975) pp.1070-87, Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iran's Foreign Policy', in *ibid.*, pp.1043-69.
- 65) CIA, Intelligence Information Cable (Secret/NOFORN), Field Report # NIT-7411 (29/5/67), Subject: *oil tankers travelling between Iranian ports and the Gulf of Aqaba*.
- 66) See, *Throughput of Israeli Pipeline*: State Memorandum (Secret), DOS, (17/3/70), to: NEA/INR, from: James Akins/OFE the memorandum notes, 'our estimate is...that three quarters of the oil going through the Israeli pipeline comes from Iran...the rest, amounting to some 75,000 to 100,000 barrels per day, comes from the Bela'im offshore and onshore fields in Sinai, occupied by Israel since June, 1967.'
- 67) State Cable # 7611; *Israeli Oil and Energy* (Confidential), DOS, (20/5/76), to: SecState, from: USEmb/Tel Aviv.

- 68) For a summary of these perspectives, see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Foreign Economic Policy: *New Realities and New Directions in United States Foreign Economic Policy*; Report of Hearings, 92nd.Cong. 2nd.Sess., February, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1972). The Report notes, *inter alia*, that, 'The general assumption that the European Community may shift to a more favorable trade policy stance cannot any longer provide a basis for American policy decisions...we must assume that an enlarged Community...will aggravate American trade and investment difficulties around the world'(p.7).
- 69) *ibid.*, notes that, 'There was universal agreement that the actions taken on gold convertability and monetary realignment were wise and necessary'(p.17). See also Federal Reserve Bulletin statistics on U.S. deficit in, Richard N.Cooper, 'The Future of the Dollar', *Foreign Policy* 11, (Summer, 1973), pp.3-23 (p.8); the curve rose from \$3bn. (1969) to \$22bn. in 1971 and fell to \$14bn. for 1972.
- 70) See, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace: A Report to the Congress* by Richard M. Nixon, February 9, 1972 (Washington: GPO, 1973) (hereafter, *U.S. Foreign Policy/72*); p.64, 'International Economic Policy'.
- 71) *ibid.*, p.64.
- 72) See, MNC Rep/75, *op.cit.*, p.169; the exact figure was later disputed in some estimates (*ibid.*, p.170-2), but see also, Ragaei El Mallakh, 'Arab Petroleum Producers and the United States: Conflict and Mutuality of Interests', in, Appendix 'E', Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, the paper notes, 'The U.S. today enjoys a surplus from the Arab bloc greater than that from any other comparative region or grouping in the world. The inflow to the United States (investment returns/trade/inward investment) includes...a total sum for for 1972 of about \$3 billion', p.161.
- 73) See, Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.842-918 (p.848,849,878,879).
- 74) See, Morris, 'Greatness', *op.cit.*, pp.216-17.
- 75) See, *U.S. Strategic Alternatives and Access Problems Related to the Middle East and South Asia*, vol.iii: Political and Strategic Alternatives; Confidential Report prepared by the Westinghouse Corporation for USAF Office of Policy Planning Studies Program, draft: Stephen Oren/Peter Mayer (7/69-decl.27/3/85).
- 76) *ibid.*, pp.[H] 14-15; the report further notes that Pakistan regards the CENTO treaty as 'a useful means for securing U.S. arms', and that, 'as the history of the 1965 war showed, the American commitment against non-communist enemies of Pakistan is an extremely limited one. No use of U.S. troops to implement this commitment is contemplated...U.S. and Pakistan interests briefly converged in the 1950's. Since then they have ceased to do so. (p.[H] 18).
- 77) *ibid.*, pp.[H] 39-40; the report observes that, 'In 1965, the U.S. and the USSR seem to have warned China not to interfere in the Indo-Pakistan war'(p.[H] 38).
- 78) *ibid.*, p.[H] 67.
- 79) See, NAC/Conf.3/Res.8(6), *op.cit.*, the resolution notes, 'either army, navy or airforce bases are excluded. The area should also be free from nuclear weapons.'
- 80) Closing Press conference remarks of Foreign Minister Swaran Singh at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, Singapore, January, 1971 in, *Times*, January 16, 1971. Mr. Singh and other littoral delegates had also strongly condemned the Heath government's decision to resume naval links with South Africa; see also, Jukes, 'Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy', *op.cit.*, pp.13-14.

- 81) See, *Lok Sabha debates*, November 19, 1970.
- 82) If the fact of the treaty was not unexpected, given the history of recent bilateral exchanges, the timing was clearly designed in terms of the crisis in E. Bengal and as a riposte to U.S. relations with China; Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko referred to 'the significance of the treaty in terms of the situation developing to the South of...the Soviet Union (*Tass*, 8/13/71), Mrs Gandhi invoked a 'deterrent...against any rash adventurism on behalf of Islamabad' (*New Delhi Radio*, 19/8/71). 'We shall see to it', Swaran Singh was to tell the Lok Sabha, 'that any Sino-American détente does not affect us adversely' (*New Delhi Radio*, 20/7/71). For discussion, see, for example, M.S. Rajan, 'The Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's Non-Alignment Policy', *Australian Outlook*, (August, 1972).
- 83) In both Indian and Soviet accounts, the treaty had been in preparation for some 18 months. See, for example, Swaran Singh, *Rajya Sabha debates*, Vol.73, col.144 August 26, 1970, Indira Gandhi, *Lok Sabha debates*, 5th ser., Vol.12, col.34 March 30, 1972, Kissinger, W.H.Y., *op.cit.*, pp.866-9; the Soviet 'Collective security' agenda was first developed in conjunction with a June, 1969 tour by Prime Minister Kosygin of India, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. See, 5n. Chap.2, see also, Dieter Braun, 'The Indian Ocean in Afro-Asian Perspective', *The World Today*, Vol.28 No.6 (June, 1972), pp.249-256.
- 84) The signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty was thus accompanied by an invitation to visit Moscow for the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sultan Mohammed (*Dawn* {Karachi} August, 13, 1971); continued Soviet statements were to stress the 'political' nature of the conflict and call for 'peaceful' mediation embracing 'the entire people of Pakistan' (texts in, 'The Soviet Union and the Struggle of the Bangladesh People', Information Department, USSR Embassy, New Delhi, 1972). The Soviet Union would withhold formal recognition of Bangladesh until January 25, 1972. Analysis by the CIA points to the Indo-Soviet treaty as a means to exercise Russian 'restraint' over New Delhi; see, *New York Times*, August 13, 1971.
- 85) Henry Kissinger, background press briefing, December 14, 1971, cited in, Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (London: Hutchinson, 1974), p.261, see also, *New York Times*, December 15, 1971.
- 86) The 'Awami League' Bangladesh independence movement had itself developed links with Beijing; see, for example, G.W. Choudhury, 'Reflections on Sino-Pakistan Relations', *Pacific Commentary*, Vol.7 (January, 1976).
- 87) Kissinger, W.H.Y., p.886
- 88) See, *New York Times*, December, 4,7,8,9, 1971.
- 89) See, Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p.212, Joan Hochman, 'The Suspension of Economic Assistance to India', in, *Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy: Appendices*, vol.3 (Washington: GPO, 1975), p.105.
- 90) Kissinger, W.H.Y., pp.877-912.
- 91) Kalb and Kalb, 'Kissinger', *op.cit.*, p.262.
- 92) See, 'U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's/72', *op.cit.*, p.148; see also, *New York Times*, December, 13, 1971; Jackson, 'South Asian Crisis', *op.cit.*, pp.128-9; Kissinger, W.H.Y. *op.cit.*, p.911.
- 93) 'U.S. Foreign Policy/72', *ibid.*
- 94) *ibid.*, pp.147-8.

- 95) For discussion, see, James McConnell/Anne Kelly, 'Super-Power Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistan Crisis', in MccGwire/McDonnell, 'Soviet Naval Developments', *op.cit.*, pp.444-55.
- 96) Kissinger, W.H.Y., p.912.
- 97) *ibid.*, p.904.
- 98) *ibid.*, p.908.
- 99) *ibid.*, p.854.
- 100) *ibid.*, p.903.
- 101) *ibid.*, p.912.
- 102) Kalb and Kalb, *op.cit.*, p.262-3.
- 103) A Harris Poll had registered public disapproval of the administration's policy by a 2-1 margin; see, William J. Barnds, 'India, Pakistan and American Realpolitik', *Christianity and Crisis* (June 12, 1972), p.143.
- 104) Kissinger, W.H.Y. *op.cit.*, p.854.
- 105) *ibid.*, p.861.
- 106) See, Zumwalt, 'On Watch', *op.cit.*, p.369.
- 107) These mounted a total of 12 SSM (cruise missile) launchers; however, although configured for anti-carrier operations, the Soviet task group(s) were not comparable to TF-74. See, McConnell/Kelly, 'Superpower Naval Diplomacy', *op.cit.*, pp.442-4.
- 108) NSSM 109 (19/12/70) dealt with South Asia policy, NSSM 110 (22/12/70) contained State's views on the 'low priority' of U.S. politico/military interests in the Indian Ocean, NSSM 118 (16/1/71) was a contingency study for E. Pakistan secession; see, Zumwalt, 'On Watch', *op.cit.*, pp.262-3.
- 109) As Zumwalt recalls, Kissinger 'regards carriers as probably the most important of non-strategic weapons'; *ibid.*, p.340.
- 110) The Navy's 'Show of Force' planning called for shadowing Soviet and Indian ships in the Bay of Bengal but forecast no projection of naval power into the Arabian sea because of the absence of Soviet operations in the area; see Jack Anderson, *The Anderson Papers*, (London: Millington, 1973), pp.259-66. Zumwalt's own planning requirement presupposed a 'concept of relevant power', defined as, 'the specific force and power that can be effective in a particular situation,' ('On Watch', *ibid.*, p.344); in the CNO's view, the deployment of TF-74 had met none of these criteria. See, *ibid.*, p.360.
- 111) Kissinger, W.H.Y., p.912.
- 112) Article 1, requiring 'such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon', was formally invoked by the Pakistan ambassador on December 2; see, Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.894.
- 113) See, 'U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's/71', *op.cit.*, p.13; the Report observes, 'Maintaining the integrity of commitments requires relating their tangible expression...to changing conditions.'

- 114) Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.886.
- 115) U.S. Navy ships had also made 157 port calls to 20 states during this period; see, Hs.Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, p.11, statement of James Noyes.
- 116) *ibid.*, Noyes testimony, p.8.
- 117) The British naval force was intended to cover the final withdrawal from the upper Gulf; see, *Daily Telegraph*, November 11, 1971. For discussion, see, McConnell/Kelly, 'Superpower Naval Diplomacy', *op.cit.*, pp.444-8.
- 118) Iraq had expelled several thousand 'Iranians' at the time of the Tumbs' seizure in the Gulf and mounted a partial mobilization; see, for example, Hs.Gulf Hgs./73, *op.cit.*, statement of Dr. Richard Cottam (Pittsburg Univ.), pp.114-5.
- 119) McConnell/Kelly, *op.cit.*, p.445.
- 120) The seizure was followed by the assassination of the ruler of Sharja and civil disorder in Ras al'Khaima. See, John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1975) pp.26-8; see also, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East, *The Middle East in Crisis: Problems and Prospects*, Committee Report, December 21, 1971, 92nd.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1971), p.27.
- 121) U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean: Hearings*, February-March, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*), p.90, testimony of Seymore Weiss (Dir.PMA/DOS).
- 122) Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.897.
- 123) *ibid.*, p.899.
- 124) UNGA. A/Res/2832 (XXVI), passed at 2022nd. plenary meeting, December 16, 1971.
- 125) For discussion, see, for example, K.P. Misra, 'International Politics in the Indian Ocean', *Orbis*, Vol.18, No.4 (Winter, 1975), pp.1088-1108.
- 126) UN Doc. A/8492 (Add.1), 'Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace', October 1, 1971; this was co-sponsored by Tanzania.
- 127) *Statement of Sri Lanka Permanent Representative H. Shirley Amerasinghe*, in A/C.1/PV 1836, November 26, 1971, p.30.
- 128) UN Res. 2832, *op.cit.*, # 2(b).
- 129) *ibid.*, # 3(a).
- 130) See, K. Subrahman, 'India: Keeping the Options Open', in Joel Laurus (ed.), *Nuclear Proliferation, Phase Two* (Kansas University Press, 1974), p.122.
- 131) Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.912; for discussion of Pakistan's expectations of U.S. military action, see, Barry Blechman/Steve Kaplan, *Force Without War* (Washington: Brookings, 1978), pp.206-10, see also, Pran Chopra, *India's Second Liberation* (Cambridge: MIT, 1974), pp.209-12.

- 132) Bhutto had earlier (1965) been appointed coordinator of Pakistan's nuclear programme; for discussion, see, Pringle/Spigeman, *The Nuclear Barons* (London: Michael Joseph, 1982), pp.388-9.
- 133) See, *ibid.*, pp.374-88.
- 134) Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.915.
- 135) *ibid.*, p.918.
- 136) *ibid.*, p.913.
- 137) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *U.S. Interests in and Policy Toward South Asia: Hearings, March, 1973, 93rd.Cong. 1st.Sess.* (Washington: GPO, 1973) (hereafter, *Hs. S.Asia Hgs./73*), p.6, testimony of Asst. Sec. Joseph Sisco.
- 138) *ibid.*, p.103, testimony of Dep. Asst. Sec. James Noyes; Noyes observes, 'I think when the United States meets a commitment to supply some fairly innocuous armored personnel carriers, there is really no grounds for India to think we are undercutting their security.'
- 139) *ibid.*, p.110.
- 140) *ibid.*, p.108.
- 141) *ibid.*, p.109.
- 142) *ibid.*, p.102, statement of Lieutenant Gen. Gross (DOD).
- 143) *ibid.*, p.103, testimony of James Noyes; Noyes notes, 'Having reinstituted this policy, we will now be sticking to it.'
- 144) *New York Times*, July 23, 1973.
- 145) *Hs. S.Asia Hgs./73, op.cit.*, pp.112-3, testimony of James Noyes.
- 146) See, *Visit of Richard Nixon to the Empire of Iran: Issues and Taking Points*, (Secret/EXDIS), DOS, (12/5/72-decl.11/4/80), to: the President, from: William P. Rogers, p.1.
- 147) *ibid.*, p.35.
- 148) *ibid.*, p.36.
- 149) See, *Follow up on the President's Talk with the Shah of Iran*, (Secret), Executive Office of the President, (15/6/72), to: The Secretary of State/The Secretary of Defense, from: Henry A. Kissinger.
- 150) See, *Iranian Oil Negotiations: Intelligence Note*, (Confidential), INR, (6/12/72-decl.21/9/81), p.2.
- 151) *ibid.*, p.4; INR notes that these arrangements, 'would amount to a complete operational takeover of all facilities' and that they would 'dramatically change the fundamental company-government relationship which has prevailed since time immemorial', and, significantly, that Iranian negotiators had asked for, 'U.S. understanding and, by inference, support' in pressing their claims with the oil consortium (pp.5-6).

- 152) See, 'Visit of Richard Nixon', *op.cit.*, p.38.
- 153) *ibid.*, p.16.
- 154) Kissinger, W.H.Y., p.1264; this was to assume a sharper focus within the Schlesinger DOD and NSSM 238 (see, chaps. 4,5).
- 155) 'Visit of Richard Nixon', *op.cit.*, p.9.
- 156) See, DOD: 'U.S.-Iran Military Relationship', *op.cit.*, p.9.
- 157) *ibid.*, pp.11-12.
- 158) Zumwalt, 'On Watch', *op.cit.*, p.150.
- 159) See, SNIE/Iran/70, *op.cit.*, p.9.
- 160) See, INR: 'External Threat'/70, *op.cit.*, p.6, iii[b].
- 161) See, DOS/Iran Survey, *op.cit.*, p.41.
- 162) See, DOD Rep./FY-73, *op.cit.*, pp.63-4.
- 163) In this context, Dep. Asst. Sec. James Noyes was to state that, 'We have not endorsed, to my knowledge, and do not engage in that sort of joint planning'; see, Hs. Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, p.26.
- 164) See Hs.Gulf Hgs./73, *op.cit.*, p.123, statement of Alvin J. Cottrell. The shifting focus of Iran's defence perspectives was also apparent in the stress on strategic mobility. Commenting on a prospective purchase of 30 C-130 air transports, CIA analysis notes, 'If he (the Shah) gets these C-130's, Iran would have the capability to shift 4,000 combat soldiers at any time to likely trouble spots in the Gulf area'; see. SNIE/70, *op.cit.*, p.9.
- 165) See, 'Visit of Richard Nixon', *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 166) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 167) See, *Moscow and the Persian Gulf*: Intelligence Memorandum (Secret/NOFORN), CIA, (12/5/72-decl.23/1/86), from: Office of Current Intelligence.
- 168) See, INR: 'External Threat'/70, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 169) CIA: Moscow/Gulf/72, *op.cit.*, pp.2-3; the arms package extended to, 'AAA guns, anti-tank rockets, armored personnel carriers and fighter aircraft' and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles.
- 170) *ibid.*, p.3; analysts note that, 'at the moment, Iraq does not have a sufficient maintenance and repair capacity to handle Soviet naval ships.'
- 171) *ibid.*
- 172) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 173) *ibid.*, p.5 notes that, 'On several occasions during the past year, the Soviets tried to reassure the Iranians regarding Baghdad's intentions.'
- 174) *ibid.*, p.2.

- 175) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 176) The Soviet official media did not mention Iraq's cross- border operations until 10 days after the event. For a U.S. account of the incident, see, U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference: memcon, (Confidential), DOS, (24/8/73), to: DOS/WashDC, from: USEmb/Tehran; the memorandum records that, '(Soviet First Secretary) Vlassov denied that the presence of Russian warships in Iraqi ports were in any way connected with the incursion...the Soviets found the Iraqi actions embarrassing'. For further discussion, see, Anne M. Kelly, 'The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraq-Kuwait Border Dispute', in, MccGwire/Booth/McDonnell (eds.), *Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp.287-303.
- 177) CIA: Moscow/Gulf/72, *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 178) *ibid.*, pp.1-2.
- 179) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 180) *ibid.*, p.4.
- 181) *ibid.*, p.5; for a more public account of the Dhofar war, Dep. Asst. Sec. Noyes notes that, as of February, 1972, 'a post-monsoon offensive by Omani Armed Forces and revitalized civic action programs [by] the Sultan of Oman seems to be gaining momentum...The successes of the Sultan's military efforts can be attributed largely to the participation of [...] British officers in the training equipping and leadership of the SAF [and] occupation of previously held rebel territory...The Sultan himself is sanguine that the security situation is improving'; see, Hs. Gulf Hgs./72, *op.cit.*, pp.15-16, statement of James Noyes.
- 182) CIA: Moscow/Gulf/72, *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 183) Kissinger, *ibid.*, pp.1264-5.
- 184) See, Kimche; 'Option', *op.cit.*, pp.189-200.
- 185) As the 1964 DOS, 'History of CENTO' records, following the 1958, 'London Declaration', 'the regional members were pressing for an expansion of the work of the Counter-Subversion Office...the Turks even wanted it to become an international clandestine service'; DOS/CENTO, *op.cit.*, p.32. See also, *Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Security Services Survey*, (Secret/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), CIA-Dir. of Operations Counter-Intll., (3/79); the survey notes, 'A formal tri-lateral liaison called the 'Trident' organization was established by Mossad with Turkey's National Security Service (TNSS) and Iran's National Organization for Intelligence and Security (SAVAK) in late 1958...The Trident organization involves continuing intelligence exchange plus semi-annual meetings at the Chiefs of Service level'. p.24.
- 186) In some accounts, British advisors were present in Kurdistan in conection with Iranian-deployed 'Rapier' a/def. systems; see, Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London: Croome Helm, 1979), p.190n.
- 187) See, INR: 'External Threat'/70, *op.cit.*, p.5; NIE/69, *op.cit.*, p.8.
- 188) See, *CIA-The Pike Report*; Transcript of Findings and Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, December, 1975 (Nottingham: Spokesman Books/Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1977), p.196.

- 189) *ibid.*, as House testimony makes clear, the covert aid operation - considered in earlier forms in August, 1971 and March, 1972 - was opposed by the U.S. ambassador and some sections of the CIA itself (pp.211-12); the executive's own intelligence committee, the 'Forty Committee', was informed by Kissinger only after the fact and after the Shah had been personally briefed by Secretary of the Treasury John Connally (p.196,p.212).
- 190) CIA memorandum March 22, 1974, cited in *ibid.*, p.214.
- 191) *ibid.*, it is further recorded that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) harboured a widespread 'distrust' of the Shah and 'trusted no other major power' than the U.S. (p.212). The Shah's own motives were clear; pressure in Iraqi Kurdistan would compell a favourable solution to the Shatt al-Arab border dispute from Iraq, as indeed, transpired with the March, 1975 Algiers Agreement. Thus, a CIA memo of October 17, 1972 states that, '[The Shah] has apparently used [Algeria's] Foreign Minister to pass word to [Iraq] that he would be willing to allow peace to prevail [in Kurdistan] if [Iraq] would publicly agree to abrogate [the 1937 Iran-Iraq 'Treaty of Jeddah']' (*ibid.*, p.214).
- 192) Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.1265; but see also, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *The Persian Gulf-- Money, Politics, Arms, Power*: Hearings, July-August, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1976); testimony of Dep.Asst.Sec. Alfred L. Atherton states, 'We have, I think, sympathy for minority groups in the country (Iraq)...[but]...we have not in any way attempted to interject ourselves in this problem' (p.100).
- 193) See, 'U.S. Foreign Policy/72', *op.cit.*, p.9.
- 194) See, 'Visit of Richard Nixon' briefing memoranda, *op.cit.*, p.9.

CHAPTER FOUR: FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AFTER NIXON.

As the last chapter has shown, the realignment of U.S. foreign and security policy undertaken by the Nixon administration had found a component focus in reestablishing traditional U.S. alliances in South Asia and the Middle East. And if the retrenchment of British military power from the Indian Ocean region had, in any event, necessitated entering fresh considerations of policy, the evident willingness of the more significant regional powers to assume the 'burden' of local security functions had seemingly provided a classic vindication of the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine. In parallel, the administration's triangular diplomacy with the USSR and China had entered a systemic dimension to the process of restructuring U.S. global engagement, so envisaged to enable the United States to reduce military commitments without putting the central balance - or Kissinger's 'global equilibrium' - at risk. However, just as the administration had sought to extract complementary advantage from the several asymmetries of power and interest in the emergent 'multi-polar' international system, the scope for more unstructured manifestations of the 'diffusion of power' had also emerged, most dramatically in the Middle East war and oil crisis of October, 1973.

In providing a simultaneous release for contradictions inherent in the economic, politico/diplomatic and strategic linkages composing the Nixon Doctrine, the events of the October war had opened an historical conjuncture whose impact was perhaps uniquely damaging for the administration across the broad spectrum of policy. In the Middle East itself, the administration's studied Fabianism between the rival claims of the Israeli and Arab powers had proceeded from a clear confidence about the outcome of future conflict, even as though reconciled to its coming. The breadth of strategic co-

ordination between the Arab states had thus signally exposed the administration's assumption that 'time is on our side' in the Middle East. The (387%) oil price rise, 'a pivotal event in the history of this century,'¹ was orchestrated by the chief 'pillar' of U.S. interests in the region - Iran - and the massive Soviet supply effort to the Egyptian and Syrian belligerents - and closely fought outcome of the war itself - had provided telling demonstration of the new global reach of the Soviet Union. Such concerns had been further brought into sharp relief by the administration's 24 hour nuclear 'alert' of October 25. Moreover, for the wider Western alliance, the 'stampede of dissociation'² from U.S. policies of the NATO powers had compromised the administration's efforts to restore 'leadership' to the West, most recently attempted in the abortive 1973 'year of Europe'.³

Yet, if administration moves were to reawaken earlier antagonism to U.S. Middle East policies in Paris and London - 'I don't want to raise the issue of Suez', Edward Heath had observed, 'but its there for many people'⁴ - it was perceived ambivalence in U.S. support for Israel which would provide the focus for controversy in Washington itself. Such sentiment joined alienated bureaucratic opinion within the administration with those, such as ranking Democratic Senator Henry Jackson, with ambitions to succeed it.⁵ Perhaps more significantly for the Nixon White House, common cause would also be taken in opposition to détente with the Soviet Union. If, for many Democrats, a generalized concern at the 'Holy Alliance' aspects of détente,⁶ pursued at the expense of more traditional U.S. links with Europe and Japan, had fused with the growing issue of Soviet domestic policies - underscored by the Jewish emigration controversy - the issue for many on the Goldwater wing of the Republican party was opposition to détente itself.

The final demise of the Nixon Presidency, on August 9, 1974, would thus be effected by an alliance of what Kissinger was to term, 'conservatives who hated communists' (and thus any dealings therewith) and 'liberals,' '...who hated Nixon.' A 'rare convergence', in the Secretary of State's view, 'like an eclipse of the sun.'⁷

However, if elite opinion in the United States was to become increasingly polarized over the legacy of Nixon's 'new structure for peace', there was also a common perception, shared with the population as a whole, of increased U.S. vulnerability to leverage from regional powers. The oil crisis and attendant lobbying on Capitol Hill had given events in the Middle East a domestic resonance unseen in any foreign policy issue since Vietnam. For an administration increasingly abstracted from Presidential authority in domestic affairs, the strategic agenda was to focus on regaining the initiative for Washington with the several Middle East belligerents, and, *pari passu*, bestow a fresh significance to the United States' own capabilities in the Indian Ocean. This chapter will assess the impact of the Middle East war and the transformed regional and strategic context for the development of Indian Ocean policy. To establish the grounding for discussion, it is useful to first consider some background concerning the course and antecedents of the October war, the oil embargo, and the strategic setting.

1. The Yom Kippur War: the Oil Crisis, the Nuclear Alert and the Battle of Logistics.

In considering the background to the October war and oil embargo, it is clear that both events were widely rehearsed in the context of the admittedly 'intractable' conflicts of

interest between Israel and the Arab powers and, in this sense, anticipated by the Nixon administration. What, though, was clearly not anticipated was the efficiency with which both measures were brought to execution. From the at least the second year of administration Middle East policy, the course adopted by Egypt had closely corresponded to Kissinger's prognosis that 'only Washington' was in a position to underwrite the conflicting territorial claims in way commensurate with a stable outcome for the several Middle East governments, if not for the long-dispossessed Palestinian population. Accordingly, and particularly following its consolidation of power in Cairo in May, 1971,⁸ the Sadat regime had begun an increasing process of diplomatic rapprochement with the administration. In parallel, President Sadat's growing alliance with Saudi Arabia had opened up a further channel for U.S. diplomacy in the region. Riyadh was to mount a sustained campaign of representations to Washington, offering on September 1972, to open a economic 'special relationship' with the United States.⁹ However, Saudi Arabia had also, in common with the other OAPEC states, made clear that any future Middle East crisis would involve the 'oil weapon'.¹⁰ Earlier, in July, 1972, the Saudis had encouraged Sadat in 'expelling' the Soviet presence in Egypt.¹¹ To be sure, the latter event was closely co-ordinated with both the Egyptian war planning schedule and the Soviet Union's own calculus of the possible return from renewed regional hostilities.¹² The USSR had also, though, indicated to the U.S. the limits of its engagement in possible Middle East military conflict at the Moscow summit and other consultations with the administration.¹³ Less amenable to U.S. diplomacy was Israel. From Nixon and Kissinger's perspective, a major obstacle to movement in the Middle East lay in the studied immobilism of Israel's negotiating posture. Here, administration leverage was

compromised by Israel's influence on U.S. domestic affairs and compounded by the volatility of Tel Aviv's own internal politics.¹⁴

Thus, if the evidence adduced by some critics for 'benign neglect' on the National Security Council of prior intelligence on Egyptian/Syrian war preparations is circumstantial,¹⁵ it is also clear that after October 6, 1973 the Secretary of State wholeheartedly approved a strategy of cutting the 'Gordian Knot'¹⁶ in the Middle East by force of arms and, in particular, of the actions of Egypt's President Sadat who, like Metternich in 1813, 'set out to demonstrate the necessity of war by demonstrating the impossibility of peace.'¹⁷

If, therefore, Secretary Kissinger was reconciled to there being a 'brutal episode of battle' before a serious movement could begin on realignment in the Middle East, the facility with which the OAPEC producers were able to conduct economic warfare was wholly underestimated.¹⁸ The 1967 oil embargo had, as we have seen, been of little consequence. Further discounted in 1973 were the structural changes in the world oil market which could facilitate the uncommitted OPEC states to exploit the attendant uncertainty over oil futures and impose a fresh pricing regime. After the 1971 Tehran agreement, the producers had moved decisively to secure, under the precepts of 'participation', full operational control of all aspects of the oil industry, including such 'downstream' activities (marketing, distribution), still under nominal corporate ownership.¹⁹ The companies had, indeed, become actively partisan in Middle East policy on behalf of the producers, engaging in extensive lobbying activities and responding with 'complete co-operation' to implement the 1973 oil embargo²⁰ - covering a total

ban on exports to the United States and the Netherlands - declared by OAPEC on October, 20. For the administration it became clear, as one Congressional mission was to discover, that 'the Saudis know more about oil imports into the United States than the U.S. government does.'²¹ The cost to the U.S. economy thus estimated stood at \$48bn. for 1974, representing a 3.4% decline in GNP.²²

In contrast to the pliancy of the U.S. oil corporations and the 'dissociation' of the Western alliance, the one arena where U.S. influence could be more predictably brought to bear was in relations with the Soviet Union. If Moscow had, since the 1967 war, been closely involved in developing the option of an Egyptian/Syrian assault on Israel as a complement to its own strategy in the region,²³ the close diplomatic engagement between the great powers in bilateral contacts and at the United Nations during the October war had also seemingly demonstrated the enduring systemic basis of Nixon's 'stable structure'. Thus, whilst supporting opposing sides in the conflict, 'the United States and the Soviet Union' were, as Kissinger acknowledges, '...pursuing comparable strategies, each seeking to enable its friends to gain the upper hand on the battlefield.'²⁴ From October 11, the Soviet Union had airlifted some 15,000 tonnes of military supplies in 935 missions²⁵ to the several Arab belligerents. The U.S. airlift to Israel, commencing officially on October 13, had exceeded Kissinger's guidelines for being '25 percent ahead of the Soviets,'²⁶ delivering some 22,000 tonnes of equipment in 566 U.S. C-141 and C-5A missions, complemented by 5,000 tonnes of U.S. supplies transported by Israel itself.²⁷ Thus assessing the objective factors governing the 'correlation of forces' in the Middle East war zone, the Brezhnev Politburo would take the opportunity offered by a studied (DEFCON 3) U.S. nuclear alert of October, 24 to facilitate the Soviet Union's

withdrawal from active participation in hostilities.²⁸ In tandem, U.S. policy would be served by the one day DEFCON measures by avoiding a 'humiliation'²⁹ for Egypt and enabling the assertion of control over Israeli military operations.³⁰

Whilst the air and sea lift to Israel had demonstrated the continuing United States superiority in logistics, the close outcome of the fighting in the Middle East and unpredictable factor of Israel's own nuclear capability³¹ had, however, again brought attention to bear on U.S. abilities to conduct limited contingency operations. Despite the several structural reorganizations in the DOD, the U.S. was still, for many in the Pentagon, far from mounting a satisfactory 'half war' capability³² without either mobilizing the reserves and/or a critical drawdown of stocks for the 'major contingency' in Europe. The 'lessons of the Middle East war' would thus be used by the Defense Department to advance a new procurement programme, particularly in the realm of 'high consumption items' like, 'modern munitions, Hobo, TOW, Maverick, Shrike'³³ which should, in the DOD's view be stockpiled in U.S. (CONUS) facilities and prepositioned near likely theatres of conflict.³⁴ The ambivalent attitude of NATO allies during the conflict³⁵ - apart from the embattled Caetano regime in Portugal³⁶ - had also sharpened the need for 'secure bases', where, in the words of subsequent (1974) assessment by the Joint Chiefs, '...we can operate as free from foreign political constraints as possible.'³⁷ The U.S. 'Military Airlift Command' (MAC), as House (ASC) testimony records, had to avoid infringing sovereignty in Spain, France, Italy or Britain.³⁸ Turkey had prohibited the use of its Northern strategic air base at Incerlic for 'non-NATO contingencies'.³⁹ To the clear disquiet of some in the Pentagon, Britain had also ruled out the use of its 'air facility' at Masira island in Oman.⁴⁰ 'Ultimately', the JCS' analysis again observes, 'the

issue is whether the United States can afford to rely solely on the good faith of others when it is believed that the vital interest of the United States or one of its allies are in imminent peril.⁴¹

The central issue arising from the October War was thus not an immediate concern for failure in great power regional management, but the success of regional power leverage on Washington. The dilemma for the administration would arise in so implicating the very 'diffusion of power' strategy that the Nixon Doctrine sought to harness as a lever on the Soviet Union. The irony of such *hubris* was perhaps not lost on Kissinger the historian.⁴² If the OPEC states could threaten NATO's political unity and global economic disruption, Israel could mount a formidable domestic challenge to the administration. However, the parallel drama attending the DEFCON 3 alert, relayed with characteristic hyperbole by Nixon,⁴³ would, inevitably, serve to put in question the strategic centrepiece of U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. Accusations had begun to mount of Soviet 'cheating' in the SALT agreements.⁴⁴ This would lead to the administration conceding Senator Jackson's own revisions to the ongoing negotiations for SALT II,⁴⁵ thus providing the 'linkage' behind the several liberal and conservative strands of domestic opposition to Nixon's 'Emerging Structure' for great power engagement in the international system.

II. Diego Garcia [1]: The Lessons of the Middle East War.

For Indian Ocean policy, the 'lessons of the Middle East War' were to constitute two parallel and mutually reinforcing strands of departure - involving the strategic and local balance of forces - from the previously endorsed 'low profile' of U.S. involvement in the region. Here, the administration's change of emphasis had required Supplementals to the military procurement budget (for FY 1975)⁴⁶ and was to appear as a distinct item in the corresponding DOD *Annual Report*.⁴⁷ At a strategic level, the latter declared that, 'Soviet actions during the October, 1973 Middle East War show that détente is not the only, and in certain circumstances not the primary, policy interest of the USSR'.⁴⁸ Further, as the (February, 1974) Senate Armed Services Committee was to hear, 'the larger number of ships that the Soviets have been able to bring to bear in recent crises in the Indian Ocean and Eastern Mediterranean...have given them significant leverage during these crises.'⁴⁹ The calculus for such leverage had been essayed in a range of strategic and tactical indicators within the Navy's 'Middle East Power Equation Capabilities Analysis' (MEPEC), commissioned and updated after the Jordan crisis of 1970.⁵⁰ In these terms, 'perhaps the most important point' for CNO Admiral Zumwalt, '...is that if it becomes quite clear to both the U.S. and the USSR that the Soviet Union has superior power to bring to bear in periods of crisis, the U.S. must accommodate to Soviet objectives in the crisis or risk losing a conventional war.'⁵¹ At the level of 'bringing to bear' the U.S. Navy's own purchase on regional events, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt would tell the Senate that - even disregarding Soviet activities - 'Maritime power is a relevant power factor in the mosaic of political economical, psychological and other factors necessary to assure our continued access to seaborne resources in a

successful foreign policy.⁵² Hence, as CJCS Admiral Moorer was to inform the concurrent Armed Services sitting in the House, the United States, 'must continue to develop and invest in secure bases where [it] can operate as free of foreign political constraints as possible.'⁵³ These objectives would, 'given the present situation in the Middle East,' be further advanced in the DOD's *Annual Report* for FY 1975. Accordingly, for Defense Secretary Schlesinger, '...United States interests would be served by our presence in the Indian Ocean on a more regular basis' and, specifically, 'we are recommending...a budget supplement for \$29 million for the expansion of our support facilities on...Diego Garcia.'⁵⁴

U.S. concern at, 'continuing increases in Soviet budgets, forces and forward deployments'⁵⁵ was genuine enough, albeit the administration would not resist hyperbole in using the growing 'Soviet threat' issue to garner support for its more immediate aims of 'continued access to seaborne resources' in the Indian Ocean. For Kissinger, however, a proclivity to accept rising Soviet capability as a 'constant' factor in what was still hoped would be a 'stable' pattern of systemic engagement was to conflict with those such as Schlesinger, for whom Moscow's demonstration of strategic capability in the October war 'provided another lesson in Soviet willingness to take risks with world peace.'⁵⁶ Such a conflict would, as we shall see, eventually become insurmountable.

Consideration of the changing pattern of U.S. Indian Ocean policy was to take place in a variety of contexts, notably before the House Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia.⁵⁷ Perhaps the touchstone of debate was, though, the succession of hearings in both the House and the Senate on the expansion of U.S. facilities on Diego Garcia.

The politico-military background to opening of the several hearings (in February/April, 1974) was dominated by much media speculation on possible interventionist scenarios in the Middle East. On October 29, 1973 the administration had committed a Carrier Task Group to the Indian Ocean, consisting of the Carrier USS 'Hancock', four destroyers and an oiler, seconded from the Pacific Fleet (PACOM). The force's ostensible mission was, the State Department observed, to serve as, 'reinforcement for the signally successful efforts of Secretary Kissinger to bring the parties in the (Middle East) conflict to the peace table.'⁵⁸ The Task Group's later rotation with the Carrier USS 'Kitty Hawk' gave substance Schlesinger's December, 1 announcement that the U.S. Navy intended to 'reestablish the pattern of regular visits...disrupted by the Vietnam War'⁵⁹ and provided further evidence of U.S. 'interest' in the region by leading the November, 1974 'MIDLINK' exercises. These were the largest that CENTO had yet mounted in the Indian Ocean.⁶⁰ Whilst DOD officials were to argue that, 'Countries...such as Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia...all feel a sense of security by our additional presence in the area'⁶¹ and Kissinger had refused to 'speculate' on a *Newsweek* interviewer's suggestion of 'military intervention in the Middle East to secure oil that we can afford,'⁶² Schlesinger had maintained a studied ambiguity. The Secretary of Defense observed that, although 'only in the gravest emergency' would the U.S. recourse to military force, nevertheless, '...we should recognize that the independent powers of sovereign states should not be used in such a way as would cripple the larger mass of the industrialized world.'⁶³

A counterpoint to such interventionist 'speculation' and the debate on U.S. forward strategy in general was provided in the ongoing struggle between the Executive and Congress for control of foreign policy. The 'War Powers' act of November 7, 1973 had

sought to limit Executive discretion in military affairs, 'to fulfil the intent of the framers of the constitution' and provided for a 60 day limit on the deployment of U.S. forces 'into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.'⁶⁴ Whilst ostensibly designed to avert another Vietnam, an omnibus clause would also apply to deployments, 'which substantially enlarge U.S. Armed forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.'⁶⁵ If the application of the latter proviso to Diego Garcia was perhaps pushing a legal point, the general principle was not lost on leading Senate 'doves' such as Frank Church and Edward Kennedy who were to introduce, on March 19, 1974, a concurrent resolution to seek arms control negotiations in the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union. The Resolution noted the 'deliberations' of the UN *Ad Hoc* committee, the precedent of the SALT talks and 'the prospects for peace in the Middle East.' It also sought, *inter alia*, 'agreed limitations...on the establishment of naval and other military facilities in the Indian Ocean and littoral states.'⁶⁶ Although not successful in its original form, amendments of a similar construction would, as we shall see, attend the progress of the Diego Garcia Bill until 1976. Throughout, many Senators uncommitted to opposition to the base expansion programme were to express a general unease at the administration's tactics. Thus, although the - somewhat irregular - supplemental request was made ostensibly on the grounds of 'urgency', Senator Hubert Humphrey was to point out that, 'this business of going to the (Senate) Appropriations Committee after submitting an executive agreement (with the British Government) report to the Congress really irritates the Congress'. While Senator Jacob Javits (D-NY) was, in a similar vein, to 'serve notice' of Congressional displeasure at any 'sneaked in executive agreement'⁶⁷ which avoided the due process of debate.

The debate itself had begun in earnest before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 21, 1974, with parallel testimony in the Senate Committees commencing on April, 11.⁶⁸ The immediate matter for consideration was the administration's proposal to expand the island base from an 'austere communications facility' to a 'modest base support facility'.⁶⁹ The communications facility, granted \$20.45m. in funding for FY 1973, had been opened 'with the minimum of publicity' on March 23, 1973.⁷⁰ The revised construction schedule would now involve a lengthened runway (to 12,000 feet), extended POL storage and pier facilities, and dredging 'to accommodate the ships of a carrier task force'. Financially, the programme was to require an incremental \$37.8m. until FY 1976.⁷¹ While the package would in some ways represent a return to the Navy's original desire to establish a 'large, multi-purpose base' in the Southern Hemisphere (the 1968 'option "C"' proposals)⁷² it was to be represented before the Congress as a reaction to 'recent events' such as, '...the Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and the worldwide economic dislocations which flowed from that embargo.'⁷³ Here, in Admiral Zumwalt's view 'Our traditional, strategic view of the Indian Ocean has necessarily been changed.'⁷⁴ Moreover, in contrast to the 'low profile' approach to the region endorsed by the DOD the previous year, 'The Indian Ocean' had since, for the Navy, '...become an area with the potential to influence major shifts of the global power balance over the next decade.'⁷⁵

The factors informing this 'potential' - the local and strategic balance of forces - were presented to the Congress as analytically separate. The 'linkage' offered would be the utility of the Navy's expanded regional posture. In presenting the administration's case, three sets of complementary argument were to be thus set forth, concerning Soviet

politico/military capability, regional politico/economic significance and U.S. military instrumentality. These will be examined in turn.

The analysis of Soviet strategy and capability put forth with varying degrees of stress by State, Defense and the Navy had focused on an internal dynamic. Soviet moves were thus exhibited as proceeding 'on perception of their own interests and objectives in the region and are not driven predominantly by U.S. activities.'⁷⁶ In purely military terms, the House was to hear of the, 'steady buildup...in the Soviet naval presence,'⁷⁷ which would 'typically' consist of 'eight combatants and nine support vessels.'⁷⁸ These had engaged in approximately 150 port visits in 1973 (compared to the U.S. Navy's 184)⁷⁹ while accounting for 8,200 'ship days' (compared to a U.S. figure of 1,150).⁸⁰ Of wider concern, however was the apparent development of a Soviet (logistical) 'support system' in the area, '...that is substantially more extensive than that of the United States.'⁸¹ This included a communications station and mobile dock within the 'expanding' complex of naval facilities at Berbera (Somalia), a 'new military airfield' near Mogadishu, 'access' to Iraqi naval facilities at Umm Qasr ('built with the assistance of Soviet technicians') and 'extended use of Port facilities at the former British base at Aden.'⁸² In addition, the Soviet Union had been establishing a network of mooring buoys and was 'embarked on a world-wide program to expand bunkering and visit rights for their naval, merchant and fishing fleets.' This, the CNO would suggest, included a 'privileged' access to the Bangladeshi port of Chittagong and the large Indian naval base at Visakhapatnam.⁸³

Overall, the pattern of the Soviet naval and logistics posture was, in the Navy's view, consistent with 'primary' strategic objectives relating to, 'the expansion of Soviet

influence with the countries of the region; the enhancement of the Soviet image as a great power; and the neutralization of the PRC's political influence and military power through the expansion of Soviet power on China's Southern flank.'⁸⁴ In this sense, therefore, the existing number of Soviet combatant vessels in the region would be secondary to the potential of a 'military logistics infrastructure...capable of supporting a much greater presence than now exists'⁸⁵ and, in general to the 'geopolitical asymmetries' flowing from land and air power in the metropolitan Soviet Union itself. This, for Zumwalt, constitutes the 'most important military fact.'⁸⁶ The latter was being complemented by, 'A strong political diplomatic thrust in both the Indian Ocean and Middle East zones.'⁸⁷ Here, for State's Seymore Weiss, a 'broad indication' of Soviet interest is provided by the '\$3bn. of economic assistance' and \$4bn. in military assistance (compared with U.S. figures of \$13bn. and \$2bn. respectively) in the period from 1962-72.⁸⁸

Such assertions of Soviet capability outlined above were not, however, to go uncontested before the House Near East and South Asia Sub-committee. Whilst not raising 'first order' questions of Soviet intention, administration critics, such as Rear Admiral (retd.) Gene La Rocque and former Pentagon systems analyst Earl Ravenal, were to present a close technical critique of the Soviet 'sea control' scenarios put forward by the U.S. Navy, using the latter's own criteria. They were to similarly question the need for forward deployed logistics. Thus, La Rocque's assertion that, 'in the highly improbable event of a conventional conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean was a most unlikely area for confrontation'⁸⁹ was supported by an account of Moscow's general 'weaknesses and vulnerabilities' which have 'a particular

significance in the Indian Ocean.' These included the 'lack of sea-borne fixed wing aircraft to provide protection...and reconnaissance', and 'no nuclear powered surface combat ships' to support 'extended distant deployments.' The Soviet Navy also 'lacks reliable and secure shore based support facilities in the Indian Ocean' since existing arrangements, whatever their apparent scope, are entirely dependent on the host nation's 'goodwill'. The volatility of such arrangements, La Rocque points out, was illustrated by the 1972 expulsion of Soviet forces from Egypt. Indeed, the explanation for the apparent rise in Soviet shipping - and hence in the itself 'misleading' measure of 'ship days' - lies in the need to 'rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for fuel, provisions and repairs'. Further, since 'Western powers control most of the egress and ingress points to the Indian Ocean...the possibility of wartime reinforcement for Soviet ships...seems virtually ruled out.' In this way, the supposed vulnerability of the 'choke points' is also reversed to the Soviet Navy's disadvantage. The localized 'geopolitical' advantages enjoyed by Soviet land and air power on the 'Eurasian land-mass' are countered in turn by the wider 'asymmetry' of the global U.S. alliance system.⁹⁰

Whilst the La Rocque testimony was to contest the Navy's claims of Soviet theatre logistical superiority, former Defense Department systems analyst (OSD/Asian Division) Earl Ravenal would further question the implications of creating the Navy's own in-theatre logistics capability. As a POL facility, Ravenal observes, 'it is not efficient in terms of pure utility', since '...to refuel transiting ships from Diego Garcia...(the oil)...has first to be moved from some other place...so it represents a double expense.' Moreover, given the existing ability for 'surge' deployment of forces - demonstrated by the recent 'Hancock' task group and in the annual 'MIDLINK' series of CENTO

exercises - the development of Diego Garcia would suggest a wider agenda than the logistical convenience offered by DOD. The Navy's plans, Ravenal correctly points out, were advanced in 'summer of 1967' with the aim of creating, 'an oiling station for carrier task forces transiting from Norfolk (Virginia) to battle stations off Vietnam.'⁹¹ As we have seen, these had failed to conform to the cost-benefit criteria established by the Clark Clifford DOD. The Joint Chief's modified development schedule - again contested by Ravenal's Office of Systems Analysis - was then taken up by the incoming Melvin Laird Defense Staff on the grounds of meeting the communications requirement between north-west Cape and Asmara. 'What is so striking', Ravenal concludes, '...is the kaleidoscopic change of rationales to support the same proposals.'⁹²

For the DOD, Assistant Secretary James Noyes was to contend that there was indeed a case for forward deployed logistics on the grounds that, 'the need to sustain a logistical tail from the Philippines over 4000 miles of ocean places severe strains on our naval forces.'⁹³ Here, the Department's technical arguments were to also reflect the long-standing bureaucratic dispute surrounding the status of systems analysts in the Washington defence community. Systems methodology had itself become a controversial issue after its introduction within McNamara's DPPB reforms of 1962 and had since been downgraded in the Melvin Laird DOD. However, the wider implications of the administration's case - what, for Ravenal, had suggested the 'kaleidoscopic change of rationales' - represented more than a simple instance of 'bureaucratic longevity' within a renascent Department of the Navy. Of the Navy's 'four principal mission areas' (Overseas Presence, Strategic Deterrence, Sea Control and Projection of Forces), the Diego Garcia programme was presented ostensibly as facilitating the relatively

uncontroversial 'presence' role. This, as conventionally understood, 'exists as a purely peacetime concept.'⁹⁴ Hence, for the administration, 'Our military presence in the Indian Ocean provides tangible evidence of our concern for peace and stability'⁹⁵ with particular relevance to the 'oil production and distribution system' which is 'vulnerable to instability and military uncertainty.'⁹⁶ Historically, however, fixed installations have had a primary purpose more consistent with the more active mission areas. In Ravenal's view, 'bases are necessary only for one purpose, and that is to project military force.'⁹⁷ Thus, from the evidence of the earlier (option "C") proposals, 'it always been the ultimate intention of the JCS...to create a major, complete, multi-purpose base...capable of housing mobile projection forces...and...long range bombing planes.'⁹⁸ In this, the 12,000-foot runway extension would have a particular significance in terms of the aircraft types that could be accommodated. Given DOD's expressed desire to provide for P-3 naval patrol planes,⁹⁹ C-5A heavy air transport and KC-135 airborne tankers,¹⁰⁰ it can be recalled that the C-5 programme had emerged in conjunction with the DOD's 1963 'Rapid Deployment' planning - as had Diego Garcia itself. The KC-135's, as the House was to hear, 'have no other function but to refuel B-52's.'¹⁰¹ Whilst consistent administration denials concerning the strategic bombers themselves were, as Ravenal again observes, 'very carefully worded.'¹⁰²

The broad lines of the administration's argument were to come under further scrutiny as debate moved to the July Hearings of the Sub-committee on Military Construction of the Senate Armed Services Committee.¹⁰³ Here, however, administration critics such as Democratic Senator Stuart Symington were to find a more cautious appraisal of Soviet Indian Ocean capability from the perhaps unexpected quarter of the

CIA. Overall, in the assessment of DCI William Colby, 'the Indian Ocean Area - as distinct from the Middle East - has a lower priority than the U.S., China or Europe in the USSR's diplomatic, economic and military initiatives.' Whilst within this order of priority, 'the roles of military, and particularly naval forces, have been secondary to diplomatic efforts and aid programs in promoting Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean area.'¹⁰⁴ Hence, although a 'measured' increase in Soviet naval traffic had been apparent, this was accounted for by region's use as a '"Southern sea route" for the inter-fleet transfer of naval units', from Soviet Pacific, Black Sea and Northern Commands. Such forces that have remained in the Indian Ocean, Colby observes, 'have been relatively small and inactive.'¹⁰⁵ Moreover, in terms of possible 'mission areas', the order of battle of even combined Soviet forces would seem suitable only for a para-diplomatic 'presence' role as opposed to strategic deterrence, sea-control or projection of forces. Thus, despite Soviet concern for possible SSBN deployments, existing naval activities - in line with SALT 1 considerations - 'have not indicated an anti-Polaris mission.' Further, the 'lack of a significant submarine capability' suggests that, 'interdiction of Western commerce, particularly oil shipments from the Persian Gulf, has not been a major objective.' Whilst finally, from the 'size and composition' of theatre Indian Ocean forces, '...direct military intervention does not appear to figure prominently in Soviet plans.'¹⁰⁶

In considering the Soviet support capabilities, the 'expanding...military logistics infrastructure' central to the U.S. Navy's own case for enhanced logistics, the assessment offered by the DCI would appear equally at variance to that of State, DOD or the Chief of Naval Operations. In Somalia, the Port of Berbera is characterized as, 'a small

installation which will handle two or three ships'. Construction work had been observed on airfield facilities the previous year but has 'not gotten very far'. The 'gradual' build-up of a further airfield '30 or 40 miles North West of Mogadishu' is also noted, 'But there is not much progress on that either.'¹⁰⁷ At Umm Qasr, the 'so-called port' is actually, 'about four, five or six buildings here, a place where you can anchor', while 'The Iraqis appear to be a little bit restrictive as to the degree to which they will allow the Soviets free use of this particular port.'¹⁰⁸ In South Yemen (PDRY), although 'the former British base at Aden is a good base' the Soviet forces, 'have not used it very much', and furthermore, 'contrary to numerous reports about Socotra, the barren island has no port facilities or fuel storage and its airstrip is a small World War two gravel runway...a major construction effort would have to precede any significant Soviet use of Socotra.' India had also featured in the Navy's account of possible Soviet logistics infrastructure, and had indeed received significant Soviet assistance in its own naval expansion programme. 'Nevertheless', in the CIA's opinion, '...New Delhi has not granted the Soviets free access to Indian ports, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable future.' In general, William Colby was to conclude, 'Moscow's prospects for naval facilities in other littoral countries are not very bright.'¹⁰⁹

However, while much of the Congressional debate was to revolve around technical questions of comparative U.S./Soviet force structures and logistics, these were clearly posterior to what was held to be the strategic importance of the region itself. 'Soviet activity adds to the rationale for Diego Garcia', Zumwalt had observed, '...that rationale would exist independently of anything that the Soviets were doing.'¹¹⁰ The administration's submission was to detail what were recognizably a core of direct U.S.

concerns in the '\$3.5 billion' of capital investments in the Persian Gulf¹¹¹ and the 7.9% of imported Gulf oil.¹¹² In a wider sense, moreover, testimony would also indicate 'a range of interests which stem from the sheer instability of the area...involving about a third of the total population of the world.'¹¹³ The apparent truism of a generalized U.S. 'interest' in countering 'instability' had thus assumed a defining status for the administration's Indian Ocean policy. In this, the concern for the 'free flow of goods and raw materials' throughout the 'high seas' and the 'increasingly intricate web of mutual interdependence'¹¹⁴ is consistent with the pattern of 'informal obligations' so addressed in the DOD's 'Total Force' planning.¹¹⁵ If such an approach could yield a restricted interpretation in terms of local military balance - one which much of the Navy's own case would exhibit - the wider concern was in the more intangible realm of confidence. Here, considerations of an immediate impact on the market in oil futures were combined with the perennial issue of administration 'credibility'.

III. Diego Garcia [2]: the Regional Dialogue.

In terms of what, in recent events, had been a somewhat involuntary U.S. exposure to 'mutual interdependence' with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean, the administration was thus to reconcile the perceived strategic necessity proceeding from at least an expanded military 'presence' posture with the virtues of active international engagement, by presenting the expanded Diego Garcia programme as a contribution to regional stability. The United States had, in the State Department's view, so been able to 'play a vital intermediary role' in the concurrent Middle East peace negotiations, 'precisely

because we are a regional power with...a continuing political and security dialogue with many of the parties involved.'¹¹⁶ In the expressed view of many of the parties however, the 'dialogue's' strategic grammar was to give rise to similarly ambivalent reactions to those greeting the 1957 'Eisenhower Declaration'. Whilst there had been no equivalent 'Nixon Declaration', the deployment of the 'Hancock' task group in conjunction with the renewed expansion of Diego Garcia would be viewed in the context of Schlesinger's trenchant remarks concerning the limitations of 'the concept of national sovereignty'. Kuwait had, on January 10 proclaimed that 'mines have planted (in the oilfields)...and would be set off at a moments notice.'¹¹⁷ Bahrain had earlier (on October 20, 1973) issued a years notice on MIDEASTFOR, although the administration had (not unjustified) hopes of a 'change of mind on this.'¹¹⁸ And at the OPEC Heads of Government Conference of April 1, 1975, the latter were to 'declare their readiness...to counteract (U.S./allied) threats with a unified response, notably in cases of aggression.'¹¹⁹

In the wider Indian Ocean area, reactions of other powers to the new U.S. activism had also, as the administration admitted, 'been on the negative side.'¹²⁰ New Zealand was, in an official statement of February, 12, to express support for the U.N. 'Zone of Peace' declaration.¹²¹ While at a March, 20 press conference, Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam would claim that, 'there is no nation around the Indian Ocean which welcomes a buildup on this uninhabited...group of islands.'¹²²

As might be expected, the administration was to pronounce such overt opposition as diplomatic 'cover'. 'The picture[s] that nations give you through the public channels', in Admiral Zumwalt's characterization, 'are really so very often far from the picture

one gets privately.'¹²³ To be sure, the position of the Gulf nations was, in particular, such as to require some ambiguity. However, in the case of India, the widespread opposition to U.S. moves was quite clear in its interpretation of the ultimate relation of 'foreign policy to military force structure and mission'. India had concerted consistent opposition to U.S. military expansion in the 'Zone of Peace' motions at the UN. Although ostensibly aimed at, 'Eliminating...all bases...conceived in the context of great power rivalry,' New Delhi was adamant that 'a (U.S.) military base is certainly different from a (Soviet) naval presence.'¹²⁴ Indian opposition would flow from a variety of motives. Diplomatically, India was seeking a leading role in the nascent Non-Aligned Movement - where much of the 'Peace Zone' diplomacy had originated - similar to that enjoyed under Nehru in the 1950's. Militarily, the extension of 'superpower' rivalry to the region could inhibit India's own ambitions for local ascendancy. In the aftermath of the 1971 war, vocal opposition to Washington was a significant component in the Gandhi government's domestic appeal.¹²⁵ The *Times of India* would, though, express what was perhaps the mainstream Indian view in noting that, 'Despite the aftermath of the Dulles era, the Americans do not seem to have learned that military bases are a source of tension and insecurity, not of security.'¹²⁶

One quarter where the administration would not, however, be faced with adverse international reaction was Britain. In view of the 'extremely close' relations obtaining on the course of joint arrangements to date, State correctly anticipated a similar response from the incoming (after February, 1974) Wilson Government which, it was noted, had reached the original 1966 'blanket agreement' and supported the 'communications' enhancement programme (although the recent agreement of October 24, 1972 had been signed under the tenure of Edward Heath). The Heath Government had, in February 5,

1974, also accepted 'in principle' to expand the facilities to a 'Naval Support Base', which, as Foreign Office Minister Julian Amery explained, was 'in the general Western interest' in terms of the much discussed Soviet moves in the region.¹²⁷ Also furthering such interest was British involvement in the Dhofar counter-insurgency which had received some 'third party' transfers of U.S. war material from Iran and Saudi Arabia.¹²⁸ The new Labour Government would indeed formally accede to Washington's request on April, 4¹²⁹ albeit signalling, in the December 'Defence Review', a further strategic retrenchment by withdrawing - by April, 1976 - from Gan, Singapore and the military structure of CENTO.¹³⁰ However, while London's direct military involvement in the region was limited, a regular pattern of joint 'consultations' at staff level would continue on a six-monthly basis in tandem with other meetings 'in a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral fora.'¹³¹ Of perhaps wider significance was the more intangible legacy of the 'historically special relationship',¹³² the body of shared strategic assumptions and methodology which had prompted Admiral La Rocque's observations on the 'dream' of the U.S. Navy '...to inherit the British imperial mantle "East of Suez."'¹³³ Here, the navalists were able to call upon a rising strand of British opinion, 'as repeatedly brought up in the editorials of the *Economist* magazine', whose importance lay not so much in terms of specific policy recommendations as in the general terms of an agenda.

In this, the categories of 19th and early 20th century 'geopolitics' - as advanced in the works of Sir Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan - were to be given a fresh currency in the contemporary debate concerning both the means and ends of U.S. global strategy. The effectiveness of the OPEC embargo had stimulated wider concerns for the outbreak of 'resource wars' prompted by other commodity producing countries

in the third world. In the context of Indian Ocean security policy, these prospects presented additional theatre disadvantages stemming from the 'geopolitical asymmetry' of the Soviet Union. For Admiral Zumwalt, the inference was clear:

We are essentially a world island. We cannot survive without our allies, without being able to import oil or 69 of the 72 critical resources which must come in on the surface of the seas. Therefore...We have got to have greater capability than the Soviets do, that is, be able to control the seas in order to prevent the cutting off of sea lines of communication.¹³⁴

As can be recalled, the CNO had strongly advocated sea control as a strategy appropriate to a 'world island', although the full extent of 'Project 60' was not to be comprehensively realized.¹³⁵ It was, however, the existence of Soviet maritime capabilities as such rather than the extent to which they could actually engage U.S. forces in any significant military sense which, for many in the defence establishment, had become the main issue.

IV. Strategic 'Superiority', Theatre Sufficiency and the Central Balance.

The wider Washington debate on the central balance - itself subject to much partisan representation - was finding a primary, and for some Pentagon interests, timely, outlet within the hitherto somewhat localized discourse of Indian Ocean policy by the summer of 1974. The immediate issue of (respective) theatre capability would, in this sense, function as a signifier for concerns that the achievement of Soviet strategic 'parity' could, as Kissinger had acknowledged, 'free' to some extent '...their capacity for regional intervention.'¹³⁶ The relation between 'force' and 'diplomacy' in the nuclear age had been a central concern in Secretary Kissinger's academic writings and had achieved considerable empirical application in the structures of the Nixon Doctrine. However, the latter's apparent acceptance of a permanent loss of U.S. 'superiority' throughout

significant categories of military power had never been universally accepted in the defence and foreign policy community. By the middle 1970's, these concerns had surfaced in the 'counterforce' debate, wherein a new generation of nuclear delivery systems (Trident, Cruise, MX) were laid down in order to, as the DOD *Annual Report* for FY 1975 put it, 'shore up deterrence across the entire spectrum of risk.'¹³⁷ Thus, though acknowledging that, 'neither the USSR nor the United States has, or could hope to have, a capability to launch a disarming first strike against the other,' what became known as the 'Schlesinger Doctrine' was to hold that the maintenance of continued 'credibility' for the overall United States' strategic posture required 'a wider set of much more selective targeting options.'¹³⁸

Whilst the Secretary of State did not gainsay his own role in procurement,¹³⁹ the focus on counterforce systems was, for Kissinger, essentially 'a palliative...for increased regional defense.'¹⁴⁰ Again, however, the means as well as, increasingly, the strategic ends of the role of regional defence in the sufficiency *vis a vis* superiority debate were becoming subject to dispute within the administration. Secretary Schlesinger was to increasingly question the unchanged Nixon 'blank slate' arms sales policy in terms of the latitude so allowed to U.S. regional surrogates. This found support amongst much DOD opinion concerned at the prospect of an ever-growing need for United States' military advisors and technical staff in potentially volatile third world *milieux*. At the head of these concerns was Iran, where Schlesinger was, in September, 1975, to dispatch a Pentagon official to co-ordinate matters in the field.¹⁴¹

Of more direct impact on Indian Ocean policy was the ongoing sea control /force projection issue, which had been disputed operationally at the time of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. During his tenure, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had backed Admiral Zumwalt's opposition to further 'Enterprise' class nuclear carriers¹⁴² and, in August, 1974 ordered a redeployment of existing carriers from the Pacific and Mediterranean fleets to the Indian Ocean.¹⁴³ Both the latter decisions were rescinded following Schlesinger's own departure from office on November 2, 1975.¹⁴⁴ There was, though, to be broad agreement throughout the national security elite on the need to expand Washington's presence in the Indian Ocean as such. Kissinger would thus lobby for the consistently stalled FDL programme¹⁴⁵ and condemn the 'tendency to reduce our capacity for foreign intervention [which] caused the Congress to prohibit...the basing of B-52's at our...facility of Diego Garcia.'¹⁴⁶ Given the backdrop of bureaucratic conflict on most other issues, some observers assumed that Kissinger had here simply 'conceded' to the Joint Chiefs wishes in order to 'secure agreement on the SALT negotiations.'¹⁴⁷ The reality was, however, more complex. Underlying the 'sea control' debate was the thesis, advanced *inter alia* within the platform of the rising conservative caucus in Congress and the defence community, of a concerted drive toward 'sea denial' by the Soviet Union. The USSR was, in Zumwalt's view, 'in the process of developing a...maritime capability, superior to our own.'¹⁴⁸ This was, in turn read as a moment in overall Soviet ambitions toward 'hegemony', whose manifestations were also apparent in Moscow's strategic weapons programme. Hence, as Paul Nitze, again in office as Defense Department SALT Representative, was to argue, 'the prospects for obtaining arms control agreements...are not good' since 'the Soviet view' is that 'the correlation of [significant] forces had been, and would continue to move in their favor' and indeed,

'they have reason for their stated belief.'¹⁴⁹ For Kissinger, as for the departing President Nixon, considerations of Soviet intention - any more than those of the USSR's domestic structure - were, as we have seen, of less significance than the systemic engagement that détente would promote as a grounding for regional 'stability'.

For Kissinger's conservative opponents - amongst whom Schlesinger, Zumwalt and (before June 14, 1974) Paul Nitze were prominent from within the administration - détente had itself been a 'palliative' for managing unavoidable U.S. retrenchment after Vietnam.¹⁵⁰ In terms of naval policy, Zumwalt is clear that, 'The South Asian war...cost us a generation of ships...We were just going to have to gamble in the near term on the policy of détente getting us through the next few years...we were going to have to make the investments that would buy us back the capability which we elected to give up, temporarily, faced with that budgetary situation.'¹⁵¹ The admission of an earlier, expansive naval planning agenda, whose development in the Indian Ocean the DOD was wishing to 'reestablish', has been noted. Again, the broad agreement on enhanced conventional forces - in the Indian Ocean as elsewhere - between Kissinger and his critics on the nascent right should be stressed. Where the irreducible scission would be found was in the belief that not only was the Soviet Union striving for 'superiority', but that such a category had real strategic content to begin with.¹⁵²

To be sure, the immediate impact of such concerns was most visible in the U.S. domestic arena. Nitze, Zumwalt and others were to mobilize a formidable and bi-partisan caucus to promote the 'present danger' of Soviet power as a major issue in the Presidential elections of 1976.¹⁵³ The terms of the debate would, though, also increasingly

inform the making of regional policy: a focus of which, by 1974-5, had become the Indian Ocean. Overall, in the CNO's view, 'détente...was achieved because the U.S. had superior military strength...we will only continue to maintain détente if we continue to maintain a superior military position to the Soviets.'¹⁵⁴ However, the 'net assessment'¹⁵⁵ of the (proceeding) 'maritime balance' was, for Zumwalt, 'grim indeed.' Hence, 'if present trends continue...we will lack the capability to control and use the seas.'¹⁵⁶ Such consequences would, for prominent naval advocate Senator Barry Goldwater, strike an authentic Mahanian note. 'He who controls the Indian Ocean' the 1975 Senate Armed Services Committee was to hear, 'is going to control the economy of the world.'¹⁵⁷ Moreover, 'now that we have lost Vietnam' and 'are about to lose Thailand...to the enemy', there arises the prospect that, 'if the Straits of Malacca are closed to us, we have absolutely no control over our interests in the Indian Ocean.' That 'the enemy' would include, in this instance, 'Red China and her allies' would not detract from the case of the Senator from Arizona, who had taken the Nixon administration's accommodation with Beijing as one more indication that 'the sun...may be over the yard-arm...for the United States.'¹⁵⁸

V. The 'Natural Alliance': Soviet Regional Diplomacy, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the 'New International Economic Order'.

Whilst Senator Goldwater's 'geopolitical' arguments for expanding the U.S. Indian Ocean presence were to be widely endorsed by proponents in both the House and the administration, the latter were, however, to retain the Nixon Doctrine's premise of a 'multi-polar communism'. Indeed, some impetus for the thesis of a rising Soviet threat

(and corresponding U.S. decline) had originated in Beijing itself.¹⁵⁹ For Schlesinger and the naval lobby, the ideological challenge posed by the Soviet Union was compounded by more traditional great power considerations, stemming from an expansionist interpretation of Russian history. A possible motive for the latter's purportedly ambitious Indian Ocean programme - presented with much photographic and intelligence data to the 1975 Hearings - could thus be found in the, 'Warm water drive of the Czars...going back to Peter the Great.'¹⁶⁰ Discussion of the Soviet 'warm water' imperative had, as we have seen, also been much in evidence in the more historically inclined circles of Whitehall and 'the *Economist* magazine'. More empirical evidence for a Soviet drive to establish a 'sphere of influence' in South Asia, complementary to an enhanced Indian Ocean naval posture, would be adduced by Schlesinger in the pattern of Soviet treaties for 'Peace, Friendship and Co-operation' with littoral states. The treaties, with Egypt (May, 1971), India (August, 1971), Iraq (April, 1972) and Somalia (July, 1974), provided for economic, political and - more ambiguously - military co-operation. For the former, Moscow had, for example, replaced Western technical personnel in the Iraqi oil industry, following the nationalization of June 1, 1972.¹⁶¹ Of greater significance from the U.S. standpoint was a standard clause admitting 'mutual consultations' (amongst contracting parties) '...to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.'¹⁶² That Soviet Naval C.inC. Admiral Gorshkov had, in September 1974, paid a personal visit to Somalia was noted.¹⁶³ For Admiral Zumwalt, Soviet arrangements with the Mogadishu regime provided 'a most impressive example' of, '...the use of military-political techniques on their part to change Somalia from a non-aligned state and to bring her to the status of a client nation.'¹⁶⁴

As we have argued earlier, the sequence of regional 'Friendship' treaties were indeed conceived in the context of a more extensive, multilateral agenda. 'The significance of the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with such large developing countries as India [and] Iraq', as relayed in one 1972 Moscow editorial '...goes far beyond the framework of the USSR's bilateral relations with those states.'¹⁶⁵ Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had earlier proposed arrangements for regional economic co-operation involving India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan in the course of visits to the four states in February, 1969.¹⁶⁶ A speech of June the second that year by Leonid Brezhnev had outlined some more ambitious proposals, additionally involving Cambodia, Burma and Singapore, as part of an overall package for 'Collective Security in Asia'.¹⁶⁷ Whilst not closely limited geographically, the extensively canvassed 'collective security' formula was intended to complement institutional Non-Aligned Movement programmes in, as one Soviet commentator put it, the 'spirit of Bandung'¹⁶⁸ and further establish Soviet credentials as a 'regional power'. The formulation was to thus be invoked to suggest Soviet 'sympathy' with such moves as the 1971 ASEAN 'Kuala Lumpur Declaration',¹⁶⁹ the ongoing 'Law of the Sea' negotiations and, albeit carefully qualified, the UN 'Zone of Peace' declaration for the Indian Ocean. However, despite continued advocacy throughout the early 1970's, Soviet efforts to attach the 'principles [of] the renunciation of force between states...and wide development of economic and other forms of co-operation on the basis of...mutual benefit'¹⁷⁰ professed in the scheme to endogenous Asian and Non-Aligned initiatives would remain largely rhetorical.

For more market-oriented 'nonaligned' littoral states such as Malaysia, the unavoidable implication of the 'collective security' plan toward countering what Brezhnev's June

speech had termed 'the combination of the Chinese leader's political adventures and the atmosphere of war hysteria continually incited by them,'¹⁷¹ were to be unacceptable to governments following Washington's lead to improve relations with Beijing. India would find considerable merit in the Soviet approach for precisely this reason. 'The Brezhnev collective security proposal', the 1970 Indian External Affairs Ministry *Annual Report* had observed, 'marked a new development of some significance in that it was a declaration that the Soviet Union was as much an Asian as a European power.'¹⁷² The latter argument had, indeed, been taken up in another context by Admiral Zumwalt. Overall, however, Soviet efforts to stress an 'Asian' pedigree and identify with nonaligned aspirations were to inevitably run aground on the issue of relations with China. Soviet commentators had regularly attacked alleged Chinese influence in the NAM as trying to 'disfigure' the Movement by stressing North-South divisions rather than a common ground with the 'socialist camp' in opposition to 'imperialism'¹⁷³ In the Indian Ocean security context, Sino-Soviet rivalry had, as the DOD acknowledged, played a significant role in determining Moscow's entry to the region. For some analysts, it was a major causative factor in the development of the Soviet 'blue water' navy itself.¹⁷⁴ For its part, China had, since 1971, consistently voted with the littoral states on the UN 'Zone of Peace' declaration and had been active in concerting the 15 member *Ad Hoc* committee, founded in 1972 to 'consider...ways of implementation' of Resolution 2832.¹⁷⁵

However, if Soviet efforts to present the 'Socialist states' as the 'natural and most reliable allies'¹⁷⁶ of the NAM were encountering substantive problems beneath the rhetorical amity, the Movement had also become an item in U.S. policy considerations,

particularly after the Algiers Non-Aligned summit (September, 1973) and sixth Special Session of the UN of 1974.¹⁷⁷ These developments were to have a particular resonance for Indian Ocean policy. Here, the overlap between member states of OPEC and the NAM - notably in the cases of Egypt and Algeria - would serve to present the oil cartel as an exemplar of the possibilities for united action amongst other commodity producers, thus giving concrete expression to the Special Session's programme for a 'New International Economic Order' (NIEO). The prospect of threats to the '69 of the 72 critical resources' had, in their turn, been prominent in the U.S. Navy's rationale for an expanded theatre military capability in the Indian Ocean.

Of further concern to the administration was the diplomatic impact of the growing nonaligned caucus at the UN in mobilizing successive votes on the 'Zone of Peace' platform. Following the increased 95 nation majority (with 35 abstentions) at the twenty-seventh regular session in 1972, a report was commissioned by the Secretary General to prepare the way for an international conference on the issue. The UN study - entitled 'A Factual Statement of the Great Powers' Military Presence in all of its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their Naval Deployment, conceived in the context of Great Power Rivalry'¹⁷⁸ - appearing in May, 1974 became immediately controversial and was withdrawn by the Secretary General.¹⁷⁹ Kissinger was, nevertheless, compelled to acknowledge the potential for some diplomatic leverage from the NAM on specific issue areas. Israel, for example, had become increasingly isolated in the UN and in 1974 the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were for the first time, allowed to address the General Assembly. At a conference in New Delhi in October, 1974, the Secretary of State affirmed that 'our relations with the nonaligned

countries are another pillar of our foreign policy' albeit, that 'bloc diplomacy of any kind is anachronistic and self defeating.'¹⁸⁰

Thus, however ephemeral third world unity actually was on such issues as IOPZ and NIEO, the administration had been forced to recognize the threat of an emergent agenda. Here, U.S. policies - in the Middle East and Indian Ocean in particular - would, almost automatically, come into question. Washington's reaction, both in government and the wider foreign policy community, was two-fold. In immediate terms, Kissinger was to promote a vigorous effort 'to respond to attack by counter attack'¹⁸¹ spearheaded at the UN by new hard-line Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan.¹⁸² For Indian Ocean policy, such an approach would comport with the Navy's provisions for military unilateralism. An alternative approach, increasingly canvassed amongst Democratic Senators, middle-ranking officials at State and within the non-governmental 'Trilateral Commission', was instead to address the 'threat from the Third World'¹⁸³ in terms of, 'new policy instruments, including but going far beyond foreign aid.'¹⁸⁴ The latter would, for former NSC economic aide C. Fred Bergsten, take in 'joint fronts by countries which consume raw materials', explore 'explicit or implicit hands-off agreements among the major powers in the security sphere' and overall, 'bring the Third World itself into active co-operation.'¹⁸⁵

The above positions - given institutional expression with the (1973) founding of the Trilateral Commission and earlier (1970) establishment of *Foreign Policy* magazine - represented a widespread reaction to the Nixon Doctrine's perceived tendency to, as Bergsten observes, promote 'war on our friends [and] concessions to our traditional

adversaries.¹⁸⁶ Kissinger had himself attempted, with mixed success, to co-ordinate a consumer's oil regime - the International Energy Agency¹⁸⁷ - following the Washington Energy Conference of February, 1974.¹⁸⁸ In the Senate, the initial 'Kennedy Amendment' to the DOD's plans for Diego Garcia had stressed the need for regional arms control. It had also sought to bring the administration to 'active co-operation' with the UN *Ad Hoc* committee. Both of these themes were to receive extensive coverage as the administration's programme for an expanded Indian Ocean presence was debated before both Houses of Congress in 1975-6.

VI. Diego Garcia [3]: The Washington Dimension; War Powers, the 'Case Amendment' and 'Oil Fields as Military Objectives'.

Having set out above some broader strands of the Indian Ocean policy environment, attention will now focus on the more restricted setting of the passage of the Diego Garcia bill through the Congress. Here, reference will be made to associated technical studies of the issue, commissioned by the Legislature itself, which are illustrative of the local relevance of the wider aspects of strategy considered above. Attention will then turn to the pattern of economic and strategic integration emerging overall in U.S. relations with the region, which was to become the foundation for policy under the Carter administration.

For the House of Representatives, an amendment of similar arms control provision to that of Senator Kennedy - mounted by Robert L. Leggett (D-Cal.) - was defeated by 94 votes to 255 (with 83 abstentions)¹⁸⁹ on April 4, 1974. A further

amendment, deleting the required \$32.3m. from the current Military Construction Authorization Bill (for FY 1975), was also rejected on August, 9.¹⁹⁰ The position taken by the Senate remained, however, uncommitted to accepting the administration's proposals in their entirety. The Foreign Relations Committee had, on April 24 unanimously approved the 'Case Amendment' requiring specific Congressional authority for the base as opposed to 'this business of going to the Appropriations Committee'. Following the (July, 28) Armed Services Committee's own Report on the FY 1975 M.C.A. Bill, the Senate was, on September, 11, to approve an initial \$18.1m. for the project,¹⁹¹ subject to further arms control information. A concurrent (unanimous) Senate resolution, moved by Mike Mansfield (D-Mon.) also required direct Presidential certification that the Diego Garcia facilities were 'in the national interest' and the approval of both Houses of Congress.¹⁹²

Whilst the Senate's questioning of the Bill had owed much to wider, 'War Powers' concerns - evident in the unusual record of unanimity - it would also reflect on a general Congressional reluctance to accept any DOD budget item at face value. Defence had thus been reduced as a proportion of government expenditure from 40.1% in FY 1970 to 23.4% for FY 1977.¹⁹³ Congress was to support the Mansfield \$14.2m. deletion as part of an overall \$7bn. cut from the Schlesinger budgetary projections for FY 1975.¹⁹⁴ In this way, concerns to link the Diego Garcia programme to further arms control were to encompass a broader Congressional constituency than those Senators, such as Mansfield and Kennedy, for whom such issues were of interest in their own right. Thus, while the House was to again approve the \$18.1m.¹⁹⁵ funding tranche, following the 'House-Senate Conference Report' of December 10, 1974,

Representatives had concurred with its deferral by the Senate until the arrival of the Presidential statement. The latter, in which Gerald Ford duly confirmed that he had indeed, 'evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications' of the Indian Ocean base was issued on May 12, 1975¹⁹⁶ and reinforced by White House Official's affirmation of the undertaking's 'modest' financial outlay. The more immediately strategic aspects of the debate were, however, to reappear with the April 30, 1975 fall of Saigon. Mansfield was to take the issue back to the Armed Services Committee on May, 19 by introducing a Resolution (S.Res/160) to 'Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia.'¹⁹⁷

For Senator Mansfield, the proposals suggested a wider expansion of U.S. defence posture, requiring a 'three ocean navy'. More immediately, the expressed opposition of littoral states¹⁹⁸ should be weighed against any fresh attempts from Washington to assume a 'world policeman' role, particularly 'in the face of our bitter experience in Vietnam.'¹⁹⁹ Many supporters of the Diego Garcia programme would, however, draw the opposite conclusion from the latter 'experience'. Whilst the final collapse of the Thieu regime had not set off the sort of domestic recriminations accompanying the 'who lost China' debate of the 1950's, an emerging pattern of retrenchment amongst other U.S. allies - including the (1974) 'downfall of Portugal' and the (June 9, 1975) Philippines diplomatic agreement 'with Red China'²⁰⁰ - was, for such as Senator Barry Goldwater, all too clear. Moreover, although not supportive of the more extreme scenarios of geopolitical 'strangulation', many uncommitted Senators were to agree with Committee Chairman John Stennis that 'we ought to be somewhere around in that area of the world with some force in order not to have an empty gasoline tank.'²⁰¹ The Hearings would thus, on June

17, 1975 vote down the Mansfield 'Disapprove' motion by a majority of ten to six. To release the further \$13.8m. of the DOD's original funding schedule however, the administration would have to return to the House. Here, Secretary Schlesinger's graphic representation of the supposed Soviet 'missile handling' facility in Berbera had stimulated interest for a joint House-Senate fact finding mission to the Somalian port, which took place, on July, 4 1975, at the invitation of the government of Mohammed Said Barre.²⁰²

The willingness of the Somali regime to accommodate the eight-member House team (led by the conservative Democrat Samuel Stratton) and a 13 member Senate delegation including Schlesinger's leading Indian Ocean spokesman, James Noyes was perhaps indicative of a general desire for rapprochement on the behalf of Mogadishu. President Siad Barre had consistently denied providing 'base' facilities to the Soviet Union and had offered 'equal' bunkering rights to the U.S. Navy on an official visit to Washington in October, 1974.²⁰³ The later (May, 1976) Senate Multinational's Hearings were to disclose the existence of Somali negotiations with Saudi Arabia, in which the latter's offer to replace Soviet subsidies was apparently frustrated in Washington itself (see below). At this stage, however, the return of the joint delegation would serve to confirm existing positions on the Diego Garcia funding, the remaining \$13.8m. of which was released by the Senate (53-43) and House (voice vote) on July 28, 1975.²⁰⁴

The passage of Schlesinger's expansion bill did not, however, mark the conclusion of the debate. Senate opponents of the forward logistics base remained cautious of more ambitious plans underlying the relatively insignificant \$31.9m. schedule, \$6.9m. of which would require further assent by the Military Construction Sub-committee for FY

1977.²⁰⁵ There had, in addition, been much media interest in the 'oil-grab scenario'²⁰⁶ following President Ford's 'hypothetical' remarks on the subject of January 21, 1975.²⁰⁷ Thus, on August, 21, the Congressional Research Service issued a report on the military and legal aspects of such action. The CRS study, entitled *Oil Fields as Military Objectives*,²⁰⁸ was compiled from unclassified sources and took up Congressional 'War Powers' concerns as a particular point of reference. Overall, after documenting U.S. deficiencies in assault air/sea-lift,²⁰⁹ logistics,²¹⁰ merchant shipping,²¹¹ ASW capability²¹² and the 'significant prospects' for sabotage²¹³ in the oil fields themselves, the report observes that, 'America's current capabilities are suspect on several counts.'²¹⁴ Further, in the most credible 'sample option' for military action - the seizure of wells and terminals around Qatif/Dharhan in the 'Saudi core' - 'success' in any meaningful sense would depend on the key variables of undamaged production 'plant' and, 'Soviet abstinence from armed intervention.' Here, perhaps understandably, the study concludes that, the 'prospects would be poor' with '...far-reaching political, economic, social, psychological, and perhaps military consequences the penalty for failure.'²¹⁵

In the eyes of some critics, such 'consequences' were foreordained in the premises of the CRS Report, 'whose evident purpose' observed defence analyst Edward Luttwak, 'was to depict an intervention as undesirable and unfeasible.'²¹⁶ However, while Luttwak is arguably correct in placing the *Oil Fields* study's intentional standing,²¹⁷ the admittedly 'impressive'²¹⁸ methodology would also lend itself to counter-argument by advocates of precisely such an 'intervention' capability as found lacking in the Report. Thus, the admission that 'sixteen ASW and attack carriers would be needed' to provide adequate convoy protection whereas 'the United States has just thirteen,'²¹⁹ that 'seventy-

six percent of our 168 active cruisers and destroyers would be involved' and that, overall 'Even modest combat losses would be catastrophic'²²⁰ would echo much of Admiral Zumwalt's 'sea control' agenda. The lack of adequate air-based ASW facilities²²¹ and forward logistics²²² could equally argue the administration's case for Diego Garcia. Moreover, the stress on Soviet theatre capability would complement the position of such as Nitze in the wider debate surrounding nuclear 'superiority'; since, 'With a force posture based on (nuclear) parity', the Report had suggested, 'we would have to back down.'²²³ Nevertheless, even granting the CRS's pessimistic account of U.S. capability, many would concur with Schlesinger's earlier (January 14, 1975) observation that 'it is indeed feasible to conduct military operations (against Persian Gulf oil fields) if the necessity should arise.'²²⁴ Here, Luttwak's arguments concerning historic Soviet 'caution' would coexist with the equally plausible (albeit, usually unacknowledged) claim that, 'the local population (of Eastern Saudi Arabia) is largely hostile to the rulers...or at least indifferent to their interests.'²²⁵ Thus, whilst not concluding the case against 'seizing Arab oil', the CRS had perhaps ensured a fresh round of debate when Indian Ocean policy again came before the Senate in September, 1975.

Soon after the time of the CRS Report's publication, Secretary Schlesinger's departure from the DOD had reportedly turned, *inter alia*, on the 'carrier issue'.²²⁷ The latter concerned, as we have seen, the Defense Secretary's disagreements with Kissinger on the merits of upgrading the capability of PACOM's Carrier Task Group deployments in the Indian Ocean. Schlesinger would join Nitze and Zumwalt (who was not reappointed CNO) in trenchant opposition to Kissinger and 'détente', and campaign for U.S. rearmament at both conventional and strategic levels of capability. This general

argument was not, however, with administration plans for Diego Garcia. Here, the 'liberal' opposition led by Senators Culver (D-Iowa), Church (D-Idaho) and Hart (D-Colorado) had gained a fresh impetus from press reports concerning the Island's former inhabitants. The accounts of the dispossession of some 1,100 'Ilois' as a deliberate act of policy had appeared on September 10 and 11 in the *Washington Post* and *London Guardian*.²²⁸ Also revealed were the existence of covert funding arrangements between Whitehall and the Pentagon concerning the establishment costs of 'British Indian Ocean Territory'. On September, 11, Culver was to thus introduce a new amendment to the current (FY 1976) M.C.A. Bill, requiring that the Executive report no later than November, 10 on the extent of U.S. involvement in the depopulation. The amendment was co-sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, who noted the linkage with his own amendment to the concurrent Foreign Relations Authorization Bill which, 'expresses the sense of the Congress that the President seek direct negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve agreement on the limitations of deployments of naval and other military forces in the Indian Ocean by outside powers.' This, Kennedy asserted, had not been forthcoming on the occasion of the May 'certification' of Diego Garcia, 'despite a clear Congressional mandate to do so.'²²⁹

The response from the DOD, received by the Senate on September 30, would confirm that Washington had indeed, 'agreed in 1966 to provide half the total cost involved in the establishment of British Indian Ocean Territory' and that when 'the Diego Garcia plantations were closed down' in 1971, '...the U.S. was advised of these developments.' Moreover, the 'monetary arrangements' concluded with London had taken the form of a maximum \$14m., 'by waiving to that extent research and development surcharges for

United Kingdom purchase of the Polaris missile system.'²³⁰ The latter information was to prompt a request by Senator Gary Hart for a fuller account of the Anglo-American 'monetary arrangements' from the U.S. Comptroller General. Thus, despite opposition from Barry Goldwater and fellow Armed Services Committee Republican Strom Thurmond²³¹ Culver was able, on November, 6, to submit a further amendment to the 1976 M.C.A. deliberations which would defer all construction allocations from FY 1975 and FY 1976 pending an administration report on regional arms control - to be submitted before June 1, 1976.²³² This would, following some inconclusive debate in the House,²³³ and in the 'House-Senate Conference' on November 18, be brought back to April 15, 1976.²³⁴ The amendment's acceptance by the Senate (51-44) was to again reflect bipartisan concern that, as the subsequent Comptroller's report surmised, 'the method used (in transfer funding to the British Government) was a circumvention of the Congressional oversight role.'²³⁵

The January (1976) Government Accounting Office report was, in addition, to detail that the JCS had approached the British Government 'Early in 1962' and that 'by 1963, Defense had firm plans for Diego Garcia.' It would imply that the initiative for establishing BIOT (and thus dispossessing the then inhabitants) had come through the State Department's desire to establish 'firm rights' to the island. The report would further criticize the 'offset' arrangements as 'a technique which masked real plans and costs' and confirm that, whilst the latter had been 'settled by State and Defense' by 1965, 'it was not until 1969 that these arrangements were first disclosed to a Member of Congress.'²³⁶ Such information 'relating to the detachment' had, furthermore, been classified 'at the request of the British Government.'²³⁷ London had, with an equal lack

of publicity, concluded a third Anglo-American agreement on February, 25 to admit the expansion of BIOT from a 'limited naval communications facility' to a 'support facility for the United States Navy'.²³⁸ In addition to the allegations of financial 'circumvention', the Diego Garcia issue was to be further kept alive by the disclosure, on May 4, 1976, that a Saudi Arabian offer to replace Soviet aid to Somalia had been 'stopped dead in Washington'.²³⁹ The administration had previously (on April 15), submitted the requested statement on prospects for Naval Arms control negotiations in the Indian Ocean. The latter were, perhaps expectedly, deemed 'inappropriate' in the context of Soviet activities in Berbera and aid to the successful MPLA insurgency in Angola.²⁴⁰ The war in Angola had also, however, shown that Congress maintained - in President Ford's pejorative - an attitude of 'irresolution' toward foreign military involvements, illustrated by the substantive (323-99) House vote against continuing U.S. aid to the FNLA and UNITA.²⁴¹ The \$15m. Saudi aid proposal, revealed to the Senate by out-going U.S. Ambassador James Akins, was to thus prompt the final 'Culver Amendment' to the administration's funding schedule for Diego Garcia.

The May, 6 Joint Resolution - co-sponsored by Claibourne Pell, Stuart Symington and Edward Kennedy - called for a further six months suspension of construction activities pending the outcome of 'reasonable diplomatic efforts' to again address regional arms control. It further required an overall Congressional assessment of the base's ultimate costs and posture implications.²⁴² However, despite strong support from liberal Senators, the Culver resolution was not to achieve a majority when taken up in the Foreign Relations Committee. Whilst polls were showing a continuing support for U.S./Soviet arms control amongst the public at large,²⁴³ the perceptions of Congressmen would, in

an election year, be closer attuned to the dangers of more localized political vulnerability. Ronald Reagan had established 'national security' as a key issue in the spring Republican primaries. For Democrats, charges equating 'détente' with 'appeasement'²⁴⁴ would come as much from Senator Henry Jackson and the 'Coalition for a Democratic Majority' as from Nitze's ostensibly non-partisan 'Committee on the Present Danger'.²⁴⁵ Thus, on August 9, 1976 the Senate was to include the outstanding \$13.8m. in construction funding for Diego Garcia in the overall \$104bn. Defense Appropriations Bill for FY 1977.²⁴⁶

Whilst the DOD was subject to close Senate questioning in the May, 1977 Hearings for a \$7.3m. funding supplemental (for FY 1978)²⁴⁷ - requested on the grounds of a loss of air facilities in Thailand - the FY 1977 appropriations had, essentially, marked the end of sustained opposition to Diego Garcia. As will be shown, the incoming Carter Presidency would indeed open negotiations for Indian Ocean arms control, as were so frequently called for in the successive Hearings from 1972. The correlative would, however, involve treating the Navy's 'support facility' as part of the *status quo*. In the wider context of policy, the end of the Ford administration was to also confirm the establishment of the region as a permanent feature on the U.S. strategic agenda. In this, the Defense Department's increasingly comprehensive logistics and projection capability on Diego Garcia would provide a military counterpoint to the developing economic and political linkages with U.S. policy in the Middle East, the Gulf and South Asia.

VII. The Web of Dependence: Petrodollar 'Recycling' and the Joint Commissions.

As the dramatic rise of new centres of economic power in the Gulf threatened to redefine the Indian Ocean region as the nexus of a new third world coalition, the region had continued to receive sustained attention in the Congress and U.S. media. In the event, however, although the littoral states were to issue consistent rhetorical support for the 'New International Economic Order' - particularly in the context of 'bloc diplomacy' at the UN - the clear reality was of increasing integration of the OPEC counties within the world market. In reviewing policy at the outset of the Ford administration, Treasury Secretary Simon was to thus assure the House Near East Sub-committee that while 'there was a general recognition that the private markets face a serious challenge', from the exponential growth in oil-based liquidity 'no one was taking about impending failure of financial markets generally.' And, moreover, 'all our experience confirms that the financial authorities in the Arab countries intend to manage their oil revenues in a conservative and responsible manner.'²⁴⁸ Accordingly, Washington had earlier removed controls on foreign capital inflow, in the expectation, Secretary Simon would further tell the House, of 'substantial investments in U.S. Government securities.'²⁴⁹ In this context, a 'special' portfolio had been established for 'the OPEC nations' which would offer, 'the opportunity of government-to-government transactions which enable the investor to transact very large sums without influencing the market against himself.'²⁵⁰ Quantitatively, there was 'perhaps some 60% of total OPEC oil revenues available for investment' at this time, amounting to, 'roughly \$60bn. at the present annual rate.' Of this, Simon was confident that, 'The breadth and diversity of U.S. capital markets suggests we shall attract a substantial share.'²⁵¹

In addition to restructuring the internal U.S. capital market, a further institutional accommodation to the OPEC nation's new market power was to be developed in bilateral U.S. arrangements with the principal U.S. allies amongst the Gulf oil producers, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although an evident general requirement existed to address the global framework of institutional dislocation still extant after Nixon's 'New Economic Policy', there were two more immediate threats to counter, specific to the administration's policy for the Middle East. Firstly, despite administration affirmations of OAPEC 'responsibility', the exposure to economic interdependence was, for the Congress and the wider U.S. public, wholly unprecedented. As Secretary Simon acknowledged, 'if it were ten years ago...I suggest that the United states would not have tolerated a group of Arab countries that would do this to the rest of the world.'²⁵² If the latter sentiments could undermine U.S. public confidence in the administration's Middle East policy, there was a further awareness of the possible long term effects of 'Tehran Two' on the unity of the Western alliance. Whilst OPEC had itself built upon existing Western politico/economic rivalry, the enduring factors of differentiated dependence on oil imports between the U.S. and other OECD nations had also effectively hamstrung Kissinger's efforts to establish a united forum of consumer states in the 'International Energy Agency' to counter the producer's cartel.²⁵³ As Secretary Simon again observes, 'the European Community is relying on financing their deficit from the oil producers. It does not seem reasonable...to expect that they would confront them or be willing to be very bold that this is going to be a problem.'²⁵⁴

Kissinger had, in the light of these considerations, established 'Joint Commissions' with Saudi Arabia and Iran in June and November of 1974. The bilateral commissions,

Chaired in both instances by the Secretary of State himself, were to provide for 'co-operation in the fields of economics, technology, and industry' and, in the Saudi case, 'the supply of the Kingdom's requirements for defensive purposes.'²⁵⁵ The 'U.S.-Iran Joint Commission' would similarly span 'a broad spectrum of activities' and include a separate 'Committee on Defense and Security', Chaired by State's ISA bureau, and with representation from the CIA, the National Security Council and the Treasury.²⁵⁶ Whilst both commissions had stemmed from administration initiatives of April, 1974,²⁵⁷ the arrangements with Iran were to assume a particular importance, stemming from the continuing primacy of Iran in the administration's regional design and the adverse reactions in the U.S. to the 'special relationship' following the Shah's leading role in the 'Tehran Two' oil pricing structure. There were, indeed, many in Congress who were concerned about the 'lack of urgency' with which the administration was addressing the issue. 'I must say' House NESC Chair Lee Hamilton observed during Hearings on 'The Petrodollar Problem', 'I have the impression that nobody in the U.S. government is really taking the gloves off and talking to the Shah about this thing.'²⁵⁸ The administration's first priority was thus, as briefing memoranda for Kissinger's November, 1974 visit to Tehran makes clear, to 'engage the Shah in the development of a common strategy for stabilizing the world economy and...correcting the economic and financial dislocation caused by the rapid rise in oil prices.'²⁵⁹ To this end, Iran would be offered fresh opportunities in areas of the 'greatest personal interest to the Shah,' concerning 'co-production of sophisticated military equipment' and an extensive technology transfer programme for nuclear energy.²⁶⁰

However, if Kissinger was to also warn the Shah that any further financial 'dislocation' would create 'an impossible U.S. domestic political atmosphere for successful Iranian/U.S. collaboration,'²⁶¹ the injunction to 'build upon his vanity, ambition, self interest and strategic vision' compiled by departmental (NEA) briefers²⁶² was perhaps contributory to a satisfactory outcome for the Secretary of State's Iran initiative. The November 3, 'Joint Statement' issued in Tehran thus outlined 'a broad program of co-operation in the political, economic, cultural defense, scientific and technological fields.'²⁶³ The differences within the alliance were clearly of practice rather than of principle.²⁶⁴ Despite the 'darkening political prospect for Europe, Japan and the western allies' advanced in Kissinger's summit discussions of global oil pricing policy²⁶⁵ the sectoral prospects for U.S. business in Iran had materially gained by Iran's 'new affluence'. Some 200 U.S. companies were expanding their activities in Iran by October, 1974, representing a total U.S. investment of 'well over half a billion dollars.'²⁶⁶ Other beneficiaries of Iran's increased \$21bn. foreign exchange turnover included France (\$1bn. three-year investment loan) and the United Kingdom, recipient of a \$1.2bn. three-year disbursal loan²⁶⁷ Further economic grounds for U.S. 'appreciation' of the Shah's 'statesmanlike role in world affairs' expressed in the November, 3 communiqué were to be found in Iran's programme of 'increasing economic co-operation among the countries on the Indian Ocean littoral.'²⁶⁸

To be sure, a modest economic component had long accompanied Iran's predominantly military focus in the regional security arrangements promoted under the Nixon Doctrine.²⁶⁹ After December 1973, however, the 'dramatic' transformation of Iran's foreign exchange earnings noted in one CIA analysis had, 'switched the country

overnight from a net borrower to the Middle East's largest lender for 1974.²⁷⁰ Here, the Shah's regime was indeed engaged in an ambitious programme of Petro-dollar 'recycling' in a way wholly applauded by the administration. The Agency's account of 'the Shah's Lending Binge' details a comprehensive \$6.3bn. financial outlay covering 17 major individual countries.²⁷¹ 'The pace and variety of Iranian financial commitments', the CIA records, 'contrast with the still largely traditional mode of investment by other Middle East countries.' Iran's foreign loans, 'rival those of major industrial countries.' In the Middle East, an 'invaluable' reinforcement to administration policy was found in loans to Egypt (\$850m.), Jordan (\$58m.) and Syria (\$150m.). Further afield, 'the loan policy of the Shah reflects a strong penchant for security and for influence beyond Iran's borders.' India was thus in receipt of 'badly needed credits' of \$1bn.²⁷² and Pakistan, a \$580m. package 'geared to projects improving economic conditions in Baluchistan.' If the Shah's interest in Pakistan's Indian Ocean littoral province also extended to cross-border military aid against the insurgent 'Baluchi Peoples Liberation Front',²⁷³ Tehran's economic diplomacy had also a wider regional agenda. Thus, as the CIA further observes, 'the Shah...hopes to influence decisions on the controversial (N.W. Frontier) border problem between Afghanistan and Pakistan' and, by 'holding out the prospect of huge project credits to Afghanistan, the Shah hopes to weaken the Soviet grip there.'²⁷⁴

If, therefore, the somewhat involuntary acceleration of the 'diffusion' of world economic power had yielded compensatory benefits for the administration, an equally advantageous harnessing of the 'threat from the third world' for U.S. purposes was to be found in Iran's energetic pursuit of containment along the Soviet 'Northern Tier'. And if OAPEC's practical interpretation of the 'New International Economic Order' would

bear close comparison with older patterns of investment and exchange, security developments in the Gulf were to also belie a public regional attachment to Indian Ocean Peace Zone formulations. Of the list of reactions from 29 littoral countries to the Diego Garcia expansion, put before the Senate in the June, 1975 Hearings, 12 were deemed 'unfavourable', 13 'unknown' and four (Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, Singapore) 'balanced'.²⁷⁵ The administration, however, had suggested that a clear majority favoured the permanent U.S. military presence in the region. Here, Senate questioning was to draw Secretary Schlesinger's (well grounded) response that, 'It makes diplomatic sense...it may not make sense logically.'²⁷⁶ Declassified CIA testimony had further revealed that 'The United States' could, if required, have access to facilities in '...Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia'.²⁷⁷ Pakistan had, in 1972, begun an active involvement in the CENTO command structure and had participated in the annual 'MIDLINK' exercises for 1973.²⁷⁸

A further strand in what James Noyes had termed the 'increasingly intricate web of mutual dependence'²⁷⁹ was to be found in the level of U.S. arms transfers for the region. These were to reach a value of some \$4,492m. by 1975.²⁸⁰ Concurrently, the Defense Department had established a special 'Middle East Task Group' (METG). Chaired by Assistant Secretary Noyes and with multi-agency representation, this aimed to provide 'across the board review and control of all significant DOD actions relating to the Middle East' and 'Assess arms requests from selected Middle East countries'.²⁸¹ Overall, as the House Foreign Affairs Committee was to hear, 'there are 520 military men...co-ordinating foreign military sales in the Persian Gulf'.²⁸² The extent of U.S. programmes was, moreover, expressly designed to reflect strategic rather than purely commercial imperatives. And, as summed up by one administration official,²⁸³ 'provides a broader

base for our relationship and for our broader economic and political dialogue with the countries concerned.'

Conclusions.

Although the Ford administration had, throughout, suffered the disadvantages of an interim mandate and rising ideological controversy on all sides of the U.S. political spectrum, the course of Indian Ocean policy was to exhibit a considerable consistency. Here, Earl Ravenal's focus on the 'internal organizational necessities'²⁸⁴ of the several agencies involved is persuasive. The developments of Diego Garcia sanctioned after 1976 contain much continuity with planning schedules devised as early as 1963. Such factors, though, are not conclusive for a policy direction whose consequences clearly extend beyond the realm of 'bureaucratic logevity' was freely admitted by the administration, the decision to extend the relatively uncontroversial 'communications facility' to a much more disputed 'logistical support facility' was, in immediate terms, derivative of the 1973 war. If the conclusion of the conflict was to reflect the success of great power regional co-management, it would, by the same token, mark the emergence of the Soviet Union as truly global power. The wider pattern of direct U.S. military engagement was, however, foreordained in the economic devolution of the Nixon Doctrine after 1971. If the October War had given a new 'urgency' to administration perceptions of the strategic importance of the region, it had perhaps also bestowed a level of controversy to a planning process which, in the first Nixon term, had been largely unremarkable.

CHAPTER FOUR: FOOTNOTES.

- 1) Henry A. Kissinger, *The Years of Upheaval*, (London, Weidenfeld, 1982), p.885, pp.854-95.
- 2) *ibid.*, p.711.
- 3) *ibid.*, pp.128-94, pp.700-46.
- 4) *ibid.*, p.720; Heath had reportedly also observed that, 'We all knew what would happen and it did'.
- 5) An extensive coverage of the domestic dimension to Kissinger's Middle East policies can be found in *Foreign Policy* (1971-4). See in particular, Richard Holbrooke, 'The New Battle Lines', No.13 (Winter, 1973-4), pp.178-85 and Gelb/Lake, 'Washington Dateline: The Age of Jackson', No.14 (Spring, 1974), pp.178-88.
- 6) See, for example, *New York Times* 'Editorial', September 3, 1973; commenting on the Soviet emigration/MFN controversy, the editorial attacks 'a de-facto Nixon-Brezhnev alliance against dissent in each other's country.'
- 7) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.983.
- 8) This had excited some interest in Washington, since Anwar Sadat's principal opponent, General Secretary Ali Sabri of the Arab Socialist Union, was perceived as being 'pro-Soviet'. Some observers, however, were to discount the move's ideological significance. See, for example, Mohammed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar* (London, Collins: 1979), pp.225-31; see also Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London, Weidenfeld: 1979), pp.1282-3 on Secretary Rogers' (inconclusive) visit to Cairo of May, 1971.
- 9) The proposal was made by Saudi Minister Sheikh Ahmet Yamani at a three-day conference at the Middle East Institute (Washington) on September 30, 1972. See, for example, James E. Akins, 'Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here', *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 51, No.3 (April, 1973), pp.462-90 (p.483,487).
- 10) See, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *U.S. Oil Shortages and the Middle East Conflict: Report of Study Mission* (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *House Oil Rep./74*), pp.50-3, 'Interview with Sheikh Ahmet Zaki Yamani'.
- 11) *ibid.*, p.50; Yamani observes that, 'we were the ones that helped Sadat kick them (Russians) out of Egypt and we had no help from the United States in doing so.'
- 12) See, for example, David Kimche, *The Final Option* (London, Weidenfeld: 1991) pp.7-28, see also (Gen.) Saad esh-Shalzli, *The Crossing of Suez* (London: 1980), Mahmoud Riad, *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East* (London: 1981).
- 13) Kissinger, "Upheaval", *op.cit.*, p.469,507.
- 14) For a sample of administration views, see, *ibid.*, pp.211-15; a Nixon memorandum of February 23, 1973 states, *inter alia*, 'The time has come to quit pandering to Israel's intransigent position.'

- 15) See, for example, Ray S. Cline, 'Policy Without Intelligence', *Foreign Policy* 17 (Winter, 1974) pp.121-35; Cline, Director of INR at the State Department, notes that, 'no formal (inter-agency) NIE on the Arab-Israeli situation was written after May 17, 1973' (p.134); see also Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) testimony in, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and HR 12564, *Department of Defence Authorization for Appropriation for FY 1975*. 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. Four parts (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *House Apps./FY-75*), DIA officials claim to be 'not aware of any foreign countries that knew of the attack [...]. We don't know that the Soviet Union knew ahead of time just when the attack was going to occur' (pt.4, p.3607).
- 16) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.226, pp.459-61.
- 17) Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and the Restoration of Peace 1812-1822* (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 1964), p.61; see also Kissinger's retrospective observations that, 'Here at last was the critical test of the strategy that we had been pursuing in the Middle East ever since Nixon entered office' ('Upheaval', p.468).
- 18) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Multinational Corporations, *Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Report* (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *MNC Rep./75*), pp.142-3; the Report notes minutes of (May, 1973) ARAMCO meetings with U.S. officials in which the latter exhibited 'a large degree of disbelief that any drastic action was imminent' from the OAPEC producers.
- 19) See, for example, testimony in, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, *The Persian Gulf: Money, Politics, Arms, Power*, Hearings, July-August, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *Ps.Gulf Hgs./74*), pp.77-80, testimony of Deputy Asst.Sec. Alfred L. Atherton, p.88, testimony of Lee Hamilton.
- 20) See, *MNC Rep./75*, *op.cit.*, pp.142-8; the Report observes, 'The Arabs realised that "targeting" the embargo and production cutbacks was a complex process which required the administrative support of the major international companies' (p.145).
- 21) See, *House Oil Rep./74*, *op.cit.*, p.15.
- 22) *ibid.*, p.10.
- 23) See, Kimche, 'Option', *op.cit.*, pp.14-22; Kimche's account draws on (unpublished) MOSSAD intelligence sources; but see also Avigdor Haselkorn, 'The Soviet Collective Security System', *Orbis*, Vol.XIX, No.1, (Spring, 1975), pp.231-54.
- 24) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.519.
- 25) See, *House Apps./FY-75*, *op.cit.*, p.693 (pt.1).
- 26) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.530.
- 27) The airlift included, 'Tanks: M-60, M-48; 175 millimeter cannon, CH-53 helicopters, missiles, various types of ammunition bombs, flares, fuses, chaff, flack vests, aircraft components, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, boosters, fuel tanks, parachutes, tents, blankets, helmets, clothing and cameras' (*House Apps./FY-75*, *op.cit.*, p.695 [pt.1]).

- 28) As Kissinger recalls, 'I told (Israeli Ambassador) Dinitz that the art of foreign policy was to know when to clinch one's victories. There were limits beyond which we could not go, with all our friendship for Israel, and one of them was to make the leader of another superpower look like an idiot' ('Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.576); 'We (the U.S. and the USSR)...have a special duty to see to it that confrontations are kept within bounds that do not threaten civilized life' (Kissinger press conference, October, 25, cited in *ibid.*, p.594) and, 'Brezhnev did his part by giving a conciliatory speech on October, 26 to the World Peace Congress meeting in Moscow. He extolled the importance of détente; he did not mention the American alert.' (*ibid.*, p.600).
- 29) *ibid.*, p.573.
- 30) *ibid.*, p.507.
- 31) For a recent account of the Israeli nuclear factor in U.S. foreign policy, see, Seymour Hersch, *The Samson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb* (New York: Random, 1991); Hersch notes two Israeli nuclear 'alerts' of October 8 and 24, 1973 (p.225, 233), an October, 9 Soviet confidential warning to Washington on Israeli weapons (p.229) and that although Kissinger was personally cognizant that, 'Israel is making nuclear warheads' from Autumn, 1967 (p.168), no NIE was produced between Spring 1968 and December, 1973 (p.186, 235) due to the extreme sensitivity of the subject within USG. Hersch further suggests that the 1968 NIE, conducted by Carl Duckett for the CIA's 'Office of Scientific and Technical Affairs', seriously underestimated the (20+ warheads) then existing to a level of 'three or four' (p.186). For additional matter on the - somewhat sparse - public discussion of Israeli nuclear threat-bargaining during the 1973 war, see, Jack Anderson, 'A Close Call', *Washington Post*, March 10, 1980.
- 32) In the view of General Olechuk, Director of Matériel Acquisition, U.S. Army, '...we did not anticipate...the demand that was placed on us by the Mideast to provide significant amounts of matériel to Israel...What we found was, when we had to provide such matériel in conjunction with U.S. foreign policy initiatives, we didn't have sufficient reserve material in stock to be able to do that at the same time keeping our own readiness at a significantly high level...we had reached the point when we were at marginal combat readiness' (House Apps./FY-75, *op.cit.*, p.853 [pt.1]).
- 33) *ibid.*, p.19; the cost to the U.S. government was estimated at some \$4bn., including Nixon's \$2.2bn. 'emergency' supplemental; for detailed item schedule, see, U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Procurement Supplemental - FY 1974*, on S 299. March 12, 19, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *Sen. Supp./FY-74*), pp.4-6.
- 34) As DOD testimony to the House observes, 'If we are to provide our forces with that degree of material readiness sufficient to conduct a conventional defense in NATO or elsewhere and to provide our allies with the ability to defend themselves [ie.; a combined '1/1/2' war capability] we must quickly build up inventory levels...We anticipate establishing a CONUS-based stock of...equipment which can be...used to support allies and improving...storage facilities for pre-positioned war reserve stocks overseas' (House Apps./FY-75, *op.cit.*, p.175, [pt.1]).
- 35) Deputy Secretary Clements observes that, 'I think we had a rather clear understanding of...where we would not have received a receptive attitude' to the U.S. airlift; see, *Sen. Supp./FY-74, op.cit.*, p.88.
- 36) In the Joint Chief's view, 'Without the cooperation of Portugal, which consented to the use of Lajes [air base], the resupply operation which made Israel's survival possible could not have been conducted without great hazard and almost prohibitive cost'; House Apps./FY-75, *op.cit.*, Report of JCS, pp.176-7 [pt.1].

- 37) *ibid.*
- 38) *ibid.*, p.695, testimony of Gen. (MAC/USAF) Kearney.
- 39) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.709.
- 40) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Briefings on Diego Garcia and the Patrol Frigate*, April 11, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *Sen. Diego Garcia Briefings*); CNO Adml. Zumwalt notes that, 'The British have no facilities of their own except an island off the coast of Oman which is, belongs to Oman in which they have an airfield. Misirah [] is the name of it and they have been quite clear that we could not use it in any crisis of this kind'(p.26).
- 41) House Apps./75, *op.cit.*, Report of JCS, pp.176-7 [pt.1].
- 42) 'If we study history', Kissinger had frequently observed, 'we find out that worst tragedies have occurred when people got what they wanted'; Henry A. Kissinger, *For the Record: Selected Statements 1977-1980* (London: Weidenfeld, 1981), p.125.
- 43) The President's Press Conference of October 26, 1973, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 9, No.43 (29 October, 1973), p.1290.
- 44) See, for example, Gerard Smith, *Doubletalk: The Story of SALT 1* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), pp.441-3.
- 45) See, Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, pp.998-1020.
- 46) In addition to the March 12,19, 1974 Senate ASC supplemental ('Senate Supp./FY-74'), the DOD was pursuing a parallel track of funding appropriations for the requested \$6.23bn. 'Middle East Payback' with the House. See, U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on HR 12565*, March 18, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974).
- 47) See, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary James Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1975*, March 4, 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-75*), pp.13-14.
- 48) *ibid.*, p.13.
- 49) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on FY 1975 Authorization for Military_Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths on S.3000* [pt.2, Authorizations, February 7, 19, 22, 1974] 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess.(Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *Sen.ASC Auths./75*), p.452, testimony of Adml. Elmo Zumwalt.
- 50) The MEPEC study was established to, 'evaluate the expected performance of the SIXTH Fleet in various postures against observed and augmented Soviet and Arab forces...The analyses were conducted during October and November, 1973 using actual Soviet forces...as of the 9 October, 1973 as the basis for the steady state or unaugmented force posture examined'; *ibid.*, pp.581-2.
- 51) *ibid.*, p.452, testimony of Adml. Elmo Zumwalt.
- 52) *ibid.*, p.441.
- 53) See, House Apps./FY-75, *op.cit.*, p.177, testimony of Adml. Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the JCS.

- 54) See, DOD Rep./FY-75, *op.cit.*, p.14.
- 55) *ibid.*, p.3, 'The International Situation and the Defense Establishment'.
- 56) *ibid.*, p.13.
- 57) See, for example, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and S.Asia, *New Perspectives on the Persian Gulf*: Hearings, June-Nov. 1973, 93rd.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974) (hereafter, *Hs.Gulf Hgs./73*, see also *Hs.Gulf Hgs./74*, *op.cit.*).
- 58) U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on the Near East and S.Asia, *Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean*: Hearings, Feb.-March 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess.(Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*), p.24, statement of Seymore Weiss, Director of Politico-Military Affairs/DOS.
- 59) *ibid.*, p.25.
- 60) See, E. Sagar, 'CENTO Naval Exercises', *The Hindu*, November 20, 1974.
- 61) See, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*, *op.cit.*, p.122, statement of Dep.Asst.Sec.(DOD/ISA) James H. Noyes.
- 62) Exclusive interview by *Newsweek*, December 18, 1974, *Dept. of State Bulletin*, January 20, 1975, pp.61-2.
- 63) Television interview by Hugh Sidey, *Washington Straight Talk*, January 7, 1974. The Agency Library, USIA August, 1974 p.35.
- 64) See, U.S. Congress; *Joint Resolution concerning the war powers of the Congress and the President*. Public Law 93-148 [H.J. Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, passed over President's veto November 7, 1973. Section 4.(a).
- 65) *ibid.*
- 66) U.S. Senate, S.Con.Res.76, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. March 19, 1974, pp.2-3.
- 67) See, Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, Committee testimony, p.39.
- 68) Here, it can be recalled that the Diego Garcia agreement with Britain had never been formally submitted to the Congress as a treaty.
- 69) See, *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*, *op.cit.*, p.55, statement of James H. Noyes.
- 70) See, *ibid.*, p.171, statement of K.P. Misra (App.3).
- 71) See, Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.8.
- 72) *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*, *op.cit.*, p.83, testimony of Earl C. Ravenal.
- 73) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.2, statement of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 74) *ibid.*
- 75) *ibid.*
- 76) *Hs.Expansion Hgs.*, *op.cit.*, p.132, statement of Adml. Zumwalt.

- 77) *ibid.*
- 78) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services: *Hearings on S.Res.160 to Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of Diego Garcia*. June 10, 1975, 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Dis.Diego Garcia*), p.37, testimony of Secretary Schlesinger.
- 79) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.31, statement of Seymore Weiss.
- 80) *ibid.*, p.23; it can be noted that the measure of 'ship days' (totalled from the number of ships' individual days of mission) was contentious as a methodological construct. Its origination was claimed by Adml. La Rocque as a means to make the (then) Soviet order of battle 'impressive to members of Congress'. See, *ibid.*, p.110.
- 81) *ibid.*, p.132, statement of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 82) *ibid.*
- 83) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.15; this was consistently denied by India. See, for example, statements by Indian Naval staff in, *India, the United States and the Indian Ocean: Report of the Indo-American Task Force on the Indian Ocean* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1983), pp.62-6, see also reports of India's rejection of Soviet requests for access to the Vizag base during Brezhnev's November, 1973 visit in, *Christian Science Monitor*, November, 28, December 15, 1973, March 5, 1974.
- 84) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.6.
- 85) *ibid.*, see also discussion of 'The Middle East-India Subsystem' in Haselkorn, 'Soviet Collective Security', *op.cit.*, pp.240-52.
- 86) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.8.
- 87) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.57, testimony of James Noyes.
- 88) *ibid.*, p.35, testimony of Seymore Weiss.
- 89) *ibid.*, p.89, statement of Gene R. La Rocque.
- 90) *ibid.*, pp.96-7.
- 91) *ibid.*, p.82, statement of Earl C. Ravenal. In considering the evidence of earlier, 1960's planning for Diego Garcia, it is also worth noting the comments of former CNO Long Range Objectives Director, Stuart B. Barber, regarding the 1968 Indian Ocean Base Study. Here, the objectives were; a) 'To enable Naval patrol planes to operate in the area'; b) 'To provide a substitute for Bahrain as a base for the destroyers and flagship...we have maintained in the Arabian Sea'; c) 'To provide fuel stocks to support major task forces...in a crisis', *ibid.*, (App.3), p.174.
- 92) *ibid.*, 125.
- 93) *ibid.*, p.54, testimony of James Noyes. As is apparent from the respective testimony, the case for or against in-theatre logistics is expressed as a function of 'n+' tertiary factors (concerning posture, mission etc). In the Navy's own model, savings for a deployed carrier task force transferred from Subic Bay would, 'over 4 or 5 years' amount to between \$400m. and \$1bn.'depending on how one does the calculation'. See, Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.34, testimony of Adml.Zumwalt.

- 94) See, J.F. McNulty, 'Naval Overseas Presence-The Misunderstood Mission', *Naval War College Review* (Sept.-Oct. 1974), pp.24-5.
- 95) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.58, statement of James Noyes.
- 96) *ibid.*
- 97) *ibid.*, p.122, testimony of Earl Ravenal.
- 98) *ibid.*, p.123.
- 99) Sen. Diego Garcia Briefing, *op.cit.*, p.4, statement of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 100) *ibid.*, p.29, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 101) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.126, testimony of Earl Ravenal.
- 102) *ibid.*, p.125
- 103) U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Sub-Committee on Military Construction; *Military_Construction for FY 1975: Hearings*, July, 10-18, 1974, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974), statement of W.E. Colby, July 11, 1974 (cited in Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, pp.29-37).
- 104) *ibid.*, p.30.
- 105) *ibid.*, p.9.
- 106) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 107) *ibid.*, p.35.
- 108) *ibid.*
- 109) *ibid.*, p.30.
- 110) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.7, statement of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 111) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.24, statement of Seymour Weiss.
- 112) *ibid.*, p.36.
- 113) *ibid.*, p.28.
- 114) *ibid.*, p.54, statement of James Noyes.
- 115) See, Melvin R. Laird, *Department of Defense Annual Report for FY 1972* (Washington: GPO, 1971) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-72*), p.22.
- 116) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.24, statement of Seymour Weiss.
- 117) See, 'Kuwait Threatens Oilfield Destruction Should U.S. Step In', *New York Times*, January 10, 1974, p.17.
- 118) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.62, testimony of James Noyes.

- 119) See, 'Conference of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC Member Countries Solemn Declaration', *New York Times*, April 1, 1975.
- 120) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.37, testimony of Seymour Weiss.
- 121) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.24, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt; Zumwalt would, however, claim that, 'New Zealand has been more favourable than Australia.'
- 122) See, Washington Post, March 21, 1974. In some accounts, Australia's 'unfavourable' attitude to U.S. Indian Ocean policy had placed the Whitlam Government itself in receipt of some less than favourable attentions by the CIA; see, for example, James A. Nathan, 'Dateline Australia: America's Foreign Watergate?', *Foreign Policy* 49 (Winter 1982-3), pp.168-185.
- 123) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.16, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 124) Statement by Deputy Minister for External Affairs, *Lok Sabha Debates*, December 12, 1974. Mrs Gandhi was to reiterate the distinction at a Moscow Press Conference in June, 1976, see, *Times of India*, June 12, 1976.
- 125) See, for example, interview with (CPI leader) Bhupesh Gupta in, *The Statesman* (Delhi), September 5, 1974.
- 126) Editorial: 'A Basic Fallacy', *Times of India*, January 24, 1974.
- 127) *U.K. House of Commons Debates* (5th Series), Vol.868/1973-4 cols. 276-7 (Written answer), February 5, 1974.
- 128) This included several helicopters. See, Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.74, testimony of James Noyes.
- 129) The request would be accommodated within the terms of the October, 1972 Accord. See also, Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.17.
- 130) Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, p.58, statement for the record by Secretary Schlesinger.
- 131) *ibid.*, p.70, information supplied by DOD to Senator Taft.
- 132) *ibid.*, p.22, statement of Gen. George S. Brown (CJCS).
- 133) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.90, statement by Gene R. La Rocque.
- 134) *ibid.*, p.143, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 135) Here, Zumwalt himself cites inter-service opposition - particularly from Alexander Haig - and also the fact that the North Vietnamese offensive of October, 1972 'fouled up at least three (defence) budgets'. See, Elmo R. Zumwalt, *On Watch*, (NY:Quadrangle, 1976), p.341, p.410.
- 136) See, Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.1176.
- 137) See, DOD Rep./FY-75, *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 138) *ibid.*, p.4.
- 139) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.998.
- 140) *ibid.*, p.1178.

- 141) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on International Relations, Sub-committee on Foreign Assistance, *Arms Sales To Iran: A Staff Report* by Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Mantel, (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *Iran Arms Sales Rep./76*), p.ix. The Report notes; 'Secretary Schlesinger's decision to appoint a senior civilian DOD representative to Iran in September, 1975...is considered...to be a positive and necessary development.' See also, remarks on NSSM 238 in chap.5/12n.
- 142) See, Drew Middleton, *New York Times*, July 15, 1973. Middleton observes, 'Naval officers now regard missions to secure free access to resources as second only to sea control as a national objective.'
- 143) See, *New York Times*, August 12, 1975.
- 144) Kissinger's NSC was to restore the PACOM carrier strength from two to three; see, *New York Times*, December 19, 1975. For discussion, see also, Earl C. Ravenal, 'After Shlesinger: Something has to Give', *Foreign Policy* 22 (Spring, 1976), pp.71-95.
- 145) Kissinger, 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.1000. It can be recalled that the programme for Fast Deployed Logistics had emerged in the Pentagon's earlier 'rapid deployment' planning of 1963.
- 146) *ibid.*, p.1006.
- 147) See, for example, Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.94, statement of Gene La Rocque.
- 148) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings, *op.cit.*, p.22, statement of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 149) See, Paul H. Nitze, 'The Strategic Balance: Between Hope and Skepticism', *Foreign Policy* 16 (Winter, 1974-5), pp.136-56 (p.147); Nitze also asserts that, 'The Soviet leadership places emphasis on ambitious goals, including general hegemony' (*ibid.*, p.152).
- 150) See, Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings., *op.cit.*, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt. See also, remarks that, 'This MILCON request for Diego Garcia (lets us)...buy back cheaply some of the very major losses we have taken over the past five years' (p.23).
- 151) *ibid.*, p.41.
- 152) Here, Kissinger's widely publicized Moscow summit remarks on 'what in the name of God is strategic superiority?' (*Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, No.831 {July 29, 1974} p.215) would be answered by Nitze's contention that, 'it is not that difficult to distinguish between rough parity, meaningful superiority and unsatisfactory inferiority,' Nitze, 'Strategic Balance', *op.cit.*, p.153.
- 153) The 'Committee on the Present Danger' was formed on November 28, 1975. For an overview, see Jerry Sanders, *The Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment*, (London: Pluto, 1983).
- 154) Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.143, testimony of Admiral Zumwalt.
- 155) *ibid.*
- 156) *ibid.*, p.147.
- 157) See, Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, p.4, testimony of Barry Goldwater. The Senator also remarks, 'I feel very strongly about the Indian Ocean...the Indian Ocean has become the focal point of global strategy'(*ibid.*).

- 158) *ibid.*, p.55.
- 159) See, for example, Chiang Chien-tung, 'Maritime Hegemonic Features Fully Exposed in Soviet Social-Imperialism', Beijing Review No. 18 (April 30, 1976). (cited in, K.C.Chen, *China and the Three Worlds* (London: Macmillan, 1979) pp.321-6.
- 160) Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, p.44, testimony of James Schlesinger.
- 161) For an overview see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?* Staff Report. (Washington: GPO, 1977). Soviet and COMECON economic credits and grants from 1954-74 totalled; Somalia \$159m., Iraq \$1118m., Syria \$1195m., Pakistan \$736m., Afghanistan \$1291m., and India \$2430m. (pp.124-5).
- 162) Cited in, M.S.Rajan, 'The Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's Non-alignment Policy', *Australian Outlook* (August, 1972) p.207.
- 163) Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, p.7, statement of James Schlesinger.
- 164) Sen.Diego Garcia Briefings., *op.cit.*, p.11, testimony of Adml. Zumwalt.
- 165) *Soviet Review* (Moscow), August 8, 1971.
- 166) See, Dieter Braun, 'The Indian Ocean in Afro-Asian perspective', *The World Today*, Vol.28 No.6 (June, 1972) p.253.
- 167) For discussion of Soviet 'Collective Security' diplomacy, see, Ian Clarke, 'Collective Security in Asia', *The Round Table* (October, 1973).
- 168) V. Pavlovsky, 'Collective Security, the Way to Peace in Asia', *International Affairs* (Moscow), No.7 (July, 1972) p.23.
- 169) *ibid.*
- 170) *ibid.*
- 171) *Pravda*, June 3, 1969.
- 172) *India News*, April 4, 1970.
- 173) See, Rais A. Tuzmukhamedov, *Soviet Union and Non-Aligned Nations* (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1976) p.65.
- 174) See, Geoffrey Jukes, 'Soviet Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean', in Bowman/Clarke (eds.), *The Indian Ocean in Global Politics* (Colorado: Westview, 1981) pp.184-5.
- 175) See, Philip Towle, 'The United Nations *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean: Blind Ally or Zone of Peace', in *ibid.*, pp. 207-221.
- 176) Tuzmukhamedov, 'Non-Aligned Nations', *op.cit.*, p.65.
- 177) See, U.N. General Assembly, *Declaration and Programme for Action*: Res.3201 S-VI, 3202 S-VI. At a December, 1974 address to the Assembly, U.S. Ambassador John Scali had attacked the programme as the 'tyranny of the majority'.
- 178) U.N. Doc. A/AC.159/1; 3:5:74.

- 179 In addition to protests from the 'great powers' themselves, the allegations of military 'facilities' were contested by Madagascar, N.Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia and Tanzania. See, K.P.Misra, 'International Politics in the Indian Ocean', *Orbis*, Vol.18, No.4 (Winter, 1975) pp.1088-1108.
- 180) Henry Kissinger, Speech to the Indian Council on World Affairs, New Delhi; October 28, 1974.
- 181) See, Daniel P. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (NY: Berkeley Books, 1980), p.310.
- 182) For Moynihan's own account, see *ibid.*
- 183) C. Fred Bergsten, 'The Threat from the Third World', *Foreign Policy* 11 (Summer, 1973).
- 184) *ibid.*, p.102.
- 185) *ibid.*, p.121.
- 186) C. Fred Bergsten, 'The New Economics and U.S. Foreign Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.50, No.2 (Janary, 1972) pp.199-221 (p.209).
- 187) For a critical account of IEA, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (New Jersey: PUP, 1984), pp.217-40.
- 188) For Kissinger's own account of 'the energy crisis', see 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, pp.896-925.
- 189) *U.S. Congressional Record*, House, 93rd.Cong. Vol.120, No.8 April 4, 1974, p.H 9835.
- 190) *Congressional Quarterly: Almanac*, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess., 1974 Vol. XXX, p.602
- 191) *ibid.*, p.604.
- 192) *ibid.*
- 193) See, discussion in, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy* (London: OUP, 1982), pp.322-3.
- 194) See, Albert Wohlstetter, 'Is there a Strategic Arms Race?' *Foreign Policy* 15 (Summer, 1974) pp.3-20.
- 195) *Congressional Quarterly: Almanac*, 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess., 1974 Vol.XXX, pp.604-5.
- 196) U.S. Congress, Hs. Doc.140 (item 996): *Construction at Diego Garcia - A Message from the President*. (Washington: GPO, 1976).
- 197) Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*
- 198) The U.S. should not, 'show the flag in an area where the nations have requested that we (need) not have our Navy there in force', see, *New York Times*, May 23, 1975.
- 199) *ibid.*
- 200) Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, p.39, testimony of Barry Goldwater.
- 201) *ibid.*, p.54, testimony of John Stennis; the Senator also observed, 'I think that one world - o-i-l - is, after all, the most practical part of the matter from the standpoint of the average citizen'.

- 202) At a June, 10 press conference, Somali Foreign Minister Omar Arteh Ghalib had stated that, 'it is against our policies' to allow foreign bases on Somali territory; see, *New York Times*, June 12, 1975.
- 203) See, John W. Finney, 'The Soviets in Somalia; A "facility" not a "base"', *New York Times*, July 6, 1975.
- 204) *Congressional Record*, House, Vol.121, No.122, 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess., pp. H.7636-72, July 28, 1975. See also, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia*: Committee Print (Washington: GPO, 1975); U.S. Congress, Committee on Armed Services, *Special Sub-Committee to inspect Facilities at Berbera, Somalia*: Report (Washington: GPO, 1975). The Report notes the presence of '3000 Soviet military technicians' and that the facilities were, 'clearly beyond the present needs and technical capabilities of current Somali military forces and personel. The missile facility can store or handle naval missilies of a substantial size. The Somali Navy has no known capacity for using naval missiles' (p.9).
- 205) See, Dis.Diego Garcia, *op.cit.*, p.25.
- 206) See, Earl C. Ravenal, 'The Oil Grab Scenario', *New Republic* (January 18, 1975) pp.14-16. See also, Robert W. Tucker, 'Oil: the Issue of American intervention', *Commentary* (January, 1975) pp.21-31 and Jesse A. Helms, 'Misjudgements in the Middle East', Remarks in the Senate, *Congressional Record*, pp.S791-2, January 23, 1975.
- 207) In response to questioning on any future oil embargo, Ford observed that, 'if a country is being strangled - and I use "strangled" in the sense of the hypothetical question - that, in effect, means that a country has the right to protect itself against death'; *Department of State Bulletin*, February 10, 1975, pp.179-80.
- 208) See, U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study*, 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *Oil Fields Study*).
- 209) *Oil Fields Study*, *op.cit.*, p.61.
- 210) *ibid.*, p.63.
- 211) *ibid.*, p.73.
- 212) *ibid.*, p.66.
- 213) *ibid.*, p.71.
- 214) *ibid.*, p.75.
- 215) *ibid.*, p.76.
- 216) See, Edward Luttwak, 'Intervention and Access to Natural Resources', (reprinted) in Hedley Bull (ed.), *Intervention in World Politics* (London: Clarendon, 1984), pp.82-95 (p.88.).
- 217) The CRS has been regularly condemned by conservatives when assessing national security affairs. See, for example, discussion of earlier CRS position papers in, Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis* (New York: Dunellen, 1973), pp.221-239.
- 218) Luttwak., 'Intervention', *op.cit.* p.92
- 219) *Oil Fields Study.*, *op.cit.*, p.66.

- 220) *ibid.*
- 221) *ibid.*, p.67.
- 222) *ibid.*, p.55.
- 223) *ibid.*, p.75.
- 224) News Conference with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger at the Pentagon, January 14, 1975. Transcript, p.2.
- 225) The latter are largely Shia Moslems; see, Luttwak *op.cit.*, p.92.
- 226) See, Miles Ignotius [psuedm], 'Siezing Arab Oil', *Harpers* (March, 1975), pp.45-62.
- 227) For the *New York Times*, John Finney reported that, 'some administration officials view the carrier issue as one of the sources of tension between the two cabinet members'. (n.144, *op.cit.*, 19/12/75).
- 228) See, Martin Walker, 'Britain Evicts for Base Aims', *Guardian*, September 10, 1975, Simon Winchester, 'U.S. Missiles paid for Navy Base', *Guardian*, September 11, 1975.
- 229) *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol.121, No.133 94th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. pp. S 15865-8, September 11, 1975.
- 230) *ibid.*, S 17116, September 30, 1975. Culver noted that, 'over \$9 million in surcharges had been waived before anyone in the Congress was notified', although a written DOD reply was to claim that the arrangement had been disclosed to the Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee on Security Agreements and Commitments abroad by Melvin Laird in April, 1969 and to the House Appropriations Committee in May, 1970.
- 231) *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol. 121, No.164 pp. S 19453-62, November 6, 1975.
- 232) *ibid.*, S 19451.
- 233) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Special Sub-committee on Investigations, *Diego Garcia 1975: The Debate over the Base and the Island's Former Inhabitants*, Hearings, 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess. June- November, 1975 (Washington: GPO, 1976).
- 234) *Congressional Record*, House, Vol.121, No.172 pp. H 11338-43, November 18, 1975.
- 235) U.S. General Accounting Office, *Financial and Legal Aspects of the Agreement on the Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes*: Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *GAO/Rep.*), p.1.
- 236) *ibid.*, p.4
- 237) *ibid.*, p.7
- 238) See, *TIAS* 8230; whilst most of the provisions are unchanged from previous agreements, Article 3 states that, 'in other (than routine) circumstances, use of the facility shall be a matter for the joint decision of the Governments.'

- 239) Ambassador Akins had described State's attitude to the Gulf region at this time as, 'bordering on the hysterical', while Senate MNC Chairman Frank Church perceived a 'relationship between the desire of the Navy for the Diego Garcia base with a continuation of the Russian presence in Somalia to justify that base.' See, *Washington Post*, May 5, 1976, *New York Times*, May 5, 1976 *Wall St. Journal*, May 5, 1976.
- 240) For the State Department, a more positive approach, 'might convey the mistaken impression...that we are willing to acquiesce in this type of Soviet behaviour'. See, *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol.122, No.66, p.S 6626 May 6, 1976.
- 241) The vote, on January, 27 1976 confirmed the strength of Congressional 'War Powers' concerns found in the (December 4, 1975) 'Clark Amendment'. Gerald Ford had argued that, 'This (Soviet/Cuban) imposition of a military solution in Angola will have the most profound long-range significance for the U.S.'. See, *Washington Post*, January 28, 1976.
- 242) *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol.122, No.66, pp.6625-31 May 6, 1976.
- 243) A January, 1976 Gallup poll records a 36% to 22% majority in favour of reduced military spending. The trend was, however toward the 22% favouring defence increases (from 12% in 1974). See, The Gallup Poll, January 30-February 2, 1976 *Current Opinion*, Vol.4, No.4 April, 1976.
- 244) See, for example, Theodore Draper, 'Appeasement and Detente', *Commentary* 61 no.2 (February, 1976) pp.27-38.
- 245) The CDM was founded in 1972 in opposition to the electoral platform of George McGovern. Coordinator Eugene Rostow had addressed the May, 1976 Democratic National Convention on 'the lesson of opinion polls and primaries throughout the country...[that] ...a strong and angry tide of concern about the safety of the nation is running through the Country' and that, 'As they did in the Truman years, Democrats and liberals must again take the lead in rallying Americans to increase our defense capabilities.' Campaign for a Democratic Majority: Foreign Policy Task Force, *Statement on Foreign and Defense Policy*; delivered to the Platform Committee of the Democratic Party National Convention, May 19, 1976.
- 246) *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report*, Vol.XXXIV, No.33 p.2207.
- 247) *Congressional Quarterly: Weekly Report*, Vol.XXXV, No.22 pp.1080-2, May 28, 1977.
- 248) See, House Gulf Hgs./74, *op.cit.*, p.107, testimony of Secretary William Simon.
- 249) *ibid.*, p.108.
- 250) *ibid.*
- 251) *ibid.*
- 252) *ibid.*, p.116.

- 253) Aside from the embedded political differences between the consumer states, the administration was also in no doubt of the substantial economic barriers to mounting a common response to OPEC; see, for example, *Today's Meeting with the Oil Company Chiefs*: Memorandum for the Secretary (Confidential/LIMDIS), DOS, (26/10/73-decl.16/3/83), to: Secretary Kissinger, from: Under Secretary [Economic Affairs] William J. Casey; the discussion notes that, 'it is hard to envisage any agreement and/or organization of consumers that could bring sufficiently together their divergent national energy situations to allow for coordinated oil price policies in a tight oligopolistic sellers market'(p.7).
- 254) See, House Gulf Hgs./74, *op.cit.*, p.113, testimony of Secretary William Simon.
- 255) For structure and objectives of the Joint Commissions, see, *ibid.*, 'Appendix IX', pp.257-61.
- 256) *ibid.*, 'Joint Statement on Saudi Arabian-United States Cooperation', Washington DC., June 8, 1974 (p.259).
- 257) For an operational account of the Joint Commissions initiative, see, State Cable # 073527 (Secret/EXDIS), DOS, (11/4/74-decl.9/81), to: USEmb/Tehran, from: Henry Kissinger. The cable summarizes the extent of U.S./Iran cooperation and notes that, 'It is our current feeling that the use of existing channels can be intensified for the expanded cooperation we have in mind in the political and security field...we would welcome the Shah's views as to whether any additional structure is needed to ensure the type of very close exchange we wish'(#10/p.24).
- 258) See, House Gulf Hgs./74, *op.cit.*, p.84, testimony of Lee H. Hamilton; Chairman Hamilton is in no doubt that, 'We have all kinds of leverage with the Shah. We sold him \$5 billion worth of arms last year...He is the man who is chiefly responsible for the high price of oil'(*ibid.*).
- 259) See, *Strategy for Your Visit to Tehran*: Briefing Memorandum (Confidential), DOS, (20/10/74-decl.9/81), to: Henry Kissinger, from: Alfred L. Atherton/NEA.
- 260) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 261) *ibid.*, p.7; the memo notes that, 'The ideal result of your meeting would be the Shah's agreement to roll back prices now or, alternatively, to give you a private understanding that he will work cooperatively with others within OPEC to lower prices substantially over the next year', albeit, 'we think the Shah is unlikely to be receptive to either course of action'(p.6).
- 262) See, *Suggested Talking Points for Your Visit to the Shah*: Briefing Memorandum (Secret/EXDIS), DOS, (21/10/74-decl.9/81), to: Henry Kissinger, from: Alfred L. Atherton/NEA, p.2; 'Your Strategy for Conversation.'
- 263) See, 'U.S.-Iran Joint Statement'; unclassified briefing paper, Department of State, November 3, 1974, pp.3-4.
- 264) Thus, the October, 20 NEA briefing concludes, 'differences over oil prices have fanned the embers of historical animosity and basic rivalry [between Iran and Saudi Arabia] for Gulf leadership - but not so bad as to cause real concern'(p.12).

- 265) See, NEA/'Talking Points', *op.cit.*, p.2; the briefing suggests that Kissinger, 'Accept the need for producer/consumer dialogue but stress dangers of major conferences not carefully prepared in advance in key bilateral contacts amongst "responsible leaders" (ie., Iran, U.S. and a few others)'(p.3). See also Kissinger's later observations that whilst the Joint Commissions, 'represented a network giving various Arab nations a stake in our wellbeing...they also gave us a hedge against European bilateralism', 'Upheaval', *op.cit.*, p.1129.
- 266) NEA/Briefing, *op.cit.*, p.3.
- 267) See, *The Shah's Lending Binge*: Intelligence Memorandum (Secret/NOFORNDIS), CIA/Office of Economic Research, (12/74-decl.1/86), p.2.
- 268) 'U.S.-Iran Joint Statement', *op.cit.*, p.2; the statement notes, 'both sides reaffirmed their continued support for CENTO and the contribution which it makes to regional security and economic development'.
- 269) CIA 'Lending Binge', *op.cit.*, notes that Iran had undertaken 'only scant lending that averaged some \$30m. annually in previous years'(p.2).
- 270) *ibid.*
- 271) *ibid.*, tab # 1 *Iran: Financial Commitments*, 1, January-30 November, 1974 (p.3); the Agency notes, however, that, 'Iran's ability to spend more quickly than other oil producers will result in continued rising imports and gradual erosion of the country's surplus revenues. Indeed, unless oil prices are raised, Iran's balance of payments could be back in the red by 1979.'
- 272) *ibid.*, p.6; in the CIA's view, 'by plying New Delhi...the Shah seeks to improve political relations with India and extend his influence in the Indian Ocean area.'
- 273) See, for example, Devlet Khalid, 'Pakistan's Relations with Iran and the Arab States', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.V, No.3 (Spring, 1982), pp.16- 22; for an overview, see, Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981); see also Robert G. Wirsig, *The Baluchis and Pathans: Minority Rights Report No.48* (London: MRG, March, 1981). For the CIA's analysts, 'discontent and threat of separation [in Baluchistan] are regarded with fear by the Shah.'
- 274) CIA/'Lending Binge', *op.cit.*, p.5; see also, Kalim Bahadur, 'Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan', in, K.P. Misra (ed), *Afghanistan in Crisis* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1981), pp. 84-101.
- 275) See, Dis.Diego Garcia., *op.cit.*, p.44.
- 276) *ibid.*, p.43, testimony of James Schlesinger.
- 277) Senate MILCON Hearings (July 11, 1974), *op.cit.*, testimony of William Colby, cited in *ibid.*, p.37.
- 278) See, *New York Times*, July 26, 1973.
- 279) See, Hs.Expansion. Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 280) U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Special Sub-committee on Investigations, *The Persian Gulf 1975: The Continuing Debate on Arms Sales*, Hearings, 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975) (hereafter, *P.G. Arms Sales/75*), p.17, testimony of Richard R. Violette [Dir.Sales Negs., DSAA].

- 281) *ibid.*, p.12.
- 282) *ibid.*, p.59, testimony of Rep. Lee Hamilton; the House Sub-committee Chairman also noted that, 'of this 520, 408 are assisting Iranian sales and 94 are assisting the Saudi Arabian sales.'
- 283) See, Hs.Gulf Hgs./74, *op.cit.*, p.91, testimony of Under Secretary Atherton.
- 284) See, Hs.Expansion Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.126, testimony of Earl C. Ravenal.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE REGIONAL IMPERATIVE.

The Carter administration had assumed office on January 20, 1977, with an ambitious foreign policy programme. This included the renovation of economic and institutional links with major trading partners in Europe and Japan, the pursuit of arms' reductions for both strategic and conventional systems with the Soviet Union, curbing conventional weapons sales and nuclear proliferation, consulting 'North-South' imbalances and throughout, a re-instatement of 'principle' into U.S. foreign affairs consistent with exercising 'leadership without hegemony'.

Fundamental to all the above concerns was the premise of regional disaggregation. The avowedly systemic and great power focus of the Kissinger 'apparat' would be redressed by 'a new sensitivity, awareness and priority' towards '...the vast complex of issues clustering around the relationships between the industrialized and unindustrialized world and the new sets of global issues that are emerging.'¹ Local systems and dynamics were to receive a due attention divorced from the 'inordinate fear of communism' that, for the incoming Carter team, had distorted previous U.S. policy toward an over-concentration on relations with the Soviet Union. The focus of the administration's own concentration in foreign policy was to be on revitalizing the 'trilateral' linkages between the United States, Europe and Japan. 'The Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region', Carter's appointed National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski records, 'was to be addressed through arms control efforts with the Soviets.'² In approaching these objectives, the course of Indian Ocean policy promised to be one of the administration's least controversial initiatives. This chapter will analyse the course and rationale of the policy process by way of a particular focus on the Carter administration's agenda for global and regional

arms control. It will then assess the influence of domestic and regional factors on the prospects for a formal Indian Ocean Arms Control regime in late 1978.

1. 'World Order Politics' in the Carter Administration: Multiple Advocacy and Regional Arms Control.

If the stated policy platform of the Carter White House was designed to draw a clear distinction between a new 'world order politics'³ and what was described as the 'covert pessimism' of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward such matters as human rights, arms control and nuclear proliferation, a similar hiatus was advanced in the revised organizational framework of the NSC bureaucracy. In this, the former structure of interlocking 'Interdepartmental Groups' and centralized committees run from the National Security Advisor's office was replaced by a system of two (multi-function) committees. The first, the 'Policy Review Committee' (PRC), would consider Defence, International economic issues and general foreign policy. It was to be chaired rotationally by the appropriate Cabinet Secretary. For the second, 'Special Co-ordinating Committee' (SCC) - taking in Intelligence, arms control and 'crisis management' - the chair would devolve upon the Assistant for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski. 'The idea', Brzezinski relates, 'was to engage the Cabinet more fully in the national security decision making process and to accustom Cabinet members to working as a team.'⁴ The new system was, from the outset, designed to be functional to the Carter administration's conscious conceptual pragmatism. Thus, as summarized by the State Department's incoming Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Leslie Gelb, 'the Carter approach to foreign policy rests on a belief that not only is the world far too complex to be reduced to a doctrine, but there is something inherently wrong with having a doctrine at all.'⁵

However, in expressly abjuring the need for a 'doctrine' to relate the several policy areas in foreign and national security affairs, the Carter Cabinet was to similarly risk diffusing the focus for its concerns in a way that could not be recovered by the somewhat elusive constructs of 'Trilateralism'. And in advancing what, in organizational terms, was effectively an institutionalized 'multiple advocacy' model of decision making, the administration was to also lay the ground for an increasingly public rehearsal of inter-agency division. It would further, in giving the respective agencies considerable control over the selection of second and third-level appointees, serve more immediately to alienate sections of the wider Washington political community.

The closing years of the Nixon and Ford administration's had, as we have seen, been marked by a growth of political lobbies concerned to advance a renascent American particularism as much as the 'new sensitivity' to differentiated 'global issues' so identified in the Carter foreign policy agenda. Thus, of the 53 such nominations put forward by a joint conservative (CDM/CPD/AFL-CIO) platform, all had been rejected.⁶ In contrast, the ranks of those accepted included many - such as (Policy Planning Director at State) Anthony Lake and Paul Warnke at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency - who had resigned from previous administrations in opposition to U.S. military interventions in Vietnam and elsewhere.⁷ If the apparent progress of a 'left-of-centre foreign policy network'⁸ had given general concern to some on the right of Washington politics, the mobilizing issue was that of arms control. Here, the Warnke appointment in particular would be strenuously contested.⁹ Whilst this early surfacing of 'ideological controversy'¹⁰ had not prevented Senate confirmation (by a 70-29 margin)¹¹ of the new

ACDA Director it would, however, give the latter's conduct of Indian Ocean arms control a domestic resonance that was to increasingly surround the making of policy.

As statements by many in the Carter campaign team made clear, arms control was to receive a high priority for the new administration. An overall focus on politico-economic 'interdependence' had also been central to the Carter election platform. These concerns were to merge in addressing the United States' role in the burgeoning transformation of the world arms market. In a pre-election summary of future arms control perspectives, Leslie Gelb had noted that U.S. grant military aid (MAP) had fallen from \$5.2bn. in 1952 to under \$600m. by 1975.¹² Military sales (FMS) had correspondingly risen, to \$4.2bn for the same year. The balance of these financial indicators suggested, for Gelb, an 'incipient revolution in supplier-recipient relationships' - in effect, a 'buyers market' - which was of particular significance for the Middle East. Here, 'instead of the United States dictating to others what they need...others are telling us what they feel they need for their own purposes.'¹³ To address this trend toward 'reverse dependency' in relations with its military clients, the United States should, in Gelb's view, 'approach arms sales as a foreign policy problem, not as an arms control problem.'¹⁴ The organizational implications of this approach were to be taken up in Senate confirmation Hearings for Cyrus Vance. Agreeing the existence of 'a direct relationship between arms transfers, in terms of military sales, and arms control' the Secretary-designate was to thus propose that the central 'focus' of responsibility for both activities be taken within the Department of State.¹⁵

The arms control issue had also been a consistent reference point for Congressional 'War Powers' concerns and the general attempts to re-invigorate the Congress's own role in the making of foreign policy. It had, as we have seen, figured in the successive restrictions attached to the funding programme for Diego Garcia. These concerns had converged in the passage of the June 30, 1976, *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act*. In addition to the act broadly enjoining the United States 'to exert leadership in the world community, to bring about arrangements for reducing international trade in implements of war,'¹⁶ a specific section declared that, 'the President should undertake...negotiations with the Soviet Union...to achieve an agreement limiting the deployment of naval, air, and land forces...in the Indian Ocean and littoral countries.' Designated categories for negotiation would thus include 'the establishment or use' of military facilities, overall force structures, and levels of naval forces, 'or the number of "shipdays" allowed therein.'¹⁷

The latter undertaking had, it can be recalled, been indefinitely postponed under the Ford administration. For Carter, however, an early move on the Indian Ocean would demonstrate the increased commitment to 'consultation' with the Congress. It would further address complementary administration aims in the fields of arms control and a revived U.S. activism in the United Nations. Global institutional renovation was an integral part of the administration's declared focus on the 'architecture' of international affairs as opposed to the 'Lone Ranger' unilateralism seen at fault in the approach of Kissinger. In this context, naval arms limitation was complementary to a wider effort to advance confidence building measures for the region. Thus, Secretary-designate Vance was to assure Senators of the 'fundamental importance' placed upon the (forthcoming)

'Law of the Sea' Conference and of the need for 'new and constructive ideas in dealing...with the demands for a new international economic order.' The latter issues were linked in both conceptual and material terms to the Indian Ocean, given the expected seabed mineral wealth to be apportioned under the LOS convention, the preponderant nonaligned orientation of the littoral states and the organizational matrix provided by the NAM's Indian Ocean 'Peace Zone' co-ordinator, (Sri Lankan Ambassador) H.S. Amerasinge as President of the United Nations Committee on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).¹⁸

President Carter's first major speech on foreign policy was an address to the UN Ambassadors on March 18, 1977. Here, in addition to affirming that the United States would play a 'strong and constructive role' in the forthcoming Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), the President stated, 'We will seek...to establish Soviet willingness to reach agreement with us on mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean.'¹⁹ The choice of both setting and subject matter reflected the greater emphasis on third world concerns promoted by Carter's designated Ambassador, Andrew Young. It should be noted, however, that despite the expressed rejection of the policy of 'counter-attack' adopted by the former UN representative, Daniel P. Moynihan, the administration had no intention of conceding any 'linkage' with the ongoing Zone of Peace proceedings - a vote on which was scheduled for December²⁰ - nor the recent (September, 1976) call for the dismantling of 'existing foreign bases' in the region adopted at the Fifth Summit of the Non -Aligned Movement at Colombo.²¹

The Carter initiative had, none-the-less, placed the Indian Ocean at the centre of an ambitious arms control agenda to be pursued both in the UN and bilaterally. In an initial press statement of March 9, the President had, indeed, proposed that, 'the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized, that a comprehensive test ban be put into effect, [and] that prior notification of test missile launches be exchanged.'²² Whilst the two latter measures had little precedent outside the academic arms control community, the subsequent, United Nations, proposals for 'mutual restraint' in the Indian Ocean could recall some official sanction for a return to the pre-1973 'low profile' approach to U.S. interests in the region. Despite the widespread discussion of Soviet 'sea-control' ambitions in the Gulf and North Eastern littoral evident in the many Congressional Hearings and the literature, the Kissinger State Department had previously indicated that the U.S. would observe an informal 'zone of restraint' in the region, and would, 'keep [open] the matter of a possible future arms limitation initiative as a potential contribution to regional stability.'²³ Moscow's own naval activity, as noted in the last (Ford administration) *DOD Annual Report*, 'appeared to have stabilized.'²⁴ The thrust of the new administration's policy would, however, be altogether more positive. By designing an arms control initiative specific to the Indian Ocean, the Carter NSC was, at the same time, aiming to achieve what was believed to be a relatively simple arms control agreement, 'on which the Soviets can agree quickly'²⁵ that could accelerate movement on the SALT process and give the U.S. an additional purchase on Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa. Complementary to the perceived bilateral advantages, the opening of U.S.-Soviet negotiations could also serve to foreclose the more comprehensive 'Zone of Peace' debate at the United Nations, whilst reinforcing administration diplomatic approaches to the leading protagonist, India.

A REGIONAL POWER: UNITED STATES' POLICY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
AND
THE DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1970-80.

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II. Naval Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean.

Despite the somewhat confused reaction from allies to the President's initial March, 9 announcement²⁶ - which also caught ACDA staff and Director Paul Warnke 'completely by surprise'²⁷ - there had, in fact, been some circumstantial preparation for the initiative. The Soviet Union had itself indicated a willingness to, 'search for ways to reduce, on a mutual basis, the military activity of non-Indian Ocean states in that ocean and areas in its immediate proximity'²⁸ in a memorandum to the UN General Assembly of September, 1976. Here, Moscow's consistent diplomatic association with the Non-Aligned position, restated at Colombo, is also evident. The 'Briefing Book' for the administration's transition agenda, prepared in January, 1977 by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski had outlined arms control in the region as a possible area to 'publicly test Soviet intentions.'²⁹ Nor was the new director of Carter's Arms Control executive himself entirely unprepared for the undertaking. Warnke had, together with Cyrus Vance participated in a United Nations Association study of possible arms control moves for the Indian Ocean. The latter, published in November, 1976, was to preview much of the negotiating stance later taken up by the ACDA.³⁰ Much of the technical preparation in terms of means of measuring comparative U.S./Soviet naval capability had been established in (1975) Congressional studies³¹ and in the Ford administration's 1976 report to Congress for the hearings on Diego Garcia.³² In addition, a move to regional disarmament would accord with the general ethos of the Cyrus Vance State Department and the ACDA on the desirability for, if need be, unilateral U.S. moves to curb the arms race 'treadmill'.³³

Unlike the controversy surrounding the administration's revised proposals for a 'drastic' SALT build-down and the untried CTB treaty, however, the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation proposals (NALT) had met with a positive response from the Soviet Union when introduced by Vance during the first Secretarial visit to Moscow in March, 1977.³⁴ A working group under Warnke and Soviet negotiator Lev Mendelevitch was thus set up in May to prepare the opening of the first formal session, scheduled for June, 22 in Moscow. In the interim, the U.S. team had worked to co-ordinate an inter-agency agreement on terms and tactics with the NSC and the Pentagon. This involved an initial circulation of position papers by State (Politico-Military Affairs), Defense (ISA and Joint Chiefs) and the CIA. Options would then be reviewed at a Special Co-ordinating Committee, convened at NSC Cabinet level, with participation from JCS Chairman General David Jones, DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner and Paul Warnke as head of the ACDA. Throughout, the administration was concerned to avoid the bureaucratic 'end runs' - particularly concerning the Pentagon and civilian agencies - seen at fault in the Nixon arms control process. For the structure of negotiation itself, it was thus also agreed that the team be 'backstopped' by a parallel inter-agency body in Washington, which would, 'rapidly assess negotiating problems and obtain decisions and guidance to pass to the negotiating team.'³⁵ A further indication of the administration's intent in pursuing the talks was evident in the ultimate chain of command. Here, as a subsequent House Committee would be told, 'the instructions for the Indian Ocean negotiations come directly from the President.'³⁶

Whilst the administration would strive to obtain the maximum favourable publicity for its moves by - for the first time - admitting the press to view the base at Diego Garcia,³⁷

the terms for talks themselves were, by mutual agreement, to be strictly bilateral and 'confidential'.³⁸ In this way, President Carter was to tell press reporters on June 21, there was indeed a possibility to, 'stabilize the status quo in the Indian Ocean and refrain from further escalation', with the 'later' prospect of, '...prior notification of any military movements there, and perhaps...some reduction in the present level of military presence' that, the President acknowledged, was, in any event, 'pretty low at this time.'³⁹

Overall, the U.S. and Soviet negotiators were to meet at four sessions, commencing in Moscow (June, 1977), Washington (September, 1977), and Berne (Switzerland) in December, 1977 and February, 1978. Despite the considerable airing of the issues in the media and U.S. Senate - and the recent Soviet submission to the UN 'Ad Hoc' committee (see above) - the setting of a precise practical agenda was, on both sides, fairly tentative. As Warnke recalls, 'Initially, we weren't quite sure what the President had in mind. Then it became quite clear that the idea of, quote "demilitarizing" the whole Indian Ocean area was quite unrealistic...and the Soviets were a little uncertain too.'⁴⁰ The opening (Moscow) session would thus establish a focus for the negotiations that was to exclude limits on the movement of aircraft in the region⁴¹ and institutionalize the existing *de facto* understandings on the non-deployment of SSBN's. The latter prospect had, as we have seen, constituted a primary rationale for the original Soviet entry to the Indian Ocean in 1968.⁴² Further areas of Soviet concern were broached in addressing the 'allied factor' - notably the activities of France and Iran⁴³ - and a possible Chinese interdiction threat to lines of communication between the European and Asian regions of the USSR.⁴⁴ As the second session assembled in Washington, it became clear that such 'third party' asymmetries could be accommodated in terms of overall

limitations on 'ship-ton-days'⁴⁵ with sub-limits according to unit capability. 'Given' the former ACDA Director observes, 'that China is not a significant naval power.'⁴⁶ For its part, the U.S. delegation had agreed to restrict the development of Diego Garcia to the ongoing (FY 1977-8) schedule, which would preclude the deployment of strategic bombers.⁴⁷ The outline of an agreement, restricted in its formal expression to surface shipping, was thus apparent by mid-1977.

Thus, whilst clearly subordinate to the contemporaneous SALT and CTB negotiations, the establishment of a 'modest' Indian Ocean arms control regime could, on both sides, serve objectives that were in several respects complementary. From Warnke's perspective, the negotiating process was in itself of some heuristic value. Throughout, 'the fact that both sides had to think what the military utility of the Indian Ocean actually was' had, for the ACDA Director a positive outcome. Here, 'both sides concluded that it did not have any genuine military utility.'⁴⁸ Further, a thorough examination of military posture could also strengthen the ACDA bureaucratically against the 'worst case' analyses favoured by the Department of the Navy, regarded by Warnke as, 'the last bastion of opposition to any arms control agreement.'⁴⁹ The Soviet Union would secure a moratorium on further development of Diego Garcia - whose progress towards being a 'large, multi-purpose base' had been closely followed in the Soviet media,⁵⁰ and give content to Moscow's declared position of 'respect' for the UN Zone of Peace proposals. For the Carter administration, a parallel diplomatic course is apparent in the programme of rapprochement with the incoming Janata government in India. By mid-1977, the Indian Ocean agreement appeared, as Warnke observes, 'a risk-free operation.'⁵¹

III. Arms Control and Strategy: PRM 10, PD 18 and 'Essential Equivalence'.

Ambassador Warnke's early optimism for Indian Ocean arms control would be seemingly borne out as the strategic status of the region emerged in the context of the DOD's initial estimates for revised military posture. Here, the Carter administration had determined to make reductions in the proposed 157 unit (over five years) expansion programme for the Navy inherited from the Ford administration. This was to be reduced to 70 vessels, and although the commitment to a 'two ocean' navy was retained, the stress - as with other aspects of military posture - was to be placed on sea-borne reinforcement for NATO, 'rather than on a major anti-shipping capability.'⁵² This, in practice, referred to the role of carrier task groups. The administration's opposition to further 'Enterprise' class nuclear carriers recalls the contention attending Secretary Schlesinger's attempted 1974 reorganization of the Seventh Fleet, which upgraded one (of three) PACOM task groups from the Pacific to patrols in the Indian Ocean (see above). Whilst Kissinger had temporarily returned the third task group to Pacific duties, approaching obsolescence had required the inclusion of funding for a further nuclear carrier in the last (1976) estimates. This was resisted by the Carter administration on the grounds of economy. In the view of Defense Secretary Harold Brown, 'building more nuclear carriers' would yield, '...less defense (capability) than we could have had for the same number of dollars.'⁵³ Since without the proposed carrier, the problems of mounting an upgraded Indian Ocean presence would be compounded, the administration found in the proposed arms control regime a useful reinforcement for avoiding both increased 'defense dollars' and further internecine controversy.

Yet, the apparent underpinning of arms control policy by the Carter administration's fiscal conservatism⁵⁴ would, from the outset, confront what was in other ways an expanded U.S. strategic agenda; evident within the overall revision of United States' strategy undertaken in the planning review 'PRM 10'. Commissioned in January, 1977 under the co-ordination of Samuel Huntington,⁵⁵ the study was officially endorsed by Carter on August, 24 as 'Presidential Directive (PD) 18'.⁵⁶ For some observers, the PRM 10 exercise represented, 'the most extensive...strategic review since that prepared for President Truman in 1950.'⁵⁷ The analogy taken with the Truman administration was one encouraged by President Carter. However, unlike the - somewhat monist - construction of NSC 68, the Carter strategy team was hampered by conflicting priorities in terms of threat-assessment and budgetary goals. These were to have a particular effect on the focus given to the Soviet Union. The administration had come to office committed to a substantial cuts in defence, and the first (FY 1977) years' outlay at, \$95.7bn.,⁵⁸ was indeed lower than the \$100.1bn. Estimate offered in the previous *Annual Report* of the Donald Rumsfeld DOD.⁵⁹ However, the prospect of further defence economies was complicated by the continuing controversy, evident in the last year of the Ford administration, surrounding the 'National Intelligence Estimates' of Soviet outlay and capability. This had led to the preparation of an alternative set of (upgraded) estimates by the outside 'Team "B"'. The resulting synthesis was incorporated into the final (December, 1976) official statement of the outgoing Presidency. Hence, as the *Washington Post* accurately surmised, 'Even if the Carter administration disagrees' with the substance of the new NIE, it would remain '...as a reference for policy makers across the top echelon of the government.'⁶⁰

The disputed factual status of the administration's intelligence data-base would reflect on wider considerations in the less tangible field of Soviet intentions. The early months of Carter's Presidency had seen the re-emergence of the 'strategic superiority' debate and associated organizations - such as the 'Committee on the Present Danger'⁶¹ - which were to mount a powerful challenge to both SALT and conventional measures for arms control. In attempting a synthesis between the 'drastic' arms control aims of Carter's campaign platform and pressure for a more traditional containment, the administration had presented the perspectives of PD 18, published in the February, 1978 DOD *Annual Report*, as: 'Era Two - a period that embodies both the competition of the cold war era with the co-operation of the détente period.'⁶² Overall, the 'increasing dependence' of the United States on an 'international environment...[with]...no recognized and stable status quo' was noted, although 'the Soviet Union remains our principal national security problem.'⁶³ Here, whilst allowing that 'the Soviet defense effort...increased in real terms by about 36 percent between 1967 and 1977...[and] now exceeds that of the United States by 32 percent'⁶⁴ and that, 'the (previous) intelligence estimates may understate the cost of the Soviet buildup ...substantially',⁶⁵ the DOD was, at the same time, to argue that, 'We do not propose to plan against total irrationality.'⁶⁶ Defense Secretary Brown was to also maintain that, 'The United States has not been idle in this competition,'⁶⁷ a claim reinforced by the setting of a 3% annual increase in outlay, amounting to an overall (Total Obligational Authority) budgetary target of \$126bn. for FY 1979.⁶⁸ The influence of the domestic debate was, however, apparent throughout the administration's first published review of defence expenditure and military posture. And as Harold Brown was to further acknowledge, 'To those that are convinced that the Soviets are aiming at

meaningful strategic superiority...the programs and options I have provided here may seem inadequate.'⁶⁹

Yet, despite the denial of 'excessive restraint'⁷⁰ in establishing the administration's defence programmes, the DOD's stated position on the central balance remained premised on the continuation of an 'essential equivalence' *vis a vis* even a worst case analysis of Soviet capability.⁷¹ The practical implications of essential equivalence, as developed by Harold Brown, were to proceed from the assumption that, 'any advantages in force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by other U.S. advantages,'⁷² notably concerning the global U.S. alliance system. The factoring of 'prosperous and willing allies'⁷³ into considerations of Washington's own strategic aggregates will recall the terms of 'total force' planning developed in the Melvin Laird DOD. However, even in comparison with Laird and Schlesinger *Annual Reports* it is also clear that the Carter administration's scope for 'the conditions of U.S. security' had grown, almost imperceptibly, global. An overt 'interest' was, for the first time, declared in 'the political independence and territorial integrity of the Peoples' Republic of China and Yugoslavia.'⁷⁴ Also of 'essential' concern was, 'the independence of such critical areas as...the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia and Africa.'⁷⁵ Moreover, 'there is an important sense in which the U.S. frontier lies on a great arc that contains vital areas all the way from North Norway to Japan and the Aleutians.'⁷⁶

Thus, whilst the administration was to make a pointed political reaffirmation of the global nature of its concerns, the results for military posture would not mark a return to the more broadly gauged containment of the Kennedy era. What had emerged, however,

was an approach not dissimilar to the latter's provisions for 'flexible response'. The '1½ wars' posture of the Nixon Doctrine would be retained.⁷⁷ Yet, the force structures considered for a 'minor contingency' would be expanded to a demonstrable level of 'credibility'. Here, for the DOD, 'we believe the Middle East qualifies as an important test on several grounds. We have vital interests in the area; it is an area that still lacks stability; and it is an area sufficiently distant from the United States to make exacting demands on some of our capabilities.'⁷⁸

IV. Arms Sales and Regional Security: the Dilemmas of PRM 12.

As is apparent from the above, the Harold Brown DOD saw the Middle East and Gulf regions as more integrated than before within the purview of global posture. Brzezinski, amongst others, had begun to refer to a 'third strategic zone' complementary to established U.S. positions in Europe and the Far East.⁷⁹ In this, as with Whitehall's security planning of the 1950's, the reconciliation of expanded strategic ends with limited budgetary and material means was to suggest a reliance on strategic mobility. 'The geographical conditions' it was noted, '...that would permit the conduct of amphibious operations and air-support exist in the Middle East [and] Persian Gulf.'⁸⁰ And to this end, 'appropriate elements in our forces in the Continental United States (CONUS) must be rapidly deployable to Asia and the Middle East.'⁸¹ As will be shown, the fully constituted 'Rapid Deployment Force' would only arise in a concrete form after 1979, but the initial selection of, 'the several Army divisions, Marine Amphibious forces and Air Wings that would not be immediately required for an initial defense of NATO'⁸² is of significance

as an indication of the strategic priorities of the administration, even if the prospective combat missions in the Middle East aroused no great enthusiasm from the Pentagon.⁸³

For the present, however, the administration's attempt to present a revitalized global engagement - which had in the first instance underpinned the commitment to regional arms control - was, as unfolding operationally, to threaten a departure from previous policy in clear conflict with the programme for 'restraint' in the Indian Ocean.

Of further variance within the administration's regional policy framework was the continued reliance on arms sales to the 'prosperous and willing' littoral states as part of the overall strategic goal of 'essential equivalence'. The Carter administration had, as we have seen, placed a high priority on restricting U.S. arms transfers, and had announced, on May 19, 1977 a comprehensive package of measures to ensure that, 'henceforth' they be regarded as 'an exceptional instrument of national security policy.'⁸⁴ These would include a reduction of FY 1978 dollar volume of new FMS and grant aid commitments from the baseline of FY 1977, restrictions on weapons co-production and prohibition on, 'the development...of advanced...systems solely for export'. Further provisions addressed questions of 'end user' transfers and stated that, 'The United States will not be the first to introduce into a region...advanced weapons systems that would create ...significantly greater combat capability.'⁸⁵

Concern at the level of such transactions had been growing throughout 1976, as the Senate began considering a \$4.5bn. arms package to Iran and one of \$701.6m. to Saudi Arabia⁸⁶ Here, pre-election Hearings (from September 16 -24, 1976) before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had witnessed widespread disquiet at the prospect of

both promoting a regional arms race⁸⁷ and providing further incentive to the Shah in particular to look to the oil market for funding. Iran, it was noted, 'has taken the lead to raise annually the price of oil.'⁸⁸ For the proposed Saudi programme, opposition would focus on the, 'almost transparent relationship to the military situation in the Arab -Israeli theatre'⁸⁹ of the requested 850 'Sidewinder' a/a, 650 'Maverick' a/g and 1000 TOW (anti-tank) missiles and, further, on the inherent hostility between the Arab states and Iran itself.⁹⁰ Saudi Arabia, one witness remarked, was becoming 'the arms warehouse of the Arab world.'⁹¹ For both countries, the Senate voiced concern for the wider, sociological implications of such 'highly stratified societies...being overwhelmed by twentieth century Western technology.'⁹² As, with some prescience, Senator Church was to observe, 'the fastest way you can radicalize the politics of an underdeveloped country is through a very large military buildup.'⁹³ Overall, many in the Senate remained unconvinced by administration affirmations of the 'maturity' in U.S.-Iranian relations⁹⁴ as of the 'moderation' of Saudi Arabia. 'We cannot', Hubert Humphrey declared, 'get away [from] arms sales as if we were selling televisions and refrigerators.'⁹⁵

The above considerations had been instrumental in determining the administration's own revised arms transfer policy following the (April 1, 1977) ratification of PRM 12.⁹⁶ Whilst somewhat qualified by the exception of 'major allies' and 'our commitments to Israel'⁹⁷ the new guidelines were to have immediate results in the cancellation of an \$700m. order from Pakistan for 100 A-7 ground attack aircraft and of a proposed \$4-5bn. follow on package for Iran, for 250 as yet unproduced F-18L advanced fighters.⁹⁸ However, the issues would again arise in Senate Hearings in May, 1978.

If the 1976 arms sales programme had been then criticized by Leslie Gelb for being, 'open-ended' and, 'the functional equivalent of a treaty,'⁹⁹ the administration was now itself confronting the 'incipient revolution' in the regional terms of the arms trade as part of its overall diplomacy for the Middle East. As was often emphasized, the Carter policy agenda placed a considerable importance on securing a 'comprehensive' Arab-Israeli settlement. There was also much administration unanimity, evident in the early planning schedule (the January 31, 1977 'PRM 3'),¹⁰⁰ that the process would have to be extended beyond the bilateral Kissinger approach to admit at least acquiescence from other regional actors. As previously, however, arms transfers would remain an 'essential' avenue for the U.S. 'retaining our close relationship'¹⁰¹ with the principals. For consideration in the 1978 programme were the series of ongoing negotiations to sell F-15 and F-16 systems to Israel, 50 (lower capability) F-5's to Egypt and a further 60 F-15's to Saudi Arabia. These, to emphasize the unitary nature of the administration's strategy, were presented to Congress as a single package. The Saudi component, following from the contested TOW/Maverick package of September, 1976, was to meet with particularly close questioning. Here, Harold Brown had argued that, 'I do not recommend this sale solely on military grounds...[but]...because it is important to...the American position in the Middle East'¹⁰² and commended the 'high statesmanship' of the Saudi regime in 'placing its own immediate economic self interest subordinate to the health of the world economy.'¹⁰³ The Defense Secretary's arguments were to find support from ACDA Director Paul Warnke.¹⁰⁴ For Warnke, 'there are, indeed, certain positive arms control aspects to the sales' in obviating the purchase of more capable aircraft from elsewhere. 'The final and compelling arms control argument' for the sales proceeding, however, was seen in 'Saudi support...for progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace settlement', which will

be enhanced by, 'anything we can do to strengthen our ties with Saudi Arabia.'¹⁰⁵

Overall, for the administration as for many in Congress, the transfers presumed a reciprocal dynamic concerning U.S. 'friends...in their search for peace and in their policies of moderation.'¹⁰⁶ Thus, as one Senator observes, 'the best help the moderate Arab countries can have is the maintenance of a strong Israel.'¹⁰⁷

Yet, the complementary pattern of 'linkage' promoted by the Carter administration in its strengthening of regional allies was not self-evident in the perceptions of the powers themselves. Both Israel and the Arab states were active in lobbying against their respective regional protagonists on Capitol Hill.¹⁰⁸ Here, for one Senate witness, 'The American militarization of Saudi Arabia will lead to destabilization of the area', since '...the only way that Saudi [Arabia] can legitimize their medieval kingdom is to establish a positive linkage between pan-Arabism and Saudi legitimacy.'¹⁰⁹ Whilst for former Secretary Kissinger, the administration's unitary arms package 'links together the security concerns of Israel and the security concerns of Saudi Arabia which are not really commensurable.'¹¹⁰ Throughout, discussion both in the Senate and elsewhere would return to this central dilemma, which was to ultimately disable the administration's hopes for an inclusive regional security policy. The flawed assumption was that a common pro-Western orientation within the respective actors could be advanced into acceptance of a common U.S. strategy for the region as a whole. However, as much Senate testimony would affirm,¹¹¹ a principal 'security concern' for both Israel and Saudi Arabia was with each other.

V. Beyond the 'Tar Baby Option': Ethiopia, Somalia, and the African Dimension to Indian Ocean Policy.

If the Arab-Israeli military balance established one pole of contradiction in the Carter administration's regional security policy, the other was provided by the military imbalance in the Horn of Africa. Here, the unfolding crisis involving Soviet, Israeli, Egyptian and Saudi interests - with some indirect input from Iran - would directly impact on U.S. Indian Ocean policy and, in turn, on U.S.-Soviet relations as a whole. As is apparent from the early Carter campaign speeches and the NSC's 'Briefing Book' and PRM schedule, African policy as such was to have a higher profile in the new administration's concerns. The political background in the Democrat's domestic power base was a clear factor here, as was the general 'Trilateral' concern for 'North-South' issues. Thus, PRM 4 on the South African and Rhodesian position was to be completed by January 31 as was PRM 8 on 'North-South' strategy by March.¹¹² At his confirmation hearings, Ambassador designate Andrew Young had declared that, 'we have the opportunity to reestablish the credibility (in Africa) that we once had more than a decade ago'¹¹³ - a stance designed, as in other matters, to establish a clear break with the perceived neglect of the Nixon administration and the 'tar baby option' of NSSM 39. However, as again with much elsewhere in the Carter administration's regional strategy, the rhetoric of innovation would surmount much continuity with its predecessor. Kissinger had himself become involved in African negotiations toward the end of the Ford Presidency. The Soviet/Cuban engagement in Angola had brought the region up in strategic importance, compounding existing U.S. concerns at the more gradual Soviet establishment in Somalia. This had, *inter alia*, produced a \$300m. MAP/FMS commitment for Zaire, Kenya and Ethiopia,¹¹⁴ announced in June, 1976.

For the Carter administration there were, though, two distinct - if related - departures from established U.S. policy in the local arena of the African Horn. Firstly, for the Vance State Department and the President himself, the East-West perspective had no longer the automatic primacy found in the approach of Kissinger. This meant that the simmering Somali-Ethiopian conflict in particular was no longer to be taken up in these terms as a strategic 'given' for U.S. policy; a change that would have consequences for what had been hitherto consistent (if diminishing) U.S. support for Ethiopia, despite the avowedly revolutionary programmes of the Addis Ababa regime. Second, and collaterally, the Carter/Vance regional focus was to be more responsive to the views of allies on the Somali question where, again despite an ostensive political orientation of 'scientific socialism' and the 1974 treaty with Russia, the military government of Said Barre was receptive to approaches from conservative U.S. partners in Africa and the Middle East, notably, Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

The impact of Somalia's prospective defection from the Soviet alliance on the parallel Pentagon agenda for the 'sea lanes of communication' was a further aspect of the strategic Horn equation, whose effect on administration policy for the East African littoral and wider considerations of Indian Ocean security will be examined below.

As we have seen, a main focus of attention in both the Ford administration and much of the Congress concerned with Indian Ocean matters had been the progress of the 'steady buildup' of Soviet capabilities in Somalia. However, from 1974 onwards a further dilemma for U.S. policy had been presented by the gathering momentum of the revolution in Ethiopia, following an uprising of January-September of that year. Here,

although the Empire had entered a U.S. Military Assistance agreement in May, 1953 and between 1946-74 received \$220m. in MAP and \$350m.¹¹⁵ in overall economic aid - the largest such amount in Africa - its perceived importance to U.S. policy had been in decline. The close identification of U.S. interests with the personality of the Emperor was viewed by many in the State Department as a disadvantage. The manifest decay of the institutions of state meant that the ability of Ethiopia to play a 'moderating' role in regional politics was reduced. The Emperor Haile Sellassie was, on the occasion of his last (1973) visit to Washington, refused additional military aid to sustain a long-standing counter-insurgency campaign in Eritrea.¹¹⁶ Sellassie's obduracy on the Eritrean question had increasingly constricted the usefulness of the (Asmara-based) Kagnew station. The direct U.S. security stake in Ethiopia was also greatly reduced for other reasons after the Melvin Laird DOD reorganization of 1970, which had transferred the Kagnew Communications base to the Navy (see chap.2), and begun removing many of its functions to Diego Garcia. Kagnew had, by 1976 been reduced to 35 personnel from a peak of 3000 in 1971.¹¹⁷

However, whilst Washington's relations with the successive Ethiopian regimes had become increasingly distant, the net volume of MAP/FMS and other military transfers had actually grown.¹¹⁸ The June, 1976 package was to include two squadrons of F-5E aircraft, one of F-5A's, C-130 transports and M-60 tanks and APC's to the value of \$175m.¹¹⁹ There was also some bureaucratic momentum to maintaining a possible influence in Ethiopian affairs at the State Department. Some had argued that the pattern of the emerging government in Addis Ababa was unclear and could yet be influenced to U.S. advantage.¹²⁰ In August, 1976 Senate Hearings, African Affairs desk officials were

to endorse the FMS proposals on the grounds that, 'although (the government) is trying to set up some kind of leftist or socialist system in Ethiopia...it is not systematically or instinctively anti-United States.'¹²¹

A further factor in U.S. Ethiopia policy was the willingness of Israel to accommodate its long-standing 'peripheral' posture with the new Addis regime. The central considerations were, though, strategic. Thus, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was to hear, 'the Russians...have engineered a huge military buildup in Somalia to the point where...a very inferior force is now considered by some to have...superiority over Ethiopia'. The Somali order of battle would, to date, consist of 'some 50 Mig 15-21's' a squadron of IL-28 medium bombers, 250 T34/T54 tanks, 10 artillery battalion's (as against four for Ethiopia) SA-2 SAM's, two 'Skiori' class destroyers, 10 MTB's, two ASW ships, 300 APC's and some 2000 military advisors.¹²² The Soviet union had, in addition 'stationed Cuban Units in Somalia' and, 'are also, through Syria, allied to the (insurgent) Eritrean Liberation Front.'¹²³ The perceived threat of a greatly enhanced Somali military capability was, furthermore, compounded by the frequently expressed territorial aims of the Barre regime. The Somali (1960) constitution extended the state's notional sovereignty to not only the Ethiopian Ogaden province but to the North Frontier District (NFD) of Washington's ally, Kenya¹²⁴ and the French held territory of the Assars and Iffars. Such claims had been reinforced with the refusal, at the (July, 1976) OAU meeting in Mauritius, to recognize the future independence of Djibouti, due after a referendum in January, 1977.¹²⁵

The event of a successful Somali incursion in either (or both) of the two Horn territories would, for one Senate witness, suggest that, 'the Soviets would have the full hypotenuse of control from Mogadishu right down to the straits of Bab al Mandab.'¹²⁶ The latter prospect, as further testimony was to emphasize, also presented a strategic dilemma for Israel.¹²⁷ A previous Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran had been an (at least ostensible) *casus belli* in the 1967 war.¹²⁸ The similar strategic sensitivity of the Mandab Straits, where 'every half-hour, Israeli tankers pass through', had in consequence, led Tel Aviv to have 'located its most important mission for all of Africa in Ethiopia.'¹²⁹ Although a formal offer of military aid had been declined by the Monarchy in 1972,¹³⁰ a series of covert arrangements still obtained with the revolutionary 'Dergue', including interdiction of ELF/EPLF arms shipments off the Eritrean coast.¹³¹ Israel had also maintained its level of equally covert military and intelligence co-operation with Kenya - evident in the Entebbe raid of July 3, 1976¹³² - whilst the imbrication of regional alliances was further evident in relations between Kenya and Ethiopia,¹³³ wherein a 1964 mutual defence agreement had remained in force. An additional complication for U.S. policy was present in the support for both Eritrean independence and Somali territorial ambitions from Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; particularly following Somalia's accession to the Arab League in December, 1973.

The August, 1976 Hearings had illustrated the complexity of the evolving regional dislocation in the Horn, and the breadth of implications for U.S. policy in Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. For the Carter administration, the established consensus amongst State officials to, 'not ...change our policy on economic aid and military assistance'¹³⁴ to Ethiopia was outweighed by the Dergue's human rights record

and increasing military relationship with Moscow. Ethiopia's requests for Soviet aid had, in fact, been pending since September, 1974, but had to date only secured some limited economic support and a military training mission. However, following an internal power struggle in February, 1977¹³⁵ the reconstituted 'Provisional Military Administrative Council' (PMAC) had sought Soviet mediation on the Ogaden question. With the prospect of a political and diplomatic settlement advancing Soviet interests throughout the 'Socialist Oriented' states of the Red Sea littoral, the USSR moved to organize a summit between PMAC Chairman Mengistu and Siad Barre in Aden on the advent of Fidel Castro's March, 1977 tour of Africa. On the agenda was a proposed 'Federation of the Horn of Africa' to include Ethiopia, Somalia and South Yemen, with autonomy provided for the Ogaden and Eritrea. Whilst this had proved unacceptable to Somalia, the Dergue had also moved to consolidate bilateral Soviet-Ethiopian ties and had expelled all U.S. officials except embassy staff on April, 13.¹³⁶ This was followed by an immediate termination of U.S. military assistance and the final withdrawal from Kagnew. On May, 9 a joint Soviet-Ethiopian communiqué announced the implementation of a substantial Soviet military aid programme, whose scope was emphasized by the arrival of 400 Cuban advisors in Addis Ababa.¹³⁷

The growing involvement with the Dergue did not, at first, mean a diminution of Soviet aid to Somalia. However, whilst the PMAC had, effectively, no other option but the Soviet alliance, the Barre regime had been consolidating its links with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.¹³⁸ Riyadh, it can be recalled, had sought the removal of the Soviet presence from Berbera in 1974. From the beginning of 1977, as the Western Somalia Liberation Front increased its operations in the Ogaden, U.S. policy makers were also under increasing

pressure to detach Somalia from the Soviet camp by Iran and the Nimeiri regime in the Sudan. Khartoum had, in May, 1977 expelled 90 Soviet military advisors and ordered the closing of the military section of the Soviet embassy.¹³⁹ A common theme taken up here was to relate the Soviet advances in Ethiopia to a 'sinister grand strategy'¹⁴⁰ as the Sudanese President was to put it. Such geopolitical speculation was to fall on fertile ground in Washington, and become regularly featured in public statements by National Security Advisor Brzezinski.

VI. 'The Nominal Aggressors': the Ogaden Crisis and the Strategic Balance.

The complex pattern of inter-state conflict in the Horn throughout 1977, culminating in a virtual 'reversal of alliances' between the great powers and their regional clients was, *ceteris paribus*, a product of local factors. As shall be argued, however, a critical external bearing on events was also to be provided by the inconsistencies in U.S. policy between the key months of April-September 1977.

Here, moreover, the unravelling of bureaucratic consensus in the administration was to threaten both the prospects for Indian Ocean arms control and the influence of the 'regionalist' perspectives of State and ACDA in determining U.S. policy for the area. Heretofore, the opening of NALT had gone smoothly, and had, indeed been cited as a success area in U.S. arms control, as opposed to the slow progress on the SALT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. Referring to the several U.S.-Soviet negotiations in a July, 21 speech at Charleston, President Carter spoke of a 'yearning for peace' as 'the

invisible human reality that brings us both together.'¹⁴¹ In a similar vein, official State Department comment following the September (Washington) NALT meeting had referred to the 'advanced stage' of the talks and 'imminence' of the signing of a formal agreement.¹⁴² However, 'then' as Paul Warnke observes, 'the Horn of Africa...just chilled the negotiations totally.'¹⁴³

As the *post facto* account by Zbigniew Brzezinski makes clear, U.S. policy in the Horn was to be conducted from the NSC's standpoint as a direct function of the wider pattern of U.S.-Soviet competition in the region. From this perspective 'the situation between the Ethiopians and the Somalis was more than a border conflict. Coupled with the expansion of Soviet influence and military presence to South Yemen, it posed a potentially grave threat to our position in the Middle East...[and]...it represented a serious setback to our attempts to develop with the Soviets some rules of the game in dealing with turbulence in the third world.'¹⁴⁴ Here, it can be recorded that the administration's own observance of the 'rules of the game' was far from clear cut - particularly in terms of restraint on regional allies. As Brzezinski acknowledges, 'Our ability to help the Somalis was not helped' by the fact that, 'they were the nominal aggressors.'¹⁴⁵ What was also, though, of signal significance in assessing Moscow's regional policy was the apparent record of its realisation. 'The Soviets', it was noted, 'had earlier succeeded in sustaining...their preferred solution in Angola.'¹⁴⁶

There were indeed similarities between the course of Soviet policy on these opposite sides of the continent. In both cases, the government (or provisional government) had been recognized as legitimate by the bulk of the international diplomatic community and

the Organization of African Unity in particular. In both cases the Soviets were thus seen as providing legitimate aid against outside aggression, and in both cases the balance had been decisively shifted by Soviet logistics. In the case of Ethiopia, this had rapidly reached a level of some 1,500 Soviet advisors, 2000 Warsaw Pact personnel and 13,000 Cuban troops¹⁴⁷ by November/December, 1977 and would permit the PMAC to begin offensive operations in the new year. For Somalia itself, the increasing military pressure prompted the Barre regime to abrogate the 1974 'Friendship and Co-operation' treaty and, on November, 13 expel all Soviet military personnel and break off diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The reaction from Washington following this move was, however, as mixed as that preceding it. The U.S. regional allies had, as we have seen, long been pressing for such an outcome. In the eyes of some observers,¹⁴⁸ Barre had also received some covert encouragement from the NSC. Carter had himself declared an interest in 'moving in every way to get Somalia to be our friend' in a public interview of April, 1977.¹⁴⁹ A State Department announcement (later withdrawn) of July 29 had suggested willingness 'in principle' to supply arms to the Mogadishu regime.¹⁵⁰ Yet, for others in the administration, the case for 'aggressively challenging' the Soviet Union in the Ogaden - particularly in terms of military aid - was by no means self evident. 'For (Cyrus) Vance', Brzezinski observes, 'the African matter was largely a local issue, and he was strongly backed by the State Department.'¹⁵¹ Moreover, as a Congressional (H.I.R.C.) mission to the region of December, 12-22 was to hear, the revolutionary government in Ethiopia was concerned to present itself as observing 'strict adherence to nonalignment' and would not, in the words of PMAC Chairman Mengistu, 'be the tool of anyone.'¹⁵²

Despite considerable reservation on the Dergue's human rights record¹⁵³ the House Mission was to recommend that the U.S. 'respect Ethiopian nationalism'¹⁵⁴ and, 'avoid putting Mengistu and the Dergue in the position we put Castro and Cuba in ten years ago'¹⁵⁵ and overall, urge the 'formation of a regional approach to the Horn.'¹⁵⁶

In terms of the arguments presented, there would seem considerable scope for such an approach. The difficulty for the administration, however, would lie in reconciling the order of equivalence for local priorities and relations with the Soviet Union. As developed in the findings of the House 'factfinding mission', these issues were to be resolved on the level of counterbalancing the 'regional' perspectives on U.S. Ethiopia policy with a recommendation that 'United States-Soviet talks on the superpowers presence in the Indian Ocean...should not proceed until the Soviets display a more responsible attitude in the Horn.'¹⁵⁸ Here, a return to some form of 'linkage' was strenuously resisted at the State Department and ACDA. The arguments, familiar from the Nixon administration, had been consistently opposed by Secretary Vance. For Vance, 'By casting the complex Horn situation in East-West terms...we were shooting ourselves in the foot,'¹⁵⁹ whilst for Paul Warnke, 'we thought, if you can get a good arms control agreement, why should you pass it up just because of pique?'¹⁶⁰ Yet, for the NSC and, increasingly, President Carter himself, the questions of an Indian Ocean treaty, as with those of regional policy in general and relations with the Soviet Union in particular, were becoming increasingly conditional on the further factor of the administration's agenda for a settlement in the Middle East.

Here, an October, 1 State Department initiative to reconvene the (U.S./Soviet co-sponsored) Geneva Conference, initially endorsed by President Carter, had been withdrawn within three days after sustained domestic criticism. The Geneva opening, conceived by Cyrus Vance as part of established departmental policy on great power bilateralism, was in this instance, supported by Brzezinski in order to promote 'unease...for (Menachem) Begin.'¹⁶¹ The retraction was indicative of the divided cast of administration priorities toward the Soviet Union.¹⁶² These, again, would be placed on a level subaltern to relations with U.S. allies. The Geneva initiative did indeed cause unease in the Israeli leadership. It also, however, served to consolidate the incoming Likud coalition against U.S. pressure, and compound Tel Aviv's U.S. domestic support against the administration. It further engaged a fresh momentum in both Israel and Egypt toward a separate (bilateral) peace arrangement, apparent in Sadat's (November, 19) visit to Jerusalem.¹⁶³ The overall result was thus a more complete exclusion of the Soviet Union from Middle East diplomacy than had been attained under Kissinger. This, in turn, would remove many incentives for Moscow to cooperate with the other aspects of administration's regional strategy in both conventional arms control and naval arms control for the Indian Ocean.

The prospects for an early NALT agreement were also, from the Soviet viewpoint, to suffer from more local developments in the Horn of Africa. As has been noted, in November, 1977 the Soviet military and Naval presence, including air support facilities and a floating dry-dock, was withdrawn from Somalia to Aden. At the same time, the level of hostilities in the Ogaden war and Eritrea necessitated an actual increase in the levels of deployed Soviet Naval units, which were being used in a combat - albeit,

largely supportive - role for the first time. This would have parallel consequences for both the Soviet negotiating position and the alignments of the regional powers, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Thus, at the December (Berne) sessions, Moscow had pressed for modifications to the September, 1977 draft protocol, which had ratified a 'stabilization' of forces at current levels. This was perceived to leave the Soviet fleet at a disadvantage after the loss of Berbera.¹⁶⁴ In compensation, the Soviet delegation had suggested formal restrictions on nuclear powered vessels - which, in a clear reference to U.S. 'Enterprise' class carriers and SSN's - were not acceptable to the increasingly trenchant arms control posture adopted by the NSC. Equally unacceptable were further suggestions that Washington cease the continuing upgrade programme for Diego Garcia.¹⁶⁵ For the Carter administration, a change of emphasis was also apparent. On January, 24, 1978, the President had approved Brzezinski's recommendation that, 'the American side would deliver a protest to the Soviet Union regarding the negative implications for our negotiations of the ongoing Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa and the related buildup of Soviet military presence'¹⁶⁶ at what was to be the final Berne session in February.

The 'related buildup' of Soviet forces would, in other respects, serve to compound the regional balance in the eyes of Washington's principal local allies and hence directly engage on the administration's main concerns in the Middle East. These were to be found on both sides of the Red Sea. Firstly, the Soviet civilian and naval traffic to Ethiopia - staged through Massawa and the Dahlak Islands - was presented by Egypt as both threatening to its own shipping lanes and to any prospective support for Mogadishu. Sadat had, by December, 1977, transferred some \$30m. of surplus Soviet

equipment to Somalia,¹⁶⁷ and suggestions of an Egyptian expeditionary force, of 'one armoured brigade'¹⁶⁸ were also under active consideration at this time. These moves were supported by Sudan. Here, the Nimeiri regime was advancing joint security arrangements with Egypt and also considering troops for Somalia.¹⁶⁹

A perhaps more significant factor for Washington, however, was the - albeit, involuntary - Soviet move to Aden. Although regularly featured on the Russian naval itinerary since 1968, the level of traffic and shore-based support had been of a lesser order than the Soviet and Warsaw Pact activities in Berbera. The CIA's July, 1974 Senate deposition, it can be recalled, had concluded that (the Soviet Navy) 'have not used it (Aden) very much.' Following the Soviet move, the U.S. was to come under increasing pressure from the Saudi government to counter the 'threat' from South Yemen, which had been earlier argued in support of the contested Maverick/TOW sales programme of 1976. Iran was, from a similar standpoint, to reinforce the Saudi's approach. Following a regional tour of Aswan and Riyadh in October, 1977, the Shah reported that the Saudis were 'petrified' of a Soviet presence on the Arabian mainland.¹⁷⁰ The Iranians had themselves retained both ground and air forces in Oman following the containment of the PFLOAG insurgency, which had received some support from South Yemen. Such appeals would, at this juncture, meet a sympathetic reception from the NSC. 'The Soviets...operating in the Red Sea', Defense Secretary Harold Brown was to inform the Senate, are 'a clear and present danger' to Saudi Arabia.¹⁷¹ These considerations served to confirm the position on the merits of U.S.-Soviet arms control taken by the National Security Advisor. For the NALT, Brzezinski had long been sceptical about the

practicalities of the Indian Ocean talks and indeed, had been urging the deployment of a Carrier task group off the Horn from February, 1978.¹⁷²

VII. Regional Arms Control in a Global Context: the UN Special Session, India, and 'Proper Nonalignment'.

In the light of the unfolding regional balance in the African Horn and the parallel internal struggle waged over the conduct of the administration's foreign policy, the February session of talks on Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation was to end on a somewhat inconclusive note. As Washington's regional allies, notably Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia, laid stress on the Soviet threat in support of the several pending arms-sales packages, Brzezinski had warned that, 'linkages' throughout the spectrum of U.S.-Soviet arms control, '...may be imposed by unwarranted (Soviet) exploitation of local conflict for larger international purposes.'¹⁷³ For the State Department, however, Cyrus Vance would issue an immediate rebuttal that 'There is no linkage' between the arms control programme and '...the situation in Ethiopia.'¹⁷⁴ Whilst for Carter himself, a speech of March, 17 had declared that, 'Arms control agreements are a major goal as instruments of our national security, but this will be possible only if we maintain adequate force levels.' Moreover, the President had further affirmed U.S. interest in 'developing forces to counter any threats to our allies...in Asia, the Middle East and other regions of the world' and, in a clear reference to PD-18, that, 'The Secretary of Defense, at my direction is improving and will maintain quickly deployable forces--air, land and sea--to defend our interests throughout the world.'¹⁷⁵ This dichotomy was again pursued within a June, 7 speech at Annapolis, in which Moscow was offered the choice between, 'either confrontation or co-operation.'¹⁷⁶ Throughout, the conflicting statements issuing from the

various agencies of government concerning the future of arms control seemed symptomatic of the wider contradictions that, in the eyes of many observers, had begun to characterize the Carter Presidency. 'His sense of conscious ambiguity is hard to discern' wrote Carnegie Endowment President Thomas L. Hughes, '...This fortifies the ill-starred politics of pushing ahead indiscriminately on all fronts.'¹⁷⁷

Yet, despite the manifest disparities of 'language, truth and logic'¹⁷⁸ afflicting the administration's public presentation of its policies, the overall momentum for arms control would continue to enjoy Presidential sanction. Whilst the course of more specific developments in the Indian Ocean region were also to lend renewed optimism to the ACDA in 'pushing ahead' the NALT process. Preparations were underway for the Special UN Session on Disarmament (SSOD), scheduled for May, 23, 1978. In this, a number of arms control issues were being pursued that were of central importance to the Carter strategy. Thus, the utility of maintaining the talks was, in terms of reinforcement of the wider agenda, considerable. As indeed, would be the adverse effects of U.S. withdrawal from NALT on the 'Special Session' itself. Here, the ACDA was to argue that, 'this administration has tried to strengthen the U.S. role as a leader in the arms control field' and stress the, 'unprecedented range of negotiations, SALT II, the Indian Ocean talks, the comprehensive test ban [and] the ban on anti-satellite warfare'¹⁷⁹ which could substantiate the claim before the UN General Assembly. The earlier 'complete demilitarization' proposals of March, 1977 and opening of NALT had, moreover, produced an apparent success in assuaging what many in the administration believed was an 'artificial anti-American...majority' of third world states.¹⁸⁰ At the April, 1977 meeting of the Political Committee of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned

Nations, Bangladesh sought the removal of clauses specific to Diego Garcia in a joint Non-Aligned resolution on the 'Zone of Peace' issue.¹⁸¹ A further, and more substantive development had also served to unite the strands of administration policy to the region, with the election, in March, 1977 of a new government in India under Moraji Desai.

Unlike the Gandhi government, whose 'cold blooded pursuit of national interest' had been so inimical to the Nixon administration, the Janata party's platform had combined market economics with a declared policy of improved relations with Washington. This, the Carter administration and a State Department steeped, as Kissinger had mordantly observed, in 'three decades of sentimental attachment to India' was happy to reciprocate. India was a principal amongst the 'regional influentials' suggested as a focus for U.S. diplomacy within the initial the Carter briefing papers and meetings of the NSC.¹⁸² Congress had also, in April, 1977 repealed a 1974 injunction on U.S. approval for World Bank/IDA loans to India,¹⁸³ and further wrote in a \$60m. AID authorization for FY 1978. The process of closer economic co-operation was formalized with the signing, in August, 1978, of the \$58m. loans and \$2m. grants package, with an additional \$90m. to follow for FY 1979.¹⁸⁴ A further element in Indo-U.S. 'detente' was provided by the administration's cancellation of the A-7 order for Pakistan and rejection of the Bhutto regime's offer of naval support facilities at Gwadar.¹⁸⁵

For New Delhi, Prime Minister Desai expressed his rejection of the 'anti-Western' policies of his predecessor and concern for, 'proper nonalignment ...with no suspicions of any alliance with anybody.'¹⁸⁶ Whilst this did not mean the abrogation of the 1971

Indo-Soviet treaty, nor of the complex of institutionalized bilateral linkages - developed since the 1960's - in such spheres as arms procurement and co-production, a change in India's foreign policy orientation was apparent in the approach to Indian Ocean affairs. Here, although stressing the continued UN 'Zone of Peace' commitment to, 'eliminate [the] foreign military presence' from the region,¹⁸⁷ the previous distinction between a U.S. military 'base' and the Soviet military 'presence' was, significantly, omitted from Indian policy statements on the issue. 'It is wrong', Desai had told Congress 'I' critics in the Lok Sabha, '...to say that the Soviet Union has no base whatsoever. It has spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean and this could not be denied.'¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, as Foreign Minister Vajpayee was to affirm, the new government 'does not regard Diego Garcia as a bilateral problem between India and the U.S.'¹⁸⁹

Given the frequent U.S. assertions that the Soviet navy enjoyed a 'privileged' access to India's Eastern Fleet Headquarters at Visakapatnam, the turn toward 'true nonalignment' from New Delhi had provided a distinct, if subsidiary moment to opening the NALT negotiations. India had, indeed, actively opposed Soviet moves to establish a lease on the former British facilities at Gan on the Maldives Islands.¹⁹⁰ Further grounds for sustaining the arms control process were provided in Carter's Presidential visit to India on January 3, 1978. The latter, favourably compared to the successful 1956 Eisenhower tour, included negotiations on the \$60m. AID package¹⁹¹ and was reciprocated by a state visit to Washington in June by Desai. Here, a joint communiqué expressed optimism for a successful conclusion in the talks on the 'stabilization of (U.S.-Soviet) military presence in the Indian Ocean.'¹⁹² The possibilities for a wider engagement of the administration's strategy for 'regional influentials' had also become

apparent in the February, 1978 tour of India by the Shah of Iran. Whilst a strong supporter of Pakistan, the Shah also saw the opportunity to advance Iran's programme for a 'common market' for South Asia.¹⁹³ Indian technical expertise was well established amongst Iran's substantial pool of expatriate labour and the Shah's February agenda aimed to expand Indo-Iranian economic relations to cover joint industrial ventures in iron ore, aluminium and oil refining.¹⁹⁴

Further indication of a change of U.S. priorities in South Asia was to appear in the attitude to the respective sub-continental powers' approach to nuclear proliferation. In contrast to the fatalism prevailing under the Nixon/Ford administrations, the Carter White House had identified the spread of nuclear weapons technology as a priority issue. The Nuclear Non -proliferation Act, signed by President Carter on March 10, 1978 provided for withdrawal of U.S. nuclear fuel supplies to 'those countries...engaging in ...activities leading to...the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a non-weapon state.'¹⁹⁵ It was complemented by the 'Symington-Glen amendment', which imposed cut-offs of economic and military assistance to 'any country exporting or importing reprocessed or unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment materials...or technology.' The spread of the latter technology - an essential prerequisite for military as opposed to civil usage - was of particular concern to the administration. In August, 1978, U.S. pressure succeeded in cancelling an order for France to build a reprocessing plant at Kahuta in Pakistan.¹⁹⁶ However, continuing evidence of Pakistan's covert nuclear programme would remain an obstacle to U.S. relations with Islamabad. Whilst Pakistan was itself to introduce a provision for 'the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean' to reach agreement on '...the renunciation of nuclear weapons'¹⁹⁷ at the May, 1978 SSOD proceedings, U.S.

concern would result, in May, 1979, in the implementation of Symington-Glen on the new regime of General Zia al-Haq.¹⁹⁸ In contrast, the administration had welcomed the fact that, 'India's Prime Minister Desai has publicly renounced any further 'peaceful' nuclear explosions and has pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.'¹⁹⁹ This would permit continuing support for U.S. nuclear fuel exports to India's own unregulated facilities in Rajasthan.²⁰⁰

Thus far, in considering the mid-term of the Carter administration, it is perhaps worth restating the extent to which the inaugural, regionalist focus was - at least in the Middle East/Indian Ocean policy area - retaining a visible momentum. Carter had, *inter alia*, concerted the first (formal) bilateral negotiations between Egypt and Israel and had hopes to use the undoubted rapport with President Sadat²⁰¹ to extend the process to include Syria and Saudi Arabia. Again, whilst a clear differentiation of administration opinion - apparent in the abortive Geneva initiative - existed on the possibilities for a more comprehensive U.S.-Soviet approach to the region, Vance and Brzezinski remained, as the latter relates, 'genuinely close allies on the (local dynamic of) the Middle East.'²⁰² To be sure, the 'genuine' State/NSC accord on the Camp David process was precisely a function of the extent to which the latter negotiations excluded the Soviet Union. However, despite the increasing tendency in the NSC and indeed, for the President personally, to focus on the 'imposed' linkage between regional and arms control policy and 'actions by the Soviets',²⁰³ progress was continuing on the SALT talks which had reached a point where, as Brzezinski observes, 'the end was in sight'²⁰⁴ by the September, 1978 sessions in Washington. Hence, although the domestic perceptions of an administration 'irresolute' in its handling of foreign affairs²⁰⁵ were, by mid-1978 perhaps

even more acute than at the height of the Ogaden crisis, the SALT opening and developments in the Middle East/South Asia crescent represented a countervailing tendency such as to give encouragement for continuing overall with what one Congressional report had termed a 'regional partnership' approach as opposed to a reconstituted 'global containment'.²⁰⁶ The extent to which these hopes were to be realised will provide the final sections of this chapter.

VIII. Arms Control on Capitol Hill: the Conventional and Naval Arms Limitation Hearings of October, 1978.

If the momentum accompanying the SALT and SSOD negotiations had reaffirmed the possibilities for arms control as such, there were further, more local factors to support the ACDA position on an early resumption of the NALT agenda. The Soviet Union had, in June, 1978 withdrawn units of the naval task force sent to reinforce the campaign in the Ogaden.²⁰⁷ Contrary to fears expressed on the NSC, the 'Cuban military proxy' had not pressed home their advantages to drive into Somalia proper. The administration had, indeed, received separate assurances from Moscow, Havana and Ethiopia itself that the parties would support 'a cease-fire in conjunction with Somali withdrawal (from the Ogaden), peace negotiations and the territorial integrity of both states.'²⁰⁸ Further, in the context of much public attention on the various pending arms sales to U.S. allies in the Middle East, a successful Indian Ocean arms limitation agreement could regain an overall positive image of administration programmes for the region. To the evident frustration of Cyrus Vance, the 'setting of impossible objectives for U.S. policy' represented by the trenchant advocacy of National Security Advisor

Brzezinski, and the latter's public 'linkage' of Soviet support for Ethiopia with progress on SALT and other arms control areas was, 'creating a perception that we were defeated (in the Horn conflict) when, in fact we were achieving a successful outcome.'²⁰⁹

Against this background, the State Department and ACDA were to review the progress on NALT and conventional arms transfers before the House Armed Services Committee.

The Hearings, from Oct. 3-10, 1978, which were the only such to be devoted to Indian Ocean arms control, were held in tandem with the review of the administration's efforts to produce a regime of limitations on the transfer of conventional arms (CAT). Here, despite an initial reaction from the Soviet Union that appeared 'totally negative' in December, 1977, the subsequent (May, 1978) sessions had moved, in State's perception, to one of '...agreement with the United States that unrestrained arms transfers are a serious problem' and a proper forum for bilateral discussion. A further session had thus been scheduled for December, 1978.²¹⁰

Opening the October proceedings for the State Department, Director of Politico-Military Affairs Leslie Gelb was to present the House with a comprehensive account of the negotiations to date, together with an assessment of future development. In this, although 'Soviet naval operations' (in support of Ethiopia) had 'called into question' the basis for mutual understanding on the stabilization of force levels, the administration, 'remains committed to seeking a sensible and verifiable Indian Ocean agreement.'²¹¹ The advantages for U.S. policy for so continuing with the NALT process were two-fold. In the first instance, the absence of such an agreement could admit an area of initiative for further Soviet expansion, hence 'forcing us to match that increase in order to maintain

our position'²¹² in the region. This would, as before, require either an unwelcome redeployment of existing U.S. forces or increased defence outlay. Whilst the latter course had been strongly argued by some in Congress and the defence community, most of the Carter Cabinet still remained, in Brzezinski's phrase, 'bitten by the Vietnam bug'²¹³ and refused to countenance the construction of a 'Fifth Fleet' for the Indian Ocean. Obversely, the existence of 'an arms limitation agreement of the type we are seeking' would, in State's view, 'prevent any significant increase in Soviet naval force levels...such as that associated with recent events in the Horn of Africa' and, furthermore, 'prohibit the proliferation of military facilities under the control or primary use of the Soviet Union in littoral states.'²¹⁴

The latter considerations providing for an Indian Ocean arms control agreement were to be expanded upon by ISA Director (Policy Plans), General James Thomson, notably with regard to the channelling of great power competition into primarily 'economic and political means' rather than the military. 'In both these (former) areas' the ISA Director points out, 'the U.S. has a decided advantage over the Soviet Union.' A NALT regime would thus 'work to the long term political advantage of the U.S. in its relations with the littoral states.'²¹⁵ From a more restricted military standpoint, NALT would, 'inhibit the Soviet capability to interfere militarily in the affairs of the littoral states...[and]...from surging forces to...carry out major naval operations against a littoral state'. This could, 'provide concrete assurance to the littoral states that the military balance in the Indian Ocean would not swing in favour of the Soviet Union'. In terms of the current balance of forces, it is argued that, 'although the Soviets have numerically more ships in the Indian Ocean on a day to day basis', the Soviet forces in the region, 'are no match for

a U.S. carrier task force'. These, Washington had retained the right to maintain at the current level of three deployments per year. The recently (July 1, 1977) renegotiated agreement with Bahrain to maintain the three-vessel MIDEASTFOR would remain unaffected.²¹⁶ 'Moreover' the testimony affirms, '...the U.S. would be able to maintain its facility on Diego Garcia.' Overall, the case presented by ISA thus places some stress on current U.S. advantages in the region which a 'stabilization agreement' could only institutionalize, 'while ensuring that the Soviets could not improve their military position.'²¹⁷

The Soviet Union's own perceived motivation for conceding such a regime was, at least as admitted in open session, somewhat less clear cut. Aside from a generalized diplomatic interest in 'present[ing] themselves as great proponents of arms control'²¹⁸ the principal of these was stated as, 'to preclude any large-scale increase in the level or nature of U.S. forces.'²¹⁹ Here, given the Carter administration's expressed interest - and, indeed, apparent success - in improving diplomatic relations with the littoral states and the recent opposition to further military expansion attending the debate on Diego Garcia, a potential Soviet leeway for enhancing its own force structures would seem substantial. At this point, it is useful to review the above State/ISA argument in the light of earlier concerns for Moscow's 'expanding...military logistics infrastructure' and general Soviet 'sea denial' strategy voiced at the Diego Garcia Hearings. As has been noted, the Soviet naval presence had indeed risen, 'to its highest levels ever' - some 30 ships - by March, 1978.²²⁰ Although this had then returned to the 'average' 1975-7 level of 'about 18 ships', with, 'roughly half of these ships being combatants,'²²¹ an obvious scope for interdiction of oil trans-shipment to Japan and the '40 percent' of Persian Gulf

production for Europe had thus been demonstrated.²²² For Representatives familiar with the arguments from Admiral Zumwalt and latterly restated by the British navalist, Patrick Wall MP,²²³ the apparent European and Japanese insouciance that, 'the Russians...could bring Europe to its knees in six months'²²⁴ was thus worthy of comment.

The ISA's assessment however, was that the question of 'how best these supplies might be interdicted', would - from Moscow's own perspective - suggest a range of potentially more attractive targeting options, 'one of which is the source itself, one might be the Persian Gulf; one might be at sea near to the Soviet Union, or Japan or Europe.'²²⁵ Again, the Diego Garcia debate can be recalled. Here, 'Interdiction of Western...oil shipments from the Persian Gulf' was, for the CIA, not viewed as 'a major (Soviet) objective.'²²⁶ In the NALT Hearings 'executive session', further detail can be discerned. Thus, for interdiction 'at source', a likely vehicle could be the Soviet 'Echo' class cruise missile submarine, some of which had been identified in the Indian Ocean.²²⁷ However, on this point the closed session was told, 'if we are talking a world war situation with the Soviets...in a short war context...priorities for their submarine deployment may be placed elsewhere.'²²⁸ Indeed, in the context of the wider debate on U.S. naval posture, the DOD had been censured for 'conceding' such areas 'elsewhere' as the Soviet home waters and the Sea of Japan in order to maintain an overall 'sea control' capability.²²⁹ Moreover, in addressing the consequences of the (unlikely) adoption of the UN Zone of Peace resolution in its entirety, as, to be sure, some of the earlier Presidential comment seemed to suggest, the House was assured that 'it would not prohibit us from doing operations...[as]...for example...in the Indo-Pakistan war...we had such limited facilities at Diego Garcia at that time that we got very little support from them.'²³⁰ The sailing

time for a similar carrier task group was given as 'four and one half days' from Subic Bay, with an extra 48 hours if circumnavigating the 'choke point' at the Straits of Malacca.²³¹

The State/ACDA case for arms control in general was to also be advanced as the joint Hearings considered Soviet willingness to cooperate with the proceeding Conventional Arms Treaty agenda. Whilst the latter process had, necessarily, a wider brief, the fact of the vast majority of arms transfers going to the Middle East was to suggest a natural linkage between the two sets of negotiations. Here, given that the significant local actors were, 'predominantly allied to the U.S.'²³² an obvious ground for Soviet participation becomes apparent. The broad lines for such an agreement were, for the State Department, equally self-evident. The '\$140bn.' of arms delivered to the 'developing world' since 1970, PMA Director Leslie Gelb observed, '...is going to change world politics...in fundamental ways,'²³³ notably in that, 'this is the first time in the history of world politics that there will be dozens of countries...with military capability comparable to the major powers.' Of particular impact on the Indian Ocean naval balance were the four DD-993 'Spruance' class destroyers, ordered for Iran in the context of the Shah's \$12bn. naval expansion programme.²³⁴ As we have seen, the 'allied factor' had figured strongly in Soviet approaches to both NALT and the broader conventional arms sessions. The status of Middle East arms transfers were to thus provide the focus for the forthcoming CAT meeting, scheduled for December.

Yet, for the administration, the requirements of 'essential equivalence' in general and of inter-agency support from the Joint Chiefs in particular were to also entail a

certain ambiguity in addressing Soviet concerns. 'Harmonized national arms transfer guidelines', the JCS representative Rear Admiral James A. Lyons had observed to the House, 'must be built on a clear recognition of current political and military reality.'²³⁵ The latter considerations were, as it emerged, operative in the framework of both the DOD's own planning schedule and the more diverse needs of U.S. 'friends and allies'. Here, 'we will not allow restraint to freeze military imbalances amongst nations where those imbalances would threaten U.S. national interests.'²³⁶ Although not expressly placed on the record, the Joint Chief's approach was to also reflect the specific needs of the evolving 'rapid deployment' programme instituted with PD 18. This, it can be recalled, was of a particular relevance to the Middle East theatre. Rear Adml. Lyons was, though, clear that, 'We have to take into account...if we are considering the projection of our forces...the kinds of weapons systems various countries receive'.²³⁷ And testimony further records that, 'arms transfers can impact on (U.S.) force readiness by enhancing standardization and interoperability objectives for friendly and allied forces, serving as a *quid pro quo* for overseas base rights and authorizations [and] facilitating commonalty of doctrine and combined operations among and with allies.'²³⁸ Thus, whilst the executive session was hearing how 'the Soviets...have demanded that we...factor into our own thinking in terms of levels' the degree of allied capability and infrastructure, it was also apparent that the focus of Moscow's concern was not with the allies' capability for independent action.²³⁹ What was, however, of major significance to the Soviet approach were the possibilities for 'interoperability objectives' represented in the scale of U.S. matériel transfer and military construction. In this, it can be noted that of the \$12.7bn. Saudi FMS commitments (to 1977), \$8.1bn. was for infrastructure projects employing the U.S. Corps of Engineers.²⁴⁰ Similarly, the projected Chah Banhar

naval complex in Iran would extend to 'crew training...maintenance, base and logistics facilities.'²⁴¹ As the original schedule had included nuclear submarine pens,²⁴² a further factor in Soviet 'worst case' analyses of possible direct U.S. deployment options would be reinforced. Moreover, as the JCS was to stress, 'military construction is not included in the (1978) arms transfer ceiling.'²⁴³

The implications of contrasting levels of 'collateral' capability for U.S. and Soviet military posture were to be further explored as the Hearings considered the latter's engagement with regional powers in more detail. Again, the common geographical factors would admit a considerable overlap between the conventional arms agenda and the more restricted area of Indian Ocean arms control. Thus, for CAT - aside from the observation that 'competitive arms transfers' have caused 'a great deal of difficulty in their (Soviet) bilateral relations with the U.S.'²⁴⁴ - it was argued that, 'the Soviet Union has had a number of bad experiences...in trying to build relationships on arms transfers' with the examples given of Egypt (which repudiated a \$7bn. debt in 1976), Indonesia, Somalia and the Sudan. In terms of more directly constituted strategic alliances, the recent case of Somalia needed no elaboration. Moreover, the position of South Yemen in the Soviet military infrastructure was, the House was informed, subject to similar political ambiguities²⁴⁵ and 'pressure from (Saudi Arabia) next door'. Whilst for Massawa (Ethiopia), Adml. Lyons had suggested that access was confined to trans-shipment of supplies 'the way a commercial ship might stop' and precluded use 'for any kind of military operation.'²⁴⁶ Overall, in considering the status of the respective U.S. and Soviet alliances, General Thompson observes, 'I would submit that ours are more politically reliable and stable than theirs.'²⁴⁷

Hence, if the proposed NALT accord was to reflect both U.S. and Soviet 'past practice', the ISA was to argue that, 'we end up better off' than would otherwise be the case under unrestricted competition. Summing up, General Thompson could perhaps reflect with some justice that, 'I think there are more pluses for ourselves...(the Soviets)...have to cope with whatever they can get.'²⁴⁸

IX. Era Two turns to Confrontation: the House Report, the Yemen Crisis and the End of Naval Arms Control.

Although the case for both the NALT agreement and a more comprehensive accord on conventional arms transfers could still claim considerable merit at the beginning of 1979 - clearly on the terms so far described - such remaining hopes were, in the event, unfulfilled. Indeed, as even Warnke was to admit, whilst the agreements were 'useful' in themselves, they were also clearly subaltern to the wider progress of SALT and perceptions of the overall strategic balance.²⁴⁹ For the more specific regional balance, developments in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean littoral itself were again moving beyond the scope of the administration's policy agenda. And if dislocation in either policy area could, individually, threaten the realization of a regional accord, their combination was to prove conclusive. Thus, SALT 11, regarded as the touchstone of U.S.-Soviet relations had, as we have seen, been under attack since the end of the Nixon administration. Many in the defence community had opposed both the original formulation of Vladivostock and the modified version agreed in the Vance/Gromyko sessions of September, 1978. The issues, as before, drew much affective momentum from the standing debate concerning strategic 'superiority'. The revived CPD and

associated lobbies had dismissed the inter-agency antinomies of 'Era Two' and the apparent institutionalization of 'rough parity' contained in the administration's first DOD *Annual Report*. The Carter Presidency had, to be sure, proposed an annual 3% defence increase for the NATO alliance. For many critics however, only a 5% increase (in real terms) could retrieve the United States from what Paul Nitze would contend was, 'a position of inherent inferiority.'²⁵⁰

If the prospects of a Senate battle for SALT 11 ratification had engaged one moment of opposition to further arms control measures, the other would take effect from the unravelling of U.S. policies for the Middle East. This, again, would expose mounting Congressional antagonism. In the event, while the 'Camp David' process had, overall, restored much credibility to the administration's standing in foreign affairs, the degree of pressure required to induce Israel's compliance²⁵¹ - and the evident personal animus between Carter and Menachem Begin - had also fed into the domestic AIPAC /conservative coalition which had proved so effective against Nixon and Kissinger. The organizing abilities of AIPAC and its associates had been recently revived in the campaign against the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. To be sure, the component parties of the alliance between right wing Democrat 'neoconservatives' and more traditional conservatives on the Goldwater Republican right - Kissinger's 'unique convergence' - had, in other respects, differing agendas, not least on the position of Israel itself in U.S. strategy.²⁵² The administration's efforts to reconcile neoconservatives with the expanded strategic role envisaged for Israel's traditional opponents in the Middle East had, however, led to conceding the ground thus held in common with the wider conservative caucus, viz., the thesis of a rising regional threat from the Soviet Union.

The progress of an Indian Ocean accord was further compromised through a more endogenous dislocation in the administration's Middle East strategy. Saudi Arabia, whose support for the continuing peace process was seen as critical, had suffered a reverse in its attempts to gain influence in South Yemen.²⁵³ On June 26, 1978, a complex local power struggle, with inputs from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and the Soviet Union, had resulted in the overthrow of the incumbent President, Salim Robea Ali²⁵⁴ by the head of the (NLF) party apparatus, Fatah Ismail. Salim Robea had himself earlier attempted to move against the Ismail faction with the support of pro-Saudi forces in North Yemen and the country's President, Ahmet Gashmi.²⁵⁵

Hereafter, the new regime in Aden had ratified a 15 year co-operation agreement with the USSR, involving expanded air, logistics and intelligence facilities. The PDRY would, for its part, receive some 30 Mig-21 aircraft and missile patrol vessels.²⁵⁶ Symptomatic of the new regime's opposition to Saudi and U.S. policies in the region, Ismail renewed political support for the stalled PFLOAG campaign in Oman, reorganized as the NDFLOAG.²⁵⁷ To be sure, the military capability of the PFLO had been comprehensively defeated by joint British, Iranian and SAF (Oman) counter-insurgency programmes by 1976.²⁵⁸ The Soviet Union had become established as the PDRY's leading provider of military and economic aid during Salim Robea's (eight year) tenure.²⁵⁹ However, for those in Saudi Arabia and, increasingly, in the Carter NSC desirous of a clear South Yemen 'threat' to facilitate the F-15 and other arms transfer programmes, the exemplary possibilities of the Aden government's revolutionary stance would not be neglected.

Moreover, for the Omani dimension, a renewed period of political tension with South Yemen could provide a similar focus to the developing U.S. security planning for the Gulf region. Iranian troops had partially withdrawn from Dhofar in January, 1977,²⁶⁰ whilst remaining 'official' British forces had left in March. The former RAF base at Masira Island was, as will be shown, already under consideration for a logistics role in U.S. forward strategy. In the context of future Congressional funding proceedings, the impression offered by the reconstitution of the Soviet/PDRY alliance would have inevitably become diffused with a successful conclusion of the NALT agenda. The never overwhelming enthusiasm in the Pentagon for a naval arms accord had, by the end of 1978, turned to outright opposition,²⁶¹ thus reinforcing the negative stress on Moscow's activities so used in canvassing the administration's Saudi policy. In the scale of U.S. priorities, the above considerations had clearly outweighed what sentiment remained in the Carter administration for a naval limitation treaty in the Indian Ocean.

Finally, in a further regional setback for the administration, a coup had taken place in April, 1978 in Afghanistan. Whilst the latter territory had long been on the periphery of U.S. strategic concerns, the accession of the expressedly Marxist PDPA party marked a reversal for the Shah's regional ambitions, and would be so interpreted to Washington as further evidence of the Soviet 'grand design'. These events were compounded by a rising tide of civil unrest in Iran itself, leading to the instalment of a military government (under the Shah) on November 6, 1978. This will be dealt with more fully in the next section. Despite the profound effects that the later overthrow of the Shah would have on U.S. policy, the reaction from Washington at this time was, in fact, fairly muted. The 'instability' in Iran was to feature, *inter alia*, in the concluding

(1979) House Armed Services Committee *Report* on the October, 1978 Indian Ocean Hearings, but the grounds for the Panel's somewhat pessimistic findings lay elsewhere in the regional - and, critically - the strategic balance.

Thus, although the publication of the H.A.S.C. Report found members supportive overall of 'an agreement which would institutionalize a limit on forces in the (Indian) Ocean', the House Panel was to also consider the Soviet dispositions in the Horn as sufficient reason to 'slowdown' the negotiations and question the ACDA's view on the ameliorating effects of a possible naval arms control regime. 'The agreement as presently structured', would, on this reading, '...have only had a limited effect on the massive supply effort the Soviets carried out in Ethiopia.'²⁶² Of perhaps greater significance for the Panel were the strategic implications that could issue from limiting the possible deployment of SSBN's. Given the low priority so far accorded such 'occasional' Indian Ocean transits, this option had, as we have seen, been conceded *de facto* in the provisional agreement reached with Moscow by the ACDA. Here, however, the House Committee's own scale of priorities would reflect the terms of the current 'strategic superiority' debate on Capitol Hill rather than the actual 'past practice' of the U.S. Navy. 'Any agreement that would prohibit U.S. ballistic missile submarines from using the Indian Ocean' was thus, in the Panel's view, liable to '...give the Soviets a strategic gain that could not be matched by the United States by simply limiting Soviet conventional forces in the area to their 1977 level.'²⁶³ Explicitly, the Panel was concerned that such bargaining leverage offered by the region as theatre for SSBN deployment not be set aside until after the conclusion of the SALT 11 treaty.²⁶⁴ The Panel was well aware of claims that the SALT 1 arrangements had ratified supposed 'imbalances' in respective

U.S.-Soviet nuclear force levels, particularly in the sphere of Moscow's own SLBM capability.²⁶⁵ More generally, though, the Panel's perspectives were to also defer to the doctrinal elision of nuclear with conventional capability much evident in the defence community's discourse on the status of deterrent effect - particularly given the present strategic focus on the Gulf and South Asia. And, accordingly, an increasing reluctance in Congress to become exposed to the charge of conceding, even in symbolic terms, an exclusion area for U.S. power.

The administration was not, in legislative terms, bound by the findings of the H.I.R.C. Panel. To disregard them at this time, however, would have produced an unacceptable level of opposition from Congress and given further scope for such as Nitze and Zumwalt to attack the 'implausibility's' of SALT itself. Throughout, the Carter administration's attempt to construct a formalized arms control regime for the Indian Ocean was, necessarily, subject to developments removed from its expressedly limited terms of reference. Yet, of these, the internal factors attending the administration's own conduct of foreign policy had also become a significant variable. There had, to be sure, been close inter-agency agreement that regional affairs had been neglected by the previous administrations. There was an equal consensus that previous U.S. foreign policy had become overly driven by relations with the Soviet Union. Yet, operationally, a clear divergence of approach had become apparent from the outset. For the State Department, stress was laid on the need to remove regional issues from the matrix of East-West competition. The priority given to a 'rapid' conclusion of SALT would, though, also leave the improvement of other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations at the top of the agenda.²⁶⁶ For the NSC, however, the priority for Washington to, 'address itself to a

variety of third world problems'²⁶⁸ was precisely in order to 'challenge' the Soviet regional position. Whilst the previous 'excessive preoccupation' with U.S.-Soviet questions would be obviated by downgrading the need for good relations with Moscow itself. Thus, if Carter felt able to offer a choice of 'confrontation or co-operation' to the Soviet Union at the mid-point of the Presidency, the balance toward its end would incline to the former.

Conclusions.

In the foregoing chapter, the outline assumptions of the Carter administration's 'architectural' approach to the international system were set forth in relation to the perspectives of regional security policy and Indian Ocean arms control. The argument thereafter located the 1977 Naval Arms Limitation negotiations within the wider administration programme for confidence building in the third world, curbing conventional arms sales and the ambitious 'deep cuts' agenda for strategic arms initially proposed to the Soviet Union. The effective abandonment of regional arms control at the end of 1978 was similarly analysed within broader considerations of the current of U.S. power. The demonstration of Soviet projection capabilities in the Horn and Angola and increasingly negative perceptions of the central balance had fed into the mounting Washington debate on strategic 'superiority'.

Yet, as has been argued, whilst U.S. concerns for the several categories of military balance were real enough, the domestic strategic discourse - vivified by increased Congressional prerogatives in decision making after the *War Powers* and *International*

Security acts - had also assumed an independent momentum. Here, if Carter's Washington opponents had found fresh ammunition in the perceived 'Soviet threat' to the Northern Indian Ocean littoral for an attack on U.S. strategy begun during the Nixon era, the power of such assertions drew much from a wider, if inchoate, public sense of vulnerability - to pressure from allies, the third world and the Soviet Union alike. Under these conditions, the administration had itself come under pressure to demonstrate its commitment to the security aspects of U.S. engagement on the periphery. The Indian Ocean region had become increasingly prominent in the forefront of this debate. The confrontational approach to the Soviet Union offered to domestic critics would, by the same token, serve to diminish Soviet incentives to reach accommodation with the Carter Presidency.

Moreover, for the associated but more centrally strategic arena of the Middle East, the administration had, as the preceding chapter's analysis makes clear, attempted similar circumlocution. The advancement of regional security accord and the Arab-Israeli peace process by arms transfers was pursued in direct contrast to the parallel efforts toward arms limitation conducted with the Soviet Union. The argument that an overriding common interest in containing possible Soviet capability would justify increased inputs of U.S. arms to - otherwise contending - local allies again sat ill with regional arms control, the antinomies of 'Era Two' notwithstanding. In the concluding three sections of this analysis, the loss of the central 'pillar' of U.S. regional strategy - Iran - will be examined in terms of impact on the existing current of U.S. security policy outlined above. The study will then assess the comprehensive restructuring of U.S. global strategy outlined in the 'Carter Doctrine'.

CHAPTER FIVE: FOOTNOTES.

- 1) This 'Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Positions' as perceived at the beginning of the administration can be found within a Cyrus Vance memorandum of October, 1976, reproduced in; Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1983) pp.441-519 (p.441). For an account of Trilateralist economic perspectives, see, Marina von N. Whitman, 'Leadership Without Hegemony: Our Role in the World Economy', *Foreign Policy* 21, (Winter 1975). Like much of the ideological impetus behind the Carter campaign, the above stresses the need for new institutional arrangements to embrace the 'interdependence' created in the world economy. See also, 'Toward a Renovated International System', Trilateral Task Force Report #14 (Rep. in; *Trilateral Commission Task Force Reports 9-14* (NY: New York University Press, 1978). For Carters remarks on 'the inordinate fear of communism' see, James Earle Carter, speech at University of Notre Dame, May 22, 1977, *Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter* (hereafter, *Notre Dame*) 1977, pp.956-57.
- 2) See, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: the Memoirs of the National Security Advisor* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1983), p.177. From the outset, however, Brzezinski makes clear his doubts about this approach; see, *ibid*.
- 3) Carter campaign speech, 1976; cited in Leslie H. Gelb, 'Beyond the Carter Doctrine', *New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1980, p.26.
- 4) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.60.
- 5) Leslie H. Gelb, 'National Security and the New Foreign Policy', *Parameters*, Journal of the United States Army War College, November 8, 1977, p.10F. For a technical analysis of 'Multiple Advocacy' as an organizational tool; see, for example, Alexander George, 'The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy', *American Political Science Review*, September 1972, pp.769-81.
- 6) See, Dana Adams Schmidt, 'New, Less Gloomy Voice in the Pentagon', *Christian Science Monitor*, June 10, 1977, p.1.
- 7) The list also included former Pentagon aide, Leslie Gelb and the new Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, C. Fred Bergsten, who had resigned from the Nixon NSC in opposition to the latter's 'new mercantilism'. 'I understand', Kissinger is reported to have said to President - elect Carter, 'you people hire everybody that I fire.'
- 8) See, Robert L. Schuettinger, 'The New Foreign Policy Network', *Policy Review*, Summer 1977, p.100.
- 9) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Warnke Nomination*, Hearings: 95th. Cong. 1st. Sess. Feb. 8-9, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977). See also, 'Congressmen urge Warnke rejection', *Congressional Record*; Feb. 8, 1977, p.3938.
- 10) See, Daniel Southerland, 'Arms Control: "Dove" choice by Carter stirs "Hawks"', *Christian Science Monitor*, February 3, 1977.
- 11) Warnke received a narrower (58-40) majority for his other position as chief SALT negotiator. See, *Washington Post*, March 10, 1977.
- 12) See, Leslie H. Gelb, 'Arms Sales', *Foreign Policy* 25, (Winter 1976-7), pp.3-23.
- 13) Gelb, *op.cit.*, p.8.

- 14) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 15) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Vance Nomination*, Hearings: 95th.Cong. 1st.Sess. January 11, 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977) p.33.
- 16) *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act*. Public Law 94-329, 94th.Cong. H.R. 13680. Sec.202 (a) Section 1, FMS act (amd.).
- 17) *ibid.*, Sec. 407 (a).
- 18) See, U.S. Senate, 'Vance Nomination', *op.cit.*, pp.10-13; see also draft convention, 'The Law of the Sea' (UN/E.83V5: 1983), for an overview, see, David Ward, *The Law of the Sea- A Choice Between Anarchy and Order* (London: WDA, 1984). For Brzezinski's observations on Kissinger, see, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.53.
- 19) Press release, USIS, March 18, 1977.
- 20) Here, for the first time the WTO countries supported the 'Zone of Peace' motion, which thus carried 123 votes in favour with 13 (including the U.S., Canada and EEC) abstentions. For dets., see, UN Doc. A/AC.187/96; *Draft Programme of Action*, February 1, 1978.
- 21) It can be noted, however, that the Conference resisted a Vietnamese draft declaration referring only to 'imperialist' bases. This may have been influenced by the general U.S. effort to repair relations with the NAM at the end of the Ford administration, which extended, at Colombo, to the presence of an (unofficial) State Department observer. See, 'Political Declaration', *Review of International Affairs* (Australia), September 5, 1976.
- 22) *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No.11, 14 March 1977, p.334.
- 23) See, *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol.122, No.66, p. S 6626, (May 6, 1976) 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess.
- 24) U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report for FY 1977* by Donald Rumsfeld, (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-77*) pp.52-3. The Report also notes, 'If the Soviet Union was to mount a campaign against our wartime SLOC's...we judge that U.S. and allied forces would ultimately maintain sea control.'
- 25) *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No.11, 14 March 1977, p.334.
- 26) This was particularly felt by the Fraser government in Australia, given the domestic opposition to the U.S. communications facility at N.W. Cape. See, *Financial Review*(Australia), April 16, 1977.
- 27) Paul C. Warnke; interview on the record: Washington, June 5, 1990.
- 28) See, S. Vladimirov, 'Indian Ocean, Dangers and Hopes', *New Times*, July 29, 1977.
- 29) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, pp.50-2.
- 30) United Nations Association of the United States, *Controlling the Conventional Arms Race* (New York: UNA/USA, 1976).
- 31) See, U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Means of Measuring Naval Power - with Specific Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean: A Report to the House Committee on the Near East and South Asia*. 93rd.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1974).

- 32) See, *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol. 122, no.66, p.6626 (May 6, 1976) 94th.Cong. 1st.Sess.
- 33) See, Paul C. Warnke, 'Apes on a Treadmill', *Foreign Policy* 18, (Spring, 1975) pp.12-29. Here, in an extended correspondence on the 'strategic superiority' issue (see, *Foreign Policy* 15-17, passim), Warnke suggests a unilateral six month moratorium on Trident, B1 and MIRV development and proposes that, 'we can be first off the (arms race) treadmill', (p.29).
- 34) See, Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, p.54.
- 35) For further details on the negotiating structure, see, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation* (HASC No.95-100), 95th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter, *House I.O. Rep./79*), p.10. The Report notes that, 'representatives of the JCS and OSD express the position that their offices have been adequately represented' (*ibid.*). For discussion, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Sub-committee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy, *Panel on Indian Ocean Arms Limitation and Multilateral Cooperation on Restraining Conventional Arms Transfers: Hearings*, 95th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1978) (hereafter, *House Panel Hgs./78*), pp.38-42.
- 36) House Panel Hgs./78, *op.cit.*, p.10, testimony of Leslie Gelb.
- 37) See, Jack Fuller, 'Dateline Diego Garcia: Paved Over Paradise', *Foreign Policy* 28, (Summer, 1977), pp.175-86
- 38) Paul C. Warnke, 'Interview' 1990, *op.cit.*
- 39) *U.S.I.A. Information Guide* No. 77-26, July 26, 1977.
- 40) Warnke, 'Interview', *ibid.*
- 41) *ibid.* See also discussion on 'land-sea tradeoffs' in, *Report of the Indo-American Task Force on the Indian Ocean* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1985), pp.104-6.
- 42) See, for example, Geoffrey Jukes, 'The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy', *Adelphi Paper No.87* (London: IISS, 1972).
- 43) Warnke, 'Interview', *ibid.* The French naval presence - usually several destroyers and support vessels based at Reunion - was not, however considered a major factor, given the consistently independent (if not anti-American) line taken by Paris in the region.
- 44) Here, the Soviet delegation 'made it very clear' that the strategic linkage between the European and Asian regions of the USSR was non-negotiable. As Warnke relates, 'they said that for us it was not a trade route, for them it was,' *ibid.*
- 45) For discussion of possible models for such a regime, see, Richard Haas, 'Naval Arms Limitation in the Indian Ocean', in, Alford *et.al.*, *Seapower and Influence* (London: IISS, 1979) pp.150-7.
- 46) Warnke, 'Interview', *ibid.*

- 47) In Warnke's account, 'we were prepared to make representations as to the limited use of Diego Garcia...not for example to use it as a landing field for strategic bombers...we made it quite clear that we would agree not to extend the runways to be able to land a B-52 and eventually a B-1. So our contention was that it was not really a military facility that threatened the Soviet Union', (*ibid.*).
- 48) *ibid.*
- 49) *ibid.*
- 50) For a Soviet view, see, S.Vladimirov, 'An Urgent Problem', *Pravda/APN*, January 18, 1978, p.4.
- 51) Warnke, *ibid.* Warnke is also clear that the administration's approach to New Delhi was reciprocated. Here, 'they (Janata) wanted this very badly.'
- 52) U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report for FY 1979*, (Washington: GPO, 1978) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-79*), p.36. The Report stresses that, 'We must concentrate resources on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and seaborne anti-air warfare (AAW)' rather than the interdiction of sea lanes, 'that the Soviets would not use in wartime.'
- 53) *Press Release*, U.S.I.S., June 6, 1978. For the original (Ford admin.) schedule, see, *DOD Rep./FY-77*, Tab. 1VC-6.
- 54) Carter's campaign platform included a pledge to balance the U.S. budget by 1981. For discussion of the balance of strategic and budgetary factors underlying PRM 10, see, Hedrick Smith, 'Carter Study Takes More Hopeful View of Strategy of U.S.', *New York Times*, July 8, 1977 p.A1.
- 55) See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, pp. 51-7.
- 56) PRM 10 was divided into two sections, 'Comprehensive Net Assessment' - produced by Huntingdon - and 'Force Posture Review', conducted by Pentagon staff. The former section had taken up the more pessimistic assessment of the central balance advanced by 'Team "B" and Huntingdon's own 'Foreign Policy Task Force' sponsored by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. For Huntingdon's own account see, Samuel P. Huntingdon, 'Renewed Hostility', in Joseph Nye (ed.), *The Making of America's Soviet Policy* (New Haven: Yale/CFR, 1984), pp.278-81. See also, *New York Times*, August 26, 1977, p.1.
- 57) Hedrick Smith, *op.cit.* p.A4.
- 58) See, *DOD Rep./FY-79*, p.12.
- 59) *DOD Rep./FY-77*, p.247. Figures here are in current dollars for net outlay. The Total Obligational Authority (TOA) represented amounts to \$108.3bn. and \$112.7bn. respectively. Here, the 1979 *Report* observes that, 'The path being taken by the Carter administration starts from a lower base and climbs a less imposing slope than the route chosen by the Ford administration a year ago.'
- 60) Murray Marder, 'Carter to inherit dispute on Soviet intentions', *Washington Post*, January 2, 1977.
- 61) See, for example, *Where We Stand on SALT* (Washington: CPD, 1977).
- 62) Herrick Smith, *ibid.*, p.A4.
- 63) *DOD Rep./FY-79*, p.2.

- 64) *ibid.*, p.19.
- 65) *ibid.*, p.21.
- 66) *ibid.*, p.5
- 67) *ibid.*
- 68) *ibid.*, p.12.
- 69) *ibid.*, p.66.
- 70) *ibid.*
- 71) *ibid.*, p.56.
- 72) *ibid.*
- 73) *ibid.*, p.3.
- 74) *ibid.*, p.18.
- 75) *ibid.*, p.17.
- 76) *ibid.*, p.18.
- 77) The 'major contingency' would, as before be NATO, see, *ibid.*, pp.9-10, 90-1.
- 78) *ibid.*, p.92.
- 79) See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, pp.186-7; in this view, with a successful campaign in Ethiopia, 'the Soviet Union will be demonstrating that containment has now been fully breached.'
- 80) DOD Rep./FY-79, *op.cit.*, p.87.
- 81) *ibid.*, p.9.
- 82) *ibid.*, p.92.
- 83) In bureaucratic terms, planning for counter-insurgency - rather than a full scale assault by the Soviet union - was generally associated with lower promotional and budgetary priorities. For discussion of the Soviet and 'third party' dichotomies, see, Stansfield Turner, 'Toward a New Defense Strategy', *New York Times Magazine*, (May 10, 1981), pp.15-16.
- 84) DOD Rep./FY-79, *op.cit.* p.95.
- 85) *ibid.*
- 86) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Foreign Assistance, *Proposed Sale of Arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia: Hearings*, September 16, 21, 24, 1976, 94th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1977) (hereafter, *Sen. Arms Sales 1976*). Of the \$4.5bn. total for Iran (p.43), some \$3.8bn. would be absorbed by the F-16 programme, whilst the Saudi package would leave the total of such sales to date at \$7.51bn. (p.49).

- 87) Sen.Arms Sales 1976, *op.cit.*, p.24. Specific mention is made here of the 'standoff effect' on Iraq and the absence of clear policy guidelines pending the (uncompleted) April, 1976 inter-agency review (NSSM 238).
- 88) *ibid.* p.7, testimony of Sen. Hubert Humphrey. 'I understand', Humphrey (correctly) observes, 'that Iran is already short of capital' (p.4).
- 89) *ibid.*, p.85, testimony of Prof. Alan Dowty (Notre Dame U.).
- 90) *ibid.*, p.96, testimony of Prof. Lincoln B.Palmer (MIT).
- 91) *ibid.*, p.81, statement of Prof. James R.Kurth (Princeton).
- 92) *ibid.*, p.98, (Lincoln B.Palmer).
- 93) *ibid.*, p.108, testimony of Sen. Frank Church.
- 94) *ibid.*, p.36, testimony of Philip K.Habib (U/S Political Affs, State Dept.).
- 95) *ibid.*, p.2, testimony of Sen. Hubert Humphrey.
- 96) See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, pp. 52-5. Other specific arms control aims for the administration included 'to withdraw completely, in parallel with the Soviets from the arms sales business in Africa by 1979' (*ibid.*, p.55).
- 97) DOD Rep./FY-79, *op.cit.*, p.244.
- 98) *ibid.*, p.96. See also the Iranian 'Letter of Transmittal' for the order, (September 12, 1976) authorizing a provisional \$8bn. credit 'on an FMS dependable undertaking basis'; Sen.Arms Sales 1976, *op.cit.*, pp.129-30.
- 99) See, Gelb, 'Arms Sales', *op.cit.*, p.16.
- 100) See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, pp.90-122, Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, pp.190-9.
- 101) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Proposed Sales of Fighter Aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel: Hearings*, May 3,4,5,8, 1978, 95th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1978), (hereafter, *Sen.Arms Sales 1978*), p.20, testimony of Secretary Harold Brown.
- 102) *ibid.*, p.21.
- 103) *ibid.*
- 104) Warnke had, however, earlier opposed the Saudi Component of the arms package, but had conceded the position during the December, 1977 inter-agency review which considered support for the Sadat initiative as the top priority. See, Richard Burt, 'The Mid-East Plane Package: How the U.S. Decision Was Reached', *New York Times*, February 23, 1978.
- 105) *Sen.Arms Sales 1978*, p.23, testimony of Paul C.Warnke.
- 106) *ibid.*, p.20, statement of Harold Brown.
- 107) *ibid.*, p.27, testimony of Sen. Clifford P.Case.

- 108) These would include, *inter alia*, the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the National Association of Arab Americans, and the American Enterprise Institute. For full list of lobbyists, see, *ibid.*, p.iii.
- 109) *ibid.*, p.144, testimony of Amos Perlmutter (American U., Washington).
- 110) *ibid.*, p.208, testimony of Henry A. Kissinger. This view was consistent with the former Secretary's own bilateral approach to the Middle East.
- 111) For an assessment of Saudi security perspectives, see, The Sale of F-15's to Saudi Arabia: A Trip Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Hans Binnendijk and Bill Richardson--February 16, 1978, in *Sen.Arms Sales 1978*, 'Appendix', p.242.
- 112) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.51.
- 113) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of the Hon Andrew Young as U.S. Representative to the United Nations*, Hearings: 95th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1977), p.29.
- 114) *Washington Post*, July 6, 1976.
- 115) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on African Affairs, *Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa*: Hearings, August 4,5,6, 1976, 94th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1977) (hereafter, *Sen.Ethiopia Hearings*), p.66.
- 116) *ibid.*, p.30. Witnesses also pointed out that the U.S. Ambassador was withdrawn from Addis Ababa following the September, 1974 coup.
- 117) Although for some State Department officials, the base still, 'remains important...as part of our defense communications system', *ibid.*, p.113. Four U.S. technicians had been kidnapped from Kagnew in 1975 by the EPLF, see, *Dept. of State Bulletin*, April 7, 1975, p.440.
- 118) Thus, the U.S. supplied \$11.3m. grant military assistance and \$11m. in credits for FY 1974 and \$11.3m. in grant aid and \$25m. credits for FY 1975. See, *ibid.*, p.66.
- 119) See, *Washington Post*, July 6, 1976, *op.cit.*
- 120) This, Assistant Secretary (African Affairs) William E. Schauffele, was to describe as, 'an evolutionary situation...which potentially exists in a great many other countries'. See, *Sen.Ethiopia Hearings*, *op.cit.*, p.127.
- 121) *ibid.*, p.123.
- 122) *ibid.*, p.31, statement of John Hathaway Spencer.
- 123) *ibid.*, p.41, testimony of Prof. Donald Levine (Chicago U.).
- 124) Here, the State Department observes, 'we have recently been led to agree to military sales to Nairobi...because of the discrepancy between the size...of the armed forces of the two countries', and notes that, 'Kenya...is the only country on that part of the Indian Ocean which permits U.S. Naval visits', *ibid.*, p.116.

- 125 Somalia modified its position after Djibouti's independence in June, 1977. The state of Djibouti was to retain a small French Garrison and subsidies of some \$60m. per year. See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, *War in the Horn of Africa: Report of a Factfinding Mission to Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya*, December, 12-22, 1977, 95th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1978) (hereafter, *Hs.Horn Rep.*), p.42.
- 126) Sen.Ethiopia Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.44, testimony of John Hathaway Spencer.
- 127) *ibid.*, p.53.
- 128) *ibid.*, p.132, testimony of William E. Schaufele.
- 129) *ibid.*, p.38, testimony of Ambassador Edward Korry.
- 130) This had been made in person by Israeli COS, Gen. Bar-Lev; see, *ibid.*, p.30.
- 131) *Wall St. Journal*, July 27, 1977, p.1.
- 132) Of further note was the arrival, on July, 12, of the frigate USS 'Beary' in Mombassa and of a P-3 Orion aircraft at Nairobi airport. See, *New York Times*, July, 13,14, 1976.
- 133) Hs.Horn Rep., *op.cit.*, p.38.
- 134) *Sen.Ethiopia Hearings*, p.127.
- 135) This resulted in the execution, on February 3, 1977, of the Head of State, General Teferi Bante. See, *Africa Confidential*, May 13, 1977, p.3. For an overview, see also John Hathaway Spencer, *Ethiopia, the Horn and U.S. Policy-A Foreign Policy Report.*, (Cambridge, Mass: Inst. of Foreign Policy Analysis, 1977).
- 136) *Washington Post*, April 14, 1977.
- 137) *Le Monde*, May 10, 1977. See also, Harry Brind, 'Soviet Policy in the Horn of Africa', *International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No.1 (Winter, 1983-4), pp.75-97 (p.77).
- 138) Saudi Arabia had again offered \$200m. in military assistance to Barre in 1977 in return for removing the Soviet presence at Berbera. See, Arms Sales 1978, 'Appendix', *op.cit.* p.240.
- 139) *New York Times*, May 19, 1977, p.A4.
- 139) In Nimeiri's view, the 'African strategy' aimed at; 1) control of the Indian Ocean, 2) access to resources and 3), control of the shipment of oil. See, Hs.Horn Rep. *op.cit.*, p.30; see also remarks by Siad Barre on the Soviet 'plan for Africa', *ibid.*, p.22.
- 140) See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.* p.179.
- 141) Cited in *ibid.*, p.175. Brzezinski was, at this stage, in favour of the draft 'stabilization' agreement for the Indian Ocean, extending to a notional five years. He notes, however, that 'This position was contested by ACDA and State, with both of them favouring reductions from specific levels' (*ibid.*).
- 142) U.S.I.S. *Press Release*, October 3, 1977.
- 143) Warnke, 'Interview', *op.cit.*
- 144) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.178.

- 145) *ibid.*
- 146) *ibid.*
- 147) See, Brind, *op.cit.*, p.85
- 148) The unofficial contact between Washington and Mogadishu was allegedly performed by Barre's (U.S.) personal physician. See, *Newsweek*, September 26, 1977, pp.42-43. See also, R.A. Manning, 'Did U.S. Encourage Somalia to War?', *Guardian Weekly*, October 30, 1977.
- 149) *Washington Post*, April 26, 1977, p.A8.
- 150) See, Hs.Horn Rep., *op.cit.*, p.10. This, in the view of the House Mission, was 'a foolish move at best'. See also, Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, p.73.
- 151) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.* p.186.
- 152) Hs.Horn Rep., *ibid.*, p.14.
- 153) Here, the Mission notes, 'bloodshed permeates the present system...the Government's involvement and support is undisputed', *ibid.*, p.12.
- 154) *ibid.*, p.18.
- 155) *ibid.*, p.49; The table of 'Recommendations' also states, 'We should cease criticizing Ethiopia for simply accepting Soviet equipment.'
- 157) *ibid.*, p.46.
- 158) *ibid.*
- 159) Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.* p.88.
- 160) Warnke, 'Interview', *op.cit.*
- 161) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.94. For text of the Geneva communiqué, see, Vance 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.* p.463.
- 162) In Brzezinski's view, 'U.S.-Soviet relations are the product of long term historical forces, and we should not become too preoccupied by transitory aspects'; *ibid.*, p.173.
- 163) In some accounts, covert bilateral contacts had been in place since the previous year. See, for example, David Kimche, *The Last Option* (London: Weidenfeld, 1991), pp.73-87.
- 164) Warnke, 'Interview' *op.cit.*
- 165) See, S. Vladimirov, 'The Indian Ocean: An Urgent Problem', *op.cit.*
- 166) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.* p.175.
- 167) Hs.Horn Rep., *op.cit.*, p.20.
- 168) *ibid.*, p.40.

- 169) This would have matched the Egyptian level of one brigade. Although neither contingent was eventually mobilized, the House Mission notes that, 'A U.S. survey team has just completed a study of Sudan's military situation as a first step to providing some security assistance'; *ibid.*, p.44. It can also be noted that Saudi Arabia would, in 1978, provide \$800m. in economic assistance to Sudan and offer credit facilities for a proposed purchase of F-5E aircraft. See, Arms Sales 1978, 'Appendix', *op.cit.*, p.240.
- 170) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.174.
- 171) Arms Sales 1978, *op.cit.*, p.21.
- 172) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.182.
- 173) *ibid.*, p.185.
- 174) *New York Times*, March 3, 1978. See also, Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, p.88.
- 175) Address at Wake Forest University, cited in Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.189; for text, see, *Survival*, Vol.XX, No.4 (July-August, 1978), pp.176-9.
- 176) Jimmy Carter, Commencement Address to the U.S. Naval Academy, June 7, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 1978, p.1052.
- 177) Thomas L. Hughes, 'Carter and the Management of Contradictions', *Foreign Policy* 31 (Summer, 1978), pp.34-55 (p.36), see also, Stanley Hoffman, 'The Hell of Good Intentions', *Foreign Policy* 29 (Winter, 1977-8), pp.3-26, Simon Serfaty, 'Brzezinski: Play it Again, Zbig', *Foreign Policy* 32 (Fall, 1978), pp.3-20.
- 178) Hughes, *op.cit.* p.37.
- 179) U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Arms Control, Oceans and the International Environment, *U.S. Preparations for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament*; Hearings: April 13, 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978), p.17, testimony of Charles W. Maynes (Asst. Sec. BIOA, Dept. of State). Brzezinski was, however, more concerned to, 'use the forthcoming UN Special Session on Disarmament as a forum for exposing the Soviet military buildup'. See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.317.
- 180) Hughes, *op.cit.*, p.37.
- 181) *The Times of India*, April 11, 1977.
- 182) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.53.
- 183) This had been passed in July, 1974, following the Indian nuclear test of May, 18. See, M.V. Kamath, 'U.S. Reverses Stand on Aid to India', *The Times of India*, April 1, 1977
- 184) See, 'U.S. Resumes Aid to India', *The Times of India*, August 27, 1978.
- 185) See, Congressional Research Service; United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations. Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter, *CRS/Military Installations*), pp.103-4.
- 186) *New York Times*, March 20, 1977.
- 187) *Lok Sabha Debates*, June 16, 1977.
- 188) *The Statesman* (India), July 15, 1977.

- 189) *Lok Sabha Debates*, June 16, 1977.
- 190) CRS/Military Installations, *op.cit.*, p.92
- 191) See, 'Indo-U.S. Talks on Aid in January', *The Times of India*, January 1, 1978.
- 192) *New York Times*, June 15, 1978.
- 193) For an overview, see, Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy', *Orbis*, Vol.xviii, No.4 (Winter, 1975), pp.1043-69.
- 194) See, *The Times of India*, February 21, 1978.
- 195) U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Sub-committee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services, *Nuclear Proliferation: The Situation in Pakistan and India*; Hearings: 96th.Cong. 1st.Sess. May 1, 1979 (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter, *Nuclear Prolif. Hearings*), p.1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act passed into law on March 10, 1978.
- 196) In some accounts, \$30m. had been provided toward the plant from Libya. See, David Binder, 'How Pakistan Ran the Nuke Round the End', *New York Times*, April 29, 1979.
- 197) *Programme of Action on Disarmament*, Pakistani Working Paper, (UN)(A/AC. 187-92), January 24, 1978. For the Hearings, Asst. Secretary Thomas Pickering observes, 'We have supported for the last several years a resolution..introduced by Pakistan, to create a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia'. See, *Nuclear Prolif. Hearings*, *op.cit.* p.17.
- 198) *Nuclear Prolif. Hearings*, p.2. Had Pakistan's original programme proceeded, a time of '3 to 5 years' is given as a 'reasonable estimate' for weapons production. *ibid.*, p.26, testimony of Thomas Pickering.
- 199) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 200) This would allow the 30 year Indo/U.S. agreement, signed in 1963, to remain in force; *ibid.*, p.6.
- 201) See, Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: The Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), *passim*.
- 202) See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.* p.326.
- 203) Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, p.88.
- 204) Brzezinski, *ibid.*, p.204.
- 205) See, Norman Podhoretz, 'The Carter Stalemate', *New York Times*, July 9, 1978.
- 206) See, CRS/Military Installations ., *op.cit.*, p.2, 'Introduction and Overview'.
- 207) See, House Panel Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.28, Statement of Gen. James M. Thompson (Dir. policy Plans, OSD).
- 208) See, Vance, *ibid.*, p.87; see also, Brzezinski, *ibid.*, p.178, p.184, for parallel assurances to the National Security Advisor's office.
- 209) Vance, *ibid.*, p.88; Secretary Vance also records that 'I...urged that we keep open our lines to Colonel Mengistu...The President approved this suggestion'(p.75).

- 210) See, House I.O. Rep./79, *op.cit.*, p.8.
- 211) House Panel Hgs./78, *op.cit.*, p.7, statement of Leslie H. Gelb.
- 212) *ibid.*, p.3
- 213) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.183.
- 214) House Panel Hgs./78, *op.cit.*, p.6, statement of Leslie H. Gelb.
- 215) *ibid.*, p.29, statement of Gen. James M. Thompson.
- 216) Whilst the agreement had removed U.S. 'homeport' privileges, the MIDEASTFOR was authorized to remain in port for 120 days. See, *ibid.*, p.34, testimony of General Irwin Graham (Dep. PMA Director-JCS).
- 217) *ibid.*, p.29, statement of Gen. James M. Thompson.
- 218) *ibid.*, p.4, statement of Leslie H. Gelb.
- 219) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 220) See, House I.O. Rep./79, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 221) House Panel Hgs./78, *op.cit.* p.28, statement of Gen. James M. Thompson.
- 222) *ibid.*, p.44, testimony of Rep. Bob Wilson.
- 223) Here, Wilson refers to his own contribution to, Patrick Wall (ed.), *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World*, (London: 1978), remarking that, 'one of the grave concerns that I have...is the fact that we have isolated ourselves from South Africa' (p.36).
- 224) *ibid.*, p.44.
- 225) *ibid.*, p.44, testimony of Gen. Irwin Graham.
- 226) U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Sub-committee on Military Construction; *Military Construction Supplemental for FY 1975: Hearings* (Washington: GPO, 1974), testimony of W.E. Colby.
- 227) See, Indo-American Task Force, Report; *op.cit.*, p.107.
- 228) House Panel Hgs./78, *op.cit.*, p.57, testimony of Rear Adml. James A. Lyons (Asst. Dep. Dir.,PMA-JCS).
- 229) See, Harold Brown, Address before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations , June 6, 1978. For other discussion, see, Seyom Brown, 'An End to Grand Strategy', *Foreign Policy* 32, (Fall, 1978), pp.22-46.
- 230) House Panel Hgs./78, p.42, testimony of General Irwin Graham.
- 231) *ibid.*
- 232) *ibid.*, p.15, testimony of Leslie H. Gelb.
- 233) *ibid.*, p.15.

- 234) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on Foreign Assistance, Arms Sales to Iran; A Staff Report by Geoffrey Kemp and Robert Mantel (Washington: GPO, 1976) (hereafter, *Iran Arms Sales Rep./76*), pp.19-24.
- 235) House Panel Hgs./78, *op.cit.*, p.51, testimony of Rear Adml. James A. Lyons.
- 236) *ibid.*, p.48.
- 237) *ibid.*, p.49.
- 238) *ibid.*, p.52.
- 239) This view was shared by many of the panel. Discussing the French presence, Staff Director John F. Ford observed, 'they are like a missile. It is only effective as long as you dont have to use it...if the stability was shattered and warfare started, they would not stay to engage in it'(p.55).
- 240) See, Sen.Arms Sales 1978, 'Appendix' *op.cit.*, p.243.
- 241) Iran Arms Sales Rep./76, *op.cit.*, p.22.
- 242) The submarine pens were rejected in the process of the 1976 inter-agency review (NSSM 238). See also, Robert Graham, *Iran: the Illusion of Power* (London: Croom Helm, 1979) p.174, 189.
- 243) House Panel Hgs/78. *op.cit.* p.53, Rear Adml. James A. Lyons; Written Answers for the Record.
- 244) *ibid.* p.15, testimony of Leslie H. Gelb.
- 245) *ibid.* (executive session) p.56, testimony of Rear Adml. James A. Lyons.
- 246) *ibid.*
- 247) *ibid.* (executive session) p.55, testimony of Gen. James M. Thompson.
- 248) *ibid.*
- 249) Warnke remains convinced, however, that both NALT and CTB treaties were achievable within the given time-frame. 'Interview', 1991, *op.cit.*
- 250) Nitze supported this claim by revealing classified details of the administration's SALT position. See, 'Divulging of Secrets in Arms Negotiations Stirs Dispute in U.S.', *New York Times*, November 3, 1977, p.3.
- 251) See, for example, observations of Senator Case (D-NJ) at the F-15 Hearings, that 'If the Israelis are to be pressured constantly to announce ahead of time in order to appease Arab states that in negotiations they would have to accept a renunciation of all these things [in the Camp David accord], I think we are going much too far' (Sen.Arms Sales 1978, *op.cit.*, pp.74-5).

- 252) Again, Case deplores, 'this wholly false dichotomy that is constantly being roused between the interests of the United States and the Interests of Israel and the Jewish lobby', *ibid.*, pp.26-7; the latter was further exposed in the campaign of (Republican) Presidential candidate John Connally, see, for example, Lee Lescaze, 'Proposal on Mideast costs Connally Two Jewish Campaign Members', *Washington Post*, October 19, 1979. For a conservative view, Kevin P. Philips observes that, 'neoconservatism's strong preoccupation with Israel does suggest a genesis and a partial raison-d'etre not deeply shared by the country as a whole'; Kevin Philips, 'The Hype that Roared', *Politics Today*, May-June, 1979, p.55.
- 253) The Saudi aim was to prevent the ongoing unification negotiations between the Yemen republics. See, Fred Halliday, *Threat from the East?* (London: Pelican, 1982), pp.94-7, Anthony Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability*, (Colorado: Westview, 1984) pp.443-9; see also, *Financial Times*, June 29, 1978.
- 254) Robea Ali had instigated the coup with the aid of Colonel Ahmid Gashmi, whose own assassination on June, 24 had mobilized the alliance of Fatah Ismail and Defence Minister Ali Antar with Soviet logistical and intelligence support.
- 255) North Yemen had also, by 1978, received \$800m. in Saudi economic aid. See, Arms Sales 1978, 'Appendix' *op.cit.* p.240.
- 256) See, John Keegan, *World Armies* (New York: Facts on File, 1979) pp.812-13.
- 257) See, *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, January 10, 1983, p.4.
- 258) Keegan, *op.cit.*, pp.525-6; on December 11, 1975, Sultan Qabus (of Oman) formally announced the end of hostilities.
- 259) See, Richard F. Nyrop, *Area Handbook for the Yemens* (Washington: Dept. of the Army, 1977), pp.97-9.
- 260) Iran did, however retain some 1000 troops in Oman and access to air facilities. See, Cordesman *op.cit.*, p.436.
- 261) For a representative Pentagon view, see (Adml.) Thomas H. Moorer and Alvin J. Cottrell, 'The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance', *Strategic Review*, Vol.VIII, No.2 (Spring, 1980), pp.30-8; Moorer observes, 'That noble effort (the NALT) was abandoned...only after the massive Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa underscored its absurdity'(p.31).
- 262) House I.O. Rep./79, *op.cit.* p.11.
- 263) *ibid.*
- 264) *ibid.*
- 265) For Kissinger's refutation of the charge that SALT 1 allowed a 'secret' Soviet advantage of 124 missiles on (obsolete) 'G' and 'H' class SSBN's, see, Henry Kissinger, *The Years of Upheaval*, (London: Weidenfeld, 1982), pp.1143-7.
- 266) In a memorandum to Carter of October, 1976 Vance proposes an 'early' approach to granting the USSR 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) status and moving to SALT 111 by 'fall, 1977'. Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, p.446.
- 267) Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.149.

CHAPTER SIX. THE CARTER DOCTRINE (I): THE KEYSTONE IN THE ARCH.

In the previous chapter, the course of (1977-8) Indian Ocean arms control diplomacy was analysed within the context of the broader Carter administration foreign policy programme.¹ The pursuit of great power accord on levels of mutual military activity in the Indian Ocean region was presented as complementary to measures for limiting conventional arms sales, confidence-building initiatives toward littoral states and the expressed policy objective to disaggregate regional dynamics from the more narrowly strategic aspects of U.S.-Soviet competition. As has been shown, the administration could record some success in these areas. India had responded favourably to U.S. initiatives, and energetic U.S. diplomacy at the UN and bilaterally had done much to mitigate the 'artificial' anti-American posture which had indeed become conventional for the wider caucus of nonaligned and third world countries. If the above moves had signalled a departure from some particulars of existing U.S. policy, there was also much in the overall policy context to provide continuity. The 'twin pillars' of Iran and Saudi Arabia remained at the foundation of the U.S. regional alliance system. From both, significant and complementary contributions were anticipated by Washington toward the administration's efforts to broker Arab-Israeli disengagement in the Middle East. Here, the prospect of a rising coalition of conservative states was apparent, with consequent beneficial results for the Western alliance in terms of oil price stability and the diminished influence of the Soviet Union.

As has also been argued, however, the cast of such U.S. foreign policies had been in question from the outset of the Carter administration. An alternative, strategic, emphasis

had been advanced from both domestic opponents and actors within government itself. By late 1978, the Gulf/Indian Ocean region had become the touchstone for this wider debate.² The suspension of Indian Ocean arms control was indicative of the shifting consensus in Washington on the need to address more traditional U.S. concerns for strategic leverage and containment in the region. And within a further year of the Carter Presidency - to be considered below - the status of the Gulf, South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean area had become paramount in United States' global strategy, with the proclamation of the 'Carter Doctrine'.

If, though, the seeming emergence of a functional Soviet strategic alliance of third world states (Ethiopia, Cuba, South Yemen) in the Indian Ocean region had stimulated earlier U.S. concerns, it was the event of an entirely endogenous rupture within the U.S. alliance - by revolution in Iran - which would, as will be shown, finally reverse both the regional and strategic components of a decade of U.S. policy. To be sure, the more far-reaching rupture with the Soviet Union, and the Carter Doctrine itself, were to follow directly from the December, 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. However, if the Central Asian extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine had provided the sufficient impetus to engage a new period of great power hostility - and the first formal restructuring of U.S. military posture since 1970 - the necessary conditions, for the wider mobilization of strategy, lay in the earlier transformation of Iran from 'unconditional ally' to virulent opponent of the United States.

The argument to be pursued in this chapter will focus on the unique position which Iran had attained in securing U.S. policy for the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, the

Soviet 'Northern tier' and the wider international system. The analysis will then address the material aspects of the 'loss' of Iran in engaging the redefinition of the Indian Ocean region within U.S. global strategy. The three final sections of this study will thus examine, respectively: the pattern and dynamics of policy organization toward the revolution in Iran; the strategic restructuring following from Afghanistan; the end of détente and the Carter Doctrine; and the some operational expressions of the revised strategic assumptions within the context of renewed great power confrontation and the Iran-Iraq war - the 'countervailing strategy'. As in previous sections, the format will counterpose thematic and historical perspectives within the natural chronology of events. A concluding section will then consider the respective constituents of policy formation within an overall analysis of the historical current of U.S. power.

I: The Keystone in the Arch.

To establish the context for assessing U.S. reactions to the revolution in Iran, it is useful to return to the beginning of the administration in 1977. If a certain expectation of reformism had been engendered by some in the Carter campaign team,³ the institutional cast of policy in both State and Defense would, in practice, exhibit a clear continuity with the final year of the Ford administration. In this respect, the following summation of two decades of U.S. South Asian policy,⁴ prepared for Secretary Kissinger's regional consultations of July, 1976, is worth citing at length. Overall, the confidential DOS briefing perceives 'no immediate crisis pressing for attention'⁵ and notes that, 'you will be going to South Asia at a time when the interrelations of the

regional countries are in a more fluid and promising state than they have been for well over a decade.⁶ Proximate cause for this state of affairs is attributed to Iran. Here, the Shah's 'singular' involvement in the 'self-conscious' South Asian 'sub-system' has been 'striking'. The Shah has 'effectively prodded India and Pakistan and India to resume movement in the stalled Simla (disengagement) process; he has gotten Pakistan and Afghanistan to explore ways of defusing their dangerous quarrel (over the border status of Pushtunistan); and has paralleled our efforts to reduce the dangers of conflict between India and Bangladesh'. In tandem with the above, the paper further notes the 'interesting...lack of dynamism in the Soviet position'. Observing that, 'in Southern Asia, as elsewhere in the LDC's, the Soviets have very little attractive to offer' and that, 'the basis of their position...in the arms supply field...is a dwindling asset', the analysis concludes, 'Thus far, at least, Moscow does not appear to have any grand strategy in mind to reassert itself.'⁷

The apparently 'promising' momentum attending the Shah's regional diplomacy observed by the Kissinger State Department was echoed in reports from the U.S. Embassy in Iran itself. An intra-departmental (NEA/IRN) study prepared for the Carter transition notes that, 'In the broadest geopolitical sense, there has developed since 1971 a community of interest between China, Iran and the United States, with Pakistan a link in the chain' and, '...it is also clear that Iran is the keystone in this arch of "containment."⁸ However, whilst the U.S. derived a clear strategic benefit from such a 'geopolitical community', Iran's 'new confidence and assertiveness' was also viewed as a potential source of conflict with both other regional allies and Washington itself, 'most obviously [on] the oil price issue.'⁹ Further, the admitted arms race in the Gulf,

'sparked as much by Iranian acquisitions as by any other factor', had also created a possible field for 'Iranian adventurism', particularly given the 'political fragility of some Arab peninsula states'. Thus, as seen by State's regional and intelligence analysts, the principal 'task for U.S. policy toward Iran' is, 'to restrain Iranian proclivities toward intervention'.¹⁰ Throughout, the established institutional bias toward treating the (global) strategic balance as 'constant' would be retained from the Nixon Doctrine; the 'variable', and main secular focus of policy was on the balance at regional level. 'Trends in the region are going in our direction', the analysis observes, '...we should not endanger this situation by giving Iran a blank check.'¹¹

Thus, given that the (non-nuclear) 'blank check' approach to Tehran - particularly in the arms sales field - had become a focus for much opposition amongst Democrats, it was this aspect of policy that would most come under scrutiny with the incoming Carter administration. It had been similar concerns, in this case from the Department of Defense, which had prompted the (October, 1975) commissioning of a comprehensive review of Gulf security policy, 'NSSM 238',¹² from the Scowcroft/Kissinger NSC. Although essentially complete by May, 1976, this had remained in abeyance at the end of the Ford administration. Accordingly, State's new Director of Policy Planning, Leslie Gelb, requested a summarized account of the findings in January, 1977 to be delivered to Secretary Vance. After consideration by the (interim) Senior Review Group in early January, the resulting 'Executive Summary', commended to Zbigniew Brzezinski by his predecessor, Brent Scowcroft,¹³ was circulated by State (NEA/IRN/PMA) on January, 25 and presented assessments of security assistance relationships, lower Gulf arms sales, military presence and access to facilities.¹⁴ Outstanding amongst the several 'time

sensitive' issues to be considered by the Carter SCC were the 250 'F-18L' fighters and nine 'E-3A' AWACS aircraft on order for Iran. Here, a clear confirmation of the grounds for bureaucratic delay of NSSM 238 becomes apparent; a 'fresh look' at Iran's arms procurement programmes had been strongly recommended by the DOD.¹⁵ Such an approach would be followed by the new administration, in accordance with the revised arms transfer guidelines announced in PRM 12/PD-13 (see above, chap.5).

Carter's decision to reduce the AWACS programme to seven and cancel the F-18's altogether was not well received by the Shah. The continuing U.S. media attention to human rights violations and the Iranian role in OPEC¹⁶ were equally badly taken in Tehran. Thus, despite assurances by Secretary Vance of 'the administration's strong desire to continue very close ties' and '...that our solid relationship can be a buffer for future differences on specific issues'; and, indeed of recognition of the 'encouraging steps'¹⁷ taken in the field of human rights, delivered during the first cabinet level visit to Iran on May 13, 1977, the Shah had on August, 1 informed U.S. Ambassador William Sullivan that a 'turning point' had been reached and that he would have to reconsider 'the whole question' of U.S.-Iran relations.¹⁸

However, despite some perceptions to the contrary - notably amongst the Shah's domestic opponents¹⁹ - neither the arms sales programme nor the wider strategic 'community' with Iran would be endangered by the declared 'world order politics'²⁰ of Carter's new administration. Whilst in other spheres, Zbigniew Brzezinski in particular had cautioned against applying a 'one-sidedly anti-rightist'²¹ approach to human rights policy. On the AWACS debate, a July, 27 memorandum drafted for Secretary Vance -

in preparation for Congressional (H.I.R.C.) Hearings the following day²² - so presents the case that 'improvements of air defense capability of this nature are inherently stabilizing' and that 'we must put Iran's defense expenditure in context' and further argue that, 'to defer for some months a U.S. decision on the sale of AWACS would raise doubts about our intentions...with regard to our long-standing military relationship, and more importantly our close and broadly-based strategic and economic ties.'²³ The latter were, by the beginning of 1977, projected to a favourable U.S. balance-of-payments surplus for non-military sales of some \$8-10bn. for the period of 1975-80.²⁴ When defence sector inputs were included, this would increase by a further \$10bn. In addition, U.S. direct investment in Iran had reached \$500m., largely in the form of joint ventures²⁵ and was underpinned by the presence of an estimated 1084 U.S. military personnel, 5,489 civilian contractors which, with dependants had reached an overall total of 16,201 U.S. citizens in long term residence.²⁶

Of parallel significance in assuaging Congressional questioning of the administration's Iran policy was the Shah's longstanding strategic relationship with Israel. On the economic side, the existing 70% provision of Israel's oil supply was bolstered by the signing of a new 17m.tonne agreement (at 120 days credit) in July, 1977.²⁷ Whilst joint military co-operation would extend, *inter alia*, to development projects such as a new 155mm. artillery system and an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), codenamed 'Flower', based on French and U.S. technology.²⁸ (Albeit, discussions here acknowledge, 'America's sensitivity to the introduction of the kind of missile envisaged.')²⁹ There was also a less tangible linkage between the two U.S. strategic partners. As Iranian Defence Minister General Toufanian observed to his Israeli

counterpart, Ezer Weizman, 'I think we are the only two countries in the region that can depend on each other.'³⁰

Thus, given the singular concentration in the Carter White house on securing a Middle East peace settlement, the Shah was assured of a successful state visit to Washington in November, 1977. 'His worries and insecurity about this administration's attitude towards Iran', State's analysts were to minute the President, '...were substantially allayed.'³¹ Indeed, given the Soviet advances in the Horn following on the Ogaden war, the Shah's consistent aptitude, as remarked in one DOS briefing paper, 'to see Soviet actions...whether in South Asia, Africa or elsewhere as part of a "grand design" '³² was receiving an increasingly sympathetic reception in the Brzezinski NSC. Perhaps the apogee of the administration's engagement with the Pahlavi regime was reached as Tehran was selected as the centrepiece of President Carter's seven nation tour of South Asia in 1977-8. 'Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah', Carter had declared, 'is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world'. Noting the presence of, 'thirty-thousand American's here' that, 'work in close harmony with the people of Iran to secure a better future' and that, 'the cause of human rights is one that is also shared deeply by our people and by the leaders of our two nations', the President concluded that, 'We have no other nation on earth that is closer to us in planning for our mutual military security...[and]...there is no leader with whom I have a deeper sense of personal gratitude and personal friendship.'³³ Such hyperbole, perhaps not out of place in the public press of Iran itself, would, though overlay a more substantive discourse of shared expectations between the White House and the Niavaran Palace. However, whilst clearly not unprecedented in official U.S. discourse with the Shah, the President's public

encomia would, as in the past, again serve to marginalize any dissenting analysis of U.S. Iran policy in the governing administration.

Thus, against a background of redrawn U.S.-Iranian strategic amity, a series of inter-agency studies were initiated to consider the further integration of Iranian defence procurement into the administration's developing 'regional security framework'. Commenting on Tehran's military posture, a February, 1978 position paper (DOS/DOD)³⁴ observes that, 'in the longer run, Iran wishes to be in a position to respond to military contingencies in the East, while maintaining a sufficient deterrent force against Iraq.'³⁵ Although tensions between the two countries had been reduced since the (March, 1975) 'Algiers Accord', 'Iraq', in terms of threat assessment, 'remains Iran's most likely military opponent'. And if, 'a sustained conflict is unlikely during the next decade', a clear factor for stability was perceived in the regional balance. 'Neither state', for the DOD's analysts, 'is likely to be able...to bring a war to a decisive conclusion.'³⁶ A further stability was perceived on Iran's 'Northern front'. Here, 'A military conflict between Iran and the Soviet Union is unlikely...Iran buys Soviet military equipment and the present and projected Iranian military deployments are not concentrated along the Soviet border.'³⁷ In terms of the suitability of Iran's procurement programme to the (inter-agency) threat assessment schedule, the study notes that, 'Iran is compelled to adopt a strategy of counter-value (v/v Iraq) deterrence...to follow this strategy, Iran will require an airforce capable of inflicting severe damage on the (widely dispersed) Iraqi facilities.'³⁸ In this, the proposed AWACS programme would allow Iran to attain an 'earlier' air advantage against Iraq and, perhaps more significantly, 'permit Iran to maintain a credible air posture along its Soviet border during a conflict with Iraq.'³⁹ The

latter considerations were, it can be recalled, of much importance in any event to the DOD's overall strategic calculus of (U.S./Soviet) 'essential equivalence'.

Moreover, in addition to the maintenance of an adequate 'countervalue' posture against Iraq - and a 'credible' counter to the admittedly unlikely Soviet contingency - the Iranian defence establishment could also provide for perhaps more immediately gauged dislocations to the U.S. regional security system. These, the inter-agency report outlines as, 'sharp changes in the political orientation of (Iran's) neighbours'; and more specifically, 'a radical takeover in the Gulf or the fragmentation of Afghanistan and Pakistan.'⁴⁰ Thus, 'if given sufficient time to prepare' Iran at present, 'possesses the forces which would permit the landing of one infantry brigade by sea and one by air on the Arabian peninsula in an initial assault ...supported by Iranian naval units and 150 fighter aircraft'. 'A force of this size', the report observes, 'would exceed that of any of the smaller Gulf states'. And, given current trends, 'by 1985 Iran's capacity to project forces into the peninsula will have improved considerably'. Materially, 'the number of fighter aircraft could be raised to 250 or more, while leaving at least 300 to face Iraq and the Soviet Union'. Further to the East, 'Iran could move one infantry brigade by air and two by road to either (Afghanistan or Pakistan) border', whilst 'about 75' fighter aircraft could also be deployed to the area; which, 'would be quite valuable to Pakistan in a war with India'. By the 1980's, 'Iran should be able to move a reinforced armoured division and 150-200 fighter aircraft to Pakistan or Afghanistan with little notice.'⁴¹

For the critical area of sea control around the oil 'lines of communication' (LOC's), the follow-up 'Security Assistance Report' (ARMISH-MAAG) notes that the procurement

of, 'two ASW support ships, four DG-993 ('Spruance') destroyers, four Vosper destroyer-escorts, up to a dozen each fast frigates and guided missile boats and six-to-nine diesel attack submarines will provide Iran with anti-air, anti-surface and an ASW capability for protection of the sea LOC's in the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the Northern reaches of the Indian Ocean.'⁴² However, whilst ARMISH-MAAG was to maintain that, 'In general terms, the Mission agrees with Iran's perception of the threat'⁴³ and could thus justify the 25% (\$9bn.) of Iranian GNP earmarked for military expenditure⁴⁴ there is also, in the several studies, a growing perception that, 'the country has experienced major structural problems in beginning the transition from a largely traditional society to a balanced and self-sustaining industrial state.'⁴⁵ This, by early 1978 had led to inflation at 50%, continuous power blackouts, massive bottlenecks in the transportation/distribution of goods and widespread failure of the country's infrastructure.⁴⁶ At this stage of analysis, the balance of institutional opinion for State/DOD would, to be sure, hold the mounting economic crisis in Iran to be not 'unmanageable'. There is, though, perhaps some foreboding in the several agency's conclusions that, 'the GOI will face increasingly hard choices in allocating available funds between military and civilian sector...the opportunity cost of continuing to spend one quarter of the public budget on military facilities could be large.'⁴⁷

II. The Opportunity Cost: U.S. Crisis Management and 'Making the Best of the Change in Iran'.

The full extent of the 'opportunity cost' that had accompanied two decades of wholesale military and economic expansion in Iran was becoming increasingly apparent throughout 1978. Equally clear were the negative implications of the comprehensive involvement in

these processes, in terms of planning, investment and methodology, of the United States. And if the administration's 'Policy Review Committee', discussing the question on July, 5, would decide that, 'continued arms transfers to Iran are in the national interest of the United States,'⁴⁸ it had also accepted a probable cancellation of the 70 F-14's and 140 F-16 aircraft (additional to the 140 F-16's on order from September, 1976) agreed in November 1977, and concluded that, for the moment, 'a period of consolidation' was a more appropriate course for Iran's military establishment, 'rather than the acquisition of more hardware.'⁴⁹ By the autumn, the Shah's proclamation of a military government on November, 6 had prompted much public affirmation of U.S.-Iranian ties from the President and senior officials,⁵⁰ particularly in view of the developing Camp David process.⁵¹ Secretary Vance, for example, had declared that, 'I think one can continue on the course which the Shah has charted for himself and his nation.'⁵²

For the institutional strata of government, the consensus was perhaps more agnostic on the survival of the Shah personally, but positive that 'no sharp reorientation of Iranian policy *vis a vis* the superpowers is likely in the period through the mid 1980's.'⁵³ State Department interest in the emergence of alternative regimes is marked by requests for CIA profiles of significant political actors, including Mehdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi⁵⁴ and notably, the Shah and the Imperial family.⁵⁵ Considering the 'Possibilities for Responsible Government' in the Agency's (classified) internal review, analysts observe that, 'the Shah has had increasing depression as he contemplates the ruins of his carefully constructed, if ineptly handled programs which he once hoped would produce by the end of the 1980's a country which would compare favourably with Western Europe.'⁵⁶ Moreover, though it was not until mid-November that the Tehran Embassy and the bulk

of institutional opinion began 'thinking the unthinkable',⁵⁷ the increasing level of previous U.S. contacts with the Iranian opposition had also prompted speculation by 'several highly placed (court) officials' that, 'the U.S. is somehow involved in the (anti-Shah) demonstrations.'⁵⁸ Whilst Carter personally was clearly supportive of the Shah until the end,⁵⁹ such 'thinly veiled accusations' served to further complicate the arrival of consensus on Iran policy from an administration which, as frequently demonstrated, was never at its strongest in unanimity.

Despite the preceding lack of policy direction, however, an emergency meeting of the (NSC) Special Co-ordinating Committee on December, 28 was to present the Tehran Embassy (for the Shah) with the stark options of a 'moderate' civilian government - 'the preferred alternative' - a 'firm military government' or resignation in favour of a regency council. In the SCC's view, it would be, in any event, 'impossible to restore his (the Shah's) absolute power' and, above all, 'it is essential, repeat essential to terminate the continuing uncertainty.'⁶⁰ Following the U.S. démarche, the final departure of the Shah, on January 16, 1979, had indeed prompted an uncertain reaction from Washington's other regional allies. Despite past differences, the Saudi government feared that Iran would 'collapse' and that 'there is no real alternative to the Shah,'⁶¹ whilst for Israel, the Tel Aviv Embassy records that 'Israelis have watched with fascination Iran's progression to the lower depths'. Overall, the Israeli 'foreboding' about the turn of events would seem well substantiated. Such fears focused on both strategic and bilateral issues. 'Few doubt that the next government in Tehran will cut the Israeli-Iranian line' the Embassy observes, 'Israelis fear that...the U.S. will become even more dependent on Saudi Arabia', and 'some point to Iran as an illustration that Israel cannot, in the last

analysis, depend on Washington.'⁶²

However, if Washington had been accused from many quarters of not moving more 'energetically' to save the Shah, U.S. involvement in Iranian politics was bounded more by circumstance than lack of volition. An inter-agency 'National Intelligence Estimate' (NIE) of September, 1978 concludes that, 'no well organized political parties have developed that might provide obviously qualified or popular leadership as an alternative to the Shah and the military.'⁶³ Given the collapse of the monarchy, the clear focus for U.S. efforts would thus rest on the armed forces. Yet, for many administration analysts in Tehran and Washington, it was also apparent that the military lacked both the popular support and level of technical competence necessary to administer a complex industrial economy.⁶⁴ In the light of such constraints, a confidential DOS cable of December, 19 outlines some possible conditions for 'designing a U.S. strategy'.⁶⁵ Here, the emphasis is on an enabling rather than executive role for the Iranian military, 'wherein we could influence military opinion to follow (or at least not block) U.S. policy initiatives.'⁶⁶ In contrast to the 'passivity' perceived by the administration's domestic critics, the conduct of U.S. policy in the field was, in fact, highly pro-active. Accordingly, the U.S. would be, 'seeking to identify those officers...who can command the respect of their subordinates in a post-Shah Iran' and to, 'identify those hardline officers who would have to be dropped in order to produce a more tractable military establishment.'⁶⁷

A 'military solution' - actively canvassed by some Iranians and U.S. officials, such as Brzezinski and (NSC emissary) General Robert Huyser⁶⁸ - had been personally rejected by President Carter at the December, 28 SCC.⁶⁹ Instead, the approach adopted

would focus on 'influencing military opinion...by means of the levers we have.'⁷⁰ Given that, 'several billion dollars worth of military equipment is waiting to be delivered',⁷¹ the latter course would seem to admit considerable scope for the administration. Intelligence estimates were to suggest that, furthermore, 'Iran's airforce and air defense programme in particular are almost totally dependent on the U.S.' and note that, 'in mid-1978, almost 9,500 Americans were in Iran working in the defense sector'. And whilst Iran had launched an 'ambitious' personnel substitution programme, 'the increasing sophistication of modern weaponry and the growing demand for trained manpower in the economy...will ensure that these problems remain for at least several years as principal considerations in Iran's formulation of defense and foreign policy.'⁷²

Thus, despite 'assertions of non-alignment, non-interventionism and anti-Western rhetoric'⁷³ by the provisional government, the uncertain role of the returned Ayatollah Khomeini, and Tehran's (February 6, 1979) departure from CENTO,⁷⁴ administration observers saw a likely 'dominance of the military and nationalist conservative elements'⁷⁵ in 'post-Shah Iran' and were further encouraged by the seeming lack of 'coherence' displayed by 'independent Marxists' and the (communist) Tudeh party.⁷⁶ Some 45,000 U.S. citizens had been safely evacuated. A brief takeover of the U.S. Tehran Embassy on February, 14 had been controlled by the Bazargan provisional government.⁷⁷ U.S. opinion polls had, moreover, backed (by 68%) Carter's 'low profile' policy and, one DOS cable observes, 'Americans appear to have answered the question "who lost Iran?" to their satisfaction. The answer: the Shah.'⁷⁸ At a February, 27 news conference, President Carter thus felt able to 'make the best of the change in Iran' and stated that, 'the Khomeini government has made it clear...that they desire a close working and

friendly relationship with the United States.^{'79} Whilst perhaps not quite so sanguine, a confidential study conducted by academic Richard Cottam had found 'Khomeini's circle...ready to think in sophisticated terms about future relations with the U.S.', in that, 'they did not want a formal defensive relationship but did want U.S. backing against the Soviet threat.'⁸⁰ The latter strategic consideration was viewed as the bedrock for U.S. relations with virtually any conceivable nationalist regime in Tehran.⁸¹ In this respect, Moscow's refusal to abrogate the contentious 1921 Iran-Soviet treaty was noted,⁸² as was Khomeini's view of the 'absolute disagreement between Islam and Marxism.'⁸³

More concrete evidence for an underlying strategic continuity was perceived in the complex negotiations for readjustment in the U.S.-Iranian arms transfer programme. While Tehran was clearly unwilling and, economically, unable to sustain the Shah's \$10bn. procurement schedule, arrangements were made for the U.S. Navy to take on Iran's equity in two of the DG-993 destroyers, cancelled by Iran on February, 3. This permitted the continuing solvency (at \$580m.) of the Iranian FMS 'Trust Fund' for 'resuming the flow of spare parts.'⁸⁴ The administration had also proposed establishing a further \$5.5m. FMS facility for the Iranian airforce.⁸⁵ These moves, for administration officials, indicated overall 'our willingness to cooperate with Iran on defense matters'⁸⁶ and thus, in the view of General Ernest Graves of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, anticipated the 'resumption of a mutually beneficial military supply relationship.'⁸⁷

A corollary to U.S. initiatives on military supply with the emergent Islamic Republic were moves aimed at resuming the intelligence relationship. Although the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance facilities at Behrshahr and Kabkan in Northern Iran

had been closed to the U.S. on February, 21, negotiations had, by mid-1979 apparently restored some common ground between the administration and the Iranian military. A September 5, NEA memo for Secretary Vance records that, 'we are working with contractors to restart the IBEX intelligence monitoring project on a reduced scale' and further, that, 'the Iranians have not foreclosed the possibility of reopening the (former NSA) sites in the indefinite future.'⁸⁸ For the administration's part, whilst the full range of classified military information hitherto available to Iran had been 'suspended', following a March, 12 directive of the DOD's National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC), an instruction from Harold Brown's office also notes that, 'this suspension does not apply to the oral/visual disclosure of CMI previously authorized.'⁸⁹ Indeed, for one such presentation, NEA analysts observe that 'A CIA briefing officer gave a well received intelligence briefing to Barzargan, Yazdi, and Entzegam on August 21.' The latter were, 'most interested in Iraq, Palestinians, Afghans and Soviet dangers to the PGOI' and 'asked for a repeat briefing in two months.'⁹⁰

Administration officials had, in particular, pursued a policy of cultivating close relations with Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi.⁹¹ In this respect, a conscientious policy of avoiding U.S. involvement in the several regional insurgencies of Kurds and Azeri's⁹² was coupled with an awareness of increasing Iranian aid to the growing 'Mujahedeen' insurrection in Afghanistan. Here, although it was thought that, 'the USSR will probably avoid plunging into what could well become a Vietnam-type trap',⁹³ the administration would take the opportunity to 'encourage' the 'intelligence dialogue' with Iran on the Afghan situation.⁹⁴ It was further hoped to use intelligence on Palestinian links with radicals in Iran to promote at least a muted criticism of the Camp David process and

other U.S. policies at the September Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana.⁹⁵

III. The Anti-American Syndrome.

Whilst such 'moderates' in the Tehran provisional government as Yazdi and Bazargan were (at least off the record) willing to take a 'favourable' view of further co-operation with Washington⁹⁶ and remain agnostic on the Camp David issue,⁹⁷ the Middle East Treaty had, like the wider question of relations with the United States as such, become overwhelmingly an index of commitment in Iran's domestic power struggle. Following the (March, 26) formal signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Accords, demonstrators had occupied the Egyptian Embassy in Tehran and reports continued of crowds of 'hundreds of thousands' in the provincial capitals opposing the Treaty and demanding further Islamic measures in Iran itself.⁹⁸ In parallel, two diverging strands of U.S. analysis are also apparent throughout the spring and summer of 1979, as the various agencies extended their coverage of the developing revolution. For the State Department in Washington, stress was laid on the improving economic situation - particularly in oil supply⁹⁹ - which would lead NEA analysts to argue that, 'the (Shi-ite) clerics cannot themselves run a complex country and will be forced to seek help from Westernised officials', and overall, to, 'doubt that the hardline Mullahs will be able to score a decisive and lasting victory over the secular elements.'¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, field intelligence and the Tehran Embassy were uncomfortably aware of a 'significant increase in anti-Americanism' which 'goes beyond [the] ritual revolutionary strain' and which is vivified by 'Khomeini's anti-Western paranoia.'¹⁰¹

The latter phenomenon was not, indeed, of recent discovery. However, previous analysis had tended to focus on the structural implications of the Ayatollah's charismatic leadership rather than the ostensive terms of its definition. Here, for the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'Khomeini is a generalist and seems bored by political strategy' and, 'probably sees his role...as that of a...general moral councillor' and, overall, 'allows his aides to work out the details on specific foreign policy issues.'¹⁰² Khomeini, in this interpretation, would thus, 'use anti-U.S. rhetoric but would not be indifferent to a continuing community of interests between Iran and the U.S.'¹⁰³ Of some reinforcement to the foregoing analysis were perceptions of the role of the Iranian 'left'; both 'independent' and supportive of the Soviet Union. In this, although remarking on the 'extensive use of Soviet and other bloc materials on television and the other media',¹⁰⁴ analysts were also aware that, 'The Soviet Union's relations with Khomeini will be hampered by its...interest in encouraging radical elements in Iran.'¹⁰⁵ A further essay toward a differentiation of Iranian polity is set out in a June, 14 'threat assessment' conducted for the Department of Defense.¹⁰⁶ Here, the DOD analysts observe, 'a pronounced proclivity for political fractionalization ...not simply vertical; i.e. an ideological division between the Marxist left and the Islamic right, but multi-directional'¹⁰⁷ and note that, 'Ayatollah Khomeini seems increasingly frustrated over opposition to his Islamic republic and continued terrorist attacks on his close associates'.¹⁰⁸ And moreover, that, 'A decision to allow the deposed Shah and/or his family to stay in the U.S. could have serious consequences...such a decision would probably be the one cohesive factor in the entire Iranian political spectrum.'¹⁰⁹

For Washington, however, the fate of the deposed Shah had proved to be a far from

cohesive factor and rather, served to further sharpen existing divisions on the course of regional policy. As has been argued, for the State Department, and to an extent, Carter personally, some hopes were retained that, as the President observed, 'a genuinely nonaligned Iran need not be viewed as a U.S. setback.'¹¹⁰ Such views were, though, strongly contested within both the administration and the wider policy community. In a series of syndicated articles, Henry Kissinger portrayed the revolution in Iran as demonstrative of an adverse 'geopolitical momentum' running against U.S. interests from Afghanistan to Angola.¹¹¹ The seeming success of 'Soviet actions in Ethiopia, South Yemen [and] Afghanistan' had, for the former Secretary, 'the consequence of demoralizing those whose stock in trade was co-operation with the United States.'¹¹² To address the immediate problems of 'the growing perception of the potential irrelevance of American power'¹¹³ required, at the least, 'a visible presence of American power in the Indian Ocean.'¹¹⁴ Although partisan considerations were not entirely absent from the Kissinger critique, its broad conclusions were very much those adopted by Harold Brown and National Security Advisor Brzezinski. In early February, 1979, the Defense Secretary undertook a 'consultative' mission to U.S. allies in the Gulf. The administration had, in January, dispatched a force of 12 F-15 aircraft to Dhahran. These were followed, on March 5, by the deployment of two AWACS aircraft and the parallel movement of a Carrier Task Group - headed by the USS 'Constellation' - from Subic Bay to the Arabian Sea. Although the Saudi's had rejected a long-term presence for the F-15s and 'quickly turned down'¹¹⁵ any formal establishment of U.S. bases, the administration had, it was confirmed, 'made a policy decision about a more active role in the area.'¹¹⁶

The precise bounds of the administration's 'more active role' were, though, still under discussion at this time. The decision on AWACS and the 'Constellation', whilst prepared for (and prematurely leaked)¹¹⁷ in late December, 1978, had only been finalized by the President on March 2, 1979.¹¹⁸ Although a small NSC planning group under Brzezinski's military aide, General William Odom, had been engaged in contingency studies since November, 1978,¹¹⁹ neither the JCS nor the State Department had settled on an agreed course of political or military policy. Thus whilst Harold Brown had stated, with reference to his recent Middle East mission, that, 'the U.S. is prepared to defend its vital interests with whatever means are appropriate, including military force where necessary,'¹²⁰ and Secretary Vance would shortly after affirm that, 'there is no question that we have vital interests' in the Persian Gulf and that, 'We consider the territorial integrity and security of Saudi Arabia a matter of fundamental interest to the United States,'¹²¹ the practical implications in terms of revised U.S. force structures and posture configuration were left open. Whilst such a regional presence could, Energy Secretary Schlesinger observed, involve 'military personnel as well as equipment', whether it would also, 'involve...combat arms of the ground forces, is another question.'¹²² And again, for Defense Secretary Brown, 'less obvious and less intrusive forms of U.S. presence...such as ship visits and so on' were, at this stage, '...clearly the right way to begin such activities.'¹²³

IV. Regional Reassurance and U.S. Resolution: the Yemen 'Crisis' of February, 1979.

As has been argued above, if broad consensus on the need for some level of enhanced military preparation in the South Asian/Indian Ocean region had been achieved by early

1979, the administration's continuing divisions concerning the problems an 'obvious' U.S. presence might attract had been reinforced by the ambivalent reaction to U.S. planning amongst the regional powers themselves. 'I have explained to the U.S. (Defense) Secretary', the Saudi Foreign Minister had told interviewers on March, 2 '...that we have nothing to do with international strategies...we believe that the Zionist (not the Soviet) danger is a threat to the Arab area and its stability.'¹²⁴ Here, whilst the administration was quick to observe that, as with the earlier regional caveats over Diego Garcia, such public statements were for diplomatic consumption and were, 'incompatible with the main current of our discourse with his government'¹²⁵ other analysts believed them to also reflect a genuine difference of views within the Saudi regime.¹²⁶ In this, the Camp David agreement was a particularly contentious issue. Saudi Arabia had, indeed, concurred with the suspension of Egypt from the Arab League at the emergency (November, 1978) Baghdad summit - called to oppose Sadat's policies - and described the treaty itself as 'an invitation to war rather than peace.'¹²⁷ U.S. domestic considerations would also dictate that the White House distance itself from what would clearly be a contested follow on to the Camp David process and allow a renewed 'focus' on the Gulf and Saudi Arabia.¹²⁸ The opportunity, to thus both address the needs of Riyadh's more localized security concerns and provide a timely demonstration of U.S. regional commitment, was to arise with the outbreak of renewed hostilities in North Yemen.

Here, a border incursion of PDRY forces in support of local (YAR) insurgents, had commenced on February, 23. The U.S. response to what the administration presented as, 'a carefully planned, co-ordinated and amply supported campaign'¹²⁹ was to accelerate

the implementation of Foreign Military Sales programmes for North Yemen first agreed in 1976 (phase one) and in September, 1978 (phase two). These were to include 12 F-5E aircraft, 50 APC's, 64 M-60 tanks and assorted 155mm. and anti-aircraft artillery, TOW systems and a further 50 APC's transferred from Saudi Arabia.¹³⁰ The 'phase two' FMS package, like much of the continuing instability in North Yemen itself,¹³¹ had originated in Riyadh's desire - following the 'coup' of June, 1978 - to bolster its own support in Sana'a in opposition to the South Yemen regime of Fatah Ismail (see, chap.5). It would be entirely funded by Saudi Arabia.¹³² In this, as with similar programmes in Egypt and Somalia, the aim was to move North Yemen 'away from a Soviet inventory' and, as was claimed, had been 'very carefully studied by the United States and Saudi Arabia in the period two years, three years preceding the 1976 agreement on the first phase of assistance.'¹³³ However, whilst officials were to stress the 'urgency' of the YAR position, considered sufficient to warrant, for the first time invoking the 'waiver' provisions in the 1976 *Arms Export Control Act*,¹³⁴ and indeed, suggest that the crisis, 'may have been related to South Yemen's desire to exploit its current superiority in equipment before our announced military assistance reaches...the North Yemen armed forces,'¹³⁵ a wider agenda was also put forward by the administration. The FMS transfer, it was stated, together with the AWACS and the 'Constellation' CTG deployments were developed in tandem with 'the recent visit of our Defense Secretary Harold Brown' as, '...part of a coherent long term strategy designed to combat instability in this area and allay the concerns of our friends.'¹³⁶

At the seat of the ostensible hostilities on the YAR/PDRY border, a cease-fire, mediated by the Arab League, had in fact been observed since March, 7 - prior to the

commencement of Congressional Hearings on the administration's waiver request on March, 12. Some in the House Foreign Affairs Committee were to question the size of the \$390m. package which, it was pointed out, was 'more than triple the annual state budget of North Yemen.'¹³⁷ U.S. intelligence on the state of the fighting was admittedly 'poor'.¹³⁸ It was further admitted that, as the YAR armed forces had hitherto used Soviet equipment, the 'full integration in terms of combat effectiveness...(of the U.S. matériel)...would be as much as two years away.'¹³⁸ The 'anomalous situation'¹³⁹ of successive military governments in Sana'a retaining not only a Soviet weapons inventory but some 200 Russian military instructors - despite the presence in South Yemen of '800-1,000 Soviets' and '500-700 Cuban advisors'¹⁴⁰ - was ascribed to a presumed 'helpful' Soviet influence toward, 'producing the withdrawal of the South's troops'.¹⁴¹ It was perhaps equally explicable in terms of North Yemen's resistance to Saudi domination.¹⁴² The administration was, though, to stress that, '(our policies) are not dictated in any respect by the Saudis. They are dictated by our own national interest, which lies in addressing ourselves to the acute concern of a country we are as close to as Saudi Arabia.'¹⁴³ Such bureaucratic *non sequitur* was, withal, not unusual at this stage of the Carter administration. For many in Congress however, the question as to, 'whether or not the (FMS) particulars are suited to the situation in North Yemen', as with that of possible 'war powers' qualification on the deployment of AWACS,¹⁴⁴ was clearly subaltern that of, 'the need today...for some sign of decisive leadership in the U.S.', and, moreover, 'what really counts in this region is the perception.'¹⁴⁵

To be sure, the perceived need for the President to, 'stress [the] role as Commander-in-Chief' and promote the attendant image of 'resolve' had also been a continuing

preoccupation of National Security Advisor Brzezinski.¹⁴⁶ If critics could accuse the administration of, 'making a military decision affecting the Yemenis...principally for political reasons affecting Saudi Arabia,'¹⁴⁷ it was arguable that U.S. military capability was the most flexible policy instrument for engagement with the Saudi regime. Thus, while the precise framework for an overall strategy was still under discussion, moves would continue throughout 1979 toward strengthening the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean. Here, in addition to the 'Constellation' CTG supplementing (from mid-April)¹⁴⁸ the similar 'Midway' task group on regular triennial deployment, a further enhancement of Indian Ocean naval capability was provided by a five vessel 'Surface Combatant Task Force' seconded from the Seventh Fleet on July, 7; whilst the longstanding MIDEASTFOR in Bahrain was upgraded to five ships on October, 18.¹⁴⁹

These measures were, however, like the administration's activism over the Yemen, essentially a palliative for the wider dislocation in U.S. regional policy after the fall of the Shah. In addressing the altered theatre military balance, the adjustment costs in procurement and military posture could be ameliorated by the foundations laid for a more forward U.S. South Asian presence in PD-18. Less susceptible were displacements in the substratum of the Carter administration's foreign policy architecture. Here, the requirement for longer term policy reassessment for the Middle East, oil supply and the strategic balance would provide the grounding for the later redefinition of global strategy found in the 'Carter Doctrine'. These areas will be briefly examined in turn.

V. The Levers of Power: the Oil 'Shock', SALT II, and the Return of 'Linkage'.

In terms of the dislocation of U.S. regional strategy flowing from the Iranian revolution, it is clear that, if the Camp David accords had provided a focus for anti-American sentiment in Iran and the Middle East in general, the removal of Washington's 'unconditional ally' in Tehran had also greatly circumscribed the implementation of the Treaty itself. For Israel, the loss of two decades of carefully nurtured military co-operation had been compounded by the shortfall in 70% of its (Iranian) oil. This, President Carter had promised to guarantee from U.S. stocks.¹⁵⁰ Less open to negotiation was the heightened strategic importance of Israel as a U.S. regional ally. Such leverage had left Tel Aviv unforthcoming on the Palestinian question, whilst the more able to exert domestic pressure on the administration. For Saudi Arabia, the Iranian revolution had brought out a general sense of the vulnerability of the Saudi regime to insurgent and populist forces of precisely the sort which overthrew the Shah, whilst the issue of Palestinian rights had provided a likely catalyst. The Embassy occupations and hostility to Egypt in Iran had been closely followed in Riyadh, which had reacted by taking up its own leverage on U.S. policy through the world oil market. Although Saudi Arabia had, overall, increased its oil liftings to compensate for the dislocation (from 6m. to 3m./bpd) in Iranian supplies, this had been carefully modulated - involving an actual (500,000 and 1m./bpd) decrease in the first and second quarters of 1979¹⁵¹ - to emphasize Saudi concern over Camp David and the border conflict in the Yemen. This had contributed to a 65% price increase (over that of December, 1978) sanctioned by OPEC on June, 1979 at Geneva.¹⁵² Whilst the Saudis correctly drew attention to the structural factors, concerning the 'voracious appetite for oil'¹⁵³ in the West and in the U.S. in particular,

underlying an eventual 150% increase by the end of the year, the immediate impression conveyed was of further 'disarray'¹⁵⁴ in the Carter administration's strategy for the Middle East.

On a broader international level, the effects of Khomeini's revolution were still more disruptive of U.S. standing. Carter had come to office promising greater integration with 'Trilateral' allies in Europe and Japan. The essential correlatives for the administration's (domestic) economic programme were conditions of global reflation. These, following the second 'oil shock', were clearly untenable and such unilateral U.S. measures as were undertaken served to further dislocate allied unity in a manner reminiscent of Nixon's 'New Economic Policy'. To be sure, the administration had attempted to introduce a stringent domestic energy policy, portrayed as 'the moral equivalent of war',¹⁵⁵ and to co-ordinate tactics internationally at the Tokyo OECD summit of June, 1979.¹⁵⁶ This was, however, overshadowed by the threat of a direct linkage of oil price stability with a more 'comprehensive' Middle East peace at the parallel OPEC deliberations in Geneva. The U.S. unilateralism perceived in sanctioning a separate Egypt-Israel peace accord was widely - and in some measure, perhaps incorrectly¹⁵⁷ - attributed to domestic pressures on the administration. The European powers had, indeed, expressed open scepticism that Camp David only represented 'a partial step toward a comprehensive settlement and a solution of the Palestinian problem'¹⁵⁸ and were to further affirm a positive role for the PLO in the independent 'Euro-Arab dialogue' at the EEC's June, 1980 'Venice declaration'.¹⁵⁹

If the Iranian revolution had engaged wide-ranging policy disputes with U.S. allies

in Europe and the Middle East, its effects were becoming equally apparent in exacerbating the Carter administration's domestic conflicts over the course of national security policy. This third strand of inter-relationship was concerned with U.S. perceptions of the overall strategic balance and would find a particular salience in the Senate Hearings on SALT II ratification of July, 1979. As we have seen, the administration had consistently sought to counter the continuing 'strategic superiority' debate by stressing the 'essential equivalence' with Soviet strategic capability conveyed by the 'willing and prosperous' U.S. alliance system. Iran, the 'keystone' of regional containment, was clearly, after January, 1979, unable to fulfil either qualification. Moreover, despite some residual 'long term' administration hopes, the loss of the NSA surveillance sites in Azerbaijan had seriously compounded the technical problems of SALT verification without, as an NEA memorandum acknowledges, the possible 'acquiescence' of Moscow itself.¹⁶⁰ And if the administration had strenuously sought to disengage any systemic correspondence between these several aspects of national security policy, its critics were to reinstate 'linkage' with an equal vigour. 'To seek to separate U.S.-Soviet relations into discrete compartments', Henry Kissinger informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, '...runs the risk of encouraging Soviet leaders to believe that they can use East West co-operation in one area as a safety valve while striving for unilateral advantage elsewhere.'¹⁶¹ The Vienna (SALT) Summit, 'recorded no progress toward a clear understanding with the Soviet Union on the key issue of political restraint'.¹⁶² Furthermore, the former Secretary asserted, 'the military balance is beginning to tilt ominously against the United States in too many significant categories of weapons',¹⁶³ particularly land-based 'heavy' ICBM's. This 'revolution in the strategic balance' suggested, in turn, that, 'our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to

offset the Soviet capacity for regional intervention'.¹⁶⁴ Such 'dangerous trends' in this direction were already apparent, in Kissinger's view, in the 'unprecedented Soviet use of proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia.'¹⁶⁵

Thus, whilst avoiding the charge of a direct Soviet involvement in the fall of the Shah - which, although favoured by some observers,¹⁶⁶ had received no corroboration in the administration's own intelligence assessments¹⁶⁷ - Kissinger was to launch a potent effort to associate the Iranian revolution with the supposedly 'unfavourable' strategic balance in terms of, 'the demoralization of a pro-Western leadership group by the gradual and unopposed growth of Soviet power in the nearby areas.'¹⁶⁸

The apparent repudiation by Henry Kissinger of an arms control programme essentially negotiated by himself in 1976 was seen by some as a direct result of the Carter administration's treatment of the deposed Shah.¹⁶⁹ The former Secretary's demonstration of, in the words of one observer, 'a fine sense of where power is shifting,'¹⁷⁰ was, however, perhaps more significant as an index of the mounting opposition in Washington to arms negotiations with the USSR of any kind. Prominent as ever in such debate was the Policy Studies Chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger, Paul Nitze. Here, in a position paper circulated for the CPD - entitled, *Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?* - Nitze had set out a clear aetiology between nuclear 'counterforce' capability and the exercise of politico-military power at regional level. For the latter, 'the focus of Soviet strategy has been on Western Europe. By achieving dominance on the Middle East, they hope to outflank Europe. They propose to outflank the Middle East by achieving controlling positions in Afghanistan Iran and Iraq on one side, South and

North Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Mozambique on the other, and by achieving the neutrality of Turkey to the North.¹⁷¹ To implement this strategy, the Soviet Union was, for Nitze, aiming to secure strategic superiority. 'The nuclear balance is, of course, only one element in the overall power balance', Nitze had argued in an earlier (March, 1978) address to the Foreign Policy Association¹⁷² 'But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum on which all other levers of influence - military, economic or political - rest'. And moreover, 'can we be confident that there is not at least a measure of validity to that viewpoint?'¹⁷³

The latter question was, indeed, one which the Carter administration was finding difficult to answer. Whilst Brzezinski had, from the outset of PRM 10, sought to address the 'capability to manage a protracted nuclear conflict' to counter the 'doctrinal asymmetry'¹⁷⁴ presumed on these grounds within the Soviet nuclear strategy, President Carter himself had not, at this stage, entirely conceded the argument. Cyrus Vance had, moreover, retained some hopes of moving on toward a more ambitious 'SALT III' agreement, which would again address the 'deep cuts' agenda unsuccessfully proposed at the outset of the administration. Yet, to further complicate the case for the present SALT II, much of the other 'grand design' aspects of Nitze's analysis had been taken on board by the administration in order to mobilize support for its arms packages to Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The record of further seeming Soviet 'windfalls' in Iran and Afghanistan had lent a certain historical plausibility to the thesis which, it can be recalled, was nowhere more strongly held than by the recently departed Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

VI. The Hostage Crisis.

For all practical purposes, the question of whether a 'grand design' or merely 'tactical opportunism' provided the governing logic for Soviet strategy in the Northern Indian Ocean littoral was of lesser importance by 1979 than the clear diminution of the United States' ability to effect desired outcomes in the region. This state of affairs was brought into a sharp relief by the seizure, on November, 4 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The impact of the latter incident was both immediate and enduring for U.S. policy. Firstly, the holding of the 53 diplomatic personnel hostage would give the question of U.S. capability in the region a domestic salience which was to dominate the agenda of the Carter Presidency to the end. Secondly, the virulent anti-Americanism of the Khomeini regime would promote a similar immediacy to the military and - *ceteris paribus* - 'East-West' aspects of what Brzezinski was terming the 'regional security framework', further foreclosing the regionally specific and politico-diplomatic dimensions to policy making emphasized by Cyrus Vance and the State Department.

Here, whilst Secretary Vance had himself proclaimed that, 'there is no question that we have vital interests' in the Persian Gulf, the continuing efforts to set U.S.-Iranian relations 'on a new foundation' set out - not disingenuously - in correspondence from Foreign Minister Yazdi,¹⁷⁵ plus the expressed opposition of other regional actors to the 'Constellation' and 'Midway' carrier deployments had sharpened existing reservations at State about the political utility of military reinforcement in South West Asia. Similar worries were also repeatedly raised in the diplomatic traffic to Washington from the Tehran Embassy. Iran had formally lodged 'its concern with such plans', which, a

diplomatic note of July, 23 relates, '...would undoubtedly have an undesirable effect on the two countries relations.'¹⁷⁶ The point had been well taken by the U.S. Embassy. The enhanced U.S. naval posture would clearly complicate ongoing attempts to restore access to former U.S. military properties, notably involving the uncompleted IBEX communications network in the Gulf military district of Iran. As these were apparently being handed over to the Prime Minister's Office, such requests, the Embassy believed, 'might be worth another try.'¹⁷⁷ In any event, a September, 30 cable observes, 'It would be very useful if the Secretary (Vance) could discuss with Yazdi (the) disposition of our forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf so that he will have full understanding of our intentions in the area.'¹⁷⁸ The importance of such discussions was underscored by intelligence reports in September/October detailing the growing struggle for control of the Iranian military, and in particular, the threat from Khomeini to transfer advanced U.S. equipment, including F-14/16's with 'ground support and maintenance personnel' to Syria, 'or other Arab countries confronting Israel.'¹⁷⁹

Against this background, initial hopes of procuring an early diplomatic resolution to the Embassy takeover - as indeed had happened in the earlier February occupation - would suffer from a growing realization of the critical role of the hostages in Iran's internal power struggle. This became immediately apparent with the resignation of Foreign Minister Yazdi on November 5, and Khomeini's endorsement of the occupation as a 'splendid Islamic act'.¹⁸⁰ Here, the U.S. dilemma was compounded by the seizure of confidential DOS, DOD and CIA files detailing U.S. contacts with virtually all the 'moderate' political figures in Iran, including former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi and the incoming President, Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr.¹⁸¹ In addition, some

of the principal U.S. proponents of such a 'measured' approach were themselves incommunicado in the Embassy compound on Takht-i Jamshid Avenue.

To be sure, Cyrus Vance and many in the State Department still believed that a focus on military capability would only complicate U.S. political options in the region and had opposed the decision, taken at the November, 20 SCC meeting, to deploy a further Carrier Task Group (the USS 'Kitty Hawk') to the Arabian Sea and a covert AWACS flight to Egypt.¹⁸² By the follow up SCC session of December, 4, however, Defense Secretary Brown was to announce that, with the AWACS in place and the 'Kitty Hawk' supplementing the existing 'Midway' carrier group, the U.S. had, 'sufficient forces to carry out a retaliation or punitive strike against Iran if this should prove necessary.'¹⁸³ The hostage crisis had prompted a thorough review of U.S. capability in the Northern Indian Ocean. This, as then NSC aide Gary Sick observes, had reached the 'sobering conclusion...that U.S. ability to project military power in the region - beyond a show of naval force - was extremely limited.'¹⁸⁴ The Saudi reactions to the February F-15 deployment had served to highlight the political problems for U.S. defence planning that securing regional access would present. President Carter was to thus further authorize the dispatch, on December, 18, of a inter-agency mission to examine possible basing sites in Oman, Kenya and Somalia¹⁸⁵ (this will be considered in detail below).

VII. A Sobering Conclusion: 'Nifty Nugget', the Unilateral Corps and the Return of the Lesser Contingency.

Although the earlier, (April) SCC meetings had considered a range of measures to

underwrite Brzezinski's 'regional security framework' for the Gulf and South Asia,¹⁸⁶ the accent had been on undertaking an essentially supportive role to Saudi policy in North Yemen. The November planning process thus marks a departure from previous administration policy in terms of the urgency given to establishing a unilateral capability for the wider Indian Ocean region. Before such a capability could be in place, however, the NSC was to face opposition from the Joint Chiefs on organizational and budgetary grounds. This will be outlined below.

As the previous chapter has shown, the administration's first DOD *Annual Report* had laid some stress on 'power projection' capability¹⁸⁷ and identified, at least on paper, both a force structure - the 'appropriate elements' of U.S. (CONUS) based Army /Marine/TACAIR NATO reserves - and a likely theatre of operations in the Middle East.¹⁸⁸ However, whilst the Pentagon's 'Office of Programme Analysis and Evaluation' (PA&E) had conducted preliminary studies of such deployments,¹⁸⁹ the DOD and the Services assigned a higher priority to European contingencies and NATO. This had also been the case with earlier planning. The European Command (EUCOM), had drawn up contingency plans for Middle East operations when allocated the region in the Melvin Laird DOD reorganization of 1972.¹⁹⁰ Its predecessor, the Strike Command (STRICOM) had developed a methodological basis for the 'Rapid Deployment of Forces for Limited War' (see above, chap.1) and conducted limited field exercises in the Persian Gulf region.¹⁹¹ The Johnson administration's 1963 programme for a specialized 'brushfire' strategic air/sea lift capability had procured the C-5A aircraft, although the full 'Package Force Concept' of Fast Deployed Logistics (FDL) ships and a dedicated land/air force

structure had met consistent opposition from the service commands before being finally rejected by Congress in 1967.¹⁹²

The worsening situation in Iran had, though, combined with a need to counter Congressional opposition to the forthcoming SALT II ratification, served to mobilize a more concrete framework to the PD-18 directives. Thus, by June 3, 1979, a *Washington Post* report revealed the planning for a regional 'strike force' and speculated on a 'Carter Doctrine for oil'.¹⁹³ Confirmation was provided by Army COS Bernard Rogers on June, 21 when the Pentagon released details of a 110,000 strong 'Unilateral Corps' composed of all four services which had been established following 'Consolidated Guidance' from the DOD the previous year.¹⁹⁴

Despite the evident commitment of Brzezinski and Defense Secretary Brown, however, the proposed strike force was received with mixed enthusiasm by many in the Pentagon. Questions would arise concerning budgetary allocation, mission parameters and the particularly contentious area of inter-service command structure. Thus, whilst the early 1978 (PD 18) Guidance had called for the assignment of 'light, mobile and flexible forces'¹⁹⁵ for deployment outside the NATO area, and indeed, identified the Gulf/Middle East region as the theatre of a possible 'brushfire' conflict occurring in parallel with hostilities in Western Europe,¹⁹⁶ the threat assessment had suggested that such lesser contingencies would, 'initially involve U.S. but not Soviet forces.'¹⁹⁷ The scenarios so developed by PA&E had thus focused on a possible Iraqi assault on Iran or Saudi Arabia.¹⁹⁸ In terms of the assignment of mobile forces, the priorities of PD 18 were placed on 'rapid reinforcement' for the Central Front rather than 'rapid deployment' to

a non-NATO theatre.¹⁹⁹ This ordering of mission priority had accorded with the established preferences of the services themselves.²⁰⁰ In acknowledging these perspectives, Secretary Brown had observed that, whilst 'events in the Persian Gulf could soften the glue that binds the (NATO) alliance', the DOD remained 'as yet unsure of the utility of U.S. military power in the Persian gulf contingencies.'²⁰¹

To be sure, the above considerations, expounded in 1978, were being modified under pressure from both Harold Brown and the events in Tehran. However, for all the services, the force projection role against likely 'Soviet-model client armies' (rather than the Red Army itself) in the Gulf had thus far taken similar issue to the earlier disputes over STRICOM. As before, a prime consideration was budgetary. As the JCS was well aware, the provisioning for the 'Unilateral Corps' would largely involve a reallocation of existing funds rather than new appropriations. The proposed allocation of the mission to REDCOM - essentially a CONUS-based logistics command - would also suggest that such new funding as was available be diverted into lift assets and logistics, rather than the combat equipment preferred by the service chiefs.

A further area of disagreement concerned the allocation of command structures and inter-service responsibility. An obvious option was that the whole mission be given to the U.S. Marine Corps. This was, though, resisted by the Corps itself on the grounds of losing its status in the European theatre.²⁰² The latter, anti-Soviet mission was seen by all the services as central to both budgetary and career considerations. Hence, while the SCC had ordered Pentagon option papers on the command process for the 'Unilateral Corps' in April and June, the Joint Chiefs were, by August, 29 still unable to produce

an agreed recommendation.²⁰³ The increasingly public intra-agency dispute over the status of the Gulf in U.S. military posture had also fed into strategic relations with U.S. allies in East Asia, as it became clear that an enhancement of Indian Ocean capability would most probably take place at the expense of U.S. forces deployed in South Korea and Japan.²⁰⁴ Thus, following (October 16-20) talks on the security of Middle East oil, aimed at reassuring Seoul and Tokyo, Harold Brown then issued a directive to the JCS on October, 22 ordering that a Command for Persian Gulf operations be functioning by March 1, 1980 - even though central questions of strategy, structure and inter-service responsibility were so far left unresolved. Here, the DOD's concern was underscored by an extensive 'command post' exercise, (from October, 2 - November, 4) codenamed 'Nifty Nugget'. This suggested that, theoretical provisions of '1½ war' doctrine notwithstanding, the services were in practice unable to cope with more than one 'major contingency' at any one time.²⁰⁵

The coincidence of the pessimistic 'Nifty Nugget' findings with the Tehran hostage seizure was, for the NSC, 'sobering' indeed. Of longer term significance was the perception of a growing incommensurability between military posture and likely mission. The variegated nature of the challenge itself would further tax the administration's threat assessment schedules for what was popularly being termed the 'arc of crisis'. These would have to account for not only the inchoate currents of local revolution but more conventional politico-military formations at interstate level.

VIII. The 'Arc of Crisis'.

In parallel with the political isolation of Egypt, the Iran hostage crisis and the studied distance from U.S. policies being maintained by Saudi Arabia, the prospect of a more directly gauged regional dislocation of United States' interests in the Middle East/South Asian crescent was apparent by the end of 1979. In an event of clear political, if uncertain military significance for U.S. planners, the PDRY had on October 25, signed a 20 year 'Friendship and Co-operation' treaty with the Soviet Union. Here, while most of the text was *pro forma*, a specific clause enjoined the two countries to, 'continue to develop co-operation in the military field in the interests of strengthening their defence capacity.'²⁰⁶ Earlier, on September 7, press reports had suggested the formation of a 40,000 man air-mobile brigade of South Yemeni, Ethiopian and Cuban troops with in-theatre logistics, so that airborne re-supply dependence on the Soviet Union, 'would not be necessary, at least at the beginning of a conflict in the Middle East.'²⁰⁷ Although the precise extent of this development was unclear at the time (and subsequently seen as unfounded), the possibilities for such co-operation were highlighted by the signing of a further treaty between South Yemen and Ethiopia on December, 2.²⁰⁸ Of further concern to the U.S., some 500 armed militants had, on November 20, occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca and called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime. On the same day, violent protests involving Shi-ite oil workers were suppressed by the Saudi National Guard.²⁰⁹ Later, on December 11, Tehran Radio broadcast a strong condemnation of Saudi treatment of the 125,000 Shi'a minority and described the monarchy as a 'corrupt and mercenary agent of the United States.'²¹⁰

If the Mecca insurgency exclusively concerned orthodox (Sunni) Wahabi sectarians, and was thus not directly related to the simultaneously erupting Shi-ite riots in the Saudi Eastern oil province,²¹¹ such theological distinctions appeared less than absolute to observers in Congress and the NSC. And to seemingly compound the former Shah's warnings of an anti-Western alliance between 'the Red and the Black', the responsibility for the Mecca takeover was also (albeit, spuriously) claimed by the left-wing, ex-Nasserist APPU based in Beirut.²¹² A rumour that the occupation was the work of the U.S. and Israel had led to the burning of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad on November 21, further accentuating the prospect of a generalized 'anti-American syndrome' across the entire region - as well as the tenuous hold on power of the Pakistan military government of Zia al-Haq. From Washington's perspective, the gravity imputed to these events would lead Cyrus Vance to order an immediate evacuation of some 900 dependants and non-essential diplomatic staff from other U.S. missions throughout the State Department's Near East and South Asia division.²¹³

Thus, by the end of 1979, the Carter administration's position in the south-west Asia crescent was confronted by apparently escalating challenges to virtually every aspect of the 'vital U.S. interests' declared in the Defense Department's first overview of the region of 18 months before. And while such encompassing scope was then intended as a largely symbolic and political affirmation of U.S. globalism, the focus at the median of the 'great arc' had since assumed a more literal and military interpretation. For U.S. Indian Ocean policy, the debate had moved away from the largely naval focus of the early Carter administration to considerations of combined arms strategy and regional access. For the broader strategic framework, policy orientation had undergone a parallel

shift from arms control to arms transfers to remaining 'pillars' of the U.S. regional alliance in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Such circuition was underscored by changes within the foreign policy bureaucracy. Paul Warnke had departed from the ACDA in October, 1978 to be followed by the resignation of Leslie Gelb as Director of Politico-Military affairs at the State Department.

The gradual departure of the 'left-of-centre foreign policy network' from the administration had also registered the effective cessation of any further efforts to secure a Naval Arms Limitation regime for the Indian Ocean; an objective to which, as Brzezinski observes, 'the State Department was still dedicated.'²¹⁴ To be sure, U.S. statements at the time of the (June, 1979) signing of SALT II had affirmed that 'the United States remains committed to avoiding a U.S.-Soviet military competition in the Indian Ocean', and a new State Department co-ordinator, Ralph Earle, had met with Soviet ambassador Mendelevitch to 'review' the status of NALT on July, 23.²¹⁵ For Brzezinski, however, the successful appointment of former 'Coalition for Peace through Strength' and 'American Security Council' member²¹⁶ General George M. Seignious as the new head of the ACDA would mark the end of the 'continuous disputes between the ACDA and the Defense Department'²¹⁷ on Indian Ocean policy, to the clear satisfaction of the latter.

Conclusions.

In contextualising the changing patterns of U.S. Indian Ocean policy after the revolution in Iran, it is apparent that the dislocation so ensuing was of an entirely different

magnitude to the earlier challenges posed by the war in Ethiopia and the several conflicts in the Yemen. The chapter above has argued that in three policy areas - the Middle East, the Soviet Northern tier and wider Western alliance system - the assumptions of two decades of U.S. strategy had been thrown into question. The inversion of Iran to not merely nonalignment but outright hostility to the United States had engaged, in contrast to the policies of the preceding decade, a move to establish credible direct capability for U.S. military intervention. It is clear, however, that such capability was, in the first instance, intended as a political reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to the region, rather than a functioning military force. The material requirements for military intervention - in terms of force structures, budgetary allocations and forward access - were to be still unsettled at the time of the proclamation of the 'Carter Doctrine' itself.

The continuing internal debate throughout the areas of government and the wider public arena was, though, reflective of the central dilemma of U.S. policy for the Gulf/Indian Ocean region during the 1970's: that is, the question of reconciling the rising importance of the region to the United States with the diminishing of U.S. leverage in an era of diffusion of power and strategic parity with the Soviet Union. It is the responses to this dilemma that form the concluding sections of this study.

CHAPTER SIX (1): FOOTNOTES.

- 1) For an extended account of these perspectives, see Cyrus Vance, 'Overview of Foreign Policy Issues and Positions', in, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in U.S. Foreign Policy* (NY: Simon and Shuster, 1983), pp.441-519 (Appendix 1); for a critical reading of the early Carter policies, see, for example, Alan Wolfe, 'Reflections on Trilateralism and the Carter Administration: Changed World Realities vs. Vested Interests', in Sklar (ed), *Trilateralism* (Boston: South End Press, 1980), pp.533-52 .
- 2) See, for example, Robert W. Tucker: 'Oil and the Issue of American Intervention', *Commentary* (January, 1975), pp.21-31; Richard Burt, 'How U.S. Strategy for the Gulf Evolved' *New York Times*, January 25, 1980, p.6; Tucker, 'American Power and the Persian Gulf', *Commentary*, Vol.79, No.5 (November, 1980), pp.25-41.
- 3) See, Leslie H. Gelb, 'Arms Sales', *Foreign Policy* 25, (Winter 1976-7).
- 4) See, *Your Trip to Tehran, Kabul and Islamabad*; briefing memorandum (Secret), DOS/OSE (26/7/76-decl. 23/3/83), to: Henry Kissinger, from: Winston Lord/Alfred C. Atherton FOIA/DOS.
- 5) *ibid.*, p.1.
- 6) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 7) *ibid.*, p.6; the memo also notes that, 'as the question of an Indian Ocean "Zone of Peace" will come up at [the] Columbo [NAM summit], some missionary work with the Afghans may not be out of place' (p.8).
- 8) See, *Iran Reaches for Power: The Implications for U.S. Policy*; inter-agency report (Secret), NEA/IRN (31/12/76), to: DOS/WashDC, from: USemb/Tehran (Documents from the U.S. Den of Espionage; hereafter, *Esp.*{v.8:103-109}), p.7.
- 9) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 10) *ibid.*, p.7.
- 11) *ibid.*
- 12) In Defense Secretary Schlesinger's view, 'The extensive acquisition of military materiel, based on a limited absorptive capacity...may lead to failure and ultimate recriminations against the U.S., deserved or not'; see 'Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to the President', Sept. 2, 1975 - (Secret); cited in, *The Evolution of the U.S.-Iranian Relationship(B): A Survey of U.S.-Iranian Relations: 1941-79*, State Report (Top Secret/NODIS), IRN (1980-decl., 11/4/83), (hereafter, *IRN/Iran Survey*), pp.57-8. Kissinger's response was to commission a policy review (NSSM 238) which would place Iran arms sales in the context of wider Gulf security and relations with Israel; see, Memorandum from Kissinger to Sec/Def., 10/10/75 - (Secret); cited in, *ibid.*, p.58. NSSM 238 *in toto* remains classified.
- 13) NSSM 238 Executive Summary, January 19, 1977 (Secret).
- 14) State memorandum (Draft) from Atherton and Gelb to Sec/State, attached to a memorandum from Palmer to Ericson *et al*, January 25, 1977 (Confidential); p.2.
- 15) Cited in, *IRN/Iran Survey*, *op.cit.*, p.60.

- 16) See, *Iran*; State Briefing Paper, Transition (Secret), DOS/IRN - Draft; Charles Naas, Myles L. Greene, Robert W. Beales (31/12/76), (Esp. v.8:122-132), pp.8-9; DOS notes that, 'the human rights situation in Iran is very broadly perceived in the United States...as unsatisfactory...[a] more recent aspect of the problem is the allegation that SAVAK...is exercising surveillance...in the United States and carrying out a number of illegal activities'(ibid).
- 17) See, *Your Meeting With The Shah, May 13, 1977*, State Briefing Memorandum (Secret), DOS/NEA (30/4/77), to: Secretary Vance, from: NEA-Alfred Atherton, p.1.
- 18) State Cable # 06825 (Secret/EXDIS), DOS (1/8/77), to: SecState/WashDC, from: USEmb/Tehran.
- 19) Carter's election was particularly applauded by the 'liberal' opposition to the Shah, including the 'Iran Nation's Party' and the (Mossadeqist) 'National Front'. See, Amir Tahiri, *The Nest of Spies* (London; Century, 1988), pp.88-90.
- 20) In a pre-election speech of June, 1976, Carter had declared 'We must replace balance-of-power with world order politics' and that, '...in the near future...issues of war and peace will be more a function of economic and social problems than of...military and security problems'. Cited in; Leslie H. Gelb, 'Beyond the Carter Doctrine', *New York Times Magazine*, February 10, 1980, p.26.
- 21) See, Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: The Memoirs of the National Security Advisor* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983), pp.126-8.
- 22) For Secretary Vance's HIRC testimony, see, *DSB* (1977), part IX, 'The Middle East,' pp.719-21.
- 23) See, *Your Appearance Before the House International Relations Committee, Thursday, July 28, On the Sale of AWACS to Iran*; State Briefing Memorandum (Confidential), DOS (27/7/77), to: Cyrus Vance, from: NEA-Alfred Atherton, Draft: Charles W. Naas, Henry Precht, pp.2-3.
- 24) See, Iran/DOS 'Transition', *op.cit.*, p.3.
- 25) *ibid.*
- 26) See, *Iran Study: An Inter-Agency Report Submitted to Congress* (Secret), DOS/DOD (28/2/78-decl.,23/3/83), (hereafter, *I/A/Iran*), p.47.
- 27) See, Minutes of Meeting held in Tel Aviv between Gen. Moshe Dayan, Foreign Minister of Israel and Gen. Hasan Toufanian, Vice-Minister of War, GOI, 18/7/77 (source; Israel Min. of Def./Esp. V.19:12-16), pp.4-5.
- 28) *ibid.*, p.5; see also, Martin Bailey, 'The Blooming of Operation Flower', *The Observer* (London), February 2, 1986.
- 29) 'Minutes', *ibid.*, Ezer Weizman/Hasan Toufanian (Esp. V.19: 23-41), p.14; Minutes record that Israel had begun work on a modified 'Pluton' (French) IRBM system in 1962 and spent some \$1bn. Defense Secretary Schlesinger had refused to sell 'Pershing 1' missiles to Iran in 1975.
- 30) *ibid.*, p.18.
- 31) See, *Your Visit to Tehran, December 31-January 1*; State Memorandum (Secret/NODIS), DOS (13/12/77), to: the President, from: Warren Christopher (decl. 21/10/83, 18/4/85), p.3.

- 32) See, NEA/Vance Briefing, *op.cit.*, p.14.
- 33) See, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter* (Washington; GPO, 1977), pp.2220-2222.
- 34) See, I/A/Iran, *op.cit.*
- 35) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 36) *ibid.*, p.12.
- 37) *ibid.*, p.20.
- 38) *ibid.*, p.18.
- 39) *ibid.*
- 40) *ibid.*, p.26.
- 41) *ibid.*, p.27.
- 42) See, *Security Assistance Reporting Requirements*; Airgram # A.113 (Confidential), DOS/ARMISH-MAAG (6/9/78), to: USCINCEUR/DOS (WashDC), from: William Sullivan/USEmb/Tehran , p.7.
- 43) *ibid.*, p.4.
- 44) See, I/A/Iran, *op.cit.*, p.52.
- 45) *ibid.*
- 46) For background discussion, see, Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (London; Croom Helm, 1978), pp.105-25. For a candid State Department view of the economic component in the Shah's 'coup de grace', see, Stanley T. Escudero, 'What Went Wrong in Iran?', confidential article, (*DOS/intl.*, June, 1979-decl. June 1, 1985), pp.70-3.
- 47) See, I/A/Iran, *op.cit.*, p.53.
- 48) See, *Iran: Background: Arms Transfer Policy and Iran's Defense Purchases*, State Briefing Paper (Secret), DOS, (19/10/78-decl. 17/9/79), to: Dept. of Treasury, p.1 .
- 49) *ibid.*
- 50) See, The President's News Conference of October 10, 1978; The Secretary of State's News Conference of November, 3; Interview with the President by Bill Moyers of the Public Broadcasting Service, November 13; The President's News Conference of November, 30.
- 51) See, *Correspondence on the Arab/Israel Conflict and the Camp David Peace Process*, Executive Office of the President, (15/8/78), to: The Shah of Iran, from: Jimmy Carter (Esp. V.12-b:3-6); Carter hopes, 'that I can count on you for understanding and full support for the task on which we are embarking'.
- 52) See, Secretary Vance's News Conference, (3/11/78-decl.,21/9/81).

- 53) See, Iran: Special National Intelligence Estimate (Secret/NOFORNDIS), CIA (9/78; hereafter, *SNIE/78*), p.23 (Esp. V.34:97-103). For discussion on the SNIE and other intelligence data, see, U.S. Congress. House. Sub-committee on Evaluation, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Prior to November, 1978*. Staff Report (Washington: GPO, 1979).
- 54) See, *Ibrahim Yazdi: Biographical Sketch*; (Secret), CIA (2/10/78), (Esp. V.18:134).
- 55) See, *The Shah's Mental State: Questions for USAmb*. (Secret/SEN), DOS (6/10/78), to: William Sullivan, from: Henry Precht, (Esp. V.7:234-235).
- 56) See, CIA/NFAC , 'Possibilities for Responsible Government', *Middle East and SouthAsia Review*, (20/10/78-decl. 21/12/83), p.5.
- 57) Tel. #11039 AMEMB (Tehran) - SECSTATE (Washington), November 9, 1978 (Secret/NODIS). See also, Gary Sick, *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (New York: Random House, 1985), pp.140-50, William H. Sullivan, *Mission to Iran* (New York: Norton, 1981), p.203.
- 58) See, Circular Letter, (Official/Informal) to: Michael Metrisko/USConl/Tabriz, from: Charles W. Naas/USEmb/Tehran, (6/9/78), (Esp. V.12-B:31-32).
- 59) See, for example, Cyrus Vance, 'Hard Choices', *op.cit.*, pp.327-30, Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: The Memoirs of a President* (NY: Bantam, 1982), p.441.
- 60) Numbered State Cherokee message # 282348, December 28, 1978 (Top Secret/NODIS/Cherokee), decl. 28/3/83.
- 61) State Cable # 00049; *Report of conversation with Foreign Minister Prince Saud, January 3, 1979* (Confidential), to: DOS/WashDC, from: John C. West/USEmb/Jeddah, (Esp. V.35:19-20).
- 62) State Cable # 00270; January 4, 1979 (LIMDIS), to: DOS/WashDC, from: Samuel Lewis/USEmb/Tel Aviv, (Esp. V.63:27-31). The Cable also notes the loss to Israel of some \$320m. p/a in exports and joint ventures.
- 63) See, *SNIE/78, op.cit.*, p.32.
- 64) See, *Looking Ahead: The Military Option*; State Cable # 10786, November 2, 1978 (EXDIS), to: DOS/WashDC, from: William Sullivan/USEmb/Tehran, (Esp. V.13-A: 12-20.) The Cable argues that, 'A military takeover is feasible, but at heavy long-term costs to U.S. interests' (p.1) and, 'It is highly doubtful that the military have the expertise...sufficient to run oilfields and...run a national budget...many moderate technocrats are reluctant to be associated with a military regime' (p.17).
- 65) See, *Seeking Stability in Iran*; State Memorandum (Secret/NODIS), DOS/NEA (19/12/78), to: Harold Saunders, from: Henry Precht, (Esp. V.13-B:19-24).
- 66) *ibid.*, p.2.
- 67) *ibid.* The memo notes that, 'In the last six weeks, the military government has demonstrated failure to restore order and restart the economy. Under its present leadership, the military is damned for its association with the Shah and its harsh methods' (p.22); and further that, 'We should begin now to educate the Saudis and others...away from the "communist in the wood-pile" thesis, for which there is little hard evidence' (p.5).

- 68) See, Sick, 'Iran', *op.cit.*, pp. 98-102, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, pp.381-2, see also; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Europe and the Middle East, *General Huyser's Mission to Iran: Hearings*, June 9, 1981, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1982). Huyser states that, *inter alia*, 'I had very strong feelings back in August and September, 1978 that there should have been more aggressive actions' (p.4).
- 69) See, Jimmy Carter, 'Keeping Faith', *op.cit.*, p.446, Brzezinski, *ibid.*, p.381, pp.563-4
- 70) See, Henry Precht, 'Stability in Iran' memo, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 71) See, SNIE/78, *op.cit.*, p.26.
- 72) *ibid.*
- 73) See, *Iran's Opposition and Foreign Policy*; Secret State Cable # 304889 (EXDIS), December 1, 1978, to: USEmb/London, from: SecState/WashDC, (Esp. V.13-A:73-77).
- 74) See, Secret State Cable: *Current Foreign Relations*; Issue No.6, February 7, 1979, 2:3, to: U.S. Embassies/worldwide, from: Lowell Fleisher/DOS. The Cable notes, 'we must assume Pakistan will also withdraw from CENTO...the Turks are very unlikely to remain the sole regional member' (decl. 4/2/86).
- 75) State Cable # 304889, *op.cit.*
- 76) See, *Iran: The Threat from the Left*, Intelligence memorandum (Secret/WNINTEL), CIA/OPA, (25/4/79-decl. 29/01/86) (hereafter, *CIA/Iran Left/79*), p.2.
- 77) See, Sullivan, 'Mission', *op.cit.*, pp.252-4.
- 78) See, Secret State Cable: *Current Foreign Relations*; Issue No.10, March 14, 1979 (decl. 2/86). The Cable notes, 'A substantial majority of Americans approved of the U.S. staying on the sidelines' (p.8).
- 79) The President's News Conference, Washington, February 27, 1979, cited in, *American Foreign Policy 1977-80* (Washington: GPO, 1981), Part IX (Doc.339), pp.735-6.
- 80) See, *The Further Report of Richard Cottam*; State Cable # 004510 (Confidential), DOS (7/1/79), to: USEmb/Tehran, from: Cyrus Vance, p.1 (Esp. V.10:126-127).
- 81) See, for example, President Carter's interview with ABC News, (December 14, 1978); Carter states, 'I made it very clear to...the Soviets that we have no intention of...permitting others to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.' Cited in Doc. 333, *American Foreign Policy 1977-80*.
- 82) State Cable # 01105 (Confidential), DOS (13/1/79), to: DOS, from: Malcom Toon/USEmb/Moscow; commenting on conversations with the Iran Desk Officer at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Cable notes, 'Soviets defend continued viability of the Treaty, saying that GOI had never abrogated it. He denied that recent Soviet media references to the Treaty represented a warning of possible Soviet intervention' (pp.1-2), (Esp. V.48:119-125).
- 83) See, *Iran: Khomeini's Prospects and Views*; Intelligence Memorandum, (Confidential/NOFORNDIS/ORCON), CIA/NFAC (19/1/79-decl.23/1/86), (hereafter, *CIA/Khomeini*). The memo also notes that Khomeini, 'has condemned the USSR for "misrepresenting" and failing to support "the sacret Islamic movement in Iran"' (p.10).

- 84) State Cable # 262958; *Meeting with Yazdi on Defense Issues* (Secret), DOS (6/10/79), to: USEmb/Tehran, from: Cyrus Vance, p.2. (Esp. V.34:177-181).
- 85) State Cable # 167423 (Secret/EXDIS), DOS (26/6/79-decl.4/3/85), to: USEmb/Tehran, from: DOS/Warren Christopher, p.2.
- 86) See, 'Meeting with Yazdi', *op.cit.*, p.1; Vance observes that, 'Yazdi said he would like to see the current FMS account cleared up, the security of classified equipment resolved, then go back to paying cash on an item by item basis'(p.5).
- 87) See, non-classified letter (18/10/79), to: Ibrahim Yazdi, from: Gen. Ernest Graves/DSAA.
- 88) See, *Policy Towards Iran*; State Briefing Memorandum (Secret/Sensitive), DOS/NEA, (5/9/79), to: Cyrus Vance, from: Harold Saunders/NEA, (hereafter, *NEA/Iran*), p.6. (Esp. V.16:69-76).
- 89) See, DOD Cable # 04204; *Disclosure Guidance for Iran* (Secret), DOD, (15/6/79), to: ARMISH-MAAG/Tehran, from: SecDef/WashDC/ASD:ISA, p.2. (Esp. V.1-6:64-75).
- 90) See, 'NEA/Iran', *op.cit.*, p.7; the memo recommends, 'When feasible, seek to include Iranian military officers in examination of the military threat'.
- 91) This is apparent from the above. See also, 'Record of Conversation with a Senior Iranian Diplomat in Norway'; *Intelligence Report* (Secret/NOFORNDIS), DIA (22/10/79), to: DIA, from: Daniel Gaumgartner/ODA/USEmb/Norway, (Esp. V.28:85-86). Source suggests that Yazdi will emerge from the Tehran power struggle as the new 'strongman' in Iran.
- 92) See, *NEA/Iran*, *op.cit.*, p.2; detailing the extent of regional insurgency in Iran, the memo records that, 'In these confused and uncertain circumstances, our posture has been to lie low'.
- 93) Confidential State Cable # 03626 (9/5/79), to: DOS, from: USEmb/Kabul; subject: The Current Soviet Role in Afghanistan.
- 94) Secret CIA Cable # 516886 (WNINTEL), CIA (19/9/79), to:USEmb/Tehran, (Esp. V.30:162-163). The Cable notes the arrival in Kabul of 'a senior Soviet military delegation' to, 'study the insurgency situation', and suggests that the Embassy, 'provide selected intel orally, rpt. orally, on Afghanistan to Yazdi or Bazargan.'
- 95) Here, DOS could record a partial success; see, State Cable # 10222, (Confidential) DOS (19/9/79), to: SecState/WashDC, from: USEmb/Tehran. After the Summit, the Cable notes, 'Yazdi stressed Independent role at the NAM, and made it clear that Iran did not follow Cuba's line during the meeting.'
- 96) Diplomatic correspondence from Ibrahim Yazdi to Cyrus Vance (30/5/79), (Esp. V.63:90-94).
- 97) State Action Cable (Confidential/LIMDIS), DOS (20/3/79), to: SecState/WashDC, from: George Lambrakis/USEmb/Tehran; the Cable records that, 'Bazargan...and his government...have not really taken a position on the treaty.'
- 98) State Cable # 03259 (Confidential), DOS (26/3/79), to: DOS from: USEmb/Tehran, subj: Iranian reaction to the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, (Esp. V.54:35).
- 99) See, *NEA/Iran*, *op.cit.*, p.6; in NEA's view, 'there is no indication that PGOI will discriminate against us when 1980 (oil) contracts are signed in December.'

d., p.2.

- 101) State Reporting Message (Confidential), DOS (18/4/79), to: DOS, from: Charles A. Naas/USEmb/Tehran, subj: 'The Anti-American Syndrome'.
- 102) See, CIA/Khomeini, *op.cit.*, p.8.
- 103) *ibid.*, p.9.
- 104) See, 'Anti-American Syndrome', *op.cit.*
- 105) CIA/Khomeini, *op.cit.*, p.10.
- 106) See, DOD, Office of Security-Threat Analysis Group, *Threat Assessment: Iran* (Secret/NOFORNDIS/NOCONTRACT/WNINTEL) DOD (14/6/79), (Esp.V.24:125-146).
- 107) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 108) *ibid.*, p.4.
- 109) *ibid.*, p.18; the assessment also records the 'lack of discipline' displayed by the Iranian 'Mujahideen' guards attached to the Tehran compound; and that, 'of definite concern is the Embassy's lack of control over the after-hours activities of (troop leader) Mashallah (Kashani) and his troops'(p.19).
- 110) Minute of SCC meeting, January 3, 1979, cited in Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.377.
- 111) See, for example, 'An Interview with Kissinger', *Time*, January 15, 1979, p.29. See also 'The Crumbling Triangle', *Economist*, December 9, 1978, p.11.
- 112) Interview between Henry Kissinger and the editors of the *Economist* (pt.2), *Economist*, February 10, 1979.
- 113) *ibid.*
- 114) *ibid.*
- 115) Comment by DOD officials, February 26, 1979, cited in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Sub-committee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, *U.S. Security Requirements in the Near East and South Asia: Hearings*, February, 6,7,20,27; March,4,18, 1980; 96th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1980) (hereafter, *SFRC/NESA Hearings*), p.354.
- 116) Comment by DOD official, cited in, 'Brown Said to Urge Boost of U.S. Forces', *International Herald Tribune*, February 20, 1979.
- 117) See, Sick 'Iran', *op.cit.*, pp.127-8.
- 118) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.447.
- 119) See, *ibid.*, p.446.
- 120) Secretary of Defense Brown, 'Face the Nation' interview, *CBS News*, February 25, 1979.
- 121) Secretary of State Vance, 'Face the Nation' interview, *CBS News*, March 18, 1979.
- 122) Secretary of Energy Schlesinger, 'Meet the Press' interview, *NBC News*, February 25, 1979.

- 123) Secretary Brown, 'Face the Nation', *op.cit.*
- 124) Comment by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Saud, March 2, 1979, cited in SFRC/NESA Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.354.
- 125) See, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on Europe and the Middle East, *Proposed Arms Transfers to the Yemen Arab Republic*: Hearings, March 12, 1979, 96th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter, *House Yemen Hgs.*), p.55, testimony of (Dep. Asst. Sec. State-NESA) William R. Crawford.
- 126) See, *Saudi Arabia and the United States: The New Context in an Evolving 'Special Relationship'* - Report for the House Sub-comm. on Europe and the Middle East (CRS/For. Affs. National Defense Division) August, 1981, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981) (hereafter, *CRS 'Saudi Arabia'*). CRS analysts note, 'an increasing sense of insecurity in the Saudi regime ...Policy differences between those...inclined toward closer collaboration with the United States and those tending toward closer ties with the radical-revolutionary Arab states are likely to be a major source of dissention'; p.22, see also, p.21, 55, in *ibid.*
- 127) Interview with Crown Prince Fahd, *Le Monde*, May 14, 1979.
- 128) Brzezinski had suggested to Carter that, 'it is advisable for you to reduce your involvement in continuing (Middle East) negotiations...we should also be focusing on Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, Sudan and North Africa'. See, confidential minute #91, (March 23, 1979) in Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.564.
- 129) See, House Yemen Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.8, Prepared Statement of William R. Crawford.
- 130) *ibid.*
- 131) For an extended discussion of Saudi policy in the YAR, see, for example, Anthony Cordesman, *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (Colorado: Westview, 1984), pp. 436-82.
- 132) House Yemen Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.30, testimony of William R. Crawford.
- 133) *ibid.*, p.37.
- 134) The Presidential waiver for section 36(b) of the AECA was signed on March, 7, see, *ibid.*, p.1, opening statement of Lee H. Hamilton.
- 135) *ibid.*, p.8, Prepared Statement of William R. Crawford.
- 136) *ibid.*, p.45, testimony of William R. Crawford.
- 137) *ibid.*, p.2, opening statement of Lee H. Hamilton.
- 138) *ibid.*, p.25, testimony of William R. Crawford.
- 139) *ibid.*, p.32.
- 140) *ibid.*, p.7, Prepared Statement of William R. Crawford.
- 141) *ibid.*, p.31, testimony of William R. Crawford.
- 142) See, CRS 'Saudi Arabia', *op.cit.*, p.10; the Report notes that, 'the prospect of a possible merger between the two Yemens...is a major Saudi concern.'

- 143) House Yemen Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.54, testimony of William R. Crawford.
- 144) Here, written State Department submission had denied the relevance of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution on the grounds that, 'the AWACS...are neither equipped for nor capable of engagement in combat with hostile forces by themselves', *ibid.*, p.51.
- 145) *ibid.*, testimony of Rep. Paul Findley.
- 146) Confidential Presidential minute #94 (April 12, 1979), cited in Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.565.
- 147) House Yemen Hgs. *op.cit.*, p.16, testimony of Lee H. Hamilton.
- 148) The Seventh Fleet SCTG consisted of three Frigates, one Guided Missile Cruiser and one Oiler; see, State Cable # 175611 (Secret), DOS/DOD (7/7/79-decl.4/3/85), to: U.S Embassies, Indian Ocean region, from: SecState, subj: Press Guidance for Indian Ocean Deployment; Cable stresses that, 'this is a routine deployment...in keeping with U.S. policy.'
- 149) The MIDEASTFOR was expanded by two Destroyers seconded from the Sixth Fleet. On October, 18 it was announced that a PACOM task force deployment would take place four times per year. See, SFRC/NESA Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.351.
- 150) See, Shahram Chubin, 'Repercussions of the Crisis in Iran', in Gregory Treverton (ed.), *Crisis Management and the Superpowers in the Middle East* (Farnborough: IISS, 1981), p.110.
- 151) See, William Quandt, *Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy* (Washington: Brookings, 1982), p.17.
- 152) See, Rober J. Lieber, 'Europe and America in the World Energy Crisis', *International Affairs*, Vol.55 No.4 (October, 1979), pp.531-46 (p.531).
- 153) See, Mohammed Abu al-Khail, 'The Oil Price in Perspective' in *ibid.*, pp.517-30 (p.521).
- 154) Here, 'As we move forward toward the 1980 electoral year', Brzezinski outlines the critical concern of, 'How to avoid the deep-seated perception of disarray in the national security process', confidential Presidential minute #86 (January 26, 1979) cited in Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.564.
- 155) See, Lieber, *op.cit.*, p.543.
- 156) *ibid.*, p.538.
- 157) In an Israeli view, the (bilateral) Camp David agreement was established by the administration as a prelude to an envisaged second-term initiative, when Carter 'would be free to compel Israel to accept a settlement to the Palestinian problem on his and Egyptian terms'; David Kimche, *The Last Option*, (London: Weidenfeld, 1991), pp.60-115, 125.
- 158) Ministerial statement by Lord Carrington (House of Lords) May 22, 1979, cited in, Stephen J. Artner, 'The Middle East: A Chance for Europe?', *International Affairs*, Vol.56 No.3 (Summer, 1980), pp.420-442 (p.435). Carrington had also proposed a supplemental to UN 242 with specific reference to Palestinian 'rights', see, *Financial Times*, February 13, 1980.
- 159) For text, see, the *Times* (London) June ,13, 14, 1980.
- 160) See, NEA/Iran, *op.cit.*, p.6.
- 161) Henry Kissinger, statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 31, 1979, cited in Henry Kissinger, *For the Record: Selected Statements 1977-80* (London: Weidenfield, 1981), p.219.

- 162) Kissinger, *ibid.*, p.218.
- 163) *ibid.*, p.193.
- 164) *ibid.*, p.197, p.201.
- 165) *ibid.*, p.193.
- 166) See, for example, Robert Moss, 'Who's Meddling in Iran?' *Washington Post*, November 12, 1978; Gary Sick records that 'Brzezinski...reproduced the Moss article, circulated it to the President and other top policy makers, and cited it in policy meetings for weeks', see, Sick, 'Iran' *op.cit.*, p.241.
- 167) See, SNIE/78, *op.cit.*, p.11; the Estimate notes that, whilst 'Iranian officials have occasionally alleged that the USSR has actively backed dissident groups in Iran', the agencies have 'no independent evidence to confirm this.'
- 168) Kissinger, 'Record', *op.cit.*, p.218.
- 169) See, Brezinski, *op.cit.*, p.474
- 170) See, Morton Kondracke, 'Home for Hardliners', *The New Republic*, February 4, 1978, p.21. Kondracke was commenting on Kissinger's move to the American Enterprise Institute and the CSIS at Georgetown.
- 171) Paul H. Nitze, *Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?* (Committee on the Present Danger) May 16, 1978, p.40.
- 172) Paul H. Nitze, 'Peace With Freedom: A Discussion by the Committee on the Present Danger', before the Foreign Policy Association, March 14, 1978, p.14.
- 173) *ibid.*
- 174) Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, pp.456-7.
- 175) See, 'Diplomatic correspondence: Ibrahim Yazdi', *op.cit.*
- 176) Cited in, State Cable # 08222 (Confidential), DOS (2/8/79) to: DOS, from: USEmb/Tehran, subj: U.S. Contingency Planning (Esp. V.34:130-131); the Iranian protest also noted the U.S. announcement, on June, 21, of the 110,000-man strike force 'to launch operations outside the NATO area' and that, 'A number of senior American officials...have openly mentioned the possibility of U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf area.'
- 177) State Cable # 10500 (Confidential), DOS (30/9/79), to: DOS from: Bruce Laingen/USEmb/Tehran, subj: U.S. Presence in Persian Gulf (Esp. V.16:114-115).
- 178) *ibid.*, the Cable also notes Iranian news stories alleging that six thousand U.S. troops are stationed at the Jufair base in Bahrain.
- 179) See, Intelligence Report (Secret/WNINTEL/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), CIA (24/10/79), to:(Dir.)INR, (Dir.)DIA (Esp. V.44:49-50).

- 180) Khomeini's message was delivered by his son, Ahmad to the captured embassy. See, Tahiri, *op.cit.*, p.123.
- 181) For example, a recent meeting between Bani Sadr and a CIA station officer is recorded in; Cable # 54173 (Secret/WNINTEL), CIA (4/9/79), to: DCI, from: CIA/Tehran (Esp. V.9:51-54).
- 182) See, Sick, 'Iran', *op.cit.*, p.238. The (2) AWACS deployment, taken in conjunction with joint (U.S./Egyptian) air exercises was publicly acknowledged on January 9, 1980. See, SFRC/NESA Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.351.
- 183) Sick, 'Iran', *op.cit.*, p.241.
- 184) See, Gary Sick, 'The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions', in Alvin Rubinstein (ed.), *The Great Game*, (NY: Praeger, 1983), p.72.
- 185) Sick, 'Iran', *op.cit.*, p.238.
- 186) See, Brzezinski. *op.cit.*, p.444, Sick, 'Strategy' *op.cit.*, p.72.
- 187) See, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Harold Brown, *Annual Report for FY 1979*, (Washington: GPO, February, 1978) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-79*), #5 (g.) 'Power Projection', p.87.
- 188) *ibid.*
- 189) See, (Capt.) Henry Leonard and Jeffrey Scott, *Methodology for Estimating Movement Rates of Ground Forces in Mountainous Terrain With and Without Defensive Obstacles: First Draft* (Washington: Study for the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation, October 12, 1979); see also, Kenneth Waltz, 'A Strategy for the RDF', *International Security*, Vol.5 No.4 (Spring, 1980), pp.49-73.
- 190) See, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Melvin Laird, *Annual Report for FY. 1973* (Washington: GPO, February, 1972), (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-73*) #5, 'Unified Command Plan', p.138.
- 191) See, 'The RDF: What's Been Done, What Should Have Been Done' (interview with REDCOM Gen. Volney Warner), *Defense Week*, June 30, 1980. Gen. Warner recalls that STRICOM, 'conducted joint operations with the Iranians and dropped the 82d.(airborne) in Iran', p.10f.
- 192) See, Members of Congress for Peace through Law, *Congressional Record of MCPL Report*, U.S. Senate, June 27, 1980. The Report notes that, 'Military equipment for the RDF in 1965 is similar to that requested in the FY 81 DOD budget', p.3.
- 193) See, Jim Hoagland, 'A Carter Doctrine for Middle East Oil?' *Washington Post*, June 3, 1979: D1, D2.
- 194) See, SFAC/NESA Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.353; see also, George C. Wilson, 'New U.S. Military Plan: European, Persian Focus', *Washington Post*, July 27, 1978, p.1.
- 195) DOD sources cited in, 'Carter Orders Steps to Increase Ability to Meet War Threats', *New York Times*, August 26, 1977, p.1.
- 196) Wilson, 'New U.S. Military Plan', *op.cit.*
- 197) See, *DOD Rep./FY-78*, *op.cit.*, pp.53-4.

- 198) See, 'I/A Iran'(1978), *op.cit.*
- 199) Thus, for Secretary Brown, 'Our near term objective is to assure that NATO could not be overwhelmed in the first few weeks of a blitzkrieg war, and we will...spend our resources preferentially toward that end', cited in Wilson, *ibid.*
- 200) See, Lawrence J.Korb, 'The 1979-83 Defense Program', *AEI Defense Review*, Vol.2, No.2 (April, 1978), p.24.
- 201) Wilson, *ibid.*
- 202) See, for example, 'Marines Face New Role as Reserve for Europe', *New York Times*, June 30, 1975, p.1; Binken and Record, *Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?* (Washington: Brookings, 1976); Jeffrey Record, 'Why Plan Rapid Deployment of the Wrong Kind of Force?', *Washington Star*, February 3, 1980, p.4.
- 203) See, W.O.Staudenmaier, 'Contemporary Problems of the Unified Command System', *Parameters*, Vol.IX (March, 1989), see also discussion in, Charles A. Kubchan, *The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security*, (Boston: Allen/Unwin, 1987), pp.84-6.
- 204) Brown's Japan visit had coincided with the public disclosure of the 'Swing Strategy' to transfer U.S. forces from Asia to the European Central Front; see, Richard Burt, 'War Plan Secret for 25 Years Creates Dilemma for U.S.', *New York Times*, October 9, 1979, p.1. In explaining the new U.S. emphasis on the Persian Gulf, the Secretary observed that, 'deployments in case of a conflict to that region might be the best way of improving the security of Western Europe and Japan as well as the United States', cited in, Bradley Martin, 'Brown Tries to Mollify Opponents of "Flexible Capability Forces"', *Baltimore Sun*, October 21, 1979, p.1.
- 205) According to Gen. Volney Warner, 'We took a good sized force of units that the RDF could pull from its pool...[and]...it took 169 days to close the units into the (Middle East) area with all equipment and support units'; Warner, Def. Week. interview, *op.cit.*, p.11f. See also, comment by Harold Brown, 'We have never fully acquired the agility and mobility required by such a (1-1/2 war) reinforcement strategy'; Defense Secretary Brown statement before the HASC (Hearings on Military Posture), January 29, 1980, cited in SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.350; for background, see, Walter R. Shope, 'The Lessons of Nifty Nugget', *Defense* 80 (December, 1980), pp.14-22, John J. Fialka, 'The Grim Lessons of Nifty Nugget', *Army* (April, 1980).
- 206) *New York Times*, October 26, 1979; see also, Cordesman, 'The Gulf', *op.cit.*, pp.449-50.
- 207) *Die Welt*, September 7, 1979
- 208) CRS 'Saudi Arabia', p.8, see also *Middle East*, August, 1982, pp.20-1.
- 209) The Mosque was retaken on December, 4 with the aid of French commandos. See, *New York Times*, February 25, 1980. In some accounts, the 'Ashura' riots left some 60 persons killed, 150 wounded and 600 imprisoned. See, *Middle East Economic Digest*, December 7, 1979, p.24.
- 210) Tehran Radio, December 11, 1979, January 7, 1980, cited in CRS 'Saudi Arabia', *op.cit.*, p.24.
- 211) The leader of the insurgents, Juhhaiman bin Saif al-Utaiba represented the militant 'Ikhwan' movement which regarded Shi-ism as heresy. For discussion, see, for example, T.R. McHale, 'A Prospect of Saudi Arabia', *International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No.4 (Autumn, 1980), pp.622-47.

- 212) The Arabian Peninsula Peoples Union (APPU) was established by Saudi Arabian sympathisers to Nasser in 1962. In some accounts, it maintained links with the (Palestinian) PFLP and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. See, CRS 'Saudi Arabia', *op.cit.*, p.22, see also, *Arab Report and Record*, 1975, p.614.
- 213) The U.S. embassy in Tripoli (Libya) was also attacked on December, 1. See, Sick 'Iran', *op.cit.*, p.233.
- 214) Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.447.
- 215) State Cable # 223010 (Confidential), DOS (24/8/79), to: U.S. Embassies Indian Ocean region, from: DOS/Reginald Bartholomew, subj: *Position of Indian Ocean Talks*; the DOS guidance to embassy staff, 'whose host countries are sending representatives to the Havana NAM' (summit) stresses that, 'we share the the belief...that the Indian Ocean should not become an arena for an arms race' and that, 'recent Soviet statements in Pravda about the status of the Indian Ocean talks have not been helpful' (Esp. V. 33:87-88).
- 216) See, *New York Times*, December, 14, 1978, 'Potomac War Fever', *The Nation*, February 3, 1979, A. Lin Neumann, 'Peace Groups Attack Hawk in Dove's Coop', *In these Times*, February 7-14, 1979.
- 217) General Seignious, Brzezinski observes, was chosen 'with (SALT II) ratification in mind', Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.337-8.

THE CARTER DOCTRINE (II): THE THIRD STRATEGIC ZONE.

The preceding section outlined the several dimensions of dislocation - economic, political, strategic - in United States' policy which had flowed from the Iranian revolution. U.S. reactions to the overthrow of the Shah were, as has also been shown, something of a composite. Military moves were set in train to upgrade U.S. intervention capability, but sustained attempts were also undertaken by the State Department, and by Secretary Vance in particular to reach accommodation with the provisional regime in Tehran. Again, if such diplomacy had derived a main impetus from the remaining 'liberal' factions in the foreign policy establishment, there were also more pragmatic hopes that the Islamic cleric's well-rehearsed animosity to Marxism could yet provide for a common opposition to the Soviet Union. Whilst on all sides of the policy community, there was agreement on the need to maintain a continuing dialogue with the Iranian military. The immediate focus for such potential rapprochement was, particularly after the events of April, 1978, the increasing level of Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

However, if U.S. policy-makers of all inclinations were to suffer mounting frustration in attempting to mobilize a strategic community of interest with Tehran, a new consensus had emerged after the November, 1979 hostage seizure. It had become clear that the captive U.S. embassy personnel occupied a central role in the Khomeini government's claims to political legitimacy. Indeed, the Carter administration's own legitimacy was becoming increasingly in question, as the NSC digested the 'sobering' results of the November strategic review and the 'Nifty Nugget' findings against a background of rising domestic calls for more forthright military action.

If the triumph of Islamic radicalism in Iran had presented the U.S. with a wholly new dilemma, whose impact on Washington's international and great power relations was as yet unquantifiable, the - always implicit - fusion of regional and strategic threat was to assume a dramatic and clear cut form after the Russian entry into Afghanistan. However, as the argument will show, whilst there was virtually universal agreement, if mixed satisfaction, in Washington that these events had signalled a watershed in U.S.-Soviet relations, the ending of détente was, in other respects, not without compensations to the United States - not the least in terms of the stipulative and organizational aspects of U.S. national security policy. It would remove institutionalized obstacles to unilateral U.S. initiatives, present clear objectives for the military planning process and simplify the terms of reference in relations with regional allies.

The following section will take up these perspectives in analysis of the comprehensive redefinition of the Gulf/Indian Ocean region in U.S. strategy following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. In particular, the analysis will focus on the restructuring of strategic assumptions and military posture in the region consequent from the Carter Doctrine.

1. 'A Militarization of Discourse': the Senate Hearings of March, 1980 and the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan.

If the fall of the Shah had thus far produced a growing NSC pressure on the U.S. military toward substantiating the option papers of PD-18, and the hostage crisis had seemingly demonstrated their inadequacy, the Gulf/Indian Ocean region was to take the

top of the Pentagon's agenda with the December 26, 1979 Soviet occupation of Kabul and parts of Afghanistan. This imperative for the policy process was underscored in President Carter's January 23, 1980 'State of the Union' address. 'Events in Iran and Afghanistan', Carter had declared, 'have dramatized for us the critical importance for American security and prosperity of the area running from the Middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia...Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.'¹ Whilst deliberately posed in such a way as to recall the 'Truman Doctrine' of 1947,² the reference to 'outside forces', in what was immediately termed the 'Carter Doctrine' had acquired a somewhat different function. Truman had raised the prospect of a Soviet military threat to shore up U.S. support for the Middle East holdings of America's principal ally - Britain - in the face of a still substantial domestic commitment to isolationism. Carter was responding to a gathering disengagement from U.S. policies by principal allies in the face of strong U.S. domestic and Congressional sentiment toward intervention.³

The domestic calculation behind the 'Carter Doctrine' was clear: the new policy orientation would 'draw a line' under what had been originally conceived as a desirable move toward a 'multiple advocacy' model of decision making in the areas of security and foreign affairs. However, in thus offering commendation to the President for, 'reversing the process [of] matching our foreign policy to our military capabilities'⁴ as one Senator was to put it, the Congress was also giving expression to the widespread feeling that the executive branch had lost control of the agenda.

The extent of the administration's reversals, internal and international, were to become clear as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to consider the issues in April and March, 1980. Given the multitude of dimensions to the crisis on the periphery, the Senate was to engage in a public review of U.S. regional policies of similar breadth to the earlier scrutiny of U.S. nuclear strategy at the hearings for SALT II. The latter treaty had, indeed, been indefinitely postponed on January, 4. The administration would now be concerned to demonstrate a further range of measures adopted to address what President Carter had described as the 'greatest threat to peace since the Second World War.'⁵ Analogies with the inter-war period were also favoured by some Senate witnesses, particularly with regard to the 'appeasement' of Soviet actions perceived by Senators in the European alliance. Here, in responding to Senator Jacob Javits' depiction of the 'Finlandization of Western Europe,'⁶ Carter administration special envoy Clark Clifford was to condemn the apparent willingness of 'some of our allies' to, 'go right ahead on a business-as-usual basis with the Soviet Union';⁷ and for former Under Secretary Joseph Sisco, 'The reaction of our European allies...has been short of what will be required in the 1980's in the common interest.'⁸ In the view of Senator George McGovern, the historical parallel concerned, 'not so much the Nazis going into the Rhineland as it is the unfortunate experience we had of stumbling into Vietnam.'⁹ Whilst for veteran U.S./Soviet relations analyst George Kennan, such analogies were indisputable in one respect, that 'never since the end of World War Two has there been such a far reaching militarization of thoughts and discourse in the capital.'¹⁰

Such pervasive 'militarization' of the Washington foreign policy community was perhaps rendered the more palpable by its seeming lack of differentiation. To be sure,

for the present focus of such 'discourse' in the Gulf/South-West Asia and Northern Indian Ocean, 'the task of devising a coherent and consistent U.S. policy', Senator Frank Church had observed, 'is especially difficult because of the diverse nature of possible threats to U.S. interests in the area.'¹¹ Albeit, the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman remained, 'troubled by the apparent lack of any clear administration assessment of the specific threats our military buildup is designed to counter.'¹² Perhaps fortuitously for those advocates of the pre-existing 'military buildup', at least since PD-18, in the administration, a firm basis for threat assessment was now inevitably focused by the six Soviet divisions in Afghanistan. In this for Defense Deputy Under Secretary Walter Slocombe, the 'Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not a surprise in the sense of being unexpected. We had already begun to shape our programmes and our diplomacy to improve our ability to deter and resist Soviet adventurism in remote areas and, specifically in that area of the world.'¹³ And moreover, as one administration official remarked to press reporters, 'I think the Soviets have done us a big favour.'¹⁴

Whilst the Soviet incursion represented, in the latter sense, a certain advantage to concerting U.S. policy making, the motivation for Moscow itself was less clear. Here, former NSC aide Helmut Sonnenfeld was to speculate on whether the Soviet Union was entering an 'imperial phase' of evolution.¹⁵ And again, for Joe Sisco, 'the Soviets did not miscalculate by going into Afghanistan...[but rather]...assessed correctly that we and our allies could not prevent the direct aggression in Afghanistan...[and]...took advantage of a strategic opportunity.'¹⁶ This argument, as Sonnenfeld further observes, is suggestive that the, 'advance of Soviet influence and presence in many parts of the world...may not have been occurring in accordance with a fixed pattern or original design, but it has

happened frequently enough that a pattern has in fact emerged whether intended or not.'¹⁷

If the simple 'opportunist' hypothesis advanced by Sisco can be read as complementary to Helmut Sonnenfeld's general observations on strategic voluntarism, the 'pattern' in Soviet strategy now emerging could, in the view of some analysts within the administration, be driven by a more compelling material motive on the behalf of the USSR - that of an accelerating demand for Middle East oil. Thus, in a declassified CIA study of Soviet energy requirements,¹⁸ DCI Stansfield Turner had predicted that Soviet oil production was set to peak (at 12m./bpd) in 1980 and decline thereafter to an estimated 10m./bpd by 1985.¹⁹ The significance here would not necessarily appear in drastic Soviet domestic shortages, but in a diminished Soviet ability to employ oil exports in concerting influence over the Comecon countries and in earning hard currency for the USSR economy. The 1979 Soviet proposal to convene a 'European Energy Conference'²⁰ had suggested an increased Soviet interest to assert its position in the wider political economy of oil. Of further U.S. concern was that the external political-strategic disorientation projected from falling oil returns would coincide with the internal discontinuity of Soviet succession politics. Here, noting that, 'President Brezhnev told President Carter at the (Vienna) summit that energy was Moscow's most pressing problem'²¹ the CIA was to argue that, 'these (coming) dislocations will put a great deal of strain on both the Kremlin leadership and the Warsaw Pact alliance. Relations within the Pact are also uneasy because of the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan. Given the advanced age of the Soviet leaders, the oil crunch is likely to occur during a large scale changeover in the Soviet Politburo.'²²

If analysts were to differ over the likelihood of a Soviet 'oil crunch', with the CIA's 1977/80 estimates in particular being strongly contested,²³ what was less open to question was the extent of Western (OECD) dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Here, the projected OECD aggregate would remain at some 62% throughout 1979-85.²⁴ Divided up, the European (EEC) percentage import figure would display a slight reduction, from 63% in 1979 to 62% gauged for 1985, whilst Japanese Gulf imports would, for the same period, remain constant at 73%. For the U.S., the percentage figure would actually rise from 31% (1979) to a projected 35% for 1985.²⁵ To compound such dependency, as oil economist Walter Levy had observed, 'there are fundamentally no acknowledged and accepted rules for conduct governing the (oil) trade.'²⁶ These had fallen away with the erosion of the post-war corporate oil structure after the 1971 Tehran Agreement. The International Energy Agency had been set up by Kissinger following the first (1973) oil crisis to address this problem. At the current (1980) sessions on February 18-19, however, the 19 members had resisted U.S. calls for a uniform percentage oil import cut and other moves toward a closer co-ordinated consumers oil regime.²⁷ Moreover, it was widely felt in Washington that, as SFRC panellist Joseph Binden was to tell the Senate, 'the IEA just really could not cope with a Persian Gulf shutdown.'²⁸ It would thus follow, for the Senator from Delaware, that, 'We are faced with either developing the capability through diplomacy or military means to ensure a steady uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf...and these are not necessarily mutually exclusive.'²⁹

It was thus not necessary to adopt a 'strong' version of the 'Soviet hegemony' thesis - of the kind advanced by Nitze - or otherwise, a 'weak' version which viewed Soviet policy as intent upon reducing the West to 'economic vassals'³⁰ through less direct

'intimidation' of the Middle East producers, for U.S. planners to see the danger in a possible Soviet oil shortfall. To be sure, as Senator Pell had argued, 'there is no reason why (the Soviet Union) can't purchase energy from that area the way we do.'³¹ This point was, however, well - if obliquely - taken in the CIA's approach to the 'Geopolitics of Energy'. In the Agency's view, 'the entrance of the Soviet Union into the free world's competition for oil will not only further squeeze supplies but entails major security risks.'³² The latter would obtain perhaps especially if, 'the Soviets...hold out as a carrot the glimmer of a stable political atmosphere'³³ for the Gulf, by thus admitting an increased 'nonaligned' leverage on U.S. policy amongst the producers themselves. Heretofore, while there had been much speculation on the evidence for an 'historical drive' to the Middle East on behalf of Soviet Union - and indeed, its Czarist predecessors - of which an imputed desire for oil was only the most recent manifestation, the clear historical fact was that, as George Kennan observed, 'the only interruption of this (oil) supply we have had to date came from the Arabs.'³⁴

II. A Doctrine without a Strategy? - the Inventory of Rapid Deployment, Spring, 1980 - FY 1981-2.

The obvious politico-diplomatic constraints on the administration entering a full account of the 'diverse nature of possible threats to U.S. interests' in the Gulf/Indian Ocean region had lead to some critics describing Carter's January, 23 pronouncement as 'a doctrine without being a strategy'.³⁵ 'The administration', Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church observed, '...is clearer about the specific actions it is undertaking to increase U.S. military strength in south-west Asia than it is about the

policies these actions are designed to support.'³⁶ The administration's military moves to date, including the October 18, 1979 MIDEASTFOR upgrade (by two Sixth Fleet destroyers and a quadrennial carrier group deployment from PACOM)³⁷ and Harold Brown's December, 14 announcement of the Rapid Deployment Force, had been - not surprisingly - recapitulated by the White House Press Office to ensure the maximum of publicity. Such an approach had, to be sure, positive utility in the sense that an unqualified military buildup would admit enhanced political flexibility to the administration, whilst allowing respective 'target' constituencies in the Middle East, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and U.S. domestic politics to draw their own conclusions. It would have the further merit of masking the still considerable policy differences within the Carter cabinet itself.³⁸ These, however, were to increasingly concern modalities rather than principle. Since Carter's own expressed 'conversion' to a more militant anti-Soviet approach after Afghanistan,³⁹ the centre of gravity for decision making had shifted decisively to the NSC.⁴⁰ Cyrus Vance had resigned on April 29, 1980. His replacement as Secretary of State, Ed Muskie was, as Brzezinski relates, 'much less informed (than Vance) about international affairs'⁴¹ and overall, for the National Security Advisor, the administration was by now geared toward 'a genuinely balanced and effective foreign policy.'⁴²

If there was thus some clear momentum for a comprehensive, 'combined arms' enhancement of U.S. military presence in the N.W. Indian Ocean, toward a 'formal recognition...that America's security had become interdependent with the security of three central and inter-related strategic zones' (Western Europe, the Far East and the Middle East/Indian Ocean),⁴³ questions would still remain concerning military posture,

likely mission, and allocation of resources. However, advantageously for the administration, the need to present a clear cut military mission for the proposed forces had been realized and, to an extent, addressed in the 'Consolidated Guidance' of June, 1979. On June, 28 press reports confirmed that incoming Army COS General Edward C. Meyer had prepared force assignments for possible RDF contingencies.⁴⁴ And whilst in public, as Hubert Humphrey observed before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 'little discussion has been offered by the DOD about the actual scenarios under which the RDF would be employed,'⁴⁵ the 'specific threat' emerging in the DOD planning process was that of a Soviet incursion into Northern Iran.

It is proposed to take up a more detailed consideration of the grounds for such U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-regional contingencies below. It is first necessary to establish the force structures within which the administration could act to meet them. In terms of existing (March, 1980) U.S. capability in the North West Indian Ocean region, a DOD statement had placed this at two carrier task groups (two carriers, 120 combat aircraft, 15 other surface combatants, four amphibious ships transporting a Marine Amphibious Unit [1,800 troops] and six support vessels). In terms of possible reinforcements, the DOD could insert tactical aircraft in a 'few hours', and 'significant units' backed by AWACS within a few days. In addition, battalion sized units of airborne forces (82nd./ab) could arrive within 48 hours and the entire division could 'close' (i.e., fully deploy) in two weeks. A self-contained 'Marine Amphibious Force' (one division plus one air wing) could be deployed within a month.⁴⁶ The above force levels had been enhanced in accordance with the November 23, 1979 (Camp David) NSC option schedule, which had included a naval blockade of Iran and the seizure of the Kharg Island oil terminal.⁴⁷ On

January 14, 1980, U.S. naval strength in the Indian Ocean was temporarily increased to 25 ships with the addition of a third carrier group (the USS 'Nimitz'). Whilst the military option against Iran actually chosen - the failed April, 24 hostage rescue - reflected a perceived need for 'restraint' following the Soviet entry into Afghanistan,⁴⁸ wider contingencies for Iran and elsewhere were addressed in co-ordinated AWACS - Carrier Task Group exercises of January and February⁴⁹ and the announcement, on March 5, that seven 'Near Term Prepositioning Ships' (NTPS) containing equipment sufficient to support a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) of about 12,000 men and to sustain several USAF fighter squadrons were to be deployed in June to Diego Garcia.⁵⁰

In terms of future force levels envisaged in the FY 1981/2 procurement schedule, air and sea-lift assets were to figure prominently. For the latter, the Defense Department was requesting eight 'SL-7' fast container ships converted from civilian use. These could deliver a mechanized division, plus support, from the U.S. East Coast to Gulf Persian locations in 20-6 days⁵¹ and were costed at \$341.5m.⁵² For the long term, the administration sought construction of a new class of 12 'Maritime Prepositioning Ships' (MPS - T-AKR) sufficient to support three brigade sized MAGTFs for 30 days by 1987.⁵³ Increased air assets (for FY 1981) would include the C-5 wing modification programme (\$178.6m.), C-141 in-flight refuelling modifications (\$25.6m.), KC-10A (aerial tanker) procurement (\$309.7m.) and a new strategic lift aircraft, the 'C-X' (\$80.7m.).⁵⁴ Many of the above had, in fact, been programmed before the Afghanistan crisis and were reclassified as RDF capable, notably the 'CX'.⁵⁵ Combat assets assigned to the RDF included four Army divisions (two a/b., one inf., one mech.), one armoured brigade, one air combat (heliborne) brigade and a Marine Amphibious Force. For the Navy; three

carrier battle groups, one surface action group, five sq./ASW, and six amphibious assault ships were assigned, whilst Airforce capability was extended to 12 tactical fighter squadrons, two tac/recon. squadrons, and two tac./airlift wings. To enable in-theatre logistic support for these forces, the DOD was also requesting \$367m. in military construction funding ('Milcon')⁵⁶ (this will be considered in more detail below).

The Carter administration's upgraded defence estimates were not, to be sure, restricted to enhanced theatre capability for the 'third strategic zone'. Much of the Army and USAF assets were also earmarked for NATO contingencies.⁵⁷ The overall Rapid Deployment 'concept' however, as envisaged by the appointed RDJTF Commander, Lt. Gen. (USMC) Kelly, was to consider such forces as a, 'reservoir of mainly CONUS based units from which forces can be drawn to cope with a specific contingency.'⁵⁸ The 'task', is thus to, 'provide a capability for deploying force packages, of varying size and structure, to any region of the world.'⁵⁹ Initial, (1978-9) planning had proposed to retain the existing REDCOM designation of light, airmobile units uncommitted to either NATO or PACOM contingencies.⁶⁰ Here, the upgrading of the RDF force structure to include NATO-allocated armour and artillery reflects the growing strategic interest of the Harold Brown DOD in developing options for 'horizontal escalation'.⁶¹ 'The Soviets', Defense Secretary Brown had declared, 'must consider the possibility that renewed aggression by them may lead to a much wider war, escalated in both intensity and geography.'⁶²

The concept of 'horizontal escalation', whilst endorsed by Brzezinski as a valid military option,⁶³ was strongly resisted by some in the defence community.⁶⁴ Put simply,

such objections revolved around the difficulties of establishing a calculus of strategic equivalence. What did, though, find a more general agreement within the administration was the political return perceived in establishing the prospect of a 'much wider war' as a possible threat. The RDF, as a unilateral U.S. enterprise, was clearly the touchstone of such 'resolve'. The earlier (1967) proposals for similar forces, as DOD Under Secretary Walter Slocombe reminded Senators, had been rejected, 'because of a belief (in the Congress) that if the United States had the ability to use military force, it would be tempted to use it unwisely.'⁶⁵ Such belief was no longer discouraged by the administration. The actual military mission of the RDJTF had, however, been arrived at perhaps as much by intra-bureaucratic, intra-service and intra-regional considerations as by calculation of likely actions by the Soviet Union. It is now proposed to take up the grounding for RDF strategy in more detail.

III. The RDF: Strategy, Threat-assessment and Forward Defence.

It is important to distinguish between the established provisions for counter-insurgency - which can be more properly taken up in the politico-military context of regional alliance diplomacy - and the development of the 'primary mission' for the RDF involving large scale deployment of regular U.S. forces for inter-state conflict. Here, with the fall of the Shah, the focus for U.S. contingency planning in South West Asia had shifted from a possible Iraqi threat to Khuzestan - and the lower probability of renewed India-Pakistan hostilities - to considerations of a Soviet advance into Iranian Azerbaijan. To be sure, the latter prospect had, particularly following Afghanistan, a certain surface

plausibility. The Soviet Union had occupied the province during World War II. Moscow had, moreover, reaffirmed the 'mutual security' provisions of the 1921 Iran-Soviet treaty, despite repeated disavowals by the Bazargan and Bani-Sadr governments in Tehran. The Soviet move in Afghanistan suggested, for many observers, a greater propensity toward military risk-taking.⁶⁶ However, whilst intelligence of April, 1980 had detailed the presence of 125,000 troops on the Soviet Azeri border, and an enhanced, 28 vessel naval presence in the Arabian sea,⁶⁷ this fell considerably short of the capability to mount a full scale invasion. The present likelihood of such a move would seem further discounted by Soviet diplomatic rapprochement with the Tehran regime. The wider strategic issue - concerning possible Soviet cross-border actions in the event of a general outbreak of hostilities - would indeed require the assignment of U.S. forces. Yet, while such contingency was to comprise the main planning assignment for the RDF, it would also represent, in operational terms, the point of departure.

In public session the administration was adamant that U.S. military action in the region was 'scenario dependent'⁶⁸ and that 'planning must consider a broad range of potential threats.'⁶⁹ Not the least of these was perceived from Iran itself. Possible U.S. action in Khuzestan had, as we have seen, been under consideration at the November/December, 1979 meetings of the SCC. The difficulties of mounting a large scale assault on the Southern oilfields, brought out in the 1975 CRS Report on 'Oilfields as Military Objectives', were again emphasized by the Pentagon. The adoption of a primary anti-Soviet mission - involving forward defence of Iran in the North - would, however, have the merit of incorporating the options of earlier planning whilst concerting a more favourable response from the JCS. In concrete terms, the revised strategy envisaged a

three phase, deployment wherein the attrition of Soviet advances through the two successive mountain chains (the Northern Qareh Dagħ-Elburz-Golul Dagħ and the Southern Zagros) would permit the establishment of a favourable terrain for combined operations in Khuzestan. The core contingency of a 'combined arms' defence South of the Zagros mountains had, though been arrived at against a background of intense inter-service bargaining. And whilst it is difficult to assign relative weight to such factors, it is also apparent that the need to engage service co-operation had figured strongly as a counterpoint to more abstract threat-assessment formation.

As General Kelly made clear to the February, 1980 sessions of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the development of force structures and strategic priorities 'has gone through an evolutionary process...during this past year.'⁷⁰ Here, against a background of the initial PD-18 focus on REDCOM of September, 1977 and the June, 1979 formation of an Army-dominated 'Unilateral Corps', some analysts had argued strongly for the whole RDF mission to be allocated to the Marines. The latter had the advantage, as some Senators pointed out, of being designed for precisely such contingencies.⁷¹ The drawbacks, though, were threefold. Firstly, as the Corps lacked heavy armour/artillery and the DOD was unwilling to upgrade its 'organic' tactical air (TACAIR) capability (the 'AV-8B'), actions would be confined to the seizure of a beachhead in Khuzestan. Secondly, whilst the administration was, in conclave, prepared to contemplate a divided Iran (see below), the public focus on such a strategy implied by a Corps-dominated RDF could complicate U.S. diplomatic initiatives in the region, and send the wrong 'signal' to the Soviet Union. Thirdly, a commitment to such a demanding mission was received with mixed reactions in the Marine Corps itself. Although clearly

wishing a major input to RDF strategy, it was also unwilling to abandon other roles in NATO and the Pacific which such a concentration would entail.⁷² Confining the RDF to the Marines would also meet strong opposition from the Army - involving the probable dissolution of REDCOM - and from a U.S. Airforce reluctant to be restricted to an essentially logistics role.

The NSC planning group's inclusion of options for the more demanding 'forward defence' mission was thus pitched to elicit the greatest co-operation from the services. Army air assault and special forces were assigned an interdiction role in the 'choke points' of the Northern (Qareh/Golul Dagħ) mountain chain, whilst the Airforce was to plan for tactical 'deep strike' missions on advancing Soviet columns and prevent the establishment of Soviet airmobile forces beyond the mountain barrier. A key element in Airforce strategy was the assignment of 28 B-52H's (based in North Dakota) as a conventionally armed 'Strategic Projection Force' which could be deployed to Diego Garcia.⁷³ Concurrently, a beachhead in the Khuzestan oilfields would be occupied by the initial Marine Amphibious Brigade - in General Kelly's view, the 'smallest force capable of projecting itself against opposition'⁷⁴ - which, within 90 days, could be supported by an additional two MAB's, three army divisions (including one armoured and one mechanized infantry) and ground-based tactical air.⁷⁵

The extent that inter-service considerations had influenced the setting of the administration's strategic priorities in Iran was further apparent in the bounds of the command structure. Whilst the unified (RDJTF) command, established on March 1, 1980, had routine responsibility to 'train, exercise...and employ'⁷⁶ units assigned to the

RDJTF from the four services, the peacetime planning function was subordinate to the REDCOM commander, General Volney Warner. However, on deployment, the assignment would shift to the appropriate regional command. This, for the Persian Gulf region was EUCOM. And while the division of responsibilities in the Army itself was, as Warner acknowledged, 'causing some difficulties,'⁷⁷ the need for inter-service co-ordination had led to a further link in the command chain being established (against Warner's advice),⁷⁸ 'directly to the National Command Authority' (the JCS).⁷⁹ Here, given that any significant Gulf contingency - particularly involving the Soviet Union - would result in increased tension in other theatres, choices concerning the assignment of 'joint earmarked' NATO and PACOM assets would assume a critical importance. Restrictions on strategic lift capability would, moreover, lend a further criticality to the associated time factors which could determine inter-service and inter-theatre priority.⁸⁰ Thus, although General Kelly was to (accurately) state that 'the real purpose behind the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is to harmonize the capabilities of all the services,'⁸¹ it is also clear that involvement in the RDF mission was something none of the services themselves could afford to downgrade.

IV. Non-Soviet Contingencies and Regional Strategy.

The previous section has outlined the institutional background to U.S. 'Rapid Deployment' strategy, and indicated the facility of the focus on Soviet contingencies in securing the optimal inter-service response for joint planning. However, whilst the declared 'primary mission' of the RDF was to resist a 'possible large scale Soviet

invasion of the Persian Gulf region,'⁸² it was also apparent that the capability to conduct a 'high confidence' defence of the region would not be in place until at least 1986.⁸³ In some estimates, a current (1980) airborne deployment of one light and one heavy division would, for example, require all of U.S. Military Airlift Command's 77 C-5A and 276 C-141 aircraft and take up to five weeks.⁸⁴ Of more immediate application to the 'regional security framework', the administration was also considering 'a number of potential non-Soviet contingencies' wherein a 'relatively small RDJTF would be adequate'. Here, the focus would be on 'advisory teams, special forces and logistics.'⁸⁵ In this, the 'apparent lack' of administration guidelines on the issues had a clear diplomatic utility: a specific concern was to avoid the political complications attending the 1975 'Oilfields' Report and the contemporaneous speculation by President Ford and Secretary Schlesinger on the consequences of 'actual strangulation of the industrial world'. The obvious point of departure for 'non-Soviet contingencies' was, though, counter-insurgency in the lesser Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. 'Military aggression', as General Kelly's had acknowledged, '...is not the only - or even the most likely - threat that we might face.'⁸⁶ Thus, though officials were careful to stress that a full mobilization of the RDF would only occur in the event of aggression by 'outside powers', the routine subvention of 'security and stability' in the Gulf would be addressed, as Under Secretary Komer informed the Senate Armed Services Committee, through a scale of: [1] 'local forces' (security assistance), [2] 'military presence' (joint exercises and periodic TACAIR and Marine deployments) and [3] 'surge capabilities' from PACOM or the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.⁸⁶

Operationally, the main secular assignment of the RDJTF thus falls naturally into two

categories: firstly, that involving special forces in an essentially internal security role; secondly, a mission involving external threat, possibly in support of internal insurrection. In regard to the first, Senate testimony by Defense Intelligence (DIA) officials had answered (Armed Services Committee Chairman) Senator Henry Jackson's request to assess the 'real threats to security' in the Gulf by outlining the 'significant potential' for subversion by 'expatriates' - largely Palestinian - in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE. Bahrain, continuing base to the upgraded MIDEASTFOR, had indeed undergone riots (from within the 60% Shi'a community) at the time of the Iranian revolution.⁸⁸ Albeit, in the DIA's view, 'the governments of these three countries are confident that they can control any disturbances.'⁸⁹ However, intelligence analysts were to also note that, 'the Mecca incident has made all regional states appreciate the possibility that an undetected or low profile group can literally emerge from nowhere and cause major security problems.'⁹⁰ The latter prospect had also occurred to Zbigniew Brzezinski. On June 3, 1980, the National Security Advisor received Presidential assent to set up 'a very small rapid intervention force...for the purpose of helping a friendly government under subversive attack.'⁹¹

If the first category of RDF mission was concerned with the provision of low visibility internal support, particularly in the lesser Gulf states, for the second a demonstrable U.S. profile was required. Here, the respective 'military presence' and 'surge capability' roles represent passive and active responses to essentially external contingencies involving the larger regional actors. Albeit, it was widely recognized that local inter-state conflict could involve both an internal component, for example, an attempted coup, and the indirect involvement of the Soviet Union. Despite the heightened

focus on regional threats in Washington, however, the actual U.S. security position in the Middle East had, in some ways, improved since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Earlier contingency planning had focused on the possible Iraqi threat to Iran, Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. By mid-1980, though, the administration was confident that Iraq would not serve as a Soviet 'proxy' for exerting leverage or launching outright hostilities on either Kuwait or the Saudi regime.⁹² Baghdad had, indeed, condemned the Soviet actions in Afghanistan at the (January, 1980) Islamic summit in Pakistan and was, in a broad sense, aligned with U.S. policy in North Yemen and Somalia. For the Iraqi threat to Iran, this, as will be shown, would now become, objectively, an asset to U.S. policy in the region.

Of the remaining powers, Saudi Arabia was thought unlikely to be subject to an internal coup due to the diffused nature of the political process, dispersion of the armed services and the 'pervasiveness' of the al-Saud family.⁹³ Oman, central to RDF forward logistics co-ordination, was similarly thought to be internally stable; 'their society', in (DPP/JCS) General Richard Lawson's view, 'has a stronger fabric than the others in the area.'⁹⁴ Thus, the principal 'external' concern of RDF strategy was on North and South Yemen. Here, speculation in the Senate was focused on a PDRY takeover of the North, utilizing disaffected indigenous forces and graduated support from the Soviet Union. To be sure, such a development would, given historical precedent, seem the most likely of possible crisis scenarios. It had earlier provided a rationale for the administration's emergency \$172m. MAP supplemental. In Senate executive session, Henry Jackson had recapitulated that, 'Can you think of an easier (strategy) for the Soviets to employ?'⁹⁵ In this instance, however, the administration would focus on the

actual local conditions in the Yemen Arab Republic itself, rather than on recent analogy and presumed Soviet strategy and capability. Whilst agreeing that 'Unification', between the Yemens, '...could constitute a serious threat to U.S. interests',⁹⁵ Robert Komer was to stress a perceived post-Afghanistan 'worry' at possible Soviet designs from the current North Yemen leadership (Col. Abdullah Saleh) and, critically, the extent of a substantially armed 'opposition...to unification under a South Yemeni dominated regime', which could mount a 'strong factional resistance...even to the point of civil war'. Under such conditions, Under Secretary Komer concludes that, even were a unitary state to be established, it would be 'unlikely, at least in the near term, to threaten or harass its moderate neighbours.'⁹⁷

Yet, the shifting locus of regional threat was of mixed utility to the administration's wider strategic ambitions. On the one hand, as Senator Frank Church had observed, 'the persistence of bitter regional quarrels, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Indo-Pakistan antagonism, pose continuing difficulties for U.S. attempts to organize even an informal security system.'⁹⁸ Whilst on the other, the apparent lessening of tension in other areas - such as Saudi relations with Iraq - combined with the clear administration priority given to great power issues and a vigorous 'peace offensive'⁹⁹ from Moscow itself, was admitting greater leverage to the respective regional allies to pursue their particularist claims. Thus, if the initial component of Indian Ocean strategy sought to address the immediate security position in the Gulf, the wider politico-military bounds of the Regional Security Framework would involve; firstly, the co-ordination and expansion of existing intra-regional linkages and, secondly a more 'formal' provision for American bases and pre-positioning facilities - sanctioned by treaty - which could admit the possibilities of a greater unilateral U.S. action. These will be considered in turn.

V. The Regional Security Framework: Third Party Co-ordination on the Soviet Northern Tier.

In laying the ground for the proposed 'Regional Security Framework' for the Gulf and south-west Asia, the administration was aware, to again cite Senator Church's observations, that previous attempts to superimpose a great power strategic framework on regional subsystems - such as the Baghdad Pact and CENTO - 'never developed much indigenous strength' and that, 'many of the problems that have for a generation hampered U.S. efforts to create a barrier to the expansion of Soviet power still exist in the South West Asia-Persian Gulf region, sometimes in a more acute form than in the past.'¹⁰⁰ Underlying these vicissitudes, for the SFRC Chairman, was the fact that, 'Few countries in this part of the world have created effective political systems.'¹⁰¹ Prominent amongst the latter stood the old linchpin of CENTO, Pakistan.

Here, given that relations had been consistently strained throughout the Carter Presidency, the administration could avail the opportunity of the Afghan crisis to restore some measure of strategic consensus with Islamabad. President Carter had thus telephoned Pakistan's military leader, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq on December 28, 1979 to assure him of the continuing validity of the 1959 'executive agreement' on 'appropriate (joint) action (to specified external threats)...including the use of armed forces'; this was publicly reaffirmed by Brzezinski on December, 30. Carter was to also take the occasion of the first major policy speech on Afghanistan (on January, 4) to announce a \$400m. military and economic aid package - bypassing Symington-Glenn provisions - to the Zia regime.¹⁰² It was further decided that National Security Advisor

Brzezinski would accompany Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Pakistan for joint consultations on February, 2.

Though Brzezinski had expressed himself 'delighted' with the 'tangible results' of the February mission,¹⁰³ the restitution of a close U.S. strategic relationship with Pakistan was not without cost; notably, in the first instance, to Washington's own credibility. Thus, whilst the evolving U.S. provisions for a 'regional security framework' had necessarily contemplated a consonant role for Pakistan's (well regarded) military assets, the setting out of concrete MAP schedules represented a clear reversal of administration policy. Previous military aid had been cut off as recently as April, 1979. U.S.-Pakistan relations had further deteriorated with the execution of former President Bhutto later the same month. The Zia government's apparent indifference to U.S. opinion was again demonstrated in the U.S. embassy burning of December, 4. The administration's initial aid offer, which in Brzezinski's own view should perhaps, 'have been expressed more tangibly,'¹⁰⁴ was memorably dismissed by Zia as 'peanuts', and the Brzezinski mission of February, 2 deliberately rescheduled to succeed those of an Islamic delegation and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua. Moreover, as was made clear to the NSC/State delegation, the Zia regime's own security concerns were assigning the Soviet/Afghan threat a lower priority than that of securing the capability to conduct Pakistan's traditional military rivalry with India.¹⁰⁵

Here, as South Asia analyst Selig Harrison observes, the established U.S. policy of, 'including Islamabad in a Middle East-Persian Gulf strategic consensus...ignores the ethnic, cultural, historical and geopolitical ties that orient Pakistan to South Asia.'¹⁰⁶ The

Carter administration had, to be sure, attempted, and to an extent succeeded in reversing this pattern. Although the (July, 1979) return of Congress 'I' to office in India suggested a possible departure from the 'true nonalignment' professed by the Desai government, the administration had some hopes - buttressed by favourable trading relations and continuing U.S. uranium shipments to the Indian nuclear programme - that the earlier diplomatic gains could be preserved. Presidential special envoy Clark Clifford was thus dispatched to India in January, 1980 as a counterpoint to the Brzezinski/Christopher mission.¹⁰⁷ This was to have limited impact, however, as New Delhi correctly perceived a return of U.S. policy to its traditional mould of subscribing Pakistani particularism in South Asia.

With the fall of the Shah, the 'Peking-Tehran-Islamabad axis'¹⁰⁸ under -pinning three U.S. administration's South Asian strategy had indeed lost the 'keystone' of containment of the Soviet Northern tier. The linkage between Beijing and Islamabad - symbolized in the (1978) completion of the trans -Himalayan 'Karakorum highway'¹⁰⁹ - remained, though, as active as in the era of Yahya Khan and Zhou Enlai. With the July, 1977 overthrow of the Bhutto/PPP government, moreover, Saudi support for the new Zia regime's (Sunni) Islamic orthodoxy found Riyadh increasingly displacing secular or Shi-ite Iran as the focus of Pakistan's regional diplomacy. Saudi economic aid had amounted to some \$7.5bn. by 1980,¹¹⁰ for its part, Pakistan was to service up to 90% of (incoming) Saudi foreign labour requirements¹¹¹ and provide a 1,500 strong contingent of military advisors to the Saudi military and National Guard.¹¹² Pakistan had also provided military missions to some 21 other countries, mainly in the Middle East, including Kuwait, the UAE, Oman and Jordan.¹¹³ For the administration's renascent

'Northern tier' strategy, Defense Secretary Harold Brown had visited Beijing immediately prior to the Brzezinski mission, to further advance a 'complementary' approach to the Soviet Union amongst the respective U.S. interlocutors.¹¹⁴ Brzezinski was to return from Islamabad via Riyadh to facilitate Saudi participation in a more comprehensive Pakistan arms package unencumbered by U.S. 'budgetary stringency's'.¹¹⁵

Overall, if the initial phase of the Carter administration's diplomatic activism at the United Nations had dispersed much of the 'routine' hostility toward the U.S. amongst nonaligned and third world countries, the aims of Brzezinski's post-Afghanistan diplomacy further envisaged a growing community of interest with the Islamic nonaligned nations in actively resisting the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the CENTO alliance in April, 1979, had removed a residual barrier to concerting such ostensibly 'third party' opposition to Soviet power in South Asia. Pakistan had capitalized its success in hosting the January, 1980 Islamic conference with attaining formal membership of the Non-Aligned Movement.¹¹⁶ 'The Pakistani leaders' Brzezinski relates, '...took the position that their security interest would be better served...with Pakistan publicly distancing itself from the United States and instead collaborating more closely with other Moslem countries in opposing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.'¹¹⁷

While the administration could thus record some progress in concerting the politico-diplomatic linkages of the 'regional security' strategy the politico-military aspects would require an established forward logistics infrastructure. Planning for the Iran hostage mission had indicated the difficulties of deploying even existing U.S. forces using current base assets and 'surge capability'. To be sure, DOD planning had implicitly assumed

a right of access to the substantial Saudi infrastructure under crisis conditions, as it had with former U.S. facilities in Pakistan. Riyadh had, however, consistently made clear its opposition to a formal military agreement with the U.S., whilst for Pakistan, General Zia had not renewed the offer of the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar - favoured by some in the U.S. Navy¹¹⁸ - made by the late President Bhutto. The U.S. tenure on the existing MIDEASTFOR facilities in Bahrain was also, as had been demonstrated in 1973, conditional upon local factors. The provision for 'base redundancy' thus assumed a critical importance for the DOD. For securing Congressional funding, such bases would further require the sanction of a formal treaty. Accordingly, the task of negotiating regional access, undertaken after the December 4, 1979 NSC meetings, would assume a new urgency with the three Indian Ocean states which were more willing to formally participate in the administration's forward strategy. The countries in question were Oman, Somalia and Kenya.¹¹⁹

VI. The Regional Security Framework (II): Regional Access, Base Redundancy and Forward Deployed Logistics.

Although the locations of the respective littoral states were, in some respects, fortuitous, their selection was also indicative of the new U.S. scope in defining the Indian Ocean as a unitary theatre of operations. For Oman, the negotiations, conducted by the joint DOD/State delegation under (DOS Director of Politico-Military Affairs) Reginald Bartholomew, were to result in the signing of a formal treaty on June 4, 1980.¹²⁰ Overall, the terms would permit U.S. access to facilities in Seeb (airfield/port), Thumrait (airfield), Muscat (airfield/port), Salalah (airfield) and Masira Island (airfield), 'in

circumstances where both countries would benefit from this use'.¹²¹ Oman, given its strategic location on the Straits of Hormuz, had attracted the interest of earlier U.S. military planning. The Sultanate had been granted FMS eligibility status in January, 1973 and in January, 1975, was considering a request for landing and airspace access to Masira Island from the Ford administration.¹²² The strategic and geographical advantages of Oman were reinforced by the Sultanate's political orientation. Oman had, alone amongst the (other) Arab League states, publicly supported the Camp David accords. It was also, moreover, party to a 'deep and long-standing' security relationship with Britain. Here, an HCFA Staff Report notes that, 'The three service chiefs and many of the Sultan's (Qabus) advisers are British citizens.'¹²³ Oman was thus the only U.S. forward position in the Gulf where the Pentagon could expect more or less automatic military commitment from a NATO ally.

The possible disadvantages were twofold. For the proposed centre of U.S. operations - the former RAF base at Masira Island - the Congressional staff analysts note a vulnerability to air-attack and that, 'monsoons make Masira unreachable by ship [for] four months of the year'¹²⁴ and add some difficulty to the conduct of air operations. Furthermore, 'Oman regards this (U.S./Omani) agreement as tantamount to a U.S. commitment to its security.'¹²⁵ In this, however, Washington would itself be forthcoming, in the light of the most likely threat emanating from the PDRY. The 1980 'Defense Requirements Survey' thus recommended a \$25m. FMS package (with a further \$25m. follow on for FY 1981), including M-60 tanks and TOW and Sidewinder missiles.¹²⁶ For the United States' own requirements, the administration would request an initial \$13m.

(for FY 1981) in naval construction funding, with a future \$38m. tranche for, 'fuel storage, personnel support and airfield facilities'.¹²⁷

If the Oman facilities were useful as a forward base for possible combat operations, the routine deployments of the enhanced U.S. naval presence - the two carrier task groups assigned from PACOM - would benefit from the signing of the 'U.S./Kenyan Access Agreement' of June 26, 1980. This was to encompass overflight and landing rights at airports at Nairobi and Nanyuki, and ship replenishment/repair facilities at Mombasa harbour.¹²⁸ Here, the 'unique assets Mombasa offers as an R&R port are not available elsewhere in the region'. For more direct military purposes, a four km. paved road would be constructed to the (Kenyan) naval base, as would communication facilities and an ammunition magazine.¹²⁹ The main harbour would also be dredged to accommodate a 3,000 yard wide turning basin for aircraft carriers, and additional access channels provided at a cost of \$40m. (a \$60m. total through to FY 1983). Other U.S. funding for Kenya itself included \$50m. economic aid (AID and PL 480) and \$27m. in FMS credits over 1981-2.¹²⁹

In contrast to the conditions attending both the Oman and Kenya facilities, the implicit requirement for, 'an extremely limited U.S. military presence and low profile on implementation of access agreements'¹³⁰ was reversed for the administration's third regional treaty with Somalia. Indeed, as the HCFA Report observes, 'they (Somalia) would clearly welcome large numbers of American Armed Forces, and would allow extensive, high visibility use of Somali facilities.'¹³¹ For the facilities themselves, the agreement, signed on August 22, 1980, was centred around the port and airstrip complex at Berbera. Here, bellying the graphic descriptions previously offered to Congressional

Committees, Defense Department testimony before SASC appropriations Hearings (for FY 1982) was to acknowledge that 'both were constructed by Soviet forces to a very low degree of quality.'¹³² Although some 600 miles closer to the Persian Gulf than Mombasa, the Berbera port facilities were viewed as 'extremely limited'¹³³ and the four km. airstrip, although possessing 12 hardened shelters and POL storage, was lacking in water or electricity.¹³⁴ The DOD would thus request \$75m. (for FY 1982)¹³⁵ to provide an extended wharf at Berbera port and a 75,000 barrel POL facility for exclusive USN use, and upgrade the airfield to permit P-3 (aerial surveillance) flights.

The 'high visibility' U.S. presence envisaged by the Mogadishu regime was matched by 'extremely high expectations'¹³⁶ of military aid from Washington. The terms finally agreed, however would be limited to a total of \$53m. in economic aid and \$40m. FMS credits over two years. From the Pentagon's perspective, the actual military rationale for the Somali facilities lay in contingency planning, supplemented by 'occasional support of fleet activities out of Berbera.'¹³⁷ Perhaps more significant for the administration, was the political return that could accrue from, 'eliminating [the] Soviet presence and influence and otherwise fostering regional stability in the Horn.'¹³⁸ Here, the acceptance of a formal U.S. presence in a second Arab League state (the other being Oman) could establish further precedent for U.S. forward planning. An added consideration was that of increased U.S. purchase on the dangers to 'regional stability in the Horn' from Somalia itself. The August 21, 1980 sessions of the House Foreign Affairs Africa Sub-committee had received classified CIA testimony that Somali regular forces and some 300 'volunteers' were supporting the continuing Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) campaign in the Ogaden.¹³⁹ There was here an evident

concern to avoid the sort of inter-agency confusion attending the earlier U.S. approaches to Somalia of June, 1977. Administration officials were to thus stress that, 'any use of United States arms in the Ogaden or Kenya would cause an immediate cutoff of United States' military assistance.'¹⁴⁰

However, whilst the treaties with Kenya, Oman and Somalia provided respectively for routine U.S. fleet deployment, a foundation for actual forward combat deployment and a reserve 'base redundancy' capability, the strategic grounding for U.S. Indian Ocean policy was to find an inevitable focus on Saudi Arabia. In the view of HFAC regional analysts, 'Saudi Arabia, despite its limited military capability, remains the key country in the Arabian peninsula in the sense [that] Saudi views...are usually followed by other...Gulf states.'¹⁴¹ Aside from Saudi Arabia's central political importance, strategic location and substantive strategic infra-structure (to be considered below), the U.S. had a direct stake in the Kingdom unmatched by that in any other regional ally. The extent of Saudi economic integration with the United States bears recapitulating. Since diplomatic relations were established in 1947, the Kingdom had purchased some \$56bn. worth of U.S. products, \$31bn. of this for arms and related services.¹⁴² Investments in U.S. stocks and government securities would approach a level of \$70bn. by 1980.¹⁴³ The trend in U.S./Saudi trade was, moreover, upward. By 1980 the Kingdom had become the seventh largest market for U.S. goods and services and the most rapidly expanding export market. The value of U.S. Exports to Saudi Arabia in 1980 was estimated at \$5.76bn. - a 20% increase - and represented one fifth of total Saudi imports and 2½ % of total U.S. exports for that year.¹⁴⁴ In addition, some 35,000 U.S. citizens were employed to maintain defence hardware and in the oil industry;¹⁴⁵

whilst the U.S./Saudi 'Joint Commission', established in 1975, was engaged in 19 ongoing projects by March, 1980.¹⁴⁶ Of perhaps equal significance to the scale of U.S./Saudi economic traffic was its sectoral distribution. As is apparent from the above, this was overwhelmingly concentrated in three areas - oil, defence-related products and financial services - of a particular salience to national security policy.

Thus, given the above, 'Decisions on the part of the Saudi Arabian government', the 1980 HFAC Report accurately observes, '...potentially affect the U.S. balance of payments, the future of the dollar, the U.S. and world energy equation, the rate of world economic recovery, U.S. interests in the Middle East and...the objective of an overall resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.'¹⁴⁷ However, if the Riyadh government - as U.S. analysts suggested - did indeed, 'perceive the military relationship with the United States to be the principal test of U.S. reliability and political commitment toward the Kingdom,'¹⁴⁸ attempts by Washington to translate this perception into overt forms of military co-operation had previously foundered. Whilst it was always believed, and on occasion, publicly stated by U.S. officials, that Washington would enjoy 'access...to Saudi facilities' - notably the (U.S. built) Dhahran complex - in conditions of 'national emergency'¹⁴⁹ this was consistently denied by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Middle East tour of February, 1979 by Harold Brown had produced little in the way of concrete commitments and much in the way of regional dissociation from overt co-operation with U.S. planning. In February, 1980 Brzezinski had, as we have seen, held renewed discussions with the 'very pro-American'¹⁵⁰ Saudi head of government, Crown Prince Fahd. This had resulted in provisional agreement for an enhancement package for the F-15's (programmed in 1978) and the sale of five AWACS, which was announced by

the administration in June, 17.¹⁵¹ What was not placed on the public record, however, was a further agreement from Riyadh to fund considerable 'overbuilding' of base facilities and a communication centre for a future Gulf air defence system.¹⁵² Later (1981) testimony on the AWACS sale would reveal that, '(the agreement would) increase our own capabilities if we were ever called upon to deploy in the area'¹⁵³ and was to include 'three years of spares for AWACS and F-15's which would be compatible with U.S. equipment'¹⁵⁴ and additionally provide for, 'the extensive logistics base and support infrastructure that will be a necessary part of this equipment will be fully compatible with the defense needs of this whole vital area.'¹⁵⁵

If the Oman facilities and more covert preparations in Saudi Arabia represented the 'front' for the Gulf theatre of operations, the functions providing for the 'rear' would be found in Egypt. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Egypt possessed substantial armed forces which could bestow a regional legitimacy on any multi-national defence of other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Perhaps more significant for routine planning, was the strategic geographical linkage between EUROM and PACOM responsibilities in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. This could permit the staging of air/sea-borne logistical support and long range AWACS/B-52 operation - such deployments as had initially taken place in January, 1980.¹⁵⁶ Egypt's facilities would also present a clear advantage in mounting operations in the African Horn and North Yemen.

The administration had, as we have seen, already inaugurated a 'modest' arms supply relationship with the Sadat regime centring on the F-5 sale of 1978. In the light of the 'constructive role Egypt now plays in regional affairs,'¹⁵⁷ Cairo was in receipt of some

\$1bn. economic and food assistance,¹⁵⁸ and, as Congressional Staff analysts record, the 'demonstrated success of its (Egypt's) moderate policies and...economic well being' had become a 'priority interest[s] of the United States.'¹⁵⁹ Egypt had also, by 1980, become the, 'second largest United States FMS financing recipient in the world' (the largest being Israel), with \$1.5bn. allocations for FY 1979, \$1bn. for FY 1980 and \$550m. scheduled for FY 1981. Proceeding FMS programmes included the existing F-5 aircraft with a provision for 20 F-16's for 1982.¹⁶⁰ Aside from the F-5 training programme, active U.S.-Egypt military co-operation had, by mid-1980 extended to a joint desert training exercise ('Bright Star' 1). For possible basing facilities, although suggestions of U.S. usage of the former Israeli bases (Etzion and Ophira) in the Sinai were made by some analysts, these were consistently dismissed by Egypt. Cairo was, however, willing to consider further joint exercises, transit of the Suez canal, overflight without airspace restrictions and, 'regular U.S. access to Egypt's military facilities'¹⁶¹ including former Soviet facilities at Cairo West airport.¹⁶² Significant for possible RDF considerations were the discussions for use of the Red Sea Port of Ras Banas as a 'rearward logistics support base for contingencies in the Persian Gulf'. Here, the 'rudimentary' existing facilities would require extensive dredging and construction to an initial cost of \$250m.¹⁶³ Overall, Egypt was to present a valuable complement to U.S. forward strategy in the Indian Ocean. The potential political and diplomatic costs - emphasized by Cairo's suspension from the Arab League after Camp David - would, though, preclude the establishment of a formal treaty.¹⁶⁴

Also excluded, this time on the U.S. side, from formal military relations was Israel. There had, to be sure, been suggestions from some analysts that a compelling strategic

case for - at least - a U.S. military presence in the 'two great bases in the Sinai'¹⁶⁵ was provided by the 'national emergency under present conditions';¹⁶⁶ a view supported by some in the Senate.¹⁶⁷ Again, a 'strong' version of what might be termed the South Asian 'domino' thesis, proposed to the SFRC on this occasion by Stanford analyst Richard B. Foster, had placed Israel at the focal point of containment in South Asia. Without such a U.S. commitment - suggested at two divisions¹⁶⁸ - Moscow could thus 'outflank Egypt...and isolate Sadat', further 'outflank Pakistan...creating a separate Baluchistani state and...gain access to Arabian Sea ports', 'outflank and divide up Iran', 'effectively dominate the Saudi government...and replace other pro-Western regimes...including Kuwait, Dubai, North Yemen' and, overall, 'complete the geopolitical link with the pro-Soviet regimes in Ethiopia, East Africa and on the North African littoral.'¹⁶⁹ Although the detail informing Dr. Foster's presentation, notably concerning an imminent Soviet threat to 'the Saudi Arabian government...[which]...may only have a few months of life left'¹⁷⁰ would be questioned by most in the administration, the analyst's positive correlation of such Soviet strategic opportunity with the supposed 'unilateral' U.S. nuclear concessions in the SALT process¹⁷¹ had, at this stage in the debate, become near-conventional. Whilst the assertion that 'the radical conservative Islamic movement and the Marxist Socialism of the USSR have much in common'¹⁷² could also identify with a more intangible feeling in the wider public arena that the U.S. was beset in the Middle East by a growing range of opponents, old and new.

There was also, in what might be viewed as an inverted or 'weak' version of the domino thesis, a positive argument for the utility of overt U.S. military commitment to the Israeli/Sinai theatre. Here, as put before Senators by former INR Director Ray

Cline and former Under Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, the focus was on the removal of hostile Egyptian capability from the ranks of 'confrontation' states in the Middle East. In consequence, 'war is not a viable Arab option today.'¹⁷³ This strategic fact could, in turn, ameliorate Israeli opposition to progress on the development of a Palestinian 'entity' as envisaged at Camp David, and further, increase U.S., Egyptian and Israeli 'leverage' on the 'Palestinian Arabs and the PLO'; whose 'overriding fear' in Sisco's view, had become that of 'being left out of the action'.¹⁷⁴ And similarly, for Ray Cline, 'all of these very intransigent problems will become...a little easier if we do reestablish the credibility of our guarantees of military presence in the area.'¹⁷⁵

To be sure, if purely military factors were taken in isolation, there would indeed seem a strong case for considering Israeli bases, if not necessarily in the Sinai, for at least a prepositioning role in U.S. forward strategy. There was a close affinity, in terms of interoperability, training and military doctrine, between the U.S. and Israeli armed services. Considerations of base security and the dangers of internal opposition, prominent in other designated regional powers, would not apply. The geographical location of Israeli bases, in the Sinai and elsewhere, could provide for considerable strategic flexibility in access to the likely theatre of operations. Such military advantages were, however, outweighed by the unpredictable political impact on regional volatility. In the first instance moreover, as a CRS paper prepared for the Senate points out, Israel itself has to date, 'preferred to retain control of its own defenses and...not to seriously consider accepting the constraints on its freedom of action that would result from an American base on its territory'.¹⁷⁶ From an Arab perspective, such a presence would inevitably be viewed as a threat to neighbouring regimes - particularly in terms of oil

fields - and could thus, 'end the U.S. role as a peace arbiter.'¹⁷⁷ It would become a focus for anti-Americanism in the region, risk direct U.S. involvement in a future Arab/Israel war and further provide a compelling rationale for hitherto neutral Arab states to 'grant Soviet base rights...in retaliation for an Israeli base.'¹⁷⁸ Finally, given the 'unique' nature of the strategic relationship and the numerous public U.S. commitments to Israel's security¹⁷⁹ it was also apparent that Israeli bases and facilities would, in any event, be automatically available to Washington in a major crisis.

VII. Regional Security in a Global Context: Japan, NATO and the Western Alliance.

In the broader span of the U.S. alliance system, the Afghanistan crisis also served to focus attention on adapting NATO forces and possibly those of Australia and Japan to military contingencies in the Gulf. For the Japanese, whilst the administration had dismissed calls for a direct military involvement - observing *inter alia*, that 'the (proscriptive) self defense clauses of the (Japanese) constitution...were put in largely at U.S. insistence'¹⁸⁰ - there were hopes for, 'a very substantial Japanese financial contribution to the economic recovery of countries like Pakistan' which, it was further suggested, could thus, '...free up some Pakistani foreign exchange to purchase (military) equipment.'¹⁸¹ From Australia, a more formal contribution could be expected. The Australian Navy had long participated in joint Indian Ocean exercises with U.S. forces, under the auspices of ANZUS and SEATO, and had committed a Carrier Task Group to the Arabian Sea in February, 1980.¹⁸² The Canberra government had also reaffirmed its willingness to expand the Indian Ocean naval base at Cockburn Sound and the VLF (submarine) communications facility at N.W. Cape. Additionally, plans

were under consideration to obtain basing rights in Australia for B-52's.¹⁸³ The main focus for U.S. diplomacy was, however, upon European NATO. Thus, on January 8, 1980, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher had convened an emergency meeting of the NATO political forum, the North Atlantic Council (NAC).¹⁸⁴ The basis for a unified NATO response, as conceived by Washington, envisaged a two-phase process of, firstly immediate diplomatic and economic measures to be followed by more long-term military co-ordination. This was formally broached before the April 'Defence Planning Committee' (DPC) sessions of NATO by Under Secretary Robert Komer.

The response from NATO was, though, on both counts, somewhat less than was hoped for by the administration. A formal NAC communiqué, issued on January, 15, committing NATO members to take 'appropriate individual steps'¹⁸⁵ on enhancing Gulf security had only underlined the difficulties of co-ordinating a unified policy platform in an alliance simultaneously strained by disagreements on Theatre Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernization and on adopting other sanctions on Iran.¹⁸⁶ In the more restricted arena of joint military planning, the suggestion of a NATO 'out of area' complement to the Rapid Deployment Force was not encouraged by the Defence Planning Committee. The RDF had been presented to NATO as a U.S. initiative, whose unilateral status had, indeed, been stressed to domestic opinion by the administration.

The nub of the question, however, would not necessarily concern the assignment of existing NATO combat assets to the Gulf - a capability in any case lacking in most member's inventories, with the limited exception of France and Britain - but a renewed stress on the established administration policy of encouraging increased NATO-area

expenditure to release committed U.S. defence assets to RDF contingencies. Although NATO had, as we have seen, agreed in principle to expand defence expenditure by 3% p/a (in real terms) in 1977, the bulk of air/sea-lift capability was still overwhelmingly provided by the U.S.¹⁸⁷ With the revision of U.S. military posture to address 'simultaneous contingencies', with the eventual aim of containing a 'three-theatre conflict' signalled in the DOD *Annual Report* for FY 1982 (see below), it was clear that much of the three-percent programme would be absorbed in logistics and mobility enhancement (as opposed to combat capability) - a prospect as unwelcome in the armed forces of European NATO as in the Pentagon.

The issue of 'compensatory deployments' was thus, on several levels, a contentious one within NATO. Some analysts would agree with Senator Jacob Javit's argument that, 'the United States renegotiate the NATO treaty to extend NATO's responsibilities to the Persian Gulf', because, '...that is where the real threat lies.'¹⁸⁸ This view was also supported by the Ford administration's Indian Ocean spokesman, Joseph Sisco, who warned of the possible 'dissolution' of NATO on the 'out of area' question.¹⁸⁹ There had, to be sure, been some military support for the administration from Britain; involving the assignment of a three frigate force to the Mediterranean (relieving units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet) and a further dispatch of one frigate to the Gulf theatre itself.¹⁹⁰ France was to also mount an increased naval presence (to 14 warships) in the Indian Ocean. Paris had, however, made it clear at the January North Atlantic Council meeting that it was opposed to any co-ordinated NATO military response to the Soviet intervention.¹⁹¹ Thus, whilst applauding Under Secretary Komer's 'tough talk'¹⁹² at the January NAC sessions, many in the Senate expressed concern at the apparent 'free

ride' of NATO states on the U.S. defence burden in the Indian Ocean. The increased cost to the 'American taxpayer', it was pointed out, of the current U.S. deployment of two carrier task groups, was \$282m. for FY 1980.¹⁹³

However, whilst there had been much Congressional and press speculation in the U.S. on the question of a formal revision of the NATO treaty, the evident functional complexities - involving such matters as the credibility of nuclear guarantees (see below) and the 'very weakened condition'¹⁹⁴ of Turkey - on top of the structural difficulties involved in overcoming opposition in European NATO itself, had never made this a serious option.¹⁹⁵ Here, as Robert Komer acknowledges, 'it would probably not be very beneficial to try to extend the NATO boundaries, and have a big political argument with no particular military gain.'¹⁹⁶

Not the least of the barriers to such an 'out of area' expansion for NATO was the outright opposition of the Gulf powers themselves. Public statements from Saudi Arabia had consistently stressed the need 'to prevent the gulf region from becoming an arena for rivalry among the foreign powers.'¹⁹⁷ Following the February, 1980 discussions in Riyadh with Brzezinski and Warren Christopher, Crown Prince Fahd was to deny that possible U.S. forward bases were on the agenda, emphasizing instead the prospects for 'friendly countries' to supply adequate arms to the Gulf states to facilitate a credible self defence.¹⁹⁸ In April, the Saudi Foreign Minister had stated that, 'accepting foreign bases or granting military facilities to others would undermine their (Saudi) independence.'¹⁹⁹ Indeed, these reservations were brought to a head following the failed April, 24 Tehran hostage mission. Here, Riyadh promptly issued a statement expressing, 'extreme

concern...over the action by the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran' and its view that such military force went, 'beyond accepted limits of international conduct.'²⁰⁰

The foregoing considerations, concerning U.S. allies in NATO, the Gulf and elsewhere, served to underline the politico-diplomatic difficulties facing the administration in concerting an international (politico-military) counterpoint to the Carter Doctrine. 'I don't think it would be accurate', a Presidential press briefing of January, 29 had conceded '...to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough military strength...to defend the (Gulf) region unilaterally.'²⁰¹ For NATO, the administration could record some diplomatic progress in placing the out-of-area question on the Defence Planning Committee's formal agenda. However, though Defence Ministers had 'agreed...to use their best efforts to achieve peace and stability in South West Asia'²⁰² at a further (May, 1980) DPC meeting, it was also made clear that the military responsibility, 'falls largely upon the United States.'²⁰³ This would, accordingly, lend a greater significance to the one indisputably secure U.S. land facility in the Indian Ocean region, the base on Diego Garcia.

VIII. 'The Hub of the Wheel': the Re-emergence of Diego Garcia.

On January 12, 1980, the Carter administration had informed the United Kingdom of its intentions to mount a substantial development of the facilities on 'British Indian Ocean Territory'. By April 5, press reports suggested that the JCS were studying a \$1bn.

upgrade plan for the island base which would involve pre-positioning supplies, harbour construction, transit facilities for ground troops and a capability to stage B-52 flights from an expanded runway complex.²⁰⁴ The administration's original FY 1981 budget submission had requested \$17.9m. in construction funding, additional to the programmed 'Phase Four' (\$72.5m.) construction schedule, due for completion by July, 1982,²⁰⁵ to accommodate the MPS programme; with a further \$86m. to follow for FY's 1982-4.²⁰⁶ On March, 31, however, the DOD issued supplemental requests for FY 1980 and FY 1981. For the first, an additional \$23.5m. was required for expanded naval facilities, with a further \$8.6m. reallocated from other DOD funding for construction infrastructure itself. For the FY 1981 budget amendment, the DOD was requesting a supplemental \$128m.²⁰⁷ Whilst the bulk of development would come to fruition during the Reagan administration, the programme put before Congress at this stage called for: additional dredging, a 1,000 foot deep-water wharf, airfield support and lighting, a supply warehouse complex and temporary accommodation for 1500 personnel.²⁰⁸ Though the latter would provide for construction staff, it could also have an obvious utility in staging a Marine Amphibious Unit (of 1800 combatants) should this be necessary. Also of possible operational significance was the deployment, announced on March, 5, of the seven 'near term' pre-positioning ships to be on station by June. This capability would be comprised of three roll-on roll-off ships, two break-bulk ships and a tanker. Although the DOD plans called for an eventual 15 purpose-built vessels - to support three marine brigades - the former (NTP's) would be sufficient to supply one Marine Amphibious Brigade (some 16,000 personnel) with 'organic' air support from appropriate USMC TACAIR squadrons,²⁰⁹ for a two week period.²¹⁰

The advantage of the Diego Garcia facilities in the DOD's planning was, though, not necessarily to be found in the amount of matériel that could be prepositioned - the true 'forward' role could be performed by Masira island and, as was hoped, Dharhan - but in its central geographical location. In global terms, this was viewed as mounting an axis running from the expanded Lajes Naval/Air base in the Azores to Subic Bay in the Philippines. From a regional perspective; 'Diego Garcia', as Robert Komer observes, 'can be viewed as the hub of the wheel with spokes extending to other areas on the Indian Ocean littoral.'²¹¹

Conclusions.

In historical perspective, a certain inevitability attends the transition of Diego Garcia from the 'austere communications facility' presented in the DOD's 1970 estimates, through the 1974 'limited logistical support' schedule of the Nixon Doctrine to the fulfilment of plans for a 'major, complete, multi-purpose base' then predicted in the extended Hearings of 1974-5. There is also, however, a sense of historical recurrence, in that the island base, like the somewhat stillborn regional intervention planning of STRICOM, was first envisaged at the high-water mark of U.S. power in the Kennedy administration. In a further parallel with the perceptions of an emergent 'power vacuum' in the Indian Ocean debated within the McNamara DOD, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the diminishing British presence were not then viewed as substitutes for direct U.S. capability in the region. To be sure, the circumstances facing the Carter administration were far more straitened. The Kennedy/Johnson regional intervention programme envisaged continuing U.S. strategic superiority. The Carter administration's strategic

options, even given the quantum increases in military expenditure, could not extend to a return to such conditions.

Yet, in some respects, the United States had retained, and even increased, its lead in military capability over both the regional powers and the Western alliance. And again, it was military capability which would provide the critical U.S. edge in relations with allies. For the concluding section, the analysis will extend these perspectives to consider parallel military developments in the strategic nuclear arena, the dilemmas of 'extended deterrence' and, in a further echo of the Kennedy era, the return of 'rollback', strategically conceptualized and, at a tactical level, operationalized, in the administration's 'countervailing strategy'.

CHAPTER SIX (11): FOOTNOTES.

- 1) President Carter, 'State of the Union' address, January 23, 1980, *Presidential Documents: Administration of Jimmy Carter* 1980, Vol.16, No.4, (Washington: GPO, 1981), p.197.
- 2) As Zbigniew Brzezinski recalls, 'On a number of occasions I had drawn the President's attention to the significance of that Doctrine, and after the invasion of Afghanistan, I urged him explicitly to emulate President Truman's historic act'. See, Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.444.
- 3) See, *ibid.*, p.309 et.seq.
- 4) SFRC/NESA Hearings, *op.cit.*, p.275, testimony of Sen. Jacob Javits.
- 5) The President's Press Conference, January 8, 1980; cited in SFRC/NESA *ibid.*, p.127.
- 6) *ibid.*, p.24, testimony of Jacob Javits
- 7) See also Clifford's recommendation 'to you men that have these important decisions to make that you read Winston Churchill's volume called "The Gathering Storm"', *ibid.*, p.11.
- 8) *ibid.*, p.45, testimony of Joseph Sisco.
- 9) *ibid.*, p.32, testimony of Sen. George McGovern.
- 10) See, George F. Kennan, 'Was This Really Mature Statesmanship?', *New York Times*, February 4, 1980, cited in *ibid.*, p.92.
- 11) *ibid.*, p.4, introductory statement by Sen. Frank Church.
- 12) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 13) *ibid.*, p.304, testimony of the Hon. Walter Slocombe; for a plausible corroboration that the Soviet move in Afghanistan was preceded by 'a three month build-up (of forces) of which Western intelligence was aware', see, Jiri Valenta, 'From Prague to Kabul: the Soviet Style of Invasion', *International Security*, Vol. 5, No.2 (Fall, 1980).
- 14) Cited in 'Washington's "Realistic" View of Soviet Aims', *Christian Science Monitor*, January 7, 1980, p.14.
- 15) SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.129, testimony of Helmut Sonnenfeld.
- 16) *ibid.*, pp.42-4, testimony of Joseph Sisco.
- 17) *ibid.*, p.124, testimony of Helmut Sonnenfeld.
- 18) See, 'The Geopolitics of Energy', Prepared Statement of Adml. Stansfield Turner, cited in *ibid.*, p.213.
- 19) *ibid.*, p.215.
- 20) *ibid.*, p.216.
- 21) *ibid.*

- 22) *ibid.*
- 23) A (November 20, 1979) report by independent Swedish analysts 'Petro Studies' suggested that, 'proved oil reserves of the USSR are doubly as large as currently thought in the West'; cited in SFRC/NESA, *ibid.*, p.351.
- 24) Statement of Deputy Secretary of Energy, John C. Sawhill cited in *ibid.*, p.168.
- 25) *ibid.*, p.169.
- 26) cited in *ibid.*, p.184.
- 27) See, 'Oil Importers Spurn U.S. Plea on Cutback', *Washington Post*, February 20, 1980.
- 28) See, SFRC/NESA, *ibid.*, p.178, testimony of Sen. Joseph Binden.
- 29) *ibid.*
- 30) See, SFRC/NESA, *ibid.*, p.5, statement of Sen. Frank Church.
- 31) *ibid.*, p.120, testimony of Sen. Claiborne Pell.
- 32) *ibid.*, p.217, statement of Adml. Stansfield Turner.
- 33) *ibid.*, p.216.
- 34) *ibid.*, p.106, testimony of George Kennan.
- 35) *ibid.*, p.85, testimony of Frank Church.
- 36) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 37) *ibid.*, 'appendix', p.351.
- 38) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, pp.430-43.
- 39) Carter was reported as stating that he had learned more about Soviet intentions from the Afghan invasion than from all his previous experience in the Presidency; see, Sick, 'Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.73.
- 40) *ibid.*
- 41) Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.451.
- 42) *ibid.*, p.448.
- 43) *ibid.*, p.443; Brzezinski had publicly advanced the concept of the 'three strategic zones' at a speech in Montreal on December 5, 1979 - see, Sick, 'Strategy', *op.cit.*, p.74.

- 44) See, 'Rapid Deployment Forces-Issue Brief No. IB80027', by John Joseph Stocker (CRS/National Defense Division), cited in SFRC/NESA, 'appendix', *op.cit.*, p.327. It should be noted that the June, 1979 Guidance - like the Consolidated Guidance of 1978 - did not, at this stage, envisage the RDF as a separate category of fixed and sized forces. See also Harold Brown July, 30 speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco; Brown states that, 'Mobile and capable conventional forces are essential not only to support our allies in Europe, but also to execute contingency plans to assist friends outside the NATO area...for this latter purpose, we continue to maintain ready general purpose forces--we have called them "Rapid Deployment Forces"--distinct from those forces...assigned for NATO' (DOD Press Release of Secretary Brown's Speech, July 30, 1979).
- 45) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1981 (pt.1)*: Hearings, January 31, February 1, 2, 6, 19, 21, 1980, 96th.Cong. 2nd.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1980) (hereafter, *DOD FY-81 Hgs.*), p.496, testimony of Sen. Hubert Humphrey.
- 46) See, 'DOD written answers', cited in SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.325.
- 47) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.483; the Kharg Island option was made public on March, 21, see, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.348.
- 48) Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.485.
- 49) Four 'amphibious assault' ships (incl. one helicopter carrier) mounting one MAF were also deployed from Subic Bay for mid-March; see, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.349.
- 50) See, *ibid.*
- 51) See, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Harold Brown, *Annual Report for FY 1982* (Washington: GPO, February, 1981) (hereafter, *DOD Rep./FY-82*), Chapter 7, 'Mobility Forces', p.203.
- 52) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs.(pt.6), *op.cit.*, p.3286.
- 53) The procurement schedule envisaged prepositioning for one MAGTF by FY-83, FY-85 and FY-87 respectively. DOD notes that, '(deployment) response time would be ten days or less'; see, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.206.
- 54) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.492; see also DOD Rep./FY-82 *op.cit.*, p.200, p.201, p.202, p.203 (FY/82 costings).
- 55) The 'C-X' was rejected by the HASC (22-17) on March 27, 1980 see, SFRC/NESA, 'RDF - Issue Brief' *op.cit.*, p.335.
- 56) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.262; for discussion of force structure, see; Jeffrey Record, *The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention of the Persian Gulf: Special Report* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 1981) pp.48-55.
- 57) See, Record, 'RDF' *op.cit.*, p. 55 (tab.6).
- 58) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.440, Prepared Statement of Lt. Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 59) *ibid.*

- 60) See reports of PRM-10 scenarios in; George C. Wilson, 'War Planner's note Soviet Grip on NATO's Oil', *Washington Post*, July 9, 1977, p.7; see also, 'Carter Orders Steps to Increase ability to Meet War Threats', *New York Times*, August 26, 1977, p.1 for summary of PD-18. While suggestions were made of possible redeployment of the 2nd. Infantry Division from Korea, the Directive gave no conclusive guidance on force structure and organization; but see also, U.S. Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios and Options*, (Washington: GPO, April 1978).
- 61) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.445.
- 62) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.83.
- 63) See, Carter, 'Memoirs', *op.cit.*, p.483.
- 64) See, for example, Joshua Epstein, 'Horizontal Escalation: Sour Notes on a Recurrent Theme', in Art/Waltz (eds.), *The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policies*, (Lanham, MD: UPA, 1983).
- 65) SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.319, testimony of Walter Slocombe.
- 66) *ibid.* p.9, statement of Clarke Clifford.
- 67) The naval deployment included the 13,000 ton amphibious assault ship 'Ivan Rogov'; decl. CIA briefing April 16, 1980 cited in *ibid.*, p.348.
- 68) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.450, testimony of U/S Robert Komer.
- 69) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.325, DOD written answers.
- 70) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.475, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 71) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.310, testimony of Sen. Charles Percy; see also, George C. Wilson, 'Marines to form Rapid Reaction Force', *Washington Post*, December 6, 1979, p.15, Jeffrey Record/Martin Binkin, 'Send in the Marines', *Washington Post*, March 3, 1980.
- 72) For discussion, see, Congressional Budget Office, *The Marine Corps in the 1980's: Prestocking Proposals, The RDF and Other Issues* (Washington: GPO, 1980) (hereafter, *CBO/Marines*).
- 73) See, George Wilson, 'Anytime, Anywhere; a new Conventional Role for B-52 Bombers', *Washington Post*, March 31, 1980, p.6.
- 74) The MAB could deploy within 2 weeks; an (1,800 man) Marine Amphibious Unit, 'such as the one moving into the Indian Ocean now' was 'not fully capable of forcible entry', see, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.458, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 75) See, Congressional Budget Office, *U.S. Airlift Forces: Enhancement Alternatives for NATO and Non-NATO Contingencies* (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter, *CBO/Airlift*), p.23, p.55. See also comparison of relative U.S./Soviet S.W.Asia capability in DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.438, statement of Gen. Richard Lawson (DPP/JCS).
- 76) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.310, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 77) See, Gen. Warner, 'Defense Week interview', *op.cit.*, p.11-f.
- 78) Warner was to resign when the Reagan administration established CENTCOM in 1981.

- 79) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.311, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 80) See, CBO/Airlift, *op.cit.*, pp.55-6.
- 81) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.310, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly; see also, Richard Burt, 'Army and Marines in Battle over control of RDF', *New York Times*, December 10, 1980.
- 82) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, Chapter 6, 'Rapid Deployment Forces', p.191.
- 83) See, *ibid.*, p.198.
- 84) See, CBO/Airlift, *op.cit.*, p.56.
- 85) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.191.
- 86) See, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.325, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 87) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, (Executive Session), p.482, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 88) See, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf: Report of Staff Study Mission, October, 21-November 13, 1980*, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981), (hereafter, *HFAC/Gulf Rep.*), p.31; the Report notes that, whilst 'Iran has frequently exhorted the Persian Shias in Bahrain to revolt', to date, Bahrain has exhibited reasonable skill in avoiding large scale unrest.'
- 89) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, (Executive Session), p.482, testimony of DIA.
- 90) *ibid.*
- 91) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.450.
- 92) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs. *op.cit.*, (Executive Session), p.480, testimony of Sen. Byrd. The Senator observes that, 'I am encouraged by what you (Komer) say about Iraq'.
- 93) See, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.xi.
- 94) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, (Executive Session), p.480, testimony of Gen. Richard Lawson.
- 95) *ibid.*, p.472, testimony of Sen. Henry Jackson.
- 96) Komer notes that, 'The combined military strength of North and South Yemen could pose a serious threat to Saudi security'; see, *ibid.*, p.487.
- 97) *ibid.*
- 98) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.2, introduction by Sen. Frank Church.
- 99) *ibid.*, p.45, testimony of Joseph Sisco.
- 100) *ibid.*, p.2, introduction by Sen. Frank Church.
- 101) *ibid.*
- 102) Also announced in the January, 4 speech were a partial grain embargo on the Soviet Union, a ban on high technology exports, and a suspension of all U.S./Soviet official exchanges ; see, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.432.

- 103) *ibid.*, p.449 .
- 104) 'I had hoped', Brzezinski observes, 'that we might be able to put forward a large package involving both military and economic aid'; see, *ibid.*, p.448.
- 105) *ibid.*, p.449; see also, Christopher Van Hollen, 'Leaning on Pakistan', *Foreign Policy*, No.38 (Spring, 1980) pp.35-50, Robert Worsing/James Roherty, 'The United States and Pakistan', *International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No.4 (Autumn, 1982), pp.588-609.
- 106) See, Selig S. Harrison, 'Fanning the Flames in South Asia', *Foreign Policy*, No.45 (Winter, 1981-2), pp.84-102
- 107) See, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, pp.30-1, testimony of Clark Clifford.
- 108) See NEA/Iran, *op.cit.*, p.7.
- 109) See, Worsing/Roherty, *op.cit.*, p.598.
- 110) See, *The Economist*, September 13, 1980, p.40.
- 111) See, *Pakistan Affairs*, November, 16/December 1, 1981, Vol.34, No.'s 22, 23, p.2.
- 112) See, Ghassan Salame, 'Political Power and the Saudi State', *MERIP Reports*, No. 91, October, 1980, p.10.
- 113) *New York Times*, February 6, 1981, p.4Y.
- 114) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.433.
- 115) See, *ibid.*, p.449.
- 116) See, Worsing/Roherty, *op.cit.*, p.596.
- 117) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.449.
- 118) See, Adml. Thomas Moorer/Alvin J. Cottrell, 'The Search for U.S. Bases in the Indian Ocean: A Last Chance', *Strategic Review*, Vol. VIII, No.2, (Spring, 1980), pp.30-8; 'Gwadur', Moorer observes, '...is an ideal spot' (p.36).
- 119) See, Henry S. Bradsher, 'Three Nations OK U.S. Request to Use Bases', *Washington Star*, January 4, 1980.
- 120) See, 'U.S. Announces Pact with Oman on Access to Air Bases and Port', *New York Times*, June 6, 1980.
- 121) See, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Security Interests in the Persian Gulf: Report of Staff Study Mission, October, 21-November 13, 1980*, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981) (hereafter, *HFAC/Gulf Rep.*), p.16. Oman had earlier expressed reservations after U.S. usage of the Masira facilities in the April hostage mission; see, Michael Gettler, 'Oman Again Receptive to U.S. Use of its Bases', *Washington Post*, May 12, 1980.
- 122) See, *HFAC/Gulf Rep.*, *op.cit.*, p.18; for early U.S. interest in Masira, see, for example, Drew Middleton, 'Persian Gulf Energy as Military Focus', *New York Times*, January 22, 1975, p.2.
- 123) See, *ibid.*

- 124) *ibid.*, p.16.
- 125) *ibid.*, p.17.
- 126) The MAP schedule had also included C-130 transport aircraft and an option on K-130 tanker refueling aircraft; although 'Britain will most likely remain Oman's principal arms supplier', *ibid.*, p.19.
- 127) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Appropriations Authorizations for FY 1982: Hearings*, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1982) (hereafter, *DOD/App. 82*), p.324.
- 128) See, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.44. U.S. Naval and Airforce units were already operating from Mombassa, Embakasi and Nanuki; see, 'Statement of Ambassador Robert Komer before the House Foreign Affairs Committee' (April 2, 1980; processed), p.9, cited in CBO/Marines, *op.cit.*, p.57.
- 129) See, *DOD/App. 82*, *op.cit.*, p.323, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.43.
- 130) See, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.51.
- 131) *ibid.*
- 132) See, *DOD/App. 82*, p.321. On the Berbera facilities, Congressional staff analysts note that, 'two 5-ton cranes installed by the Soviet Union in 1968 have never been used because the electricity required to operate them is equivalent to the needs of the entire city of Berbera'; HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.51.
- 133) *ibid.*
- 134) *ibid.*
- 135) See, *DOD/App. 82*, *op.cit.*, p.321, statement of Comdr. S.C. Beuby (Dir./Indian Ocean Projects Office, Naval Facs. Eng. Comd./DON).
- 136) See, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.50.
- 137) *DOD/App. 82*, *op.cit.*, p.320.
- 138) HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.11.
- 139) See, George C. Wilson, 'Indian Ocean Bases Plan Hits Snag', *Washington Post*, August 28, 1980.
- 140) See, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.50.
- 141) *ibid.*, p.11.
- 142) *ibid.*, p.55.
- 143) See, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.43.
- 144) *ibid.*, p.38.
- 145) See, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.58.
- 146) See, CRS/Saudi Arabia., *op.cit.*, p.42.

- 147) *ibid.*, p.1.
- 148) *ibid.*, p.xii.
- 149) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee Military Construction, *Military Construction for FY 1975: Hearings*, July 11, 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1975), testimony of DCI William E. Colby; cited in, Disapprove/Diego Garcia *op.cit.*, p.37. Colby notes that, under given circumstances, 'The United States...would have access to Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia.'
- 150) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.449; Brzezinski and (Dep. Sec. State) Warren Christopher also reportedly gave guarantees on supporting the territorial integrity of Iran and concerting 'progress' on the Palestinian question; see, *New York Times*, February 6, 1980.
- 151) See, *New York Times*, June 18, 1980, Washington Star, August, 18, 1980.
- 152) The USAF's civilian contractors (the Mitre Corporation) was employed to conduct air defence assessments for Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE; see, *Washington Post*, November 1, 1981.
- 153) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military and Technical Implications of the Proposed Sale to Saudi Arabia of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements: Hearings*, March-October, 1981, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981) (hereafter, *SASC/AWACS 81*), p.4, testimony of Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger.
- 154) *ibid.*, p.84, prepared statement of JCS.
- 155) *ibid.*, p.4, testimony of Casper Weinberger.
- 156) The January, 9 deployment of two AWACS was essentially a short term response to the Afghan crisis; more pre-planned U.S./Egyptian exercises, involving air (F-4) and USMC deployments would take place in March ('Positive Leap') and November ('Bright Star'), see, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.194.
- 157) See, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.63.
- 158) *ibid.*
- 159) *ibid.*
- 160) *ibid.*, p.68.
- 161) *ibid.*, p.64.
- 162) *ibid.*, p.65.
- 163) *ibid.*
- 164) *ibid.*
- 165) See, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.277, statement of Richard B. Foster. Foster also suggests that Saudi Arabia, 'is a vulnerable tribal state, whose legitimacy...derives from the British', and alleges that, 'the Soviets had a brilliant strategy in attacking the source of that legitimacy, the Great Mosque in Mecca.'
- 166) *ibid.*, p.279.

- 167) See, Senator Richard Stone, *Washington Star*, December 2, 1979; cited in *ibid.*, p.277.
- 168) *ibid.*
- 169) *ibid.*, p.276.
- 170) *ibid.*, p.275.
- 171) *ibid.*, in Foster's reading of, 'the effect of SALT' on the regional balance, '...it became evident that we were making the world safe for Soviet conventional armed aggression.'
- 172) *ibid.*, p.275.
- 173) *ibid.*, p.73, testimony of Joseph P. Sisco.
- 174) *ibid.*, p.74.
- 175) *ibid.*, p.75, testimony of Ray S. Cline.
- 176) See, U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, *U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations*: Staff Report prepared for the SFRC, 96th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979) (hereafter, *CRS/Military Installations*), p.77.
- 177) *ibid.*
- 178) *ibid.*, p.78.
- 179) Such statements, the CRS observes, have 'created a "de facto" commitment that may have a force comparable to treaty or law'; *ibid.*, p.77.
- 180) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.452, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 181) *ibid.*
- 182) See, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.349.
- 183) See, 'Proposed U.S. Naval Base Enlivens Australian Campaign', *Washington Post*, March 22, 1980, p.15. The initial U.S. lease on N.W.Cape was signed on June 23, 1963 and the facility operational by 1967; see, for example, Robert C. Aldridge, *Background Paper on Trident and the Militarization of the Indian Ocean*, (Santa Clara (CA): PLRC, 1983), p.3; see also Robert Komer's remarks that 'Prime Minister Fraser of Australia' was, 'extremely encouraging about the Australian contribution', in DOD FY 81-Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.451. For the (subsequently cancelled) B-52 planning, see, Michael Gettler, 'U.S. Forces Around the World are Stretched by Gulf Buildup', *Washington Post*, July 19, 1980, p.1.
- 184) See, 'West Fails to Agree Action Against the USSR', *Financial Times*, January 16, 1980.
- 185) See, NATO North Atlantic Council, *Press Release* (SHAPE, Brussels, January 15, 1980).
- 186) See, Sick, 'Iran', *op.cit.*, p.248; although the Iran sanctions package had formal allied support on the UN Security Council, the inconclusive debate in the January, 13 sessions (10-2 approv., with a Soviet veto) meant that the European powers had 'refused to cooperate' in practice with the U.S. programme, '...despite earlier assurances.'
- 187) See, DOD.FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.461, testimony of Robert Komer.

- 188) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.66, testimony of Sen. Jacob Javits.
- 189) See, *ibid.*, p.67, testimony of Joseph Sisco.
- 190) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p. 451, testimony of Sen. John Tower.
- 191) See, 'French Policy on Afghanistan Provokes Questions, Criticism', *International Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1980.
- 192) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.461, testimony of Sen. John Tower.
- 193) *ibid.*, p.451, DOD statement for the record.
- 194) See, SFRC/NESA. *op.cit.*, p.75, testimony of Sen. Charles A. Percy.
- 195) See, U.S. International Communications Agency, October 8, 1980, 'An interview with U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown'.
- 196) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.466, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 197) Interview with Saudi Deputy Prime Minister Abdallah, *Al Akhbar* (Jordan), November 13, 1979; cited in CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.57.
- 198) Interview with Crown Prince Fahd, *Al-Jazira* (Riyadh), March 2, 1980; cited in *ibid.*, p.60.
- 199) Interview with Prince Saud, *As-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), April 8, 1980; cited in *ibid.*
- 200) Riyadh Radio, April 27, 1980; cited in *ibid.*
- 201) See, 'Carter Concedes U.S. Alone Can't Defend Persian Gulf' *New York Times*, January 30, 1980.
- 202) NATO D.P.C., *Press Communiqué*, (Brussels, May, 1980), par.6.
- 203) *ibid.*
- 204) See, Richard Halloran, 'U.S. Studying \$1 Billion Expansion of Indian Ocean Base', *New York Times*, April 6, 1980, p.16.
- 205) See, DOD/App. 82, *op.cit.*, p.318, statement of Comdr. S.C.Beuby.
- 206) See, CBO/Marines, *op.cit.*, p.6.
- 207) *ibid.*
- 208) *ibid.* Funding actually authorized for FY 1980 (supp.) and 1981 programmes was \$124m.; see, DOD/App. 82, *ibid.*
- 209) See, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, p.315, p.322, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 210) Cited in SFRC/NESA 'appendix', *op.cit.*, p.349.
- 211) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.498, testimony of Robert Komer.

THE CARTER DOCTRINE (III): THE COUNTERVAILING STRATEGY.

The preceding two sections of this study have treated with, respectively, the overall redefinition of the regional policy environment following the revolution in Iran and the more restricted counterpoint of redefinition in national security policy following the end of détente and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Clearly profound in themselves, it is the combination and synthetic character of the impact of these events that will form the concluding section in this analysis. Accordingly, the argument will now broaden. These perspectives will be pursued in terms of the restructuring of nuclear strategy in U.S.-Soviet engagement, the concomitant reappraisal of regional strategy in U.S. engagement with the Western alliance and the strategic integration of the Indian Ocean region within the current of U.S. power in general.

If the previous analysis has focused on some of the difficulties perceived by the administration in securing international collaboration for the Carter Doctrine, it should be stressed that these were largely operative in the sphere of U.S. domestic and formal alliance politics and - as such - would revolve around means rather than ends. Despite much Congressional and U.S. media criticism of supposed 'indifference', the European NATO powers and Japan were acutely sensitive to developments in the Gulf and had commenced an increasing institutionalization of both bilateral and multi-lateral contacts with the region through such instruments as the (EEC sponsored) 'Euro-Arab Dialogue'. This will be taken up below. It should further be stressed that, despite the avoidance of formal ties, the increasing *de facto* security involvement of principal European powers in the Gulf through the medium of arms trading would provide a basis for an informal 'regional security framework' of arguably greater utility than had been the more juridical

structures (Baghdad Pact, CENTO) of the past. At the same time, however, the administration was aware that such public divergence of approach by the Western alliance could entail, at the least, severe politico-diplomatic 'transaction costs' for crisis management in the event of further regional tension.

The policy implications, to be studied hereafter, were twofold. In the first instance, the uncertainty attending regional affairs after Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution was also a basis for initiative by the United States. Given the heightened awareness of security issues amongst the Gulf powers, the opportunity would be taken to encourage a closer political alignment of regional states - and particularly, the realignment of Iraq - towards the Western alliance. The more material underpinning for regional security policy would be taken up through further U.S. arms and military construction provision for endogenous intra-regional groupings. The new concreteness to the 'regional security framework' will be examined operationally in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. The second implication will concern U.S. policy alone. For an administration planning requirement focusing on 'scenario-specific' outcomes in the region, the probable political complications attending the mobilization of a variegated and informal security network within a crisis time-frame would be offset militarily, by developing options for preemptive action.

1. Europe and the Middle East: the 'Euro-Arab Dialogue'.

For the European (EEC) powers, the basis for a distinctive 'European' position on Middle East affairs had been established in a report to the Committee on European

Political Co-operation (EPC) of May, 1971. Whilst initially mirroring the broad United Nations' approach to Israeli 'withdrawal' from occupied territories on the basis of UN resolution 242, the EEC had moved through successive statements of 1975,¹ 1977,² and 1979³ toward a *de facto* recognition of the PLO. Finally, in the 'Venice Declaration' of June 13, 1980, Israel was called upon to 'recognize' the PLO as a legitimate partner in negotiation. The Middle East peace negotiations were not, though, the sole pre-occupation of EEC diplomacy. The central issues were concerned with trade, and accordingly, a formally constituted 'General Commission' was established in February, 1975 to conduct annual sessions of the related 'Euro-Arab Dialogue' in European and Arab capitals respectively. The Palestine question would, however, serve as the touchstone to identify European interests in the region and, as an August, 1980 Report for the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the (British) House of Commons makes clear, enable Europeans to 'distance themselves from United States Diplomacy.'⁴

For the more material aspects of the 'Euro-Arab Dialogue', Saudi Arabia had developed a considerable military trading relationship with states of the EEC. Consideration was being given to a package of 400 'Leopard II' tanks and 1000 APC's from West Germany and the multi-role 'Tornado' aircraft from the Panavia (UK/Germany/Italy) European consortium.⁵ The European power most deeply involved in arms supply to both Saudi Arabia, Iraq and throughout the Gulf states in general was France. By 1980, France had supplied Riyadh with some 400 AMX-30 tanks, a training mission and further equipment to outfit an armoured brigade. In October, 1980, a further \$3.35bn. contract was signed to modernize the Saudi navy⁶ whilst in September, a preliminary agreement had been reached for Saudi investment of \$968m. in the development of the

Mirage '4000' aircraft.⁷ Iraq, a significant trading partner with Italy and West Germany and focus of French oil and arms diplomacy since 1974, had received more than \$2bn. of French military exports by 1979.⁸ Paris had earlier agreed, in September, 1975 to supply 'research' reactors and ancillary equipment to the Iraqi nuclear programme.

Thus, given the increasing avenues outside of the 'special relationship' with Washington for political, and to some extent, security support, the well-rehearsed Saudi dissociation from the Carter Doctrine could admit some substance beneath the conventional diplomatic 'cover'.⁹ The Riyadh government and other Gulf regimes were, up to a point, entirely consistent in desiring a regional approach to the containment of Islamic revolution in Tehran. In June, 1978, talks had been held between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and (pre-Revolutionary) Iran, on the foundation of a possible Gulf security system.¹⁰ As these were resumed in January, 1979 between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the Iraq Foreign Minister, Sa'adun Hamadi, expressed the hope that a common Gulf security policy might emerge through 'Arab co-ordination and solidarity', adding that, for the Gulf, 'dependence on the big powers is ultimately a futile policy.'¹¹ The Iraqi's were, on these grounds, unwilling to join the preparatory sessions which would, by February, 1981, involve Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE in the formation of the 'Gulf Co-operation Council'. However, though endeavouring to move the Gulf security debate to the forum of the Arab League - which, it can be recalled, had suspended Iraq's rival, Egypt, from its proceedings after Camp David - Baghdad was not indifferent to the strategic advantage conveyed by a regional security network clearly concerted against Iran for its own designs on the region. The outcome of these considerations was to become apparent in the opening of the Iran-Iraq war.

II. A Reversal of Alliances: the Iran-Iraq War of 1980.

Throughout 1980, there had been a growing awareness by both Washington and its regional allies of, on the one hand, the possibilities for revolutionary upheaval represented by Iran toward the 'moderates' in the Gulf - notably, the 'mercenary' Saudi monarchy - and on the other, the efforts by former officials of the Shah to destabilize the Shi-ite coalition in Tehran. The final connecting factor in this pattern was provided by another potentially fertile field for the Iranian exemplar, Iraq. Following the 'Ashura' (November, 20) riots amongst the Saudi Shi'a minority of 1979, Tehran radio had intensified its propaganda assault on the Saudi Government and, on January 7, 1980 called for its overthrow.¹² Also targeted by hostile Iranian propaganda, albeit accompanied by more substantive instruments of subversion, was the 'infidel Ba'athist' regime in Baghdad. Here, a low-level insurgency conducted by the Shi-ite 'al-Da'wa' movement in Iraq had resulted in the expulsion, in April, 1980, of some 35,000 Shi-a's of supposedly Iranian descent and the bombing of Iranian border towns by the Iraqi airforce.¹³ In Iran itself, dissidents supported by deposed Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and the former martial law administrator, General Oveissi, had organized unsuccessful military uprisings on May, 25 and July 9/10, 1980.¹⁴ Although the latter, 'Nequab', conspiracy had involved some intelligence 'assets' of the CIA that had earlier participated in the abortive hostage rescue, President Carter and DCI Stansfield Turner were opposed to direct U.S. involvement in covert operations in Iran as a matter of policy.¹⁵ Washington was, however, kept aware of the extent of collaboration between the group of Bakhtiar - whose 'witting contact' with the CIA's Tehran station had begun in the 1960's - and the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.¹⁶

Washington's own relations with Iraq, which it can be recalled, was early designated as one of the key 'regional influentials', were becoming closer as the Baghdad 'Revolutionary Command Council' sought to expand its political options in the Middle East and diminish the influence of the Soviet Union (and the Iraqi Communist Party) in Iraq itself.¹⁷ Clandestine contacts between NSC officials and the Saddam regime had been established in Jordan in April, 1980, whilst in public, Zbigniew Brzezinski was to state that, 'We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq and we do not feel that American-Iraq relations need to be frozen in antagonism.'¹⁸ Such moves were to be encouraged by U.S. perception of the 'gradual normalization' of Iraq-Saudi relations. This dynamic, in the view of one Senate (FRC) report, was proceeding from the 'increasing alienation of the majority (Iraqi) Shi'a population from the Iraqi Sunni ruling elite.'¹⁹ 'Such factors' the Report observes, '...appear to have convinced the Iraqi leaders that the pursuit of revolutionary policies in the Gulf region...could ultimately affect their turbulent domestic situation.'²⁰ The latter combination of domestic 'turbulence', regional (intra-Arab) accord and rapprochement with Washington would also have appeared to have convinced the Iraqi leaders of the strategic opportunity offered to realize long-standing Ba'athist policy on the 'liberation' of Iranian Khuzestan ('Arabistan') and redress the more recent (1975) imposition of Iran's suzerainty on the Shatt al-Arab waterway.²¹

Here, whilst the September, 22 move by eight Iraqi divisions into Iran across a 200 mile front would be publicly condemned by the U.S. as a violation of the 'national integrity' of Iran,²² the Iraqi threat was also perceived as an opportunity for Washington to finally resolve the hostage issue and restore some measure of strategic accord (if not

cordiality) with the Islamic Republic.²³ The failure of the April rescue mission had left the U.S. with few realistic options for further pressure on the Tehran regime. Although planning had immediately begun on more ambitious military contingencies - including the mining of Iranian ports,²⁴ selective air strikes on 'high value' Iranian defence assets and seizure of the Kharg Island oil terminal - the level of uncertainty concerning possible Soviet response was such that they could only be activated in the event of actual harm to the hostages or a general outbreak of hostilities.²⁵ From a U.S. perspective, a successful conclusion to the Iraqi campaign could leave Shahpour Bakhtiar installed as the Premier of a proposed 'Free Republic of Iran' in the Eastern Khuzestan province²⁶ and produce a possible military coup across all Iran against Khomeini. At the least, there was expected to be a greater flexibility from Tehran stemming from the military supply situation. A considerable body of data was available to U.S. analysts from the extensive 'threat assessments' conducted under the Shah for precisely this contingency. Repeated intelligence studies had concluded that the 'disposition of ground forces and the greater mobility of Iraqi forces could in fact give Baghdad a substantial numerical advantage along the border during the initial stages of an attack.'²⁷ Moreover, the 'critical' dependence of Iran on U.S. military spares was such that, 'the Iranian armed forces probably could not sustain full scale hostilities for longer than two weeks.'²⁸

If the above assumptions were predicated on an indeterminate level of Soviet support for Iraq - with the latter posited in some 'worst case' scenarios as a '(Soviet) land-bridge to Africa and the Indian Ocean basin'²⁹ - the response from Moscow to the actual conditions of war had combined a studied neutrality with reassurances to Iran on the security of its Northern border.³⁰ The Soviet Union was, furthermore, to conclude a

20 year 'Friendship and Co-operation' treaty with Iraq's Ba'athist rival (and Iran's ally), Syria on October, 10, and to take the occasion to, 'support the inalienable right of Iran to decide its own destiny...without...interference from outside' in a joint communiqué issued in Moscow by Leonid Brezhnev and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad.³¹

However, though the Soviet Union might anticipate some political and diplomatic gain from its median position in the Gulf conflict, the main strategic beneficiary would be the United States.

III. The Gulf Conflict and Regional Co-ordination: the Gains of War.

In thus far considering that the full scope of the Carter Doctrine's ambit in South West Asia was to extend from the Soviet border to the Straits of Hormuz, the analysis has also identified the further geographical sub-division between Northern and Southern theatres. These correspond to military contingencies emphasizing direct U.S.-Soviet engagement and lower level (regional) engagement respectively. For the first, U.S. strategy was, for reasons outlined above, to focus on a forward defence of Iran extending from U.S. beachheads South of the Zagros mountains. For the second, provisions for 'coups, subversion and counter-insurgency' in the lower Gulf were centred on sea power in the Northern Indian ocean, with the primary ground role performed by local forces backed by U.S. COIN units and sea-based TACAIR. However, though theatre force-structure requirements would clearly vary according to mission, the unifying factor throughout the 'third strategic zone' was airpower; and in this the key to U.S. flexibility was the deployment of AWACS. The wartime advantages of the 'Airborne Warning and Control

System' as a 'force multiplier' had been stressed in DOD studies concerning the (1978) sale of the aircraft to Iran.³² They would clearly apply in offsetting any initial U.S. theatre inferiority in Khuzestan. The utility of AWACS in providing a peacetime surveillance capability over the oil fields and strategic waterways of the Gulf would have an equally clear application to the 'regional security framework'. The latter considerations had provided a strong, if publicly understated, rationale for the proposed 1978 AWACS sale to the Shah. Accordingly, a request from Saudi Arabia to redeploy AWACS, which had followed the outbreak of the Gulf War, would thus also allow the DOD to reinstate elements of earlier (PD-18) strategic planning.

The Saudi request, relayed to CJCS David Jones in Riyadh on September, 28, was for four AWACS and some 300 USAF personnel. These were reinforced by a further 100 support staff accompanying ground radar/communications equipment deployed on October, 5.³³ On October, 22, Riyadh announced its intention to buy the AWACS system in conjunction with an enhancement package (including ground attack munitions and long-range 'conformal' fuel tanks) for the F-15's ordered in 1978.³⁴ Although the AWACS/F-15 package would, in the light of trenchant Senate opposition,³⁵ be ostensibly subject to a fresh Defense Department study, 'to guide further policy determination,'³⁶ agreement on essentials had, in fact, been reached during Zbigniew Brzezinski's round of regional security consultation of February, 1980.³⁷

Here, as with other defence aspects of the U.S./Saudi 'special relationship', the advantage for the DOD lay in Saudi finance and political 'cover' providing a material basis for the possible deployment of U.S. forces themselves. As DOD briefings for the

later (Reagan administration) Hearings on the sale were to make clear, the presence of such an 'air superiority network' was an essential pre-requisite to deploying the RDF³⁸ and could provide for a surveillance capability extending to the Soviet border.³⁹ Intelligence data from the AWACS - collated by U.S. aircrew - would be made available to the Pentagon 'on a joint basis', whilst the complexities of operating the system would ensure an active U.S. involvement for an indefinite period to come.⁴⁰ Thus, whilst electoral considerations would delay the final implementation of the \$2bn. programme until the succession of the Reagan administration,⁴¹ the Gulf conflict had - in similar fashion to the crisis in Afghanistan - provided a fortuitous case of 'changes in the regional security atmosphere'⁴² to facilitate the activation of pre-existing defence planning provisions for South West Asia.

Equally advantageous, from the administration's perspective, was the momentum afforded by the Gulf hostilities toward co-ordinated 'out of area' military planning with the Western alliance. Whilst similar efforts in April and May 1980, had been complicated by the ongoing TNF controversy and French resistance to perceived U.S. particularism, the '61 percent' of EEC oil imports from the Gulf was viewed as a more direct European security interest than the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Gulf war would thus provide a concrete focus for the NATO 'out of area' debate and, additionally, diffuse diplomatic attention from the unilateral U.S. naval moves in the region. Thus, following guidelines agreed at the September, 28 Joint Chief's consultations in Riyadh,⁴³ the 31 vessel (18 combatants and 13 support) 'Midway' and 'Eisenhower' Carrier Task Groups were reinforced by a 14 ship French task force (albeit, under separate command and control arrangements).⁴⁴ By October, 20, the number of allied warships on station

in the Arabian sea had risen to 60, with the addition of units from Britain and Australia.⁴⁵

If the display of allied military co-ordination in the Gulf had gone some way to restore domestic perceptions of foreign policy competence for the Carter administration, a more material domestic benefit from the Gulf war was found in the stabilization of the world oil market. Whilst the threat of conflict in the Gulf had, in conjunction with the loss of Iranian liftings, produced an inflation (reaching \$40 p/b.)⁴⁶ of the oil 'spot' market, the outbreak of actual hostilities had enabled Saudi Arabia to concert a freeze in OPEC prices to a benchmark \$32 per barrel until the end of the year.⁴⁷ The agreement on OPEC price stabilization - resolving a prolonged internal conflict on pricing policy - was underpinned by the announcement of a unilateral one million bpd. production increase to bring up Saudi output to a total of 10.3 million bpd. (out of a 26.891 m/bpd. OPEC total for 1980).⁴⁸ It would also mark the advent of Saudi ascendancy within the oil cartel. The engagement of political conditions for such an assertion of Saudi market power was indicative of the extent of consultation between Riyadh, the Gulf states and Iraq undertaken in the months preceding the Gulf war⁴⁹ - notably regarding the modification of Iraq's own position as an oil price 'hawk'. Baghdad had, by August, 1980 received pledges of up to \$7bn. in loans from Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi Arabia,⁵⁰ some of the latter in the form of a \$4 p/b. surcharge on the one million bpd. extra Saudi liftings announced in September.⁵¹ In addition, Riyadh was to facilitate the construction of a new oil pipeline from Iraq's Southern fields to the Red Sea.⁵² A more active Gulf collaboration with the Iraqi war effort, involving the seizure of the disputed Tumbs Islands from bases in Oman was, though, vetoed by the U.S. and Britain.⁵³

To be sure, the prospect of a total victory by Iraq was as unwelcome to the Gulf states as it was in Washington.⁵⁴ After the failure of the initial Iraqi assault on Khuzestan, however, it was clear that the hopes of the informal U.S./Saudi coalition for a more limited Iraqi battlefield pressure on the Khomeini government had been reversed by a combination of the extensive matériel base accumulated by the Shah⁵⁵ and the 'downright incompetence'⁵⁶ of the Iraqi war machine. And whilst negotiations were indeed proceeding to release the U.S. hostages in tandem with the \$240m. of U.S. military supplies embargoed within the Shah's FMS 'trust fund',⁵⁷ it had also become clear that the war - like the hostage crisis itself - was secondary to the domestic aims of the Tehran regime. It would further appear that the Gulf war had, moreover, a distinct political utility in this regard, in both providing a focus for the armed forces and displacement of the rising domestic discontent against the ruling 'Islamic Republican Party'. Ancient Arab/Iranian antagonisms were redrawn. The regime also, and not incorrectly, 'saw the U.S. hand emerging from Saddam's sleeve'⁵⁸ and had gained an enhanced legitimacy from the conflict.

The U.S. had not been able to concert the NATO powers into adopting formalized security commitments for the Gulf region. This prospect had, though, always been viewed as somewhat remote by the administration, 'tough talk' by officials and Congressional leaders notwithstanding. The more concrete benefits for Washington lay in the increasing integration of Iraq within a looser axis of the lesser Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. The further association with the former CENTO powers - Turkey and Pakistan⁵⁹ - would provide a grounding for the *de facto* redefinition of containment along the Soviet Northern tier. The geopolitical proximity of Iran with the Soviet Union could

admit a certain functional elision of strategic and regional threat of clear advantage to strategic co-ordination. Thus, the continuing stalemate of the Gulf war was, in these terms, to contribute a mobilizing logic to facilitate the wider aims of what was being termed the administration's 'Countervailing Strategy'.

IV. Counterforce, PD-59 and 'The Case for a Theory of Victory'.

As has been argued above, the U.S. security position in the Gulf and South Asia had, in terms of the regional balance, undergone some measure of improvement after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. A 'steady state' of regional conflict had underscored the ultimate military dependence on Washington of local allies and, more indirectly, of the wider Western alliance system. The administration's own perception of a 'genuinely balanced and effective'⁶⁰ conduct of strategic affairs had not, though, gathered sufficient momentum to reclaim the Carter Presidency. In a campaign dominated by the twin foreign policy themes of revived cold war and the importance of the U.S. position in the Middle East, the resolution of the touchstone Iran hostage issue was to not be finalized until after the November, 3 elections had returned Ronald Reagan. Perhaps unusually for a post-election 'caretaker' transition, arrangements would continue for a 'long-range military plan for the Persian Gulf'⁶¹ formalized in the final Carter administration directives, PD-62 and PD-63, of December, 1980.⁶² Whilst much of the latter had clearly been oriented toward the Carter re-election platform, an outline account of the 'regional security framework' would be incorporated in the final Defense Department *Annual Report* for FY 1982. The Carter defence legacy for the Indian Ocean region was

substantial. Before considering the theatre implications in detail, it is useful to take up the enhanced U.S. Indian Ocean posture in the overall context of the DOD's revision of global strategy and doctrine. Prominent here was the departure in nuclear strategy from the maintenance of 'rough strategic nuclear equilibrium' sought in the first (February, 1978) administration defence review toward an accelerated development of new strategic systems, to enable more selective, 'counterforce' nuclear targeting.

Throughout the *Annual Report* and other public discussion, Secretary Brown was to contend that the administration's 'countervailing strategy' is 'not a new strategic doctrine',⁶³ rather a, 'natural evolution of the conceptual foundations...built by men like Robert McNamara and James Schlesinger.'⁶⁴ However, whilst it is correct to assign a certain technological inevitability to the 'evolution' of counterforce⁶⁵ strategy as stemming, to some extent, from the 1962 decision to develop multiple re-entry systems (MIRV) and provision for the launch vehicles - notably Trident and MX⁶⁶ - in the 1975 Schlesinger procurement schedule, the final decision on MX in particular owed much to the need to secure the assent of the Joint Chief's for SALT II.⁶⁷ With the indefinite suspension of the Treaty after Afghanistan, the administration had also moved to exploit the capabilities inherent in MX for a more conceptually refined counterforce posture, which was codified in the revised (July, 1980) statement of strategic doctrine, PD-59.⁶⁸

The restructured U.S. doctrine had not, to be sure, explicitly conceded the argument for strategic 'superiority'. Harold Brown was to stress the 'indescribable' consequences of actual nuclear exchange and deny that lower levels of nuclear conflict 'would remain "limited"'.⁶⁹ The PD-59 formulation would, though, grant considerable scope for, 'the

political advantages of being seen as the superior strategic power'⁷⁰ on the presumptive grounds of incorporating, 'evolving elements of Soviet thinking'⁷¹ on the question. Here, given that - in the DOD's reading - the Soviet strategists 'seem to consider victory in a nuclear war at least a theoretical possibility,'⁷² the distinction between such 'perceptions' and, 'the military advantages of in fact being superior'⁷³ was thus a fine one. President Carter had declared that, 'I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations.'⁷⁴ Clearly, if the U.S. capability would, at present, run to, 'the ability to devastate the entire target system of the Soviet Union',⁷⁵ the force expansion sought in PD-59 would seem to admit the substance of Paul Nitze's familiar contention that, 'to have the advantage at the utmost level of violence' has, historically, had an apparent utility at lesser levels of (politico/military) engagement. It is this logic that was finding a particular relevance to the emerging strategic locus of U.S. global engagement, in the Gulf and Indian Ocean.

In the latter context, a July, 1979 Pentagon study - the 'Wolfowitz Report'⁷⁶ - had considered a range of possible threat scenarios in the Gulf/South Asia region. Although proposing a series of U.S. options for 'Capabilities for Limited Contingencies in the Persian Gulf' the thrust of the analysis had focused on the likelihood of Soviet intervention and particularly, the prospect of a Soviet incursion in Iran. It had thus concluded that the sheer weight of Soviet forces in Central Asia could necessitate a U.S. (tactical) nuclear escalation. It is worth emphasizing that the report was completed before the Soviet move into Afghanistan. The utility of a primary anti-Soviet mission focus in eliciting a positive response from the JCS can also be recalled, as can the division of views - apparent from the outset of the Carter administration - which had characterized

'Era Two' and the 'net assessment' and 'force planning' sections of PRM-10, and the predilection of the NSC planning group for 'net assessment' in focusing such contingencies.⁷⁷ Other (PA&E) contingency planning had also focused on an early exercise of the nuclear option.⁷⁸ Moreover, whilst given a clear contemporaneity by the events in Iran, the Wolfowitz Report itself had been commissioned in response to the 'Consolidated Guidance' for U.S. military posture outlined in PD-18.⁷⁹

The background of doctrinal revision in nuclear planning was to find a more visible expression in regional military posture. Within ten days of the announcement of the 'Carter Doctrine', suggestions - subsequently rescinded - of possible theatre nuclear preparation in the Persian Gulf were expressed by U.S. defence officials.⁸⁰ These were reinforced by B-52 over-flights of Soviet vessels on station in the Arabian Sea.⁸¹ Moreover, as Robert Komer had acknowledged, as a corollary to the administration's January, 1979 decision to upgrade TNF in Europe, 'we are looking at long range theatre nuclear forces in other areas than NATO.'⁸² To be sure, it was widely recognized that, in terms of a likely Soviet reading of the cost/benefit relation of Persian Gulf nuclear posture to securing the central strategic balance, the region clearly lacked credibility as an arena for 'extended deterrence'.⁸³ Yet, as former OSD analyst Earl Ravenal observes, any necessary condition for adopting extended deterrence itself will, in an era of nuclear parity, stand or fall on the prospective viability of counterforce.⁸⁴ And further, if a viable repertoire of counterforce options was indeed successful in its expressed aim of securing 'crisis stability' - in terms of a mutual deferral of nuclear escalation - 'an adversary might more readily seek, and the U.S. would have to accept, the verdict of a conventional war.'⁸⁵ This, as we have seen, was precisely the perspective informing the

guidance of PD-18.⁸⁶

Thus, if counterforce, under present conditions, would still suggest an insufficient grounding for extended conventional deterrence, the logic indicates pursuing further escalatory options at both strategic and conventional ends of the deterrence spectrum. However, whilst Harold Brown was to stress that the proposed \$14,529bn. strategic forces programme (out of a gross {TOA} \$196.4bn defence outlay),⁸⁷ 'does not assume that we can "win" a limited nuclear war'⁸⁸ and that, 'it is not a first strike strategy'⁸⁹ the establishment of a 'survivable' mobile basing mode for the programmed MX system, a 'more flexible targeting of the full range of (Soviet conventional) military capabilities' and a 'clear U.S. ability' to target 'organs of Soviet political and military leadership and control'⁹⁰ would appear to concede at least a notional provision for, in the phrase of one analyst, 'the case for a theory of victory.'⁹¹

Here, it should perhaps be restated that, despite an assessment of the central balance and 'the momentum of Soviet strategic growth'⁹² which, 'will combine to make the world of the 1980's more dangerous than any we have yet known,'⁹³ the administration emphatically considered nuclear war an 'unlikely possibility'.⁹⁴ The utility of adopting counterforce, instead of, as some critics had suggested, surmounting the 'theoretical' possibility of Minuteman vulnerability by simply abolishing land based systems altogether⁹⁵ was however, perceived in promoting greater 'cohesion' in the U.S. alliance system. Relying on an assured sea and air based 'second strike' capability would indeed fulfil one expressed U.S. aim for a 'non-provocative'⁹⁶ strategic posture. Yet this could, by the same token, weaken the integration of alliance defence capability within the U.S.

global framework, perceived - as before - as underpinning 'essential equivalence'.⁹⁷ As Earl Ravenal succinctly observes, 'it takes more credibility to keep an ally than to deter an enemy.'⁹⁸ Again, a consistent strain of U.S. concern becomes apparent. 'Our allies', in Secretary Brown's view, '...are not yet fully facing up to a well documented Warsaw Pact military build-up' and furthermore, 'Even at a time of new threats to Western Europe's...and Japan's oil lifeline to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, many of our allies appear untroubled by the threats or unwilling to assume the common defense burden.'⁹⁹ Pointing out that the U.S. defence budget consumes a higher proportion of GNP than any other NATO country and 'five times that of Japan,'¹⁰⁰ Brown declares that the American people, 'will not long tolerate' a position where 'the security of our allies is...thus allowed to be more costly to Americans than it is to our allies themselves.'¹⁰¹

The concern for greater 'burden sharing' in the Western alliance was, to be sure, a perennial one for U.S. Secretaries of Defense. For Harold Brown, however, the present 'adverse trend' in the momentum of the central balance would require that these matters be addressed with a fresh 'urgency'. Brown is thus emphatic that, 'in the forefront of my concerns as Defense Secretary' has been the pursuit of 'a proper division of labour between our allies and us.'¹⁰² What this would mean in practice was made clear. Thus, 'as the United States invests more heavily in capabilities to project military power...in South West Asia...a reallocation of labour among NATO nations, in particular the European member's willingness to contribute more to shared security commitments in Europe, takes on a new significance.'¹⁰³ The administration had, as we have seen, failed to secure any formal endorsement of a NATO 'out of area' capability. However, it was also apparent that a net increment of capability for SW. Asia could also be secured by

'freeing up' existing U.S. assets in Europe. Such an outcome was, for the administration, perhaps more optimal in being both a unilateral - and thus more flexible - force increment and avoiding the inevitable political complications attending any formal NATO extension. Again, as Robert Komer had observed, 'extending the NATO boundaries to cover the Middle East would not buy us very much.'¹⁰⁴ By placing such issues on the NATO agenda, the administration could, though, find an additional lever to concert existing U.S. policy on increased conventional capability (the May, 1977, '3%' formula) in the NATO area itself. Of further significance for the revised global posture was the explicit incorporation of non-NATO forces in the DOD's augmented 'countervailing strategy'. By encouraging allies, 'especially the Japanese'¹⁰⁵ to, 'make steady and significant increases in their own defense efforts'. Furthermore, the U.S. would, 'seek to widen and deepen our military contacts with the People's Republic of China.'¹⁰⁶

Clearly, a posture of global containment was nothing new for U.S. strategy. Nixon and Kissinger had made some gestures toward exacting an increased defence burden from Japan.¹⁰⁷ The Carter administration's first defence review had perceived a U.S. security perimeter on a 'great arc...all the way from North Norway to Japan and the Aleutians'. However, the overt allowance for PRC assets in U.S. defence planning was, even in symbolic terms, a patent admission that United States' strategy was entering a new era. Stated practical moves here included export licensing for 'dual use' (civilian/military) technology, 'non weapons system military equipment' and 'a gradual expansion of military to military contacts.'¹⁰⁸ Unstated was the establishment of U.S. surveillance and intelligence facilities on the Soviet border in the Chinese province of Sinkiang.¹⁰⁹

V. The Soviet Dimension to the 'Soviet Threat'(1): the 'Domino Theory' in South Asia - Iran and Baluchistan.

If the perceived appearance of Soviet and regional threat in the hinterland of the Gulf had proved functional to concerting the administration's redrawn global strategy, the 'countervailing strategy' itself would provide for a further continuum of options for offsetting any localized force inferiorities in the lower Gulf and Indian Ocean. Despite the establishment of Rapid Deployment capability, the 'geopolitical asymmetries' stressed in previous assessments of the respective U.S. and Soviet theatre positions had entailed specific planning (from January, 1980) for 'horizontal and vertical escalation'.¹¹⁰ The administration, in 'emphasiz[ing]' that, '...our plans and programs for South West Asia serve the security interests of our European and Asian allies,'¹¹¹ was to similarly note 'our capability for shifting the geography of the conflict.'¹¹² And if the concerns of U.S. allies were focused on the more immediate security problems posed by the Gulf war and the threat of indigenous revolution - as indeed, was the main secular thrust of RDF posture - it is from the underlying universalist premise that U.S. Indian Ocean policy must be assessed. Whilst a consistent (Republican) critic of the Carter administration, Johns Hopkins analyst Robert W. Tucker puts well what had become the governing (bi-partisan) strategic orthodoxy. Here, 'It is the Gulf that forms the indispensable key to the defense of the American global position, just as it forms the indispensable key without which the Soviet Union cannot seriously aspire to global predominance.'¹¹³

In attempting to turn such an 'indispensable key' to its own advantage, the Soviet Union was, in the view of CIA analysts, handicapped by having 'little, except arms, with which to tempt these nations.'¹¹⁴ The U.S. assessment of the essentially 'negative'

Soviet leverage on the Middle East was longstanding and born out by events. It had underpinned the successful Kissinger diplomacy of 1973-5. The public focus on 'Western Europe's and Japan's oil lifeline' provided a clear platform to link the generalized notion of Soviet threat to the signal shared foreign policy issue with a domestic resonance in the West. To be sure, the advent of, in the words of one observer, an 'unprecedented crisis' in the international order could conceivably persuade Moscow that a 'major blow against the Western alliance' might be 'marginally less risky' if taken in the Persian Gulf than in Europe.¹¹⁵ Again, this argument had emerged in PD-18 and was made publicly explicit in the Defense Department's 'Posture Statement' for FY 1980.¹¹⁶ Even the latter case was, however, by no means self-evident, given the demands of 'simultaneous contingencies' on other possible Soviet theatres of operations. These will be examined below. Firstly, though, it is useful to consider in detail the two principal variants of the South Asian 'domino thesis' - involving more 'opportunistic' Soviet peacetime moves - in Iran and the Pakistani Indian Ocean province of Baluchistan.

For the latter contingency, the presumed aim of a Soviet occupation of Baluchistan or political domination of a nominally independent Baluchi state would be to secure an entrenched geopolitical position in South Asia and 'warm water port' on the Indian Ocean littoral.¹¹⁷ The imputed Soviet ambition to 'dismember' Pakistan, whilst a conventional 'worst case' prefixion to administration MAP programmes for Islamabad - and widely rehearsed in the U.S. media¹¹⁸ - was however, never seen as anything other than remote by CIA and DIA analysts of the region. In a post-Afghanistan 'Primer' prepared by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center, the Agency observes that, while, 'many (Baluchis) would support independence' and 'resent the colonial style

overlordship of the Punjabi-dominated Pakistani government',¹¹⁹ these aspirations have been diffused by the 'feudal' nature of Baluchi political development. Here, 'rivalries within the province have always prevented any unified action in the past' and 'fears that independence could lead to dominance by rival tribes or by leftists...have also tempered the views of politicians'¹²⁰ toward full statehood for the future. The main nationalist opposition, the Baluchi Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) was never, in either internal political organization or external orientation, the functional equivalent of the Afghan PDPA or the NLF of South Yemen.¹²¹ Moreover, since the military defeat of the BPLF in 1975,¹²² the apparent focus of 'leftist' support in Baluchistan had turned to the (all-Pakistan) PPP Party of the late Ali Bhutto.¹²³ Overall, while noting that Afghanistan has, in the past, supported Pushtun and Baluch separatists, and that 'we have some evidence of Soviet contact with both Pushtun and Baluch tribal leaders', the CIA has, 'never been able to confirm Pakistani reports of Soviet material support for either "independence movement." '¹²⁴

If the volatile nature of Baluchi internal politics presented a seemingly unpromising project for Soviet 'proxy' manipulation, the 'professional, disciplined'¹²⁵ Pakistani armed forces, combined with the province's 'moonscape' topography would also, in the CIA's view, make unilateral military action a 'high risk' option.¹²⁶ The prospect of Russian incursion into Iranian Azerbaijan would superficially seem more plausible, given a certain historical precedence from the 'Soviet Republic of Gilan' - briefly established on the Caspian coast in 1920 - the Soviet-backed 'Azerbaijan Autonomous Republic' (1945-6) and the occupation of the region from 1941-6 by Soviet forces. Moscow might also expect a measure of local support from Azeri nationalists, the established Iranian

communist party (the 'Tudeh') and elements of the nonaligned left grouped around the 'People's Fedayeen'.¹²⁷

Again, however, whilst conceding that, 'the Soviets do not consider the Khomeini government completely desirable',¹²⁸ the CIA observes that, 'Given their own minority situation...outright Soviet support for the separatist objectives of such groups is unlikely.'¹²⁹ And if the Agency was clear on Moscow's 'ambivalence' toward encouraging ethnic division in Iran - an analysis which accords with established Soviet policy on the 'nationalities' question - it would also suggest that the prospects for a nationally active 'leftist' opposition to Khomeini were, from the Soviet viewpoint, scarcely less promising. The People's Fedayeen, the 'principal Marxist group' had, to be sure, 'spearheaded' the overthrow of Shahpour Bakhtiar and had the 'nominal allegiance of the majority of leftists.'¹³⁰ The Fedayeen's capability to mount a concerted campaign was, though, compromised by an organizational structure which amounts to, 'no more than a loose grouping of disaffected individuals'¹³¹ and acute internal and external 'ideological differences' - not the least of which were with the pro-Soviet Tudeh party. The CIA's low estimation of the potential for Iran's left opposition was seemingly mirrored in Moscow itself. The Tudeh, 'severely reduced' under the Shah, had conspicuously avoided making common cause with the 'independent Marxists' and was, in return, allowed a degree of public tolerance by the Tehran regime.¹³² The Iranian revolution, Leonid Brezhnev had declared, 'is an essentially anti-imperialist revolution'; the Soviet Union was thus prepared to, 'develop good relations with Iran on the principles of equality and ...reciprocity.'¹³³

Perhaps more significant than internal factors as an influence on Soviet Iran policy were the likely consequences of either support for Azeri insurgents or direct military intervention on relations with Turkey. A military government had taken power in Ankara in September, 1980¹³⁴ with a programme of suppression of, *inter alia*, leftist and Kurdish separatist forces in Turkey and could be expected to react forcibly to any turbulence in Iranian Azerbaijan. Turkish hostility would inevitably mean a closer involvement by NATO. Here, a consistent current in Soviet strategic thinking becomes apparent. On October 1, 1980, Brezhnev had condemned the AWACS deployment to Saudi Arabia and warned that the Gulf war could provide a pretext for further U.S. military action in the region.¹³⁵ The Soviet leader would return to the theme on December, 11, coupled with an appeal to Washington to conclude a treaty of mutual non-intervention for the Gulf region.¹³⁶ Such concerns were clearly self-serving for the Soviet leadership. Given the extent of U.S. military preparation, they were not, however, unreasonable.

VII. The Soviet Dimension (2): 'Simultaneous Contingencies' - Strategy and Capability.

Overall, in considering Soviet strategic options for South Asia in the 1980-81 period, it is arguable that a unified but weakened Iran, remaining fiercely anti-American, was more in the Russian interest than a divided Iran, becoming fiercely anti-Soviet.¹³⁷ While the Soviet Union had vetoed proposals for UN economic sanctions on Iran on January 14, 1980, the impact of the war and unilateral U.S. sanctions had resulted in the bulk of Iran's trade transiting Soviet Central Asia¹³⁸ - a situation which gave more scope for the

exercise of 'negative' leverage than the uncertain outcome of military occupation. Conversely, however, if a further Soviet military move would serve to circumscribe Moscow's political options and polarize the alignment of states in South Asia, this position could be turned to the U.S. advantage. Here, assertions of the Soviet 'dilemma' are consistent for inter-agency analyses of the region. Thus, in considering one example, the CIA observes that, 'while the perception (of Soviet threat) alone may tempt the Saudis to deal with the USSR, actual Soviet involvement in aggressive moves may drive the Saudis back to the United States.'¹³⁹

Whether the policy rationale behind the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, assessed in terms of a range of static and dynamic strategic indicators,¹⁴⁰ would provide an exemplar for further Soviet expansion was though, in the final analysis, unclear to the administration. As Under Secretary Komer acknowledges, 'We are not assigning relative weights at this point to the amalgam of objectives the Soviets had in mind in invading Afghanistan.'¹⁴¹ For its part, President Carter had, to be sure, declared that, 'the carving out of a part of Iran to be separated from the rest would not be in our (U.S.) interest.'¹⁴² A careful reading of the RDF 'forward strategy' however, suggests that such a *de facto* partitioning of Iran would, under some circumstances, be far from a worst case outcome for the United States. It would further account for the explicit assumption in RDF configuration that U.S. forces on a possible beach-head in Khuzestan would not have to contend with a significant local resistance from Iran itself. Addressing the February, 1980 sessions of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Robert Komer was clear that, 'in most of the contingencies we regard as the kind of threat we ought to plan against, the local countries will be on our side...therefore we can sail into ports like Dhahran or

the Southern Iranian (*sic*) ports of Karachi or Muscat et-cetera, and offload.¹⁴³ The funding requests for RDF force structures thus make a minimal provision for any 'contested entry' capability.¹⁴⁴ Such planning perspectives would, after September, 1980, correspond with hopes for a successful installation of the Bakhtiar forces in Southern Iran following the Iraqi invasion.

The question of Soviet intentions in Iran, was moreover, overlaid by the evident problems of capability. In a wide ranging RAND study of possible RDF missions in the Iran/Gulf theatre, analyst Joshua Epstein concludes that, 'The Soviets face the grave threat that the military cost of a move on Iran would vastly outweigh its potential benefits.'¹⁴⁵ Here, conventional (static) planning factors alone would indicate the difficulties of assembling a sufficient Soviet 'lethality ratio' (crudely, a prevailing 3:1 offensive advantage)¹⁴⁶ for South Asia without critically reducing forces on either the European or East Asian theatre.¹⁴⁷ And if such 'simultaneous contingencies' were, in the abstract a complication for Soviet planning, the existing strategic conditions - notably a possible revolt in Poland on the European flank and increasing Chinese militancy, apparent in the February, 1978 actions against Vietnam, - would further caution against an offensive move in South Asia. Whilst U.S. planners could consider the difficulties of Harold Brown's 'three theatre contingency',¹⁴⁸ Iran or Baluchistan, as analysts pointed out, would represent the fifth (or sixth) such contingency for the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, such action would seem perhaps more unlikely in the event of a general war, given the above logistical constraints and vulnerability of forward bases, in for example, Gwadar, to sea-based air power. 'Baluchistan', as the CIA's 'Primer' observes, '...has no good

natural harbours and there is only one modern road - in Iran - from the USSR to the coast.^{'150}

Thus, although the ostensible focus of the RDF was on a 'large scale Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf region,'^{'151} such contingency was, in practical terms, viewed as perhaps the least likely of the range of Soviet options to exert power in the region. Of the 24 Soviet divisions in the Central Asia military district of the USSR, none were rated as 'combat ready.'^{'152} The massing of 125,000 troops on the Azeri border, reported by U.S. intelligence on April 16, 1980, the presence of a Soviet amphibious assault ship in the Arabian Sea and an overall Indian Ocean naval presence by September of 28 vessels¹⁵³ were viewed as essentially 'para diplomatic' moves, taken in conjunction with the occasional Soviet references to clauses five and six of the 1921 Iran/Soviet treaty.¹⁵⁴ As Under Secretary Komer Observes, to mobilize, deploy and commence hostilities, 'they would face a whole host of problems.'^{'155} In a transit to the Gulf itself through Iran, 'the most likely route,'^{'156} Soviet forces would face over 300 'choke points'^{'157} vulnerable to the sort of U.S. air or ground action considered earlier. In addition, 'they would have to count on at least some resistance from the Iranians'^{'158} themselves. The Khuzestan and Mosul (Iraq) oilfields were some 800 miles from the USSR border - and thus out of range of Soviet tactical air power - whilst the Kuwaiti fields were a further 150 miles. And the main Saudi fields 'a couple of hundred miles' further still.

The Soviet Union indeed possessed seven airborne divisions and had demonstrated, in Angola and Ethiopia, an ability to mount substantial airlift capability. And, in the view of Pentagon analysts, 'Airlift is adequate to lift one (division) 1,000 miles in short order

with three days of supplies.'¹⁵⁹ However, even local Soviet air operations in Northern Iran would, in the view of (JCS) General Richard Lawson, be subject to interdiction by 'U.S. tactical fighters, supported by air refuelling and guided by the sophisticated E-3A AWACS...[which]...have demonstrated repeatedly the worlds foremost capacity for rapid world-wide deployment.'¹⁶⁰ Again, the latter consideration was critical to U.S. rapid deployment strategy. The Soviet airforce lacked a comparable airborne battle management capability. This would leave the deployment of Soviet TACAIR dependent upon the prior introduction of a fixed 'Ground Controlled Intercept' (GCI) facility. The establishment of Soviet Ground control was, though, itself dependent on there being a safe air passage to the theatre of operations.¹⁶¹ Overall, for the Pentagon's Director For Plans and Policy, whilst the Soviet Union had a capability to, 'deploy relatively small forces against light opposition', Moscow would be, 'taxed to deploy a large force thousands of miles in a contested situation.'¹⁶²

VII. U.S. Strategy: Preemption, 'Tiered Interdiction' and Third Party Perception.

In terms of U.S. strategy, the distinction - outlined above - between Soviet 'peripheral and distant capabilities'¹⁶³ was to underpin three key factors in determining the RDF posture. Firstly, it would mean a tactical approach based on 'tiered interdiction'. In Under Secretary Komer's exposition, 'one has to look at the threat to the oilfields in segments rather than in terms of the Soviets taking over the whole thing.'¹⁶⁴ Politically this, as has been argued, encompasses the option of U.S. acceptance of a divided Iran. Secondly, given that any such Soviet action - aside from yielding uncertain strategic

dividends - would be 'an exceedingly low confidence affair' militarily, the focus of DOD threat assessment was, as Komer further observes, 'not an overt Russian attack, but rather internal instability, coups, subversion and so forth.'¹⁶⁵ Here, 'To offset the overall U.S. advantages in power projection the Soviets have adopted a style of operation which permits them to challenge Western interests at a relatively low risk.'¹⁶⁶ Such usage of, 'Soviet advisors', 'surrogates', 'friendship treaties' and 'foreign military sales' would be countered by Brzezinski's 'very small rapid intervention force'. The mission of 'rapid response' forces was, to be sure, conventionally viewed in terms of providing a 'tripwire' capability against Soviet incursions, and the current (1980) U.S. ability to deploy three battalions (by air) to the Gulf in 48 hours¹⁶⁷ was publicly discussed as such by the administration.¹⁶⁸ However, whilst the effectiveness of a 'tripwire' approach to the Soviets was contested by some in the Pentagon,¹⁶⁹ the availability of such a 'rapid reaction' capability had a clear utility in the 'lesser contingencies' which as was admitted, were of the greatest likelihood in any event.

The third strategic consequence of the theatre military balance in South Asia was concerned with the less tangible sphere of 'Perceptions', taken by Harold Brown to be 'as important as realities in the international arena.'¹⁷⁰ Such considerations, underlying the more generalized architecture of deterrence, would locate both the Soviet and local contingency implications of RDF posture within the global bounds of the administration's 'countervailing strategy'. Here, the high profile accorded to inferential factors - attributed, in the first instance, to third party readings (of great power intention) within the overall strategic discourse of the central balance - was reflective, for Secretary Brown of, 'what theorists of international politics have long held.'¹⁷¹ It was also

indicative of the extent to which the Carter Cabinet's internal agenda had taken on the contours of the standing U.S. debate on strategic 'superiority' and the credibility of security guarantees at lower levels of threat. One prominent theorist who had consistently advanced such views was Henry Kissinger. For Kissinger, the apparent 'lack of enthusiasm' greeting the Carter Doctrine amongst its ostensible beneficiaries was, in direct proportion, a result of the administration 'systematically deprecating the role of power'.¹⁷² The administration has given the impression that 'there are almost no circumstances in which America would employ its armed forces'. The Gulf nations, in the former Secretary of State's view, 'are...concerned that the United States...will accept adverse geopolitical changes provided they can be structured to appear in some way to result from internal upheavals'.¹⁷³ And, overall, 'the principal obstacle' to local acceptance of the Carter Doctrine is, 'the pervasive conviction that we lack the means or perhaps the will to implement it'.¹⁷⁴

The views of Kissinger on the administration's seeming ambivalence toward the utility of arms were to receive a clear affirmation from Harold Brown. In a valedictory (December, 1980) *New York Times* interview, Brown regretted that '(former Secretary of State) Vance was persuaded that anything that involved the use of force was a mistake'.¹⁷⁵ However, although still contested in terms of both quantity and force structure,¹⁷⁶ a clear statement of 'means' was now apparent in the administration's \$17.4bn. RDF programme.¹⁷⁷ The 'will' would be demonstrable in a strategy of preemption. Thus if, as General Kelly was to acknowledge, both the planned and existing RDF, 'would not be a force that would be capable of blunting a massive Soviet effort', it could, however, serve as a 'nucleus, as we put additional force into the area'.¹⁷⁸ The

relation between U.S.-Soviet 'geopolitical asymmetry' in South Asia, preemption, and extended deterrence was discussed in the following terms by DOD Deputy Under Secretary (Policy Planning) Walter Slocombe. Here, 'It is not necessary...for the initial units to defeat the whole force an adversary might eventually have in place. It is also not necessary for a U.S. movement to await the firing of the first shot. Many of our forces can move upon strategic warning and some even upon the receipt of very early and tenuous warning'¹⁷⁹ and, 'lacking (such a) capability...would give a serious and dangerously wrong signal...particularly to our friends in the area.'¹⁸⁰ The latter point, reinforced by Harold Brown and other administration officials,¹⁸¹ would thus affirm 'time-urgency' as the key variable in RDF strategy and preemption as the operative planning factor. Again, General Kelly's stress on the capability to, 'get forces into an area rapidly, irrespective of size'¹⁸² was also viewed by some analysts as a means to avoid 'contested entry' requirements which, as we have seen, were not programmed into the RDF.¹⁸³ In the wider context, though, it was further observed that, given the geographical disadvantages of the U.S., the shortfall in TACAIR capability of the Soviet Union, and the unpredictable political behaviour of the regional powers themselves, 'The Middle East is an area in which preemption is the only reasonable strategy for either of the superpowers.'¹⁸⁴

Conclusions: The Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Extended Deterrence.

The dilemmas discussed above will again indicate the wider agenda of 'extended deterrence'. In a summation of findings on 'The Future of Strategic Nuclear

Deterrence'¹⁸⁵ taken from the 1980 conference at the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, IISS co-ordinator Christopher Bertram argues that the perceived or actual trend to ICBM imbalance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union does not effect the core proposition of nuclear deterrence; the 'ability...to credibly threaten each other with nuclear devastation.'¹⁸⁶ And whilst some stress was placed on the supposed Soviet nuclear 'war fighting' doctrine in the preamble to PD-59 and other statements of U.S. strategic doctrine considered in this study, the sheer level of unpredictability inherent in any direct nuclear engagement would, clearly, remain unaffected by possession or otherwise of options toward 'escalation dominance' or increasingly discriminatory counterforce.¹⁸⁷ Harold Brown was surely correct in asserting that counterforce was not, *a priori*, 'a (nuclear) first strike strategy'. The contingencies where counterforce was seen to be functional, however, were those involving deterrence on the periphery; and notably, those covered here in the Gulf, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In proportion to the removal from (metropolitan and NATO) areas of clear 'core' significance to the United States, the logic of counterforce was to rest upon the exemplar of a perceived conventional 'first strike' capability in admitting greater credibility to threat-bargaining at further levels of escalation. Here, Brown is clear that, '"Counterforce" covers much more than central strategic systems...we will give special attention, in implementing the countervailing strategy, to more effective and more flexible targeting of the full range of military capabilities.'¹⁸⁸

Thus, the 'organic' link between counterforce, preemption and extended deterrence, as explored here in the case of South West Asia, was to proceed from the premise that the availability of, 'options between acquiescence and nuclear holocaust'¹⁸⁹ would lend the deterrent effect of even small U.S. force commitments and territorial guarantees

increased 'credibility' - 'particularly', as Under Secretary Slocombe observes, 'to our friends in the area.'¹⁹⁰

In considering overall the interaction between the Iranian revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the return of U.S. policy to great power confrontation, it is unwise to disaggregate *a priori* a temporal ordering of events into causal sequence. Here, though, perhaps two observations are in order. Firstly, whilst the events in Iran and Afghanistan had indeed stemmed from discrete causes, an outline hypothesis for sequential significance may be approached by positing alternatives. The outbreak and course of the Iranian revolution was, as has been extensively argued above, entirely unprepared for by either Washington or Moscow. Given the predicted continuation of the Shah's regime it is arguable that, whilst the Soviet Union would have retained its strategic interest in the internal arrangements of Afghanistan, the exercise thereon would clearly have been effected by the prospect of arousing the hostility of a regime in Iran which, as has also been shown, Moscow had made considerable efforts to maintain good relations with. In this respect, the temporary power vacuum in Tehran had surely facilitated a greater span of options for Soviet Afghan policy. Secondly, however, it may be observed that the form of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was itself in some measure a product of earlier efforts by Iran to displace Soviet influence in Kabul. These, like the other aspects of the Shah's regional activism in Iraq, Oman and elsewhere, had the full support of the United States.¹⁹¹ And perhaps more important as a defining factor in Soviet policy was the perception of increasing U.S. hostility to Russia *tout court* - underscored by the breakdown of NALT and conventional arms negotiations and non-

ratification of the SALT treaty - which had been catalysed, notably in its regional focus, by the Iranian revolution.¹⁹²

In its effects on the United States' global position, the impact of the Iranian revolution can again be approached from two dimensions of analysis. In the first instance, it removed the integrating focus for U.S. regional policy. No other power could have replaced the Shah's Iran in its linkages with Israel, Egypt, the Gulf States and the CENTO nations. At a strategic level, moreover, the 'loss' of Iran had removed a central pillar of 'essential equivalence'. From the beginning of the Carter administration, the Gulf and the Middle East were viewed as more integrated than before within U.S. global strategy. In particular, the region had become more closely integrated in global military posture. The groundwork for this process had, to be sure, been laid during the two Republican Presidencies, by Nixon and Kissinger. For the Carter administration, however, the effort to combine a greater integration of the Western alliance with a response to the increased level of Soviet capability and, critically, the focus brought to bear on such developments in the central balance by domestic critics, had identified the Gulf region as a common point of departure.

The above discussion has summarized U.S. and Soviet perspectives on the Iranian revolution. It has also suggested a strategic context wherein the aims of United States' regional policy under the Carter administration were related to parallel objectives in the Western alliance and the central balance. In conclusion, an attributive framework can also be indicated. It can be thus observed that this linkage of regional, alliance and strategic policy was first made manifest in the programme of theatre arms expansion in

NATO, the PRM-10 proposals to form a regional strike force, and, indeed, the collateral considerations of counterforce within PD-18.¹⁹³ To be sure, a 'worst case' planning scenario of a Soviet move in the Gulf was posited, from PD-18 onwards, as a possible precursor for action on the central front. Albeit, at an organizational level, the strategic stress on 'Europe and Japan's oil lifeline' had also emerged in the early planning process as a means to concert greater defence 'burden sharing' from the Western alliance, in order to better redeploy existing U.S. defence assets to the Gulf and Indian Ocean.

Here, it can be recalled that the Carter administration's approach, for Indian Ocean region and the 'South' in general, had embodied a contradiction of means and, in similar respect, objectives, from the outset. It was undoubtedly viewed by many, and notably the President himself, as a policy area neglected by previous administrations and worthy of attention in its own right. It was also, however, regarded as a ripe ground for regaining U.S. influence. The Carter foreign policy platform had thus placed some stress thereby in the initiatives toward 'regional influentials', and more particularly for our study, those Indian Ocean nations - Somalia and Iraq - hitherto taken as allied to the Soviet Union. And if Washington was indeed to undertake the most sustained effort to date to establish arms limitation in the Indian Ocean region, the military component of policy, embodied early on in the ratification of James Schlesinger's contested (1974-5) planning for Diego Garcia, was not to be neglected. The 'Era Two' approach was, at least in the eyes of its authors, adopted very much under duress. It was, for Samuel Huntington, the perceived decline in U.S. military capability that had produced the stress on economic and political means toward 'resolving regional conflicts, reducing tensions and achieving verifiable arms agreements.'¹⁹⁴

Given the existing current of great power relations, U.S. relations with allied powers and the terms of domestic opposition to the governing administration, the conjunctural impact of the Iranian revolution was, perhaps uniquely, such as to bring forth a fusion of perceived areas of challenge to the United States. As analyst Geoffrey Kemp was to observe two months after the fact, 'It has become increasingly difficult to separate the region's own internal conflicts from the broader question of U.S.-Soviet military rivalry.'¹⁹⁵ And whilst the focus of the new U.S. strategy was placed on the Gulf, the diffused and variegated perception of the challenge was registered as global. This, as our study has indicated, was to find a strategic expression in planning for 'horizontal escalation'. It is worth remarking that the first public mention by President Carter of the RDF was in connection with the supposed Soviet 'Combat Brigade' in Cuba, in a speech of October, 1979.¹⁹⁶ Such reaffirmations of U.S. global interests were integral to reassertion of U.S. singularity. The dilemma, though, remained that of reconciling the unavoidably increasing importance of the Gulf, Middle East and Indian Ocean regions to the United States' global position with decreasing comparative advantage toward other states, particularly in the non-military categories of power. The dichotomies of 'Era Two' were thus to be comprehensively settled in favour of addressing the - principally military - areas of remaining unilateral U.S. power. Areas whose failings had, regardless of the administration's intentions, objectively left the option of greater assertion inoperable.

CHAPTER SIX (111): FOOTNOTES.

- 1) The February, 1975 'Dublin Formula' established the principle of two homogenous (Euro-Arab) regional delegations for the 'dialogue', which on the Arab side would include the PLO; see, Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East: U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs* (Washington: GPO, 1977), p.79, p.121.
- 2) The June 29, 1977 declaration of the European Council stressed the 'legitimate right' of the Palestinian people to 'give effective expression to its national identity'; see, *ibid.*, p.121, *Washington Post*, June 30, 1977.
- 3) The June 22, 1979 declaration of the EEC Council of Ministers noted previous EEC and UN policy on the Palestine question and called for a 'comprehensive' Middle East settlement; see, *Times* (London), June 23, 1979.
- 4) Cited in Kimche, 'Option', *op.cit.*, p.260.
- 5) See, *The Economist*, February 28, 1981, *New York Times*, March 26, 1981; while the FRG had already supplied Saudi Arabia with a small-arms factory (Heckler & Koch) the 'Leopard II' package was cancelled by Bonn after political objections in the Bundestag.
- 6) See, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, November 3, 1980, p.33.
- 7) See, *Strategy Week*, September 22-8, 1980.
- 8) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Prospects for Multilateral Arms Export Restraint*, 96th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979), p.11. For statistical abstract of Iraq/EEC trading relations, see, *IMF: Direction of Trade Yearbook, 1980* (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, June, 1981).
- 9) 'There are many doors open to us', Crown Prince Fahd had observed, '...we can replace the Americans any time we want'; see, *Middle East Economic Digest*, Vol. 24 (January 18, 1980), p.37.
- 10) See, *New York Times*, June 18, 1978.
- 11) See, *An Nahar* (Beirut), January 22, 1979; cited in CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.11.
- 12) Tehran Radio, January 7, 1980; cited in CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.24.
- 13) The al-Da'wa had tried to assassinate (Iraq Deputy PM) Tariq Aziz on April 1, 1980, Iraq then executed Shi'ite cleric Ayatollah Musa Sadr on April, 8; Khomeini had called for Iraqis to 'turn their backs' on the Ba'ath regime, '...and overthrow it'. See, *Washington Post*, April 18, 1980.
- 14) See, *Economist Foreign Report*, (August 1, 1980), *MERIP Reports*, (July-September, 1981).
- 15) The Agency was, in fact, actively seeking ways to restrain the Kurdish insurrection. See, for example, Cable # 44802 (Secret/WNINTEL), CIA (1/10/79), to: DCI/WashDC, from: CIA/Ankara (Esp. V.32:144); the Cable records a discussion with Turkish Intelligence on 'coordinated' efforts to 'discourage' the traffic of arms across the Kurdistan border.

- 16) Bakhtiar had met CIA representative 'SD Pepper' in Paris on September 20, 1979 and requested 'substantial aid' to overthrow Khomeini. See, Cable # 12539 (Secret/WNINTEL), CIA (20/9/79), to:DCI/WashDC, from: CIA/Paris (Esp. V.38:35-36). By November, agents report Bakhtiar conducting negotiations with 'senior' figures in Baghdad and apparently coordinating a shipment of Czech armaments to the Kurdish guerillas; see, Cable # 545700 (Secret/WNINTEL/NOFORNDIS/NOCONTRACT/ORCON), CIA (3/11/79), to: DCI/WashDC, from: CIA/Baghdad (Esp. V.32:61-62).
- 17) A (May, 1979) CIA assessment notes that, despite Soviet efforts to 'ease relations' with Iraq, the RCC, 'have continued to repress the Iraqi Communist Party and were anxious to halt the Soviet-backed South Yemeni incursion into North Yemen'; see, *Changes in the Middle East: Moscow's Perceptions and Options* (Secret/WNINTEL), CIA/NFAC (29/5/79- decl.01/86), (hereafter, *CIA/Moscow/ME*), p.4; see also, Adeed Dawisha, 'Iraq: The West's Opportunity', *Foreign Policy* No. 41 (Winter 1980-1), pp.134-54.
- 18) See, interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, *MacNeil-Lehrer Report* (transcript), (Washington DC: WETA Television), April 14, 1980.
- 19) See, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.8; the Report notes that, following the July, 1975 conclusion of a border demarcation agreement for the 'Iraq-Saudi Neutral Zone', 'the Iraqi regime terminated its propaganda campaign against the Saudi monarchy.'
- 20) *ibid.*
- 21) The 'Algiers Accord' of March 6, 1975 had, in effect, ratified Iran's (April, 1969) abrogation of earlier treaties and left the bulk of the Shatt channel under Iranian control. For legal background, see, for example, Majid Khaddhami, *Origins and Implications of the Iran/Iraq Conflict* (London: OUP, 1988), pp.81-95.
- 22) Remarks of U.S. Ambassador to UN General Assembly, October 23, 1980; see, *New York Times*, October 24, 1980.
- 23) Brzezinski notes that, 'The threat to the Gulf gives us a unique opportunity to consolidate our security position...Private and secret initiatives are needed'; see, Confidential Presidential memo #156 (October 3, 1980), cited in Brzezinski, 'Power and Principle', *op.cit.*, p.568.
- 24) President Carter's own expressed view was that a second rescue attempt would be 'suicidal', see Carter, 'Memoirs' *op.cit.*, p.519; this did not, though, rule out a recapitulation of the earlier provisions for a 'punitive' strike 'should this be necessary'. See, Sick, 'Iran', *op.cit.*, p.241, p.358(fn.).
- 25) The Kharg Island option was made public on March 21, 1980; see, SFRC/NESA *op.cit.*, 'appendix', p.348.
- 26) See, *Sunday Times* (London), October 12, 1980, *MERIP Reports* (July-September, 1981), pp.3-4.
- 27) See, SNIE/78, *op.cit.*, p.22.
- 28) *ibid.*, p.26.
- 29) See, Dennis Ross, 'Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf', *International Security* No.6 (Fall, 1981), p.167; see also, Francis Fukuyama, *The Soviet Union and Iraq since 1968* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1980).
- 30) See, *Le Point* (Paris), October 27, 1980; the USSR also offered to supply Iran with arms and aviation fuel, see Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde*, October 9, 1980.

- 31) Washington Post, October 11, 1980.
- 32) DOD/DOS analysts note specific applications of the 'multiplier effect' of AWACS with respect to; 1) earlier detection of attack, 2) better allocation of resources, 3) improved command and control and kill probability for interceptors and SAM forces, 4) fewer friendly losses per engagement through improved tactics. See, 'I/A Iran', *op.cit.*, p.27.
- 33) See, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.62.
- 34) See, *Washington Star*, October 22, 1980.
- 35) Sixty-eight Senators had opposed the sale in an open letter to Carter in mid-July; see, *Washington Star*, August 18, 1980.
- 36) Secretary Brown set a November, 30 deadline for the study; see, *New York Times*, October 23, 1980.
- 37) Evidence for earlier administration moves to facilitate a 'full utilization' of the F-15 package can be noted in the (October, 1979) announcement of a \$1.5bn. construction programme for hardened shelter facilities; see, *New York Times*, October 25, 1979. In December, Congress would also consider the sale of a comprehensive munitions stockpile, including 916 'Maverick' a/g and 660 'Sidewinder' a/a missiles, 3,435 GBU-12 laser guided bombs and 1,000 CBU-58 cluster bombs. See, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-committee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, *Proposed United States Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: Hearings*, December 12, 1979, 96th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1980).
- 38) See, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military and Technical Implications of the Proposed Sale to Saudi Arabia of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and F-15 Enhancements: Hearings*, 97th.Cong. 1st.Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981), p.40, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 39) *ibid.*, p.17, testimony of (JCS) General Stamm.
- 40) *ibid.*, p.10, testimony of (CJCS) General David C. Jones.
- 41) President Carter had publicly withdrawn the F-15 enhancements offer on October, 24, but had privately offered to reinstate the programme in December in a joint announcement with the Reagan transition team (which was turned down); see, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, pp. 62-3, *New York Times*, April 22, 1981.
- 42) Statement of DOS spokesman Tom Reston endorsing the F-15 sale, July 17, 1980, cited in *New York Times*, July 18, 1980.
- 43) Carter had briefed Senators on U.S./allied coordination for the Gulf on September, 28; see, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.61.
- 44) See, *Le Monde*, October 22, 1980.
- 45) See, *Washington Post*, October 20, 1980.
- 46) The price for 'spot' Arabian light had reached \$40 p/b. in November, 1979, and would briefly stand at \$41.25 in November, 1980; see composite data in, CRS/Saudi Arabia, *op.cit.*, p.27.
- 47) *ibid.*

- 48) *New York Times*, December 11, 1980; OPEC production data available in Monthly Energy Review, (April, 1984), cited in, Mohammed E. Ahrahri, 'OPEC and the Hyperpluralism of the Oil Market in the 1980's', *International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No.2 (Spring, 1985), pp.263-77 (p.275).
- 49) For background discussion, see, Claudia Wright, 'Implications of the Iraq-Iran War', *Foreign Affairs* 59, (Winter 180-81), pp.275-303.
- 50) See, Al-Rai al-amm (Kuwait), FBIS, Daily Report (FBIS-MEA- 81-073), April 16, 1981, p.A4; see also *Middle East Economic Digest*, April 2, 1982.
- 51) See, William Quandt, *The Gulf Conflict: Policy Memo #40*, Centre for International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton: PUP, August 1981), p.45.
- 52) See, *Arab Times* (Kuwait), FBIS, *Daily Report* (FBIS-MEA-81-157), August 13, 1981, p.E3.
- 53) See, *Strategy Week*, October 12, 1980. Gulf states other than Oman were, however, decidedly ambivalent about the plan; William Quandt notes that, 'Saddam Hussein expressed some frustration that the UAE (with a titular claim) was reluctant to state clearly that it wanted the three (the Tumbs plus Abu Musa) islands back', (Quandt, 'Gulf Conflict', *ibid.*).
- 54) HFAC staff analysts observe that, 'A stalemated conflict offers (the Gulf states) more short term security than would a clear cut military victory for either side'; see, HFAC/Gulf Rep., *op.cit.*, p.11.
- 55) See, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, September 29, 1980 p.27; October 6, 1980, p.21; November 3, 1980; November 24, 1980, p.66.
- 56) See, Jeffrey Record, *The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf* (Cambridge, Mass: Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981), p.14.
- 57) Gary Sick's NSC staff had prepared a preliminary list of items for Warren Christopher's September, 16-18 meeting with Iranian officials in Bonn; see, Sick 'Iran' *op.cit.*, pp.310-12.
- 58) The phrase was often reiterated by Khomeini; see, for example, Tehran Radio in, *BBC/SWB/ME*, February 12, 1986 (A/9).
- 59) For discussion of the strategic implications for the U.S. of the Kennan Evran and Zia ul-Haq regimes, see, Claudia Wright, 'Strong Men for the Turkish Winter', *Miami Herald*, September 14, 1980; 'Reaping the Pakistani Whirlwind', *Inquiry*, September 14, 1981.
- 60) See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.448.
- 61) *ibid.*, p.468.
- 62) 'The initiative,' Brezezinski relates, was taken by Harold Brown and Robert Komer (see, *ibid.*); for Komer's retrospective view, see, Robert W. Komer, 'Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 5, (Summer, 1982), pp.1124-44.
- 63) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.42; Chap. 4, 'Strategic Nuclear Forces'.
- 64) *ibid.*, p.38.

- 65) For a succinct discussion of PD-59 and the 'counterforce' debate, see, Clarence A. Robinson, 'Carter Strategic Policy Under Scrutiny', *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, August 11, 1980.
- 66) See also discussion of counterforce in, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary James Schlesinger, *Annual Report for FY 1975*, Chap.ii, 'Strategic Forces' pp.25-28; Schlesinger notes that, 'Threats against allied forces, to the extent that they could be deterred by the prospect of nuclear retaliation, demand both more limited responses than destroying cities and advanced planning tailored to such lesser responses', (p.38). For discussion of the differences between the Schlesinger adoption of 'limited nuclear options' and the more expansive counterforce of PD-59, see, Colin S. Grey/Keith Payne, 'Victory is Possible', *Foreign Policy* 39 (Summer, 1980), pp.14-27 (p.18).
- 67) See, for example, John Edwards, *Super Weapon: The Making of MX*, (NY: Norton, 1982), pp.171-199.
- 68) For PD-59 discussion, see, Colin S. Grey, 'Presidential Directive 59: Flawed but Useful', *Parameters*, March, 1981.
- 69) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.37.
- 70) *ibid.*, p.44.
- 71) *ibid.*, p.iv.
- 72) *ibid.*, p.38.
- 73) *ibid.*, p.37.
- 74) See, Jimmy Carter, 'State of the Union', *op.cit.*, p.197.
- 75) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.5.
- 76) See, Richard Burt, 'Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require Atom Arms', *New York Times*, February 2, 1980, p.1. For an extended summary, see also Kenneth Waltz, 'A Strategy for the RDF', *op.cit.*
- 77) The 'net assessment' section of PRM-10 was managed by an NSC Special Coordinating Committee chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski whilst the 'force posture statement' was provided by a Policy Review Committee under the Assistant Secretary of Defense; see, Robert G. Kaiser, 'Memo Sets Stage in Assessing U.S.- Soviet Strength', *Washington Post*, July 6, 1977, p.1. The division between 'net assessment' and 'force planning' was first introduced into DOD methodology by Melvin Laird.
- 78) See, Joshua Epstein, *Strategy and Force Planning: the Case of the Persian Gulf* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1987) pp.13-18; see also, PA&E: 'Methodology', *op.cit.*, p.3.8; the study notes, 'ADM (Atomic Demolition Munitions) alone could quickly seal off all avenues of approach into Iran.'
- 79) In the view of some analysts, the key contribution of the Wolfowitz Report was the elevation of Soviet (as opposed to regional) contingencies; see, Burt 'Atom Arms', *op.cit.*, 'How U.S. Strategy Toward the Persian Gulf Evolved', *op.cit.*
- 80) Cited in, Jack Anderson, 'Frightening Facts on the Persian Gulf', *Washington Post*, February 3, 1981, p.18.

- 81) The B-52's were staged from PACOM in conjunction with the AWACS deployment to Egypt of March, 7-8; see, SFRC/NESA 'appendix', *op.cit.*, p.348; Sick, 'U.S. Strategy' *op.cit.*, p.75.
- 82) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.462, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 83) This was contested by Brzezinski. At SCC discussions on September 5, 1980, Secretary Muskie had agreed that, 'the loss of the Persian Gulf might lead to the loss of Europe'. 'In that case', Brzezinski relates, 'isn't it vital that we deter the Soviets from moving into Iran?'. See, Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.452.
- 84) As Ravenal observes, 'America's willingness to protect its allies', rests, 'with the United States' ability to protect its own society from nuclear attack'; see Earl C. Ravenal, 'Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection', *International Security*, Vol.6, No.4 (Spring, 1982), pp.26-43 (p.34.).
- 85) *ibid.*, p.35.
- 86) The PD-18 guidance called for a three division reaction force, 'structured, manned and equipped for contingencies that could precede a war in Europe'; see, George C. Wilson, 'New U.S. Military Plan: Europe, Persian Focus', *Washington Post*, July 27, 1978, p.1.
- 87) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, appendix 'A', Tab. 1.
- 88) *ibid.*, p.42.
- 89) *ibid.*, p.43.
- 90) *ibid.*, p.41.
- 91) See, Colin S. Grey, 'A Case for a Theory of Victory', *International Security*, Vol.4, No.1, (Summer, 1979), pp.54-87.
- 92) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.45.
- 93) *ibid.*, p.x.
- 94) *ibid.*, p.38.
- 95) See, Ravenal, 'Alliance', *op.cit.*, p.34; this course would also, however, suggest the U.S. adopting 'a more restricted security perimeter'. See also, Earl C. Ravenal, 'Doing Nothing', *Foreign Policy* 39, (Summer, 1980), pp.28-40.
- 96) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.iv.
- 97) Harold Brown was concerned to demonstrate that nuclear 'parity' still obtained with the USSR, albeit 'the momentum of Soviet strategic growth continues'; see DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-5.
- 98) See, Ravenal, 'Alliance' *op.cit.*, p.36.
- 99) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.vi.
- 100) *ibid.*
- 101) *ibid.*

- 102) *ibid.*, p.vi.
- 103) *ibid.*, p.6.
- 104) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.466, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 105) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.6.
- 106) *ibid.*; Brown also notes that, 'China considers the Soviet Union its major adversary, and has deployed its...most capable forces to the Northern military regions', albeit, 'it would take years to develop the PLA into a force comparable in modernity to those of the United States and the Soviet Union today', (p.84).
- 107) See, Henry Kissinger, 'White House Years', *op.cit.*, pp.750, 1089-90.
- 108) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.34.
- 109) See, the reference to 'over-the-horizon radar' in Brzezinski, *op.cit.*, p.431.
- 110) *ibid.*, p.445.
- 111) DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.83.
- 112) *ibid.*
- 113) See, Robert W. Tucker, 'The Purposes of American Power', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.59, No.1, (Fall, 1980), pp.241-74 (p.256).
- 114) See, CIA/Moscow/ME. *op.cit.*, p.6.
- 115) See, Dennis Ross, 'Threats to the Persian Gulf', *International Security*, Vol.6, No.2, (Fall, 1981), pp.159-80 (p.174).
- 116) In outlining the administration's revised perspectives on '1-1/2 War' strategy, Brown observes that, 'It has become difficult to imagine another sepearate large war with another major power breaking out, simultaneously with one in Europe, that would require a large U.S. intervention. A simultaneous lesser contingency...not only seems plausible, it could also be the triggering event for a much larger conflict'. See, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Harold Brown, *Annual Report for FY 1980* (Washington: GPO, 1979), p.98.
- 117) In the view of Robert Komer, 'the presence of Soviet forces within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean...brings Moscow closer to attainment of an historic Russian foreign policy objective'; see, DOD 81-Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.481, answer supplied for the record.
- 118) See, for example, Robert Moss, 'Reaching For Oil: The Soviet's Bold Mideast Strategy', *Saturday Review*, April 12, 1980.
- 119) See, *Baluchistan: A Primer*; Intelligence Memorandum (Secret), CIA/NFAC (10/1/80-decl.12/7/84), p.3.
- 120) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 121) See, Selig S. Harrison, 'Nightmare in Baluchistan', *Foreign Policy* 32 (Fall, 1978), pp.136-60 (pp.158-9).
- 122) See, *ibid.*, p.139.

- 123) CIA 'Primer' notes that, 'In local elections held last year, Bhutto's PPP for the first time made significant gains...a vote many interpret as directed against the tribal chiefs', *ibid.*, p.5.
- 124) See, *ibid.*, p.6; the Agency also notes that, 'the Afghans, not necessarily with Soviet encouragement, have been involved for years with (Pushtun) separatists across the border.'
- 125) *ibid.*, p.5.
- 126) *ibid.*, p.8.
- 127) See, CIA/Iran/Left, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 128) See, CIA/Moscow/ME, *op.cit.*, p.4.
- 129) *ibid.*, p.5; the Assessment also suggests that, 'the Soviets would probably not oppose support funneled discreetly to (the minorities) by third parties in the interests of maintaining instability.'
- 130) CIA/Iran/Left, *op.cit.*, p.2.
- 131) *ibid.*
- 132) The Tudeh operated semi-legally during the height of Khomeini's (August-October, 1979) campaign against Azeri and Kurdish minorities. See, for example, Sharam Chubin, 'Leftist Forces in Iran', *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XXIX, No.4 (July-August, 1980), p.9; see also, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'The Soviet Union and Iran Under Khomieni', *International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.4 (Autumn, 1981), pp.599-617.
- 133) See, Leonid Brezhnev, *Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 26th Congress of the CPSU, February 23, 1981* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Press, 1981), p.23.
- 134) See, Claudia Wright, 'America's Sticky Turkish Delight', *New Statesman*, June 20, 1981, pp.921-2.
- 135) See, *New York Times*, October 1, 1980.
- 136) Brezhnev speech to the Lok Sabha (India); see, *New York Times*, December 11, 1980.
- 137) In the CIA's view, the USSR 'want to maintain a proper relationship with the Iranian regime to protect both the Tudeh Communist Party and their own assets as well as encouraging an anti U.S. posture by that government'; see, CIA/Moscow/ME, *op.cit.*, p.iv.
- 138) See, *Daily Telegraph*, April 19, 1980.
- 139) See, CIA/Moscow/ME, *op.cit.*, p.3.
- 140) Conventionally, the 'static' planning approach is concerned with fixed inputs and simple numerical indices, the 'dynamic' methodology involves the analysis of the outcome of specific scenarios: in Harold Brown's summation, 'This approach specifies that the way to measure...our capabilities and to determine our programmatic needs is by analyzing hypothetical conflicts and their outcomes', see, DOD Rep./FY-80, *op.cit.*, p.63.
- 141) See, DOD 81-Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.481, answer for the record by Robert Komer.
- 142) See, *New York Times*, October 19, 1980.

- 143) See, DOD 81-Hgs., *op.cit.*, 458, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 144) As Komer makes clear, the requested NTPS and proposed 'SL-7' fast sea-lift, 'will not give us an amphibious assault capability'; *ibid.* See also Jeffrey Record's criticism of this approach in 'RDF/U.S. Intervention', *op.cit.*, pp.55-6.
- 145) See, Joshua M. Epstein, 'Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent', *International Security*, Vol.6, No.2, (Fall, 1981), pp.127-58 (p.156).
- 146) *ibid.*, p.143.
- 147) In Epstein's calculation, to sustain the full complement of Soviet capability (est. 24 div's) for a 'high confidence' assault on Norther Iran would require a draw-down of some 55 division's complement of logistics trucks from other theatres; see, *ibid.*, p.142.
- 148) Notionally, this would involve, 'a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation, a war in South West Asia, and a North Korean attack on South Korea'; see, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.86.
- 149) Epstein, 'RDF', *op.cit.*, p.143.
- 150) See, CIA 'Primer', *op.cit.*, p.7.
- 151) DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.191.
- 152) As Robert Komer observes, 'most of the Soviet forces up there, except those used in Afghanistan, are not fully fleshed out'; see, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.299.
- 153) These were comprised of 12 combatants and 17 support vessels; see, *Washington Post*, September 28, 1980.
- 154) See, for example, *Pravda*, April 6, 1979, *FBIS/USSR*, August 14, 1979, H1, *FBIS/USSR*, February 28, 1980, H4-H5.
- 155) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.478, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 156) *ibid.*
- 157) Testimony of Gen. David C. Jones before HASC, February 8, 1980; cited in SFRC/NESA 'appendix', *op.cit.*, p.349.
- 158) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.478, testimony of Robert Komer.
- 159) Nine other Soviet divisions were also deployed near the Iranian border; see, DOD briefing cited in SFRC/NESA 'appendix', *op.cit.*, (February 1, 1980), p.350.
- 160) See, DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.438, statement of Gen. Richard Lawson.
- 161) Even in place, the GCI is vulnerable to jamming by carrier-based EA-6B ('Wild Weasel') ECM systems; see, *Soviet Aerospace Handbook* AF Pamphlet 200-21 (Washington DC: Dept. of the Airforce, May, 1978), p.45.
- 162) DOD FY-81 Hgs., *op.cit.*, p.438, statement of Gen. Richard Lawson.
- 163) *ibid.*
- 164) *ibid.*, p.478, testimony of Robert Komer.

- 165) *ibid.*, p.455.
- 166) *ibid.*, p.439, statement of Gen. Richard Lawson.
- 167) According to DOD information, these would comprise; 1 bn. (NATO/Italy), 24 hrs., 1 bn. (82d.a/b - CONUS), 48hrs, 1 bn. (USMC, 'swing'), 48 hrs. See, SFRC/NESA, 'appendix', *op.cit.*, p.350.
- 168) See, Richard Burt, 'Atom Arms', *op.cit.* (NY Times, 2/2/80), p.1.
- 169) See, for example, Jeffrey Record, 'Why Plan Rapid Deployment for the Wrong Kind of War?', *Washington Star*, February 3, 1980.
- 170) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.44.
- 171) *ibid.*
- 172) See, Henry Kissinger, 'The Future of American Foreign Policy', Address to the annual convention of the ASNE, Washington, April 10, 1980; in, Henry Kissinger, 'For the Record', *op.cit.*, p.281.
- 173) See, Henry Kissinger, 'On Iran', interview with the *Economist* eds., February 10, 1979; cited in *ibid.*, p.181.
- 174) See, Henry Kissinger, 'The Geopolitics of Oil', statement before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, July 31, 1980; cited in *ibid.*, p.307.
- 175) See, *New York Times*, December 7, 1980.
- 176) See, for example, Paul H. Nitze, 'Strategy for the 1980's', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.59, No.1, (Fall, 1980); Nitze (for the CPD) calls for an additional \$260bn. defence outlay over five years, (pp.95-7).
- 177) DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, p.vii.
- 178) See, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.317, testimony of Gen. P.X. Kelly.
- 179) See, *ibid.*, p.307, testimony of Walter Slocombe.
- 180) *ibid.*, p.309.
- 181) Thus, for Harold Brown, 'What is important is the ability to move forces into the region ...many of our forces can be moved upon strategic warning, and some on receipt of even very early and ambiguous indicators'; see, Harold Brown, *Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations*, (New York, March 6, 1980).
- 182) Pentagon press briefing by Gen. P.X. Kelly, June 18, 1980.
- 183) See, George C. Wilson, 'Outlook Grim in a War for Mideast Oil', *Washington Post*, October 28, 1980.
- 184) See, Richard K. Betts, *Suprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning*, (Washington: Brookings/SDP, 1982), p.ix-10.
- 185) See, 'The Future of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence' (Part 1): Papers from the IISS 21st Annual Conference; *Adelphi Paper 160* (London: IISS, Winter, 1980).

- 186) See, Christopher Bertram, Introduction, in *ibid.*, p.2
- 187) As Bertram argues, 'to favour the capability of nuclear weapons to destroy military targets, rather than cities, does not necessarily imply a war-fighting strategy, but still rests on the need for deterring, rather than winning, a nuclear war'; *ibid.*
- 188) See, DOD Rep./FY-82, *op.cit.*, Chapter 4, 'The Countervailing Strategy', p.41.
- 189) See, *ibid.*, p.40.
- 190) See, SFRC/NESA, *op.cit.*, p.307, testimony of Walter Slocombe.
- 191) See, for example, Selig Harrison, 'The Shah, not Kremlin touched off Afghan Coup', *Washington Post*, May 13, 1979.
- 192) See, Claudia Wright, 'Afghanistan: What They Were Really Up To', *New Statesman*, April 5, 1985.
- 193) Whilst the PRM-10/PD-18 review and guidance for nuclear targeting options had essentially confirmed the 'flexible options' provisions of NSDM 242 (for limited and counter-silo nuclear attacks), the PD-18 guidance would indicate a more comprehensive counterforce capability, due to the mutual dependence of U.S. targeting planning and the politics of DOD procurement decisions on the MX system. For discussion of these areas, see, Edwards, 'The Making of MX', *op.cit.*, pp.158-77.
- 194) See, Samuel P. Huntington, 'Trade, Technology and Leverage', *Foreign Policy* 32 (Fall, 1978), pp.63-80.
- 195) See, Geoffrey Kemp, 'Contingency Planning and Persian Gulf Options', in, *Proceedings of the National Security Affairs Conference 1979* (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1979), p.367.
- 196) Cited in, 'Troops Episode Spurs Development of Mobile Forces for Third World Moves', *Baltimore Sun*, October 3, 1979, p.1.

CONCLUSION: From ARAMCO to CENTCOM.

The signal advance of United States' engagement in the Indian Ocean region considered in this study would seem, at first sight, to represent the reversal of an historical trend. American power in the international system, preeminent for the first twenty years of the post-war era, had expressly begun a process of retrenchment during the Nixon and early Carter administrations, and this was recognized in the policies and 'doctrine' so promulgated. Clearly, the current of U.S. power was, in objective terms, unable to recapture the absolute primacy, admitted by a unique historical combination of economic strength and strategic nuclear superiority, which had earlier obtained. The advent of the 'Carter Doctrine', its assumption of a fresh area of 'vital national interest' for the United States in the Gulf region, and of its associated military instruments, the Rapid Deployment Force and, later, the Central Command (CENTCOM)¹ was attended by much speculation that the U.S. was undergoing the classic process of attempting to replace economic with military power which would, effectively, retrace the path of earlier empires in decline. The 'imperial overstretch'² thesis had, indeed, seemed to have gained some empirical validation, as the world of the 1980's took on politico/military characteristics seen by some analysts as a 'new cold war' and as the Reagan administration began accelerating such policies - not least in the Indian Ocean.

The perspective of imperial overstretch, whilst attractively concise analytically, is though, and for this same reason, only valid in terms of the characteristics given for traditional empire.³ In this respect, it was surely predictable that a great power threatened in its economic interests, as was apparent with the United States' perception of the rise of OPEC, should take the traditional route of incorporating such concerns in its military

posture. However, whilst analytically coherent, this 'imperial' focus neglects, in other respects, the historical specificity of U.S. power and the domestic lineage of its engagement internationally, and particularly, its military engagement. As John Lewis Gaddis has observed, the course of U.S. global strategy since 1950 has, 'To a remarkable degree...been the product, not so much of what the Russians have done, or what has happened elsewhere in the world, but of internal forces operating in the United States.'⁴ The signifier for such forces, however, was from the time of Harry Truman onwards, the ideological confrontation with communism and its main secular exemplary, the Soviet Union. Throughout the post-war period, successive U.S. administrations have sought to address the 'menace of Soviet communism' to a sometimes sceptical domestic constituency. It can be recalled that the circumstances launching the 'Truman Doctrine' embodied precisely this aim. Opposition to the 'Kremlin design', was, moreover, doubly functional as a counter to embedded domestic isolationism. If the Soviet strategic threat was real enough to U.S. policy makers, the more mundane threat to U.S. local economic interests would also require an active military and political involvement in world affairs. The Truman Doctrine was thus directed, *inter alia*, to oil producing countries on the USSR's Eurasian periphery; the first significant instance of concerted U.S. diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union concerned the national status of Iran.

From the above perspective, the advent of formal U.S. incorporation of the Indian Ocean region within its global military posture can thus, with perhaps greater historical accuracy, be placed within this signal continuous domestic correlate in U.S. foreign policy - containment of the Soviet Union. If, during the 1970's, the United States had

clearly lost power in some categories, it had also, with the rise of significant local multipolarity - and critically, with the formation of a *de facto* strategic alliance with China - the means to make containment again truly global. 'The China card', as Harold Brown observes, 'is actually a full deck.'⁵ It was this extension of endogenous local and regional political autonomy within a global economic frame of reference still predicated on the market power of the United States that was to give U.S. policy both its imperative and opportunity to advance a new period of strategic engagement in the Indian Ocean.

If the realization of this objective had become a declared U.S. policy goal only at the end of the Carter administration, the opportunity was founded in the recognition of Soviet-Chinese enmity by the Nixon Doctrine. To be sure, the Nixon/Kissinger programme was itself a formation *faute de mieux* after U.S. reverses in Vietnam, but again, the move by the Nixon administration to energetically reposition U.S. interests in the Gulf and Indian Ocean was part of the wider assertion of differentiation of (politico/military) means in U.S. global strategy. The specific modalities at issue here were, in simple terms, adopted as the most readily realizable under the historical circumstances. However, if the Nixon/Kissinger approach to China was, over time, moderated by the uncertain trend within Chinese politics itself - the eclipse of Zhou Enlai, the succession question following the (1976) death of Mao Zedong - it was also a product of the Nixon administration's strategic calculation that, whilst the *threat* of U.S.-Chinese alliance could induce co-operation from the Kremlin, the actuality would surely yield an unpredictable level of Soviet hostility. With the Chinese leadership after 1978 again actively seeking such alliance with the United States, the proclivity within all factions of the Carter administration to avoid an 'excessive preoccupation' with U.S.-

Soviet affairs had removed this leeway for differentiation in the Washington/Moscow/Beijing strategic triangle. The corresponding hardening of attitudes from the Soviet Union that did indeed transpire from the 'China card' would, in turn, compound the existing U.S. trend toward an increasing stress on the military dimensions of power. And further vivify the engagement of a fresh geopolitical front which, for the economic and alliance reasons which we have outlined, was already prominent in U.S. national security planning.

Indeed, the Carter administration's concept of 'world order politics' had reflected, in some particulars, the critique of Nixon's policies formed on the right of U.S. politics - notably, in respect of Kissinger's alleged 'historical pessimism' regarding the relative decline of the United States' global position. It is, in this respect, also worth recalling the domestic provenance of the Carter campaign platform, which was formed in express opposition to the McGovern Democrat's call to 'come home America'. And if aspects of the programme adopted in public office, including, in the initial stages, moves on arms control and nuclear proliferation, were to so mark a distinction from some of the more narrow *realpolitik* perspectives of the Kissinger world view, the same logic could be applied, *pari passu*, to such matters as regained U.S. strategic superiority.

It is this latter issue that set the point of departure for the U.S. national security debate during most of the 1970's. And whilst often approached at a high level of abstraction within the Washington defence community, it also provided the touchstone for more diffused, inchoate fears amongst the American public, encompassing economic weakness, defeat in Vietnam and a generalized sense of diminishing U.S. influence in world affairs.

The period of United States' strategic superiority was associated with economic prosperity. The acceptance of 'rough parity' with the Soviet Union was linked in the public mind with economic recession. For those in the policy community itself, such concerns lent a new immediacy to the dilemmas of 'Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age' which had characterized much of the post-war strategic theorizing.

Thus, for the overall public agenda of U.S. foreign and security policy, the terms of discussion had devolved consistently toward an elision of strategic threat, most prominently, in respect of the advances in Soviet military capability and the rise of OPEC. This affective debate on the loss of United States' ability to concert desired outcomes for its policies was, in turn, relayed through the terms of internal and bureaucratic conflict within the formal policy apparatus which had, by 1973, itself broken forth into the public domain. Here, Admiral Zumwalt was to give forthright expression to one partisan perspective on, 'the inextricable relationship [that] the Nixon administration's perversion of the policy process bore to its ignoble outlook ...Its contempt for...the judgement of its own officials and experts reflected Henry Kissinger's world view; that the dynamics of history are on the side of the Soviet Union.'⁶ The then Secretary of State's reported view that the Soviet Union had become 'Sparta to our Athens'⁷ was seized upon as symptomatic of a generalized administration malaise by critics on the liberal as well as the right wing of the U.S. political spectrum.

Clearly, the conduct of this debate was informed by outright partisan considerations and the conventions of public presentation - particularly in terms of its organized expression in such lobbies as the 'Committee on the Present Danger'. However, if in representing

some of the more elaborated geopolitical scenarios of a Soviet 'grand design' extending from Mozambique to North Korea,⁸ these requirements, as leading CPD activist Paul Nitze was to acknowledge, 'often lead one to oversimplify',⁹ the central thesis of a Soviet drive for strategic superiority was indeed intended to be taken at face value. As Nitze again observes, 'there is no point in "rough parity"...in these stakes, who would want to be number two?'¹⁰ If the actual status of the central balance could be questioned empirically, the logic itself was inescapable. Harold Brown, whilst contending that 'it is unlikely that meaningful superiority can be achieved against a determined opponent' would, though, allow that, 'if superiority is an idle goal, inferiority is still a possible outcome...The United States cannot afford inferiority.'¹¹ Former Secretary Brown was also expressing what had become the consensus Washington view in accepting a correlation between the 'shift since the late 1960's away from a perceived U.S. strategic superiority' and, 'its loss [having] had a significant effect on relations between the United States and its allies and on the attitudes of people in other countries towards the United States.'¹²

This latter perspective, long featured in academic and official policy discussion, had formed the principal point of departure for the Nixon Doctrine. The Doctrine's apparent success in indeed addressing the 'potential of a pluralistic world' and seemingly reaching a pragmatic *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union had - Vietnam aside - ensured that the 'strategic superiority' issue had remained somewhat muted in the early days of détente and the Nixon administration. It had only really re-emerged on the public agenda after the OPEC 'oil shock' and the 1973 Middle East war. To be sure, the conclusion of the October war was, in objective terms, a success for collaborative great power strategic

management. The combination and elision of nuclear threat, Soviet conventional capability and Arab economic leverage so revealed, was, though, to set the terms for national security discussion for the rest of the decade. And, more particularly, establish the Gulf/Indian Ocean region as the new theatre for great power strategic confrontation.

The above argument has identified a rising focus on the East-West dimension to U.S. engagement in the Indian Ocean and wider Southern hemisphere, proceeding through the events of the 1973 war, the extended debate over Diego Garcia, Secretary Kissinger and President Ford's efforts to mount a U.S. military response to the Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola and the intense governmental and Congressional interest in the several crises in the Horn of Africa region during the first two years of the Carter administration. The growth in Soviet strategic and conventional capability was thus having two consequences for the development of U.S. policy. Clearly, in the first instance, it had admitted a greater willingness to engage in regional intervention from Moscow itself. Such instances were, though, highly individuated, and susceptible, as in Egypt and Somalia, to reversal by appropriate U.S. and allied diplomacy.

The second consequence went beyond considerations of political and military adjustment at local level, and derived from the advance of a real strategic dimension to multipolarity. To be sure, Soviet power, as senior NSC and State Department aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt had observed, clearly was emerging in 'such a flawed way' as to be vulnerable to the sort of selective U.S. countermeasures set forth in the widely circulated analysis of 1975.¹³ It was, however, emerging in such a way as to provide the conditions for greater latitude to the respective regional powers, whether nominally allied to either

(great power) bloc. It was the latter, systemic, implications of a truly bipolar international order which had allowed India the scope for resisting U.S. military pressure in 1971 and given a competitive leverage in bilateral relations with Washington to the Shah's Iran. Kuwait and North Yemen had pointedly maintained good relations with Moscow as a counter to Saudi pressure, and perhaps most significantly for U.S. regional policy, the simple fact of a rival great power had countenanced the signal economic nationalism of OPEC, trenchant U.S. concerns for the 'strangulation of the industrialized world' notwithstanding.

With the advent of the Carter administration, the reciprocal dilemmas of regional leverage and Soviet strategic parity had become the main concern for U.S. national security policy. And from the outset, the administration had attempted a similarly multi-layered effort to resolve them. As has been shown, 'Era Two' had identified possible areas of advance in nuclear capability - notably, Trident, MX, Cruise and TNF in Europe - whilst an attempt to provide for a more credible programme for the 'lesser contingency' was advanced with PD-18. For the Indian Ocean in particular, there was also, in keeping with the 'World Order' perspectives of the early Carter administration, the parallel effort towards decoupling regional dynamics from the East-West matrix as such, pursued in terms of confidence building measures, U.S.-Soviet regional arms control and the curbing of arms sales to the region. Here, however, whilst what were perceived as excessive levels of U.S. arms sales were indeed addressed by the initial Carter programme - in line with much domestic and Congressional concern - the presumed political leverage afforded by such transactions remained, as under previous administrations, party to 'the increasingly intricate web of mutual

interdependence' between the United States and the significant local powers, replacing, in effect, the earlier level of technical leverage enjoyed by U.S. oil companies in the region.

Moreover, in line with what we have identified as the established course of U.S. strategy, a modulated programme of arms transfers was deemed necessary - in any event - to secure the local conditions for 'essential equivalence', the strategic concept wherein the rise in Soviet capabilities was to be offset by the capabilities of 'prosperous and willing' U.S. allies. These offsets were, however, only operative in the conventional sphere. The equipping and arming of regional surrogates, whilst functional in aggregate to the central balance, served a primary purpose in reasserting U.S. influence in inter-allied affairs, in response to such 'significant effect[s] on relations' as had been eroded by Soviet strategic parity in the first instance.

Here, the strategic issues raised in disaggregating the reciprocal dynamics of 'essential equivalence' bear again upon an earlier aspect of this analysis, that of the Indian Ocean as an arena of direct U.S.-Soviet strategic confrontation. As discussed in chapter two, the complex of strategic arms negotiations of the Nixon first term - SALT 1 - had ratified a *status quo* position of mutual strategic restraint in the region. This was integral to the overall SALT protocol on ICBM/ABM's. As the record also makes clear, neither the United States nor the USSR had proceeded with a full Anti-Ballistic Missile programme. The Soviet Union had retained a minimal 'nth country' ABM deployment around Moscow. Washington had, in turn agreed *de facto* to not deploy SSBN offensive systems in the Indian Ocean. The Pentagon's 'option C' planning for Diego

Garcia was left in abeyance, and the region was explicitly categorized with reference to the agreement on 'Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations' of May 29, 1972.¹⁴

The grounds for U.S. Soviet strategic accord on the Indian Ocean, in simple terms, a trade-off between U.S. non-deployment of strategic systems in return for Soviet 'restraint' in deploying other naval and conventional forces, were to be taken up more systematically in the moves toward a formalized Indian Ocean arms control regime. Here, the 1977-8 Naval Arms Limitation Talks were also in the forefront of the broader effort to address third world concerns undertaken by the early Carter administration. As shown in chapter five, these policies, epitomized by Andrew Young's tenure at the United Nations, were not unsuccessful in restoring a measure of U.S. influence amongst hitherto opposed nonaligned nations - India, Iraq - and, more pragmatically, in reducing the scope for Soviet 'opportunism' in the region. However, just as the administration's multilateral diplomatic approaches in the Indian Ocean were informed by a parallel level of strategic calculation, the direct, bilateral negotiations for regional arms control were also party to the wider U.S. considerations of the central balance. It was the mounting Washington debate on 'strategic superiority' which, by the end of 1978, had finally convinced Congress that, to forgo the option of SSBN deployment in the Indian Ocean 'would give the Soviets a strategic gain that could not be matched by the United States by simply limiting Soviet conventional forces to their 1977 level.'¹⁵

If this general trend toward great power confrontation was thus already in evidence by 1978, and the Indian Ocean was becoming established as the specific regional focus, the Carter administration's concerns were brought into sharp relief by the revolution in

Iran and the domestic reverberations of the hostage affair. Iran had been the unique focus for both the overall U.S. strategic posture in South Asia and the integration of U.S. policy for the Middle East. The shortcomings of the Pentagon's ability to provide for a military option were graphically revealed in the April, 1979 hostage mission, and the wider review of U.S. military posture surrounding 'Nifty Nugget'. Moreover, the uncertain level of political and diplomatic support returned for the U.S. internationally was also indicative, for some in the NSC, that Washington required a more concrete foundation to exert power in the region. With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, this urgency was taken up by the military planning process, which had hitherto, as we have seen, been reluctant to commit large resources to a non-Soviet role. These two internal conditions for a more forward U.S. posture in the Indian Ocean region had been met; those external, concerning the mobilization of regional and allied Western support, would be forthcoming from the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war.

It was thus the outbreak of war between an erstwhile Soviet ally, Iraq, and the former 'keystone' of regional containment which, ironically, provided the final enabling factor toward univocal assertion of U.S. military power in the Indian Ocean region. And in a further irony, it was U.S. planning for a defence of America's most virulent third world opponent - revolutionary Iran - against the Soviet Union which provided the organizing momentum for the concrete engagement of military posture.

CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES.

Thus, in summation, if a multi-layered and reciprocal dynamic of challenge to the United States' global position in the decade of the 1970s has been outlined - proceeding from economic rivals of the West, the emergent multipolarity of the third world and from the strategic parity with the Soviet Union - the U.S. response can similarly be viewed as a dynamic of reinforcement. The key variable for composing this response was taken up from the United States' position in the third world, and, more particularly, those regions of the Middle East and South Asia which, for economic and geopolitical reasons, had earlier been central to establishing U.S. ascendancy after 1945.

It is this redefinition of a primary role for the Indian Ocean in the U.S. global strategy of the 1970's that raises the questions of structure, agency and representation which have formed the core of our analysis. If, as has been argued, the central concern of United States' administration's during this period was with addressing the unfolding secular trend of comparative disadvantage, it is also apparent that, as analyst Richard Higgott observes, 'The declining authority of many governments over the policy process has not been due to other states but to a world market economy under less political control than national economies have been in the past.'¹⁶ In considering the identification of U.S. national interests through the policy process, it is clear that the structuring of such interests was increasingly to take account of both the constraints and opportunities offered by the growth multiple centres of influence, encompassing the realms of international politics, U.S. domestic politics and the often competing centres of inter and intra-bureaucratic power.

From this perspective, analysis of policy development demonstrates recurring attempts at recapturing the authority of government over the policy process as over the trend in politics as such. As has been detailed in this study, a primary concern of the Kissinger NSC system was to curb perceived tendencies toward 'administrative democracy' within the process whilst opportuning for direct avenues of elite-based decision-making at interstate level. In similar fashion, the 'multiple advocacy' approach of the Carter administration's foreign policy apparatus represented a further attempt to parallel assumptions about the role of power in the composition of world politics within the structuring of policy *per se*.

Given the interaction of structure, agency and the distribution of power outlined above, analysis of the course of policy for the Indian Ocean region suggests a certain derivative and adventitious character. Here, just as Europe and Japan were increasingly challenging the United States economically, and in associated respects, politically in this region, the significant local actors on the Northern Indian Ocean littoral were themselves gaining further leeway from the emerging bipolar balance amongst the great powers. The opportunity offered for U.S. policy was, however, to effect a reversal of this dynamic, precisely because Soviet global power was indeed emerging in such a 'flawed way' - notably, in the disproportionate weight accorded its military manifestations. In terms of the representation of these issues in the policy process, the recurrence of categories drawn from classical geopolitics, the 'choke points' and 'funnel areas' denotative of a locational dimension to power, identify a continuing saliency of global relational factors in the emergence of the wider Indian Ocean region itself as a distinct, albeit, loosely bounded, strategic arena. Thus, by focusing again its own signal

predominance in strategic affairs and guarantor position of the general economic interest, the United States was to successfully negotiate a transition from regional delegation backed by strategic mobility - the Nixon Doctrine - to a reestablished role as key regional actor, manifest in the RDJTF, the Camp David peace accords and the advancing 'special relationship' with the Arab oil producing states and particularly, Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the post-war era, the bipolar U.S.-Soviet aspects of the composition of the international system had operated on two levels, a symbolic one of nuclear confrontation and a real one of respective military response to conflict in the third world. The relation between the two had also real consequences, however, in that the military preparations and posture configurations designed for nuclear war, whilst serving primary symbolic and political functions, were not addressing contingencies that were, *a priori*, impossible. For the representational issues raised in considering the development of policy models, such 'counterfactual' perspectives¹⁷ served to delimit a strategic grammar of abiding conceptual consistency - albeit, one informed by an increasing technical positivism. As Alexander George, amongst others, has observed, the extent of theorizing about nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of the systems themselves, had the effect of eliding the concerns of nuclear security policy with those of security policy *tout court*.¹⁸

The paradigm of containment had emerged as the principal referent for setting the analytic agenda for United States' national security policy from the outset of U.S. hegemonic predominance in the post-war period. If the passive construction of the term reflected fears concerning the unpredictability of the use of large scale military force in the nuclear age, the concrete translation of doctrine into policy was also contingent

upon the historically unusual status of the principal hegemonic rival, the USSR, also representing both a radically alternative ideology and mode of economic organization. In direct proportion, the mobilizing logic for containment drew much from the resonance conveyed by both of these Soviet characteristics within the specific composition of U.S. domestic politics. It was also within this domestic milieu that two other factors were emerging as critical determinants of policy relating to the geographical arena of our case study: namely, perceived U.S. vulnerability to OPEC economic nationalism and the need to sustain Israel.

To be sure, the emergence of a strong, and, in the direct mode of its engagement, historically novel, containment posture in the Indian Ocean was not unquestioned in the U.S. policy community. And, as we have seen, considerable effort was placed upon advancing the case for more benign and differentiated counterfactuals - concerning, for example, the United States' abilities to reduce its oil vulnerability through domestic efforts, the disaggregation of support for Israel as a sovereign state from support for specific Israeli security policies - and notably, concerning the nature of the challenge from the Soviet Union. However, that the case for a regional détente with Moscow and for a more differentiated approach to the region itself was never fully developed suggests that a critical variable lay in the itself variegated nature of domestic consensus. As has been detailed in our study, 'doves' on U.S.-Soviet affairs could easily be 'hawks' on unquestioned military support for Israel - those urging disengagement from the Middle East power struggle were as likely to be uncompromising on rejecting a confidence-building approach to the USSR. Moreover, despite the declared stress on 'World Order' politics advanced in the early Carter term, the inheritance of the Nixon

Doctrine - notably, its cultivation of 'moderate authoritarian' regimes in Iran and Saudi Arabia - was never fundamentally questioned due to the need to maintain, *inter alia*, the core containment value of 'essential equivalence'.

If the Carter administration's awareness of these issues was demonstrated by the wide-ranging agenda for bilateral and multilateral arms control of early 1977, a valid criticism must surely lie in the extent to which the administration was also to rely upon traditional instruments of policy, through which both directly deployed U.S. military capability and arms sales to the region itself were substantially increased. To be sure, the prospects of general East-West hostilities beginning in the Gulf - as envisaged in the Carter administration's PD-18 planning - were, again, not nugatory. Yet, the dynamic proceeding from this unitary logic of containment and, notably of its derivative of counterforce, was that which, by providing an increasing clarity of ends for the unifying of the Indian Ocean policy framework, worked in tandem to absorb such arising empirical disparities - notably, those concerning autonomous political developments in the region - within, rather, an expanding differentiation of means.

The encounter with regional multipolarity had thus revealed a fresh avenue for a resurgent containment strategy. The advocates of world order had initiated the 'greatest peacetime expansion of military capability in recent history'¹⁹ and, far from disengagement, began rather taking an active and partisan role in regional conflicts - in the Yemen, Afghanistan and the Iraq-Iran war.

From the perspectives of 1994, it is clear that the burgeoning United States' military presence in the Indian Ocean did little to harm the Soviet Union militarily, but much to convince Moscow of the closing circle of a resurgent containment, displayed also within a new line of U.S. interlocutors from Baghdad to Beijing. The USSR was, clearly, pursuing first and foremost its own political and security agenda in the region. However, the readiness by the United States to 'embrace any dictator' on the Soviet Union's Eurasian periphery must surely have constituted a primary reinforcement to both endogenous regional conflict and the negative strategic calculation of Moscow itself. Albeit, to adapt from a perspective of 'without apologies, neorealism',²⁰ the outcome of the policy process was and perhaps remains, one that was doubly functional to the pursuit of U.S. power for more immediate ends - continued political hegemony in the West and reciprocal reestablishment of the United States position in the geographical nexus of the post-war political economy - the regions of the Gulf, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

CONCLUSION: FOOTNOTES.

- 1) The 'U.S. Central Command', taking on the functions of the RDJTF, was established on January 1, 1983. For details, see, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Department of Defense Authorization for FY 1983, Pt. 1, Posture Statement* (Washington: GPO, 1982), p.10, ff. See also, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1982-3* (London: IISS, 1983), pp.34-9.
- 2) For a popular account of these perspectives, see, Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000* (New York: Harpers, 1987).
- 3) For an extended analytic account of the characteristics, military, political and economic, governing the rise of 'imperial' orders, see, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass: CUP, 1981). As a general rule, Gilpin notes that, 'Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and (imperial) expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo' (p.156, ff.). The 'ahistoricism' of Gilpin's and other realist accounts has been challenged in, for example, J.G. Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis' and R.W Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', both in, Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York, Columbia: 1986). The approach taken in this study adapts from such 'synthetic' perspectives.
- 4) John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: OUP, 1982), p.357.
- 5) See, Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p.133; Brown observes that, 'The more extreme cards in the China deck are very threatening in the eyes of the Soviet Union...it is important to preserve the potential of the more threatening aspects of military cooperation with the PRC to deter more dangerous Soviet actions that are difficult to deter or counter directly on the spot'. (p.135).
- 6) See, Elmo R. Zumwalt, *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangle, 1986) p.xiv.
- 7) Personal remarks of Kissinger to Zumwalt, cited in *ibid.*, p.402.
- 8) See, Paul H. Nitze, *Is SALT II a Fair Deal for the United States?* (Washington: CPD, 1978), p.40.
- 9) Personal Interview recorded with Paul H. Nitze, Washington DC, June 6, 1990.
- 10) *ibid.*
- 11) See, Harold Brown, 'National Security', *op.cit.*, p.84.
- 12) *ibid.*, p.51.

- 13) Helmut Sonnenfeld, background briefing to U.S. ambassadors, London; December, 1975; non-verbatim State Department transcript appears in, *International Herald Tribune*, April 12, 1976. Sonnenfeld's observations, strongly attacked for their apparent acceptance of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, stated more broadly that, 'The reason we can talk and think in terms of dealing with Soviet imperialism, outside of and in addition to, simple confrontation, is precisely because Soviet power is emerging in such a flawed way...there is no way to prevent the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower. What we can do is affect the way in which that power is developed and used.'
- 14) Full text of the 'Basic Principles' agreement is in, *Department of State Bulletin* (DSB), LXVI (June 26, 1972), pp.898-9; for official acknowledgement of such 'linkage' by Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco, see, Chapter 2, p.33 (128n.).
- 15) See, U.S. Congress, HASC, *Report of the Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation* (Washington: GPO, 1979), cited in Chapter 5, p.60.
- 16) Richard Higgott, 'International Political Economy', in, A.J.R. Groom/Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory* (London: Pinter, 1994), p.163.
- 17) The issue of 'counterfactual' or 'conditional' propositions is an abiding one for the philosophy of science. Put simply, the question revolves around the unfulfilled reversal of consequent and antecedent; ie, the form 'If the Soviet Union does x, there will be nuclear war' does not entail that of, 'If the Soviet Union does not do x, there will not be nuclear war'. For discussion, see, J. Bennet, 'Counterfactuals and Temporal Direction', *Philosophical Review*, (1984), D. Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (London: 1973). For a recent discussion of Counterfactuals and IR theory, see, G. Hawthorn, *Plausible Worlds*, (Cambridge, CUP: 1991).
- 18) See, George/Smoke 'Deterrence in American Foreign Policy', *op.cit.*, pp.2-6.
- 19) Zbigniew Brzezinski (September, 1979), cited in Daniel P. Moynihan, 'Reflections: the SALT Process', *New Yorker*, November 19, 1979, p.146.
- 20) See, Colin S. Gray, *Strategic Studies and Public Policy: the American Experience*, (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky: 1982), i-iii. Gray's views will be familiar to readers of this study.

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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A/A	Air to Air (Missiles).
ABM	Anti-ballistic missiles.
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations.
A/G	Air-to-ground (missiles).
AIPAC	America-Israel Public Affairs Committee.
AIOC	Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
ANZUS	Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty Organization.
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier.
APPU	Arab Peninsula Peoples' Union.
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company.
ARMISH-MAAG	Army Mission Military Assistance Group.
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations.
ASW	Anti-submarine Warfare.
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System.
BIOT	British Indian Ocean Territory.
BPLF	Baluchi Peoples' Liberation Front.
CDM	Coalition for a Democratic Majority
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization.
CENTCOM	Central Command.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff.
CINCLANT	Commander-in-Chief Atlantic.
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief Pacific.
CMPS	Combined Military Planning Staff (CENTO).
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations.


COIN	Counter-Insurgency.
CONUS	Continental United States.
COS	Chief's of Staff (U.S./UK).
CPD	Committee on the Present Danger.
CTG	Carrier Task Group.
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence.
DEFCON	Defense Condition.
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency.
DOD	Department of Defense.
DOS	Department of State.
DPC	Defence Planing Commmittee (NATO).
DPM	Draft Presidential Memorandum (Nixon White House).
EEC	European Economic Community.
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front.
EPLF	Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front.
EUCOM	European Command.
EXIM	Export-Import Bank.
FDL	Fast Deployed Logistics (U.S. Navy).
F/G/A	Fighter/Ground Attack.
FMS	Foreign Military Sales.
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept.
GNP	Gross National Product.
HASC	House Armed Services Committee,
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee.
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile.
IG	Interdepartmental Group (Nixon White House).
IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies (London).
INR	Intelligence and Research Bureau (State Department).
IOPZ	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (United Nations).

IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff.
LPG	London Policy Group.
MAAG	Military Assistance Group.
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade.
MAC	Military Airlift Command (U.S. Airforce).
MAGTF	Marine Amphibious Task Group.
MAP	Military Assistance Programme.
MIDEASTFOR	Middle East Force (U.S. Navy).
MILCON	Military Construction.
MIRV	Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles.
MOD	Ministry of Defence (UK).
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
NALT	Naval Arms Limitation Talks.
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement.
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NAC	North Atlantic Council (NATO).
NDPC	National Disclosure Policy Committee.
NEA	Near East and Asia (State Department).
NEP	New Economic Policy (Nixon Administration).
NESA	Near East and South Asia (State Department).
NIEO	New International Economic Order.
NIOC	National Iranian Oil Company (Iran).
NLF	National Liberation Front (South Yemen).
NSA	National Security Agency.
NSC	National Security Council.
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum (Nixon/Ford Administrations).
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum (Nixon/Ford Administrations).
NTPS	Near-Term Prepositioning Ships.


OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries:
OAU	Organization of African Unity.
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense.
PACOM	Pacific Command.
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation (Department of Defense).
PD	Presidential Directive (Carter Administration).
PDPA	Peoples' Democratic Party of Afghanistan.
PDRY	Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen.
PFLOAG	Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf.
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization.
POL	Petrol-Oil-Lubricants.
PPP	Pakistan Peoples' Party.
PPBS	Planning Programming and Budgeting System (Department of Defense).
PRM	Presidential Review Memorandum (Carter Administration).
REDCOM	Readiness Command.
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force.
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.
SAC	Strategic Air Command.
SAF	Sultan's Armed Forces (Oman).
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization.
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
SIG	Senior Interdepartmental Group (Nixon/Ford Administrations).
SLOC	Sea Lanes of Communication.
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine.
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament (United Nations).
STRICOM	Strike Command.

TACAIR	Tactical Air capability.	-
TNF	Theatre Nuclear Forces.	
TOA	Total Obligational Authority.	
TOW	Target-on-Wire (missiles).	
UNCLOS	United Nations' Committee on the Law of the Sea.	
USAF	United States' Air Force.	
USCINCMEDIAFSA	Commander in Chief Middle East and Africa South of the Sahara.	
USMC	United States' Marine Corps.	
VLF	Very Low Frequency (communications).	
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front.	
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization.	

NORTH INDIAN OCEAN




SEA ROUTES TO SELECTED OIL FIELDS




U.S. FLEET MOBILITY AUGMENTATION DISTANCES

NB: Top number is distance to point "X" with Suez Canal closed; bottom number is distance with Canal open and accessible to naval ships.




USSR FLEET MOBILITY AUGMENTATION DISTANCES


Source: U.S. Department of Defense (1974).




Source: John M. Collins, U.S.- Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980).




Diego Garcia after proposed expansion of U.S. military facilities




SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE PERSIAN GULF




U.S. APPROACHES TO THE PERSIAN GULF



0 250 500
MILES
① 2000+ Miles
② 1000+ Miles



RATIO OF ESTIMATED DOLLAR COST OF SOVIET DEFENSE PROGRAMS TO U.S. DEFENSE OUTLAYS




NOTES:

1. U.S. outlays exclude retirement pay, include Department of Energy and Coast Guard defense outlays.
2. Estimated Soviet costs are based on what it would cost the U.S. to produce and man the Soviet military force and operate it as they do.
3. Projections are based upon three percent annual real growth for USSR. For U.S. real growth in outlays is projected at about five percent.
4. SEA: Southeast Asia (i.e., Vietnam costs).

Source: DOD *Annual Report* FY 1982: p.224.


DOD SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS



¹ DOES NOT INCLUDE THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDED (MASF) GRANT PROGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BUDGET TRENDS

(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1982 \$)



UNITED STATES/SOVIET NAVY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN—SUPPLIED BY DEPARTMENT OF NAVY
[in ship days]

	1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.
Carriers.....	6	0	0	0	5	0	6	0	23	0	80
Surface combatants ¹	1,382	403	1,006	644	867	788	669	1,028	944	2,381	1,312	28
Amphibious.....	0	0	0	106	0	302	183	291	23	273	18	2
Auxiliaries.....	210	445	281	877	219	1,070	329	1,245	424	2,784	672	43
MSC Auxiliaries/USSR Naval Assoc. merchant ships.....	190	(?)	28	(?)	155	(?)	146	404	23	780	72	4
AGS/AGOR.....	0	214	0	642	0	417	0	102	0	490	0	11
AGI.....	0	58	0	8	0	21	0	12	0	31	0
Submarines:												
Torpedo attack.....	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	14	[deleted]	8	[deleted]	79	[deleted]
Cruise missile attack.....	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]	0	[deleted]
Sub-total.....	1,788	[deleted]	1,315	[deleted]	1,246	[deleted]	1,357	[deleted]	1,445	[deleted]	2,233	[deleted]
SESS/SVRS.....	0	(?)	0	1,391	0	972	0	772	0	1,268	0	5
Totals.....	1,788	[deleted]	1,315	[deleted]	1,246	[deleted]	1,357	[deleted]	1,445	[deleted]	2,233	[deleted]

¹ Cruiser, destroyers, destroyer escorts, and minesweepers.
² No record.

UNITED STATES/SOVIET NAVY PORT CALLS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

	1968		1969		1970		1971		1972		1973	
	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.
Ethiopia.....	14	0	13	1	10	1	10	1	8	1	12	1
India.....	9	8	9	2	8	6	11	1	0	4	0	7
Iran.....	1	3	2	7	10	0	6	2	8	2	8	0
Iraq.....	0	3	0	8	0	2	0	11	0	14	0	16
Kenya.....	7	5	9	0	8	3	9	0	12	2	22	4
Kuwait.....	0	0	2	1	1	0	3	0	1	0	2	0
Malagasy Republic.....	8	0	5	1	7	0	13	0	11	0	19	0
Maldives.....	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
Mauritius.....	18	2	10	4	7	17	16	5	7	20	19	11
Pakistan.....	6	2	9	2	7	2	11	0	10	0	11	0
Seychelles Islands.....	6	0	6	0	3	0	9	0	6	3	10	0
Somalia ¹	1	3	0	13	0	18	2	11	0	38	0	97
South Yemen.....	0	4	0	13	0	7	0	13	0	12	0	7
Sri Lanka.....	3	4	6	8	3	2	4	2	10	14	10	9
Sudan.....	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
Tanzania.....	0	4	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
UAR (Port Suez).....	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yemen.....	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total, port calls per year.....	71	42	71	68	65	65	97	47	74	110	115	153

¹ The large increase in visits to Somalia since 1971 reflects the U.S.S.R.'s development and use of the port of Berbera for naval support. Most of the remaining port visits in the Indian Ocean—particularly those by combatants—were undertaken for diplomatic purposes.
Note: "Port calls" reflect every entry of each Soviet naval ship into a foreign port but do not reflect the duration of the visits which varied from one day to 18 mo. Port calls by oceanographic re-

search and space event support ships are included in the totals because the data available for 1968 through 1971 are not categorized by ship. Singapore is not included in the table because it is a Pacific Ocean port. However, Soviet ships from the Indian Ocean occasionally call there and Soviet naval auxiliaries are overhauled in Singapore's shipyards. In addition, ships engaged in long term harbor clearing operations in Bangladesh are not considered to be conducting routine port calls, and therefore are not included.

A modest support facility':
Diego Garcia supplemental
request for FY 1974.

Description	Scope	Amount (thousands)
Fiscal year 1974 supplemental request:		
POL storage facilities.....	[Deleted].....	\$6,834
Pier.....	750 feet of berthing.....	5,100
Parking apron.....	64,750 square yards.....	2,279
Runway extension.....	4,000 feet.....	2,264
Aircraft arresting gear.....	215
Hangar.....	440
Operations building addition.....	2,850 square feet.....	232
Overhaul paving train.....	250
Transit storage building.....	4,000 square feet.....	140
Subsistence building addition.....	3,517 square feet.....	393
Bachelor enlisted quarters.....	277 men.....	3,882
Bachelor officer quarters.....	32 men.....	1,360
Armed forces radio/TV station.....	96
Ready issue ammo magazine.....	220
Cold storage addition.....	4,190 square feet.....	466
General warehouse addition.....	26,385 square feet.....	1,251
Receiver building addition.....	1,250 square feet.....	131
Vehicle repair hardstand.....	1,110 square feet.....	40
Powerplant expansion.....	2,400 Kw.....	2,265
Utilities.....	1,065
NMCB camp.....	77
Total.....	29,000
Fiscal year 1975 request:		
Parking apron.....	25,000 square yards.....	1,000
POL storage.....	[Deleted].....	1,800
Ammunition storage.....	6,000 square yards.....	500
Total.....	3,300